Equivalence of Consequence Operations

This paper is based on Lectures 1, 2 and 4 in the series of ten lectures titled “Algebraic Structures for Logic” that Professor Blok and I presented at the Twenty Third Holiday Mathematics Symposium held at New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, New Mexico, January 8-12, 1999. These three lectures presented a new approach to the algebraization of deductive systems, and after the symposium we made plans to publish a joint paper, to be written by Blok, further developing these ideas. That project was still incomplete when Blok died. In fact, there is no indication that he had prepared a draft of the paper, and we do not know what new material he intended to include. I am therefore not in a position to complete the project as he had envisioned it. So, I have settled for the more limited objective of presenting the material from the three lectures, leaving to others the task of adapting the techniques used there to more general situations. Preface by Bjarni Jónsson Dedicated to the memory of Willem Johannes Blok     

The paradoxical nature of the grief experience

This paper develops the thesis that the grief experience attendant to loss by death is a natural phenomenon and that language has been used to obscure its nature as a process. The paradoxical nature of the grief experience refers to an expanded appreciation of its nature which can include a consideration of the survivor's own joy at being alive. A feeling of joy can occur consequent to allowing the more intense grief pain to be exposed and shared. Frequent references from playwrights and other well-known authors herein support the universal recognition of the above. The author has found these thoughtful individuals to constitute an important intellectual network for himself through the years.This paper was originally presented at the International Conference on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Department of Basic Psychoanalytic Research and Family Therapy, University of Heidelberg, West Germany, May 17, 1985.Appreciation is expressed to Betty Byfield Paul, L.I.C.S.W., Counseling Associates, Lexington, Massachusetts, for consultation and editorial review.     

Art, authenticity and appropriation

It is often suggested that artists from one culture (outsiders) cannot successfully employ styles, stories, motifs and other artistic content developed in the context of another culture. I call this suggestion the aesthetic handicap thesis and argue against it. Cultural appropriation can result in works of high aesthetic value. While in China as a visiting scholar in the Department of Philosophy of Beijing Normal University, I gave a series of lectures at leading Chinese universities. This essay is based on a lecture that I gave at Renmin University of China on 17 April 2006.     

Explaining change in psychology: The road not taken

I wish to express sincere thanks to the following persons who have given me the benefit of their comments and criticisms: Anthony S. Bryk, Renford Bamreough, Simon Blackburn, David Bloor, Jeremy Butterfield, Edward Craig, Jerry A. Fodor, Robert P. Gordon, P.M.S. Hacker, David Hansen, D.W. Hamlyn, Philip W. Jackson, Anthony Kenny, Peggy J. Miller, and Robert J. Richards. In addition, I gratefully acknowledge the support I received from a Spencer Seed Grant, University of Chicago, which allowed me to go to England in the summer of 1985 and discuss a version of this work with colleagues. Finally, I owe thanks to Benton Center for Curriculum and Instruction, University of Chicago, for various support services.     

Adorno's Aristotle Critique and Ethical Naturalism

In this paper, I do three things. First, I unpack and outline an intriguing but neglected aspect of the thought of the Frankfurt School critical theorist Theodor W. Adorno—namely, his critique of Aristotle, which can be found in two of his lecture series: the unpublished 1956 lectures on moral philosophy and the 1965 lectures published as Metaphysics: Concept and Problems. Second, I demonstrate how Adorno's Aristotle critique constitutes a powerful critique of contemporary neo‐Aristotelian ethical naturalism, of the sort advocated by thinkers such as Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson and John McDowell. Third, I expound upon where this critique leaves the prospect of formulating a robust ethical naturalism more generally.     

Skepticism and legal interpretation

For comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank Kendall Walton, Edward Averill, Marcia Baron, Richard Brandt, and Walter Schaller. This paper was first developed while in residence as a visiting scholar at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. I wish to thank both that institution for making its resources available to me during the 1986–87 academic year, and my home institution for granting me the Developmental Leave that permitted me to pursue my research. Finally, I wish to thank Thomas W. Pogge for helping me to make several substantive clarifications in the final version of this paper.     

Time and modality in the logic of agency

Recent theories of agency (sees to it that) of Nuel Belnap and Michael Perloff are examined, particularly in the context of an early proposal of the author.Elements of this paper formed the contents of lectures I gave in New Zealand and Australia in 1989. I would like again to thank Graham Oddie at Massey University, in Palmerston North, Jack Copeland at the University of Canterbury, in Christchurch, John Bacon at the University of Sydney, and Graham Priest at the University of Queensland for their kindness and the gracious receptions they and their colleagues gave me. My thanks go to Graham Oddie and Krister Segerberg, who organized a workshop on Events, Processes, Actions at Lake Taupo, New Zealand, in November 1989, and invited me to participate with a preliminary version of this paper. In June 1990, I presented a fuller specimen at the annual meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, in Wakulla Springs, Florida. Bob Beard at Florida State University organized that splendid gathering, and I am grateful to him for the opportunity to speak at it.For the past several years, Nuel Belnap has sent me copies and updates of his and Michael Perloff's papers. I would like to record my gratitude to him for this and also, especially, for extended comments on the penultimate draft of the present paper. With a few exceptions, I have not tried to take these into account here; I hope that discussions of points on which we disagree will find their way into print in due course.I would also like to acknowledge and thank a referee for a number of helpful suggestions.My largest debt is to Krister Segerberg, who as professor and head of the philosophy department at the University of Auckland invited me to spend a sabbatical autumn (antipodal spring) with him in 1989. It was he who suggested — and then insisted — that I contribute to his seminar on modal logic and agency a session or two on Belnap and Perloff's theories, and then he encouraged me to write this paper. I would like to express my deep gratitude as well to Krister and Anita Segerberg for their hospitality and companionship during my stay in New Zealand.     

Unconscious sensations

D. M. Armstrong proposes to explain the possibility of unconscious sensations by means of a distinction between the perceptual consciousness, which is essentially involved in sensations, and our introspective consciousness of sensations. He holds that unconscious sensations are instances of perceptual consciousness of which we are not introspectively conscious. I contend that, although Armstrong's distinction is plausible and significant, it fails to explain his own examples of unconscious sensation. I argue that the puzzle of how unconscious sensations are possible arises at the level of perceptual consciousness and does not concern our introspective awareness of mental states.This paper grew out of research supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities at Cornell University in 1985. I would like to express my gratitude to the National Endowment, to Cornell, and to Sydney Shoemaker.     

Interpretations into monadic algebras

In [3], O. C. García and W. Taylor make an in depth study of the lattice of interpretability types of varieties first introduced by W. Neumann [5]. In this lattice several varieties are identified so in order to distinguish them and understand the fine structure of the lattice, we propose the study of the interpretations between them, in particular, how many there are and what these are. We prove, among other things, that there are eight interpretations from the variety of Monadic algebras into itself.This paper is based on the author's doctoral dissertation at the University of Colorado-Boulder in 1985, under the direction of Prof. Walter Taylor. Research funded by Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.     

Consciousness and self-reference

Reflection on the self's way of being in consciousness yields two arguments for a theory of self-reference not based inany wayat all on self-cognition. First, I show that one theory of self-reference predicts an experience of the self because the theory inadequately analyzes the semantical facts about indexicality. I construct a dilemma for this cognitivism, which it cannot get out of, for it requires evensolitary self-reference to be based on some original self-knowledge, which is not available. I describe my kinetic model of unspoken self-reference, and I show how it fits the facts of four forms of consciousness, all of which presuppose self-reference, rather than yield it. Second, aspeaker uses the first person pronoun in sentences because she is aware of the unmediated role in agency of the beliefs she would express, and not because she is aware of herself in their content. The cognitive model, in contrast, succumbs to a vicious regress and is exposed as an obstacle to an understanding of consciousness.A version of this essay was read at Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta (February 1985), University of North Bengal (March 1985) and Jadavpur University (March 1985). My thanks to S. Basu and S. Chakraborty at Rabindra Bharati, and to M. Ghosh and S. K. Sen at North Bengal, and to Ch. Gupta and P. K. Sen of Jadavpur University. Jadavpur's Prof. Sen's extensive comments in support of the cognitive model of reference led me to revise the essay thoroughly. North Bengal University may have published a version of this essay. I also thank Kent Baldner and the referees of this journal for insightful comments forcing further revisions.     

A reflection: Howard Scott Liddell, 1895-1962

Howard S. Liddell, Professor of Psychobiology in the Department of Psychology at Cornell University, was one of the earliest American students and developers of I.P. Pavlov's theory of the conditioned reflex and an early researcher on stress. The significance of Liddell's work on stress was fully recognized when he was sent, as a member of a commission, to the battlefront at the height of the Korean War to study stress and self-control in the soldiers. This profound experience convinced Liddell that behavioral research must ultimately be made relevant to the understanding and elevation of human behavior. He spent the remaining ten years of his life in efforts to implement this conviction through research, writing, and lectures before scientific and lay groups.     

Reflections of an eclectic skeptic

Following primary and secondary education in Europe, I came to the United States for further education. After majoring in engineering, I shifted to liberal arts and social sciences. I minored in mathematics, philosophy, and education at the undergraduate level and physiology at the graduate level, ultimately obtaining a PhD in personality psychology. My interests were primarily academic, but I did not neglect the emerging field of clinical psychology. After working in hospitals for 9 years, I joined the faculty of Michigan State University where I established the psychological clinic and served as its director for 13 years. Subsequently, during 2 sabbaticals in Israel, I researched personality development in unconventional family settings (the kibbutz). I also studied such diverse issues as motivation for parenthood, time perception and time perspective, and cognition in psychopathology. After editing several textbooks on assessment techniques, I initiated the series of triennial Murray lectures that highlighted the dynamic approach to the study of personality.     

Context and process: An ecological view of the interdependence of practice and research: An invited address by James G. Kelly

Summary James G. Kelly has made important and wide-ranging conributions to community psychology. The field is fortunate to have a member with his vision and commitment. In the paper presented here, Jim discusses the advantages that arise when scientists and citizens work as collaborative partners in community research. As with his previous work, his ideas provide new insights into the role of community psychology in and for the community.The Social Ecology Network, chaired by Paul Florin, University of Rhode Island, and Division 27 invited Jim Kelly to give an invited address at the 1985 American Psychological Association meetings in Los Angeles. Paul also invited Jim to suggest several discussants. Jim was interested in having psychologists representing organizational, environmental, and clinical psychology discuss the address. Jim invited Bob Kahn, Dan Stokols, and Harold Raush to be discussants. David Altman's introduction, Jim's address, and the three discussant comments with some small elaborations and revisions are published here. At the address, Bob Kahn's comments were read by Rick Price.The Social Ecology Task Force was estblished in 1978. Its goal is to bring together psychologists and other professionals who have interests in using an ecological perspective in theory and practice (Florin, 1984). Current activities include a newsletter column in the Division 27 newsletter, a resource exchange among Task Force members, and sponsorship of invited lectures on social ecology at annual APA meetings. For additional information contact Paul Florin, Social Ecology Task Force, Department of Psychology, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island.     

Black,White and Gray: Quine on Convention

This paper examines Quine’s web of belief metaphor and its role in his various responses to conventionalism. Distinguishing between two versions of conventionalism, one based on the under-determination of theory, the other associated with a linguistic account of necessary truth, I show how Quine plays the two versions of conventionalism against each other. Some of Quine’s reservations about conventionalism are traced back to his 1934 lectures on Carnap. Although these lectures appear to endorse Carnap’s conventionalism, in exposing Carnap’s failure to provide an explanatory account of analytic truth, they in fact anticipate Quine’s later critique of conventionalism. I further argue that Quine eventually deconstructs both his own metaphor and the thesis of under-determination it serves to illustrate. This enables him to hold onto under-determination, but at the cost of depleting it of any real epistemic significance. Lastly, I explore the implications of this deconstruction for Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis.     

Introspective awareness of sensations

My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of themetaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about theepistemological status of introspective beliefs.I owe a large debt to Sydney Shoemaker. I have been helped considerably both by conversations with him and by the lectures he gave in the summer of 1985 in his N.E.H. Summer Seminar on Self-Consciousness and Self-Reference. I have also received valuable advice from Richard Lee, David Roach, David A. Schroeder, Lynne Spellman, and (especially) Anthony L. Brueckner, Willem de Vries, and David H. Westendorf.     

Relevant logic and the theory of information

This paper provides an interpretation of the Routley-Meyer semantics for a weak negation-free relevant logic using Israel and Perry's theory of information. In particular, Routley and Meyer's ternary accessibility relation is given an interpretation in information-theoretic terms.I am indebted to Max Cresswell for invariable conversations relating to the topic and encouraging me to provide a philosophical explanation of the ternary semantics for relevant logic and to Errol Martin also for useful discussions and encouragement. I am also grateful to Greg Restall who made his work available to me while I was finishing this project. While working on this project, I was supported by a grant from the Centre for Information Science Research at The Australian National University. I am grateful to John Slaney and Michael McRobbie for securing this grant. I gave an earlier version of this paper to the Basser School of Computer Science at the University of Sydney and to the philosophy department at Victoria University of Wellington. I thank all those in attendance especially John Bacon, Norman Foo, Abhaya Nayak, Kim Sterelny, and James Maclaurin.     

Hintikka,Laudan and Newton: An interrogative model of scientific inquiry

Research for this paper was supported by NSF Grant IST-8310936. An earlier version was read at the Conference on Knowledge-Seeking by Questioning, April 1985, at The Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida.     

A note on the geometric interpretation of the EM algorithm in estimating item characteristics and student abilities

This note uses the EM-algorithm in an item response model as an illustration of a general method of parameter estimation, which geometrically can be described as an alternating projection method. The research was initiated by a series of lectures on alternating projection methods given by Imre Csiszar in 1993 at Stanford University where the first author was a graduate student.     

Truthfulness,risk, and trust in the late lectures of Michel Foucault

This paper argues that Foucault's late, unpublished lectures present a model for evaluating those ethical authorities who claim to speak truthfully. In response to those who argue that claims to truth are but claims to power, I argue that Foucault finds in ancient practices of parrhesia (fearless speech) a resource by which to assess modern authorities' claims in the absence of certain truth. My preliminary analytic framework for this model draws exclusively on my research of his unpublished lectures given at the Collège de France between 1982–84. I argue that this model proceeds in three stages: the truth‐teller is first established as independently authoritative, he is subsequently tested under conditions of risk, and the encounter concludes by generating trust and a relation of ‘care’ with the audience. Foucault's model results in an ‘aesthetics of existence’ organized around a set of ethical practices, and thus offers an alternative to other forms of ethical subjectivity. In so doing, this model also critiques the place for risk in liberal political institutions.     

A note on structural models for the circumplex

Jöreskog (1974) developed a latent variable model for the covariance structure of the circumplex which, under certain conditions, includes a model for a patterned correlation matrix (Browne, 1977). This model is of limited usefulness, however, in that it employs a known matrix that is rank deficient for many problems. Furthermore, the model is inappropriate for the circumplex which contains negative covariances. This paper presents alternative models for the perfect circumplex and quasi-circumplex that avoids these difficulties, and that includes the important model for a patterned correlation circumplex matrix. Two numerical examples are provided.This research was supported in part by a grant from the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota. I wish to thank M. W. Browne for suggesting the final model presented in this paper. James Steiger and the Editor also made several valuable suggestions.