Overlapping mental representations of self, ingroup, and outgroup: unraveling self-stereotyping and self-anchoring

Smith and collaborators presented strong response time evidence for overlapping mental representations of the self and relevant ingroups, and they interpreted their findings as reflecting that people define themselves in terms of their ingroups. Besides on inferences from ingroup to self (self-stereotyping) however, self-ingroup overlap could also be based on inferences from the self to the ingroup (self-anchoring). The present research tackled this interpretational ambiguity and empirically distinguished self-anchoring versus self-stereotyping as processes possibly under-lying self-ingroup overlap. Results from three studies revealed stronger evidence for inferences from self to ingroup (selfanchoring) than the other way round (self-stereotyping).     

A Below‐Average Effect with Respect to American Political Stereotypes on Warmth and Competence

The “above‐average effect” is the phenomenon that people tend to judge themselves above average on desirable traits. Based on social identity theory, we propose that a “below‐average effect” may arise when individuals rate themselves and the average ingroup member on traits stereotypically associated with the ingroup. In two studies, Republican and Democrat participants rated themselves and the average political ingroup member on possession of desirable traits related to warmth and competence. Current political stereotypes in America associate the former dimension with Democrats and the latter with Republicans. Consistent with our hypothesis, the above‐average effect was moderated by political group and dimension in interaction. In particular, Democrats rated themselves below the average Democrat on warmth and Republicans rated themselves below the average Republican on competence.     

Dominant group members in intergroup interaction: safety or vulnerability in numbers?

An experiment examined how low- and high-prejudice dominant group members' (LPs' and HPs') reactions to intergroup contact were affected by whether they were accompanied by fellow ingroup members who exhibited prejudice-relevant behavior. Participants answered questions alone or in a group and then estimated how they were viewed by an observer who was an ingroup or an outgroup member. HPs believed that they were viewed more negatively by an outgroup member in the individual than the group condition. LPs showed the opposite effect, which led them to evaluate the outgroup member more negatively in the group condition. All participants in the group condition expected an outgroup member to exaggerate their similarity to the other ingroup members present, and LPs evaluated the other ingroup members more negatively when the observer was an outgroup member. The results suggest that intergroup attitudes guide the types of intergroup contact situations that are experienced most positively.     

Judging scandal: Standards or bias in politics

As the number of political scandals rises, we examined the circumstances that might influence how a politician would be judged as a result of a scandal. Specifically, we hypothesized that ingroup bias theory and shifting standards theory would produce different patterns of judgements. In two studies, we found support for the ingroup bias theory, such that participants rated the fictitious politician’s public approval and perceived character as higher if the politician was a member of their own political party (i.e. their ingroup) than if the politician was a member of the another political party (i.e. their outgroup). These results may explain, in part, why people may judge politicians involved in scandal more or less harshly depending on whether they are an ingroup member or outgroup member.     

Group membership and everyday social comparison experiences

In two everyday experience studies, we examined the degree to which everyday social comparisons are framed by group membership. In the first study, 30 undergraduates attending a public university in the United States completed short questionnaires about their social comparison experiences whenever they were signalled. In the second study, 34 ethnic minority undergraduates from the same university completed similar questionnaires about their social comparison experiences. Across both studies, comparisons in which participants viewed themselves as an ingroup member in comparison to an outgroup comprised less than 10% of the comparison experiences reported by participants. However, minorities in the second study who reported closer identification with their ethnic group reported more comparison experiences in which they mentioned their own or the comparison target's ethnicity.     

The effects of status on identification with multiple groups

Three studies explored the effects of the relative status of the multiple groups of which individuals are simultaneously members. In all studies participants reported their identification and their perception of the status of two groups (either real or experimental) of which they were simultaneously members. Results of all three studies lend support to the hypothesis that reactions to an ingroup are affected not only by the status of that group, but also by the status of another group of which an individual is simultaneously member: Individuals tend to perceive an ingroup as having higher status, and to identify with it more, if they are simultaneously members of a different group which has low rather than high status. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘You can criticize because you care’: identity attachment,constructiveness, and the intergroup sensitivity effect

Criticism of one's group (e.g. nation, gender, or organization) is typically received in a less defensive way when it stems from another ingroup member than when it stems from an outsider (the intergroup sensitivity effect). We present two experiments demonstrating that this effect is driven not by group membership per se, but by the extent to which critics are perceived to be psychologically invested in the group they are criticizing. In Experiment 1 (N = 117), Australian participants were exposed to criticisms of their country from either other Australians (ingroup critics) or non‐Australians (outgroup critics). Furthermore, the ingroup critics were described as having either strong or weak attachment to their Australian identity. Ingroup critics were only received more positively than outgroup critics when they appeared to have a psychological investment in the group. In Experiment 2 (N = 96) we show how outgroup critics (Asian‐Australians) can overcome defensiveness among Anglo‐Australians by locating themselves within a shared, superordinate identity (Australian). Implications for communication within and between groups are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Context matters: Explicit and implicit reminders of ingroup privilege increase collective guilt among foreigners in a developing country

We test three ways context matters in the study of intergroup inequality: where participants are approached, who interacts with participants, and how researchers ask participants questions. Regarding how, we replicate a finding that framing intergroup inequality as outgroup disadvantage rather than ingroup privilege reduces collective guilt in a novel context. Regarding where, we go beyond the laboratory to test foreigners in Nepal—a country where inequality is highly salient. Regarding who, we had participants approached by an ingroup (foreign) experimenter or an outgroup (Nepalese) experimenter. We found an outgroup disadvantage framing reduced collective guilt relative to ingroup privilege framing, but only when delivered by an ingroup member. This highlights the importance of taking where, who, and how into account to fully understand the contextual nature of intergroup emotion.     

Opposing effects of personal and collective self-esteem on interpersonal and intergroup comparisons

The relationship between self-esteem deriving from both personal and social identity and comparisons at both interpersonal and intergroup level was examined. Participants took part in individual and group brainstorming tasks which they later had the opportunity to evaluate. In the case of the individual task, participants' own solutions were judged in conjunction with solutions provided by a member of their ingroup and a member of the outgroup. For the group task, the ingroup solution was compared with an outgroup solution. Both personal and collective self-esteem were found to influence these ratings, but in different ways. In terms of intergroup comparisons, participants with high personal self-esteem (PSE) showed greatest ingroup bias. In contrast, this same effect was associated with low public collective-self esteem (CSE), that is, people who felt that their group was viewed negatively differentiated most strongly. Furthermore, this opposition of the effects of PSE and CSE also applied to the interpersonal comparisons. Participants with high PSE self-enhanced relative to participants with low PSE, while the reverse pertained for CSE scores. Participants with low private CSE rated both their own and the ingroup member's solution more positively than the outgroup solution. An analysis is presented which explains these effects in terms of threat experienced as a result of incongruency between comparative context and optimal identity enhancement strategies. Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rejected and excluded forevermore, but even more devoted: irrevocable ostracism intensifies loyalty to the group among identity-fused persons

When people are ostrasized (i.e., rejected and excluded) by either an outgroup or an ingroup, they may either withdraw or engage in compensatory activities designed to reaffirm their social identity as a group member. The authors proposed here that individual differences in identity fusion (an index of familial orientation toward the group) would moderate the tendency for people to display such compensatory activity. Consistent with this reasoning, the results of four experiments showed that irrevocable ostracism increased endorsement of extreme, pro-group actions (fighting and dying for the ingroup) among fused persons but not among nonfused persons. This effect emerged when an outgroup ostracized fused individuals due either to their nationality (Experiment 1) or their personal preferences (Experiment 2). Similarly, ostracism by the ingroup amplified the tendency for fused persons to both endorse extreme pro-group actions, refuse to leave the group (Experiment 3), and donate money to an ingroup member (Experiment 4). Finally, compensatory activities emerged even when ostracism was based on being "too good" for the group, suggesting that a desire for self-enhancement does not mediate such activities (Experiment 4).     

Why did you choose that person over me? Ingroup rejection and attributions to discrimination

The present research examined the attributions that people make when an individual rejects a member of his or her own group in favor of a member of an outgroup (i.e., ingroup rejection). Study 1 showed that Latinos rejected by an ingroup member (perpetrator) made more attributions to discrimination than Whites under similar circumstances. Study 2 showed that Latinos made more attributions to discrimination for ingroup rejection when the perpetrator was Latino as compared to when the perpetrator was White, whereas Whites' attributions to discrimination were relatively low regardless of perpetrator's ethnicity. Study 3 showed that priming loyalty norms increased attributions to discrimination among Latinos in response to ingroup rejection, but not in response to outgroup rejection. This research brings a new perspective to discrimination research by focusing on intragroup rejection and nonprototypical cases of discrimination.     

I feel our pain: Antecedents and consequences of emotional self-stereotyping

According to Intergroup Emotions Theory people categorized as group members experience the emotions of their ingroup as a consequence of that membership. Four experiments showed that participants converged toward what they believed to be their specific ingroup’s distinct emotional experience when reporting emotions as group members, but not when reporting emotions as individuals. Such self-stereotyping of ingroup emotions occurred for an experimentally fabricated ingroup as well as a range of naturally occurring groups. Demonstrating the roots of this process in categorization, self-stereotyping was increased when motivations to affiliate were amplified and was moderated by ingroup identification. The adoption of ingroup emotions changed participants’ cognitive processing in a predictable way, demonstrating that emotional self-stereotyping involved the experience rather than merely the expression of group-based emotions. Self-stereotyping of ingroup emotions is thus one mechanism by which group-based emotions are shared and can be changed.     

When and How Do High Status Group Members Offer Help: Effects of Social Dominance Orientation and Status Threat

The present study explored the implications of an intergroup perspective on individual difference and situational influences on helping, specifically, outgroup members. In particular, we examined the effects of social dominance orientation (SDO) and group status threat on the amount and kind of help offered by Jewish participants (n = 99) to Arab and Jewish students. Dependent measures were the likelihood of helping outgroup and ingroup members across various situations of need and, when help is given, the likelihood that it would be dependency‐oriented rather than autonomy‐oriented assistance. As expected, higher SDO individuals offered less help to outgroup (Arab) students, particularly when they experienced threat to group status, but not to ingroup members. In addition, higher SDO participants, when they did report that they would help, were more likely to offer dependency‐oriented help to outgroup than to ingroup members. The theoretical and applied implications are discussed.     

Seeing the world with the eyes of the outgroup — The impact of perspective taking on the prototypicality of the ingroup relative to the outgroup

The positive effect of perspective taking on favorable attitudes towards stigmatized individuals and outgroups is well established (Batson et al., 1997). We draw on the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) to better understand the processes underlying this effect. Based on their egocentric perspective, ingroup and outgroup members have different representations of the superordinate group (perspective divergence) so that the ingroup is perceived as more relatively prototypical of the superordinate group, leading to negative outgroup evaluation. We hypothesize that the positive effect of perspective taking on outgroup attitudes is due to a reduction of relative ingroup prototypicality. Across three studies with different manipulations of perspective taking, we found that participants who were taking the perspective of an outgroup member evaluated the outgroup more positively and were less inclined to perceive their ingroup as more relatively prototypical. The effect of perspective taking on outgroup attitudes was mediated by relative ingroup prototypicality.     

Group evaluations as self-group distancing: Ingroup typicality moderates evaluative intergroup bias in stigmatized groups

Outgroup favoritism among members of stigmatized groups can be seen as a form of self-group distancing. We examined how intergroup evaluations in stigmatized groups vary as a function of ingroup typicality. In Studies 1 and 2, Black participants (N = 125,915; N = 766) more strongly preferred light-skinned or White relative to dark-skinned or Black individuals the lighter their own skin tone. In Study 3, overweight participants (N = 147,540) more strongly preferred normal-weight relative to overweight individuals the lower their own body weight. In Study 4, participants with disabilities (N = 35,058) more strongly preferred non-disabled relative to disabled individuals the less visible they judged their own disability. Relationships between ingroup typicality and intergroup evaluations were at least partially mediated by ingroup identification (Studies 2 and 3). A meta-analysis across studies yielded an average effect size of r = .12. Furthermore, higher ingroup typicality was related to both ingroup and outgroup evaluations. We discuss ingroup typicality as an individual constraint to self-group distancing among stigmatized group members and its relation to intergroup evaluations.     

Self-stereotyping: the central role of an ingroup threatening identity

Self-stereotyping is a process by which people belonging to a stigmatized social group tend to describe themselves more with stereotypical traits as compared with traits irrelevant to the ingroup stereotype. The present work analyzes why especially members of low-status groups are more inclined to self-stereotype compared to members of high-status groups. We tested the hypothesis that belonging to a low-, rather than a high-status group, makes low-status members feel more threatened and motivates them to protect their self-perception by increasing their similarity with the ingroup. Specifically, we investigated the effects of an experimental manipulation that was conceived to either threaten or protect the natural group membership of participants from either a low- or a high-status group on the level of self-stereotyping. The findings supported the idea that only low-status group members protected themselves when their group identity was threatened through increased self-stereotyping.     

Exchanges of group-based favours: Ingroup bias in the prisoner's dilemma game with minimal groups in Japan and New Zealand

Japanese ( N  = 48) and New Zealander ( N  = 55) participants were first assigned to one of two minimal groups, and then played a prisoner's dilemma game twice with an ingroup member and twice with an outgroup member. In one of the two games they played with an ingroup (or outgroup) member, participants and their partner knew one another's group memberships (mutual-knowledge condition). In the unilateral-knowledge condition, only the participants knew the group membership of their partner, but the partner did not know the group membership of the participant. Ingroup bias in cooperation emerged only in the mutual-knowledge condition in both countries; in the unilateral-knowledge condition no ingroup bias emerged. Mediational analyses found that, in accord with predictions, cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition is mediated by expectation of the partner's cooperation. Ingroup bias in the mutual-knowledge condition emerged only among those who identified with the ingroup. Results provide support for a group heuristics account of ingroup favouritism in the minimal group. According to this account, participants who face minimal groups activate an ecologically adaptive heuristic of unilaterally cooperating with members of the same group, expecting indirect repayment from others in the same group.     

When fiends become friends: the need to belong and perceptions of personal and group discrimination

The present article examines the role that the need to belong (NTB) plays in people's judgments of personal and group discrimination and in the attributions people make for potentially discriminatory evaluations. The authors hypothesized that the NTB motivates people to conclude that (a) whereas they rarely experience personal discrimination, (b) their fellow in-group members do experience discrimination. In Study 1, people high in the NTB reported experiencing lower than average levels of personal and higher than average levels of group discrimination. In Study 2, an experimental manipulation of the NTB yielded similar results. In Study 3, women who were motivated to be accepted by a bogus male participant were less likely to attribute his negative evaluations of their work to prejudice.     

The Barnum effect in a group setting

The present study expands the typical Barnum effect paradigm by investigating reactions to feedback in a group setting. People initially participated in a group experience (8 per group), and then were given bogus positive or negative feedback (the favorability manipulation) purportedly prepared by either the group leader or another group member (the source status manipulation). The answerability manipulation led participants to believe that they either would or would not have to share their reactions to the feedback with the person who prepared it. Positive feedback was rated as more accurate and accepted more highly than the negative feedback, though no differences in recall of either the positive or negative feedback emerged. Additionally, a pattern of results revealed that the feedback from the group leader generated greater perceived accuracy, acceptance, and recall than did feedback from another group member. Implications for the impact of feedback given by a high status person in group settings are discussed.