A Review of Sam Harris’s Free Will

The Psychological Record -     

A Book Review of Richard Easterlin’s An Economist’s Lessons on Happiness

Journal of Happiness Studies -     

Review of G. Felicitas Munzel’s Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy: Toward Education for Freedom

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

Review of Jennifer Morton’s Moving Up Without Losing Your Way

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

Review of Nie Minli’s Being and Substance: On Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z1–9

In his new book Being and Substance: A Study of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z1–9, Nie Minli, taking a holistic perspective, argues that the primary substance—that is, the individual in Categories—is identical to form, which is the primary substance in Metaphysics Z, and that Z3 has finished arguing what the real candidate of substance is and the inserted Z7–9 texts are the “core and key” of the entire book. In spite of his excellent scholarship and masterful interpretation of Metaphysics Z4–6, Z7, Categories 1–5 and Physics Α, Nie offers insufficient textual support for his interpretation of the primary substance in Metaphysics Z and the content of Z3. Although substance is the subject (hypokeimenon) and a “this” (tode ti) in Categories, it is the ultimate subject (hypokeimenon eschaton) and a “this” (tode ti) and separable (choriston) in Metaphysics. As the ultimate subject, substance is form and matter but not the individual. As a “this” (tode ti) and separable (choriston), substance is form; moreover, the primary substance is form. In my view, that form is substance in Z3 serves more as a plan or outline needed to prove in the following than as a definite conclusion. This article also points out that tode ti in Z8, 1033b21 refers to the individual but not the form. Homōnuma in Z9 cannot be understood as “sharing the same name but with different meaning,” but, rather, simply as “having the same name.”     

A Review of the Institute of Medicine’s Analysis of using Chimpanzees in Biomedical Research

We argue that the recommendations made by the Institute of Medicine’s 2011 report, Chimpanzees in Biomedical and Behavioral Research: Assessing the Necessity, are methodologically and ethically confused. We argue that a proper understanding of evolution and complexity theory in terms of the science and ethics of using chimpanzees in biomedical research would have had led the committee to recommend not merely limiting but eliminating the use of chimpanzees in biomedical research. Specifically, we argue that a proper understanding of the difference between the gross level of examination of species and examinations on finer levels can shed light on important methodological and ethical inconsistencies leading to ignorance of potentially unethical practices and policies regarding the use of animals in scientific research.     

Review of Penelope Deutscher,Foucault’s Futures: A Critique of Reproductive Reason

Continental Philosophy Review - In Foucault’s Futures: A Critique of Reproductive Reason, Penelope Deutscher explores the “suspended reserves” in Foucault’s writing,...     

A Systematic Review of Neurocognitive Functioning in Behçet’s Disease

Neuropsychology Review - Behçet’s disease (BD) is a vascular, inflammatory multisystem disorder with neuro-Behçet’s (NBD) diagnosed in a subset of patients with neurological...