The effect of explicitly varying the proportion of “same” and “different” responses on sex differences in the Shepard and Metzler mental rotation task

The mental rotation of three-dimensional objects is consistently identified as the most salient cognitive sex difference in humans. The Shepard and Metzler task (1971) requires participants to rotate an object in their “mind's eye” and then compare the shape to a second object to identify if the two objects can be aligned in an identical orientation (warranting a “same” response) or represent mirror image shapes of one another (warranting a “different” response). The mental rotation task not only involves a rotational component but also nonrotational components such as comparison and decision making. Recent research has suggested that the sex difference in mental rotation resides in the nonrotational aspects of “different” decisions specifically. This experiment examined this proposal by varying the proportion of “different” decisions across conditions. Participants were ether exposed to the traditional format (50:50 same/different) or a bias towards (75:25) or away from (25:75) different responses. Contrary to previous research, the sex difference was found to reside in “same” responses that required a greater degree of rotation when assessing error rates in mental rotation. Sex differences in mental rotation error rates were particularly sensitive to the rotational aspect of same responses, not rotational aspects of different responses nor nonrotational aspects of both same and different responses. For reaction time, however, a sex difference emerged in the nonrotational aspects of the task. The bias described here affected these nonrotational aspects of the task, but not the rotational aspects, in line with prediction. A second study reran the experiment without making the bias explicit. Under this implicit bias, no sex differences were identified between conditions.     

Conflict,learning, and Piaget: Comments on Zimmerman and Blom's “Toward an empirical test of the role of cognitive conflict in learning”

A brief historical account dealing with the concept of psychic conflict is first presented, followed by an examination of Piaget's equilibrium/equilibration model and the relevance of the concept of conflict to that model. A critical analysis of B. J. Zimmerman and D. E. Blom (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 18–38) is then presented, after which suggestions are made regarding future directions research efforts pertaining to Piaget's conflict/learning formulation might fruitfully take.     

Comments on “Intra- and interspecific variation in self-control capacities of parrots in a delay of gratification task”

Animal Cognition - Brucks (Anim Cogn 25(2):473–491, 2021) have published an intriguing paper on the differing abilities of various species of parrots to succeed in a delay of gratification...     

Preschool children's understanding of the coordinators “and” and “or”

The development of the understanding of the words and and or was studied. Children in the age interval 2:0–7:6 received two tests of word understanding, varying in the degree to which the context of the test items contributed in determining the meaning of the connectives, and one test of spontaneous usage. The results from the tests of word understanding showed that the context variable facilitated small children's responding, and that most reponses were correct at the age of four and beyond. The results from the production test indicated that and was used to express enummerations and or to express alternatives. The difference between the linguistic and the logical meaning of the connectives was discussed.     

“Generalized imitation” on a nonimitative task: Effects of modeling and task history

Two experiments investigated characteristic generalized imitation procedures on a nonimitative successive visual discrimination task. In Experiment I, no discriminative behavior was obtained though a number of procedures designed to enhance discrimination were employed. The introduction of a differential modeling procedure after nine or 10 sessions of nondifferential performance was ineffective in producing differential responding for three of four Ss. In the second experiment, the differential modeling procedure was introduced as an initial manipulation and was successful in establishing discriminative performance in all Ss. After several sessions of differential responding, the observation of a model performing nondifferentially was relatively ineffective in altering the pattern of responding. These results suggest (1) that modeling may be functional in altering a S's behavior depending on what point in the procedures the manipulation is introduced and (2) that certain procedural variables may define a functional response class characterized by the failure to develop discriminative responding.     

“None of the above” as a correct and incorrect alternative on a multiple-choice test: Implications for the testing effect

Both positive and negative testing effects have been demonstrated with a variety of materials and paradigms (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b). The present series of experiments replicate and extend the research of Roediger and Marsh (2005) with the addition of a “none-of-the-above” response option. Participants (n=32 in both experiments) read a set of passages, took an initial multiple-choice test, completed a filler task, and then completed a final cued-recall test (Experiment 1) or multiple-choice test (Experiment 2). Questions were manipulated on the initial multiple-choice test by adding a “none-of-the-above” response alternative (choice “E”) that was incorrect (“E” Incorrect) or correct (“E” Correct). The results from both experiments demonstrated that the positive testing effect was negated when the “none-of-the-above” alternative was the correct response on the initial multiple-choice test, but was still present when the “none-of-the-above” alternative was an incorrect response.     

Do sex differences in a faceted model of fluid and crystallized intelligence depend on the method applied?

Recently, different methodological approaches have been discussed as an explanation for inconsistencies in studies investigating sex differences in different intelligences. The present study investigates sex differences in manifest sum scores, factor score estimates, and latent verbal, numerical, figural intelligence, as well as fluid and crystallized intelligence as measured by the German Intelligence-Structure-Test 2000-R (IST 2000-R; Liepmann, Beauducel, Brocke, & Amthauer, 2007). The not population-representative sample consisted of 977 German 11th and 12th graders enrolled in a “Gymnasium” (551 female; mean age: M = 16.70; SD = 0.65) who completed the IST 2000-R. Sex differences in fluid and crystallized intelligence were not influenced by the method applied with men performing better than women. However, extent and direction of sex differences in verbal, numerical, and figural intelligence differed by the method applied. Whereas there was a male advantage in all three factors measured as manifest sum scores, women performed better in verbal intelligence as measured by factor scores or as latent variables. Effect sizes of sex differences in numerical and figural intelligence were also greatly reduced when applying the latter two methods. Results are discussed with regard to their theoretical and practical implications.     

Comments on “Presentism and Diversity in the History of Psychology”

There is a need to understand what motivates claims of priority over insights, concepts or methods of psychology. Such claims are prompted by a sense of pride in saying that “my” ancestors got it before “their” ancestors. The right of any culture, or anybody for that matter, to define the label “psychology”, or to decide what psychology is or should be about is questionable.     

Inhibition and young children’s performance on the Tower of London task

Young children, when performing problem solving tasks, show a tendency to break task rules and produce incomplete solutions. We propose that this tendency can be explained by understanding problem solving within the context of the development of “executive functions” – general cognitive control functions, which serve to regulate the operation of the cognitive system. This proposal is supported by the construction of two computational models that simulate separately the performance of 3–4 year old and 5–6 year old children on the Tower of London planning task. We seek in particular to capture the emerging role of inhibition in the older group. The basic framework within which the models are developed is derived from Fox and Das’ Domino model [Fox, J., & Das, S. (2000). Safe and sound: Artificial intelligence in hazardous applications. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] and Norman and Shallice’s [Norman, D.A., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and automatic control of behaviour. In R. Davidson, G. Schwartz, & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and Self Regulation (Vol. 4). New York: Plenum] theory of willed and automatic action. Two strategies and a simple perceptual bias are implemented within the models and comparisons between model and child performance reveal a good fit for the key dependent measures (number of rule breaks and percentage of incomplete solutions) of the two groups.     

“Violent propensity,strain, and violent intentions: a test of Agnew’s revised conditioning hypothesis”

General Strain Theory’s (GST) mediating and conditioning hypotheses suggest that emotions mediate the strain-crime relationship and that personality traits condition the effects of strain. Individual-level research provides weak-to-mixed support for these hypotheses, leading to calls to revise GST. Yet, the mediating and conditioning hypotheses provide situational predictions which are largely untested at the situational-level. Further, Agnew (2013) recently suggested a modified method of testing the conditioning hypothesis. This research, using factorial survey data from 734 college students, presents a situational test of this revised version of GST. Results are generally, but not fully, supportive of the mediating and conditioning hypotheses. This indicates that Agnew’s most recent theoretical revision may be better suited for capturing the conditioning effect and that it is important to conduct more situational research on GST.     

Comments on “the measurement of factorial indeterminacy”

Guttman's index of indeterminacy (2² – 1) measures the potential amount of uncertainty in picking the right alternative interpretation for a factor. When alternative solutions for a factor are equally likely to be correct, then the squared multiple correlation ² for predicting the factor from the observed variables is the average correlation _AB between independently selected alternative solutionsA andB, while var ( _AB )=(1 – ²)²/s, wheres is the dimensionality of the space in which unpredicted components of alternative solutions are to be found. When alternative solutions for the factor are not equally likely to be chosen, ² is the lower bound for E( _AB ); however, E( _AB ) need not be a modal value in the distribution of _AB . Guttman's index and E( _AB ) measure different aspects of the same indeterminacy problem.     

Hussearle's Representationalism and the “hypothesis of the Background”

John Searle's hypothesis of the Background seems to conflict with his initial representationalism according to which each Intentional state contains a particular content that determines its conditions of satisfaction. In Section I of this essay I expose Searle's initial theory of Intentionality and relate it to Edmund Husserl's earlier phenomenology. In Section II I make it clear that Searle's introduction of the notion of Network, though indispensable, does not, by itself, force us to modify that initial theory. However, a comparison of this notion to the notion of horizon from Husserl's later phenomenology and an interpretation of Husserl's conception of the determinable X as providing a solution to the problem of perceptual misidentification lead me to conclude that in his discussion of 'twin examples' Searle had better modified his initial theory. Finally, I critically examine Searle's claim that anyone who tries seriously to follow out the threads in the Network will eventually reach a bedrock of non-Intentional capacities. In Section III I show in detail, partly in a rather Husserlian vein, that Searle's four official arguments for the Background thesis, though containing some very valuable contributions to a theory of linguistic skills, are not convincing at all if they are to be understood as going beyond the scope of (Hus)Searle's 'content-cum-Network' picture of Intentionality. The upshot of these considerations is that the Background thesis should be read as a thesis concerning the causal neurophysiological preconditions of human Intentionality rather than concerning the logical properties of Intentional states in general. Recently Searle himself has come to the same result, but he does not say for which reasons. The present essay makes it clear why Searle just had to arrive at this important result.