Decision criteria do not shift: Commentary on Mueller and Weidemann (2008)

The effects of base rates and payoffs on the shapes of rating receiver operating characteristic curves are inconsistent with the basic assumptions of signal detection theory (SDT), in particular the notion of a shifting decision criterion. Mueller and Weidemann (2008) propose that these unexpected phenomena are not due to problems with the decision- criterion construct but are instead due to two compounded effects: instability of the decision criterion across trials, and even greater instability in the flanking criteria that determine which confidence rating will be reported. There are several problems with the authors’ decision-noise hypothesis. First, even if their hypothesis about decision noise were taken for granted, the key feature of the ratings data that rejects the SDT model would remain a mystery. Second, the same violations of SDT that are exhibited in the ratings paradigm are also exhibited in the yes-no detection task when response time is substituted for confidence as a basis for analysis. Finally, the decision-noise hypothesis predicts that sensitivity will increase when one source of this variation-the response on a previous trial-is controlled for. This prediction was consistently violated in both the yes-no and ratings conditions of Mueller and Weidemann’s experiment. In an Addendum, we respond to Weidemann and Mueller’s (2008) reply to this Comment.     

Signal detection theory analyses of semantic priming in word recognition

Word recognition, semantic priming, and cognitive impenetrability research have used signal detection theory (SDT) measures to separate perceptual and postperceptual processes. In the D. Norris (1986) checking model and model simulation (D. Norris, 1995), priming alters only postperceptual word decision criteria: Stimulus-related priming reduces uncertainty, increasing sensitivity; stimulus-unrelated priming increases false alarms more than hits, reducing sensitivity. This work is cited as strong evidence that criterion changes can alter perceptual sensitivity and that SDT is inappropriate for investigating complex cognitive processes. The authors' current SDT ideal observer analysis of the model demonstrates that related priming does not directly alter sensitivity and that unrelated priming increases only false-alarm rate, reducing sensitivity. This analysis provides new perspectives on SDT concepts of complex decision processing.     

Is signal detection theory fundamentally flawed? A response to Balakrishnan (1998a, 1998b, 1999)

For nearly 50 years, signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991) has been of central importance in the development of psychophysics and other areas of psychology. The theory has recently been challenged by Balakrishnan (1998b), who argues that, within SDT, an alternative index is “better justified” than d’ and who claims to show (1998a, 1999) that SDT is fundamentally flawed and should be rejected. His evidence is based on new nonparametric measures that he has introduced and applied to experimental data. He believes his results show that basic assumptions of SDT are not supported—in particular, that payoff and probability manipulations do not affect the position of the decision criterion. In view of the importance of SDT in psychology, these claims deserve careful examination. They are critically reviewed here. It appears that it is Balakrishnan’s arguments that fail, and not SDT.     

Disambiguating conscious and unconscious influences: do exclusion paradigms demonstrate unconscious perception?

Does exclusion failure--responding with previously presented words despite instructions to avoid doing so--demonstrate unconscious influences? This article examines exclusion-based evidence for unconscious perception. I propose an alternative signal detection theory (SDT) framework that can account for exclusion failure and ostensibly convergent qualitative differences without positing additional unconscious perceptual mechanisms. In the proposed SDT model, exclusion failure is a criterion artifact, similar to classic SDT-based critiques of subjective threshold approaches. However, it is suggested that exclusion approaches do demonstrate that response strategies are applied only to above-criterion stimuli and thereby illustrate important qualitative differences between two conscious processes: phenomenal awareness itself and higher-order (i.e., metacognitive) decision processes.     

Role of serial order in the impact of talker variability on short-term memory: testing a perceptual organization-based account

In two experiments, we examined the impact of the degree of match between sequential auditory perceptual organization processes and the demands of a short-term memory task (memory for order vs. item information). When a spoken sequence of digits was presented so as to promote its perceptual partitioning into two distinct streams by conveying it in alternating female (F) and male (M) voices (FMFMFMFM)—thereby disturbing the perception of true temporal order—recall of item order was greatly impaired (as compared to recall of item identity). Moreover, an order error type consistent with the formation of voice-based streams was committed more quickly in the alternating-voice condition (Exp. 1). In contrast, when the perceptual organization of the sequence mapped well onto an optimal two-group serial rehearsal strategy—by presenting the two voices in discrete clusters (FFFFMMMM)—order, but not item, recall was enhanced (Exp. 2). The results are consistent with the view that the degree of compatibility between perceptual and deliberate sequencing processes is a key determinant of serial short-term memory performance. Alternative accounts of talker variability effects in short-term memory, based on the concept of a dedicated phonological short-term store and a capacity-limited focus of attention, are also reviewed.     

The search for an input-coding scheme: Transposed-letter priming in Arabic

Two key issues for models of visual word recognition are the specification of an input-coding scheme and whether these input-coding schemes vary across orthographies. Here, we report two masked-priming lexical decision experiments that examined whether the ordering of the root letters plays a key role in producing transposed-letter effects in Arabic—a language characterized by non-concatenative morphology. In Experiment 1, letter transpositions involved two letters from the root, whereas in Experiment 2, letter transpositions involved one letter from the root and one letter from the word pattern. Results showed a reliable transposedletter priming effect when the ordering of the letters of the root was kept intact (Experiment 2), but not when two root letters were transposed (Experiment 1). These findings support the view that the order of the root letters is allowed only a minimum degree of perceptual noise to avoid the negative impact of activating the “wrong” root family.     

Positive and negative remember judgments and ROCs in the plurals paradigm: Evidence for alternative decision strategies

Using old-new ratings and remember-know judgments we explored the plurals paradigm, in which studied words must be distinguished from plurality-changed lures. The paradigm allowed us to investigate negative remembering—that is, the remembering of a plural-altered study item; capacity for this judgment was found to be poorer than or equivalent to the conventional positive remembering. A response-bias manipulation affected positive but not negative remembering. The ratings were used to construct ROC curves and test the prediction of the most common dual-process theory of recognition memory (Yonelinas, 2001) that the amount of recollection can be independently estimated from ROC curves and from remember judgments. By fitting the individual data with pure signal detection theory (SDT) models and dual-process models that combined SDT and high-threshold components (HTSDT), we identified two types of subjects. For those who were better described by HTSDT, the predicted convergence of remember-know and ROC measures was observed. For those who were better described by SDT, the ROC intercept could not predict the remember rate. The data are consistent with the idea that all subjects rely on the same representation but base their decisions on different partitions of a decision space.     

Exactness,inexactness, and the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability

I defend, to a certain extent, the traditional view that perceptual indiscriminability is non-transitive. The argument proceeds by considering important recent work by Benj Hellie: Hellie argues that colour perception represents ‘inexactly’, and that this results in violations of the transitivity of colour indiscriminability. I show that Hellie’s argument remains inconclusive, since he does not demonstrate conclusively that colour perception really does represent inexactly. My own argument for the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability uses inexactness instead as one horn of a dilemma: the key idea is that there is a class of perceptual experiences which might plausibly be supposed either to represent inexactly or to represent exactly—but which demonstrate the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability either way.     

Implicit sequence learning is represented by stimulus—response rules

For nearly two decades, researchers have investigated spatial sequence learning in an attempt to identify what specifically is learned during sequential tasks (e.g., stimulus order, response order, etc.). Despite extensive research, controversy remains concerning the information-processing locus of this learning effect. There are three main theories concerning the nature of spatial sequence learning, corresponding to the perceptual, motor, or response selection (i.e., central mechanisms underlying the association between stimulus and response pairs) processes required for successful task performance. The present data investigate this controversy and support the theory that stimulus—response (S—R) rules are critical for sequence learning. The results from two experiments demonstrate that sequence learning is disrupted only when the S—R rules for the task are altered. When the S—R rules remain constant or involve only a minor transformation, significant sequence learning occurs. These data implicate spatial response selection as a likely mechanism mediating spatial sequential learning.     

Charged experiences of natural environments

Natural environments often generate experiences that combine great emotional and moral power—“charged” experiences. Their characteristics are explored through writings that capture them convincingly. They appear to have a perceptual character. Perception of the scene is invested with a sense of something beyond it, and much bigger. It may be God, or immensity in time or space, or the essence of a nation. This encounter is often connected with moral authority. A recurring theme is the sense that environment and the things in it—including the observer—are a self-similar pattern. People are not passive recipients of these experiences. They seek them out. Evoking the environment in words can often evoke the charged experience too—at least in part. The material suggests tasks for psychologists—most simply, finding systematic ways to describe these experiences. That may help other environmental disciplines, which face difficulty characterising the dimension of response. Theoretically, the material raises questions about the representations generated by perceptual processes. The observation that powerful moral imperatives seem to be given in the act of perceiving is also suggestive for the psychology of morality. Culture certainly plays a part in charged responses, but landscapes have the power to be invested with an emotional and moral charge where other stimuli may not. I am indebted to Helen Ross for provoking this article; to Bert Hodges, Eamonn Hughes, David Hale and most particularly to Edna Longley for ideas and examples; and to Noel Sheehy for encouragement. They cannot be blamed for my misunderstandings.     

Charged experiences of natural environments

Natural environments often generate experiences that combine great emotional and moral power—“charged” experiences. Their characteristics are explored through writings that capture them convincingly. They appear to have a perceptual character. Perception of the scene is invested with a sense of something beyond it, and much bigger. It may be God, or immensity in time or space, or the essence of a nation. This encounter is often connected with moral authority. A recurring theme is the sense that environment and the things in it—including the observer—are a self-similar pattern. People are not passive recipients of these experiences. They seek them out. Evoking the environment in words can often evoke the charged experience too—at least in part. The material suggests tasks for psychologists—most simply, finding systematic ways to describe these experiences. That may help other environmental disciplines, which face difficulty characterising the dimension of response. Theoretically, the material raises questions about the representations generated by perceptual processes. The observation that powerful moral imperatives seem to be given in the act of perceiving is also suggestive for the psychology of morality. Culture certainly plays a part in charged responses, but landscapes have the power to be invested with an emotional and moral charge where other stimuli may not. I am indebted to Helen Ross for provoking this article; to Bert Hodges, Eamonn Hughes, David Hale and most particularly to Edna Longley for ideas and examples; and to Noel Sheehy for encouragement. They cannot be blamed for my misunderstandings.     

Early morphological processing is morphosemantic and not simply morpho-orthographic: A violation of form-then-meaning accounts of word recognition

Many studies have suggested that a word’s orthographic form must be processed before its meaning becomes available. Some interpret the (null) finding of equal facilitation after semantically transparent and opaque morphologically related primes in early stages of morphological processing as consistent with this view. Recent literature suggests that morphological facilitation tends to be greater after transparent than after opaque primes, however. To determine whether the degree of semantic transparency influences parsing into a stem and a suffix (morphological decomposition) in the forward masked priming variant of the lexical decision paradigm, we compared patterns of facilitation between semantically transparent (e.g., coolant—cool) and opaque (e.g., rampant—ramp) prime—target pairs. Form properties of the stem (frequency, neighborhood size, and prime—target letter overlap), as well as related—unrelated and transparent—opaque affixes, were matched. Morphological facilitation was significantly greater for semantically transparent pairs than for opaque pairs. Ratings of prime—target relatedness predicted the magnitude of facilitation. The results limit the scope of form-then-meaning models of word recognition and demonstrate that semantic similarity can influence even early stages of morphological processing. The research reported here was supported by National Institute of Child Health and Development Grant HD-01994 to Haskins Laboratories.     

On the measurement of criterion noise in signal detection theory: the case of recognition memory

Traditional approaches within the framework of signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966), especially in the field of recognition memory, assume that the positioning of response criteria is not a noisy process. Recent work (Benjamin, Diaz, & Wee, 2009; Mueller & Weidemann, 2008) has challenged this assumption, arguing not only for the existence of criterion noise but also for its large magnitude and substantive contribution to individuals' performance. A review of these recent approaches for the measurement of criterion noise in SDT identifies several shortcomings and confoundings. A reanalysis of Benjamin et al.'s (2009) data sets as well as the results from a new experimental method indicate that the different forms of criterion noise proposed in the recognition memory literature are of very low magnitudes, and they do not provide a significant improvement over the account already given by traditional SDT without criterion noise.     

Attentional preparation based on temporal expectancy modulates processing at the perceptual level

Research that uses simple response time tasks and neuroimaging has emphasized that attentional preparation based on temporal expectancy modulates processing at motor levels. A novel approach was taken to study whether the temporal orienting of attention can also modulate perceptual processing. A temporal-cuing paradigm was used together with a rapid serial visual presentation procedure, in order to maximize the processing demands of perceptual analysis. Signal detection theory was applied in order to examine whether temporal orienting affects processes related to perceptual sensitivity or to response criterion (indexed byďand beta measures, respectively). If temporal orienting implies perceptual preparation, we would expect to observe an increase in perceptual sensitivity (ď) when a target appeared at expected, rather than unexpected, time intervals. Indeed, our behavioral results opened the possibility that focusing attention on time intervals not only enhances motor processing, as has been shown by previous research, but also might improve perceptual processing.     

Neurophysiological evidence for transfer appropriate processing of memory: Processing versus feature similarity

Transfer appropriate processing (TAP) accounts propose that memory is a function of the degree to which the same neural processes transfer appropriately from the study experience to the memory test. However, in prior research, study and test stimuli were often similar physically. In two experiments, event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded to fragmented objects during an indirect memory test to isolate transfer of a specific perceptual process from overlap of physical features between experiences. An occipitotemporoparietal P2(00) at 200 msec showed implicit memory effects only when similar perceptual grouping processes of good continuation were repeatedly engaged—despite physical feature differences—as TAP accounts hypothesize. This result provides direct neurophysiological evidence for the critical role of process transfer across experiences for memory.     

The Malay Lexicon Project: A database of lexical statistics for 9,592 words

Malay, a language spoken by 250 million people, has a shallow alphabetic orthography, simple syllable structures, and transparent affixation—characteristics that contrast sharply with those of English. In the present article, we first compare the letter—phoneme and letter—syllable ratios for a sample of alphabetic orthographies to highlight the importance of separating language-specific from language-universal reading processes. Then, in order to develop a better understanding of word recognition in orthographies with more consistent mappings to phonology than English, we compiled a database of lexical variables (letter length, syllable length, phoneme length, morpheme length, word frequency, orthographic and phonological neighborhood sizes, and orthographic and phonological Levenshtein distances) for 9,592 Malay words. Separate hierarchical regression analyses for Malay and English revealed how the consistency of orthography—phonology mappings selectively modulates the effects of different lexical variables on lexical decision and speeded pronunciation performance. The database of lexical and behavioral measures for Malay is available at http://brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/ supplemental.     

Cells,circuits, and choices: Social influences on perceptual decision making

Making decisions is an integral part of everyday life. Social psychologists have demonstrated in many studies that humans’ decisions are frequently and strongly influenced by the opinions of others—even in simple perceptual decisions, where, for example, participants have to judge what an image looks like. However, because the effect of other people’s opinions on decision making has remained largely unaddressed by the neuroimaging and neurophysiology literature, we are only beginning to understand how social influence is integrated into the decision-making process. We put forward the thesis that by probing the neurophysiology of social influence with perceptual decisionmaking tasks similar to those used in the seminal work of Asch (1952, 1956), this gap could be remedied. Perceptual paradigms are already widely used to probe neuronal mechanisms of decision making in nonhuman primates. There is also increasing evidence about how nonhuman primates’ behavior is influenced by observing conspecifics. The high spatial and temporal resolution of neurophysiological recordings in awake monkeys could provide insight into where and how social influence modulates decision making, and thus should enable us to develop detailed functional models of the neural mechanisms that support the integration of social influence into the decision-making process.     

Evidence for a conceptual account of same-different discrimination learning in the pigeon

We trained pigeons to peck two different buttons in response to 16-iconsame arrays versus 16-icondifferent arrays. In thesame arrays, the icons were all the same as one another, whereas in thedifferent arrays, the icons were all different from one another. In Experiment 1, we upset the spatial regularities of the displays by disarranging the icons—randomly displacing each icon to reduce the degree of perceptual order. The pigeons’ discriminative performance was unaffected by disarranging. In Experiment 2, spatial regularities were disturbed by varying the rotation of the icons within a display. Again, no disruption in discriminative performance was observed. These and other findings suggest that pigeons treat the 16 icons as either the same or different despite changes in the spatial organization or orientation of the icons, thus implicating a conceptual rather than a perceptual process in same—different discrimination.     

The Ignorant Citizen: Mouffe,Rancière,and the Subject of Democratic Education

Much work in the field of education for democratic citizenship is based on the idea that it is possible to know what a good citizen is, so that the task of citizenship education becomes that of the production of the good citizen. In this paper I ask whether and to what extent we can and should understand democratic citizenship as a positive identity. I approach this question by means of an exploration of four dimensions of democratic politics—the political community, the borders of the political order, the dynamics of democratic processes and practices, and the status of the democratic subject—in order to explore whether and to what extent the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can and should be understood as a particular order. For this I engage with ideas from Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière who both have raised fundamental questions about the extent to which the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can be captured as a particular order. In the paper I introduce the figure of the ignorant citizen in order to hint at a conception of citizenship that is not based on particular knowledge about what the good citizen is. I introduce a distinction between a socialisation conception of citizenship education and civic learning and a subjectification conception of citizenship education and civic learning in order to articulate what the educational implications of such an ‘anarchic’ understanding of democratic politics are. While the socialisation conception focuses on the question how ‘newcomers’ can be inserted into an existing political order, the subjectification conception focuses on the question how democratic subjectivity is engendered through engagement in always undetermined political processes. This is no longer a process driven by knowledge about what the citizen is or should become but one that depends on a desire for a particular mode of human togetherness or, in short, a desire for democracy.     

Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology

According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called “transparency thesis.” According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First, I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia—specifically, the sort that he calls “kinesthetic sensations”—can vary despite constancy in representational content.