The nature of negative thoughts in depression

We investigated the nature and content of the negative thoughts that accompany depression by examining thoughts about oneself and others during three cognitive tasks: imaging, recall, and inference. Mildly depressed and nondepressed subjects were asked to image, recall, and make inferences about a variety of events while thinking about themselves or another person. The events were sad or happy and either social or nonsocial in nature. The results suggest that the negativity in thought that accompanies depression is restricted to thoughts about oneself and does not extend to thoughts about others. The relation between negative thoughts and the depressive's view of self is discussed. It is proposed that depressives have a negative self-schema that makes the affective nature of their behavior particularly salient.     

Kant on materialism

ABSTRACT

In this paper I argue that Kant’s complex argument against materialism involves not only his generic commitment to the existence of non-spatio-temporal and thus non-material things in themselves (which follows directly from Transcendental Idealism), but also considerations pertaining to reason and the subject of our thoughts. Specifically, I argue that because Kant conceives of reason in such a way that it demands a commitment to the existence of the unconditioned so that we can account for whatever conditioned objects we encounter in experience, our thoughts, which are also conditioned, require something unconditioned that, because it is unconditioned, cannot be material. In this way, Kant’s attitude towards materialism is based not only on abstract features of his metaphysics and epistemology, but also on specific features that were under serious discussion in the early modern period.     

Neuroticism,Life Events and Negative Thoughts in the Development of Depression in Adolescent Girls

Theories of depression suggest that cognitive and environmental factors may explain the relationship between personality and depression. This study tested such a model in early adolescence, incorporating neuroticism, stress-generation and negative automatic thoughts in the development of depressive symptoms. Participants (896 girls, mean age 12.3 years) completed measures of personality and depressive symptoms, and 12 months later completed measures of depressive symptoms, recent stressors and negative automatic thoughts. Path analysis supported a model in which neuroticism serves as a distal vulnerability for depression, conferring a risk of experiencing dependent negative events and negative automatic thoughts, which fully mediate the effect of neuroticism on later depression. A second path supported a maintenance model for depression in adolescence, with initial levels of depression predicting dependent negative events, negative automatic thoughts and subsequent depressive symptoms. Unexpectedly, initial depression was also associated with later independent life events. This study establishes potential mechanisms through which personality contributes to the development of depression in adolescent girls.     

Globalised violence,community psychology and the bombing and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq

In this article, I first set out a conceptualisation of globalised violence. I then reflect upon how psychology networks in general and community psychology networks in particular appear to have positioned themselves publicly in relation to the violence of the recent bombing and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. I ask whether networks of Community Psychologists are able/willing to publicly position themselves in regards to these specific events and the levels of globalised violence in general. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the origins of endogenous thoughts

Endogenous thoughts are thoughts that we activate in a top-down manner or in the absence of the appropriate stimuli. We use endogenous thoughts to plan or recall past events. In this sense, endogenous thinking is one of the hallmarks of our cognitive lives. In this paper, I investigate how it is that we come to possess endogenous control over our thoughts. Starting from the close relation between language and thinking, I look into speech production—a process motorically controlled by the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Interestingly, IFG is also closely related to silent talking, as well as volition. The connection between IFG and volition is important given that endogenous thoughts are or at least greatly resemble voluntary actions. Against this background, I argue that IFG is key to understanding the origins of conscious endogenous thoughts. Furthermore, I look into goal-directed thinking and show that IFG plays a key role also in unconscious endogenous thinking.     

Retrieval-induced forgetting is associated with increased positivity when imagining the future

People often think of themselves and their experiences in a more positive light than is objectively justified. Inhibitory control processes may promote this positivity bias by modulating the accessibility of negative thoughts and episodes from the past, which then limits their influence in the construction of imagined future events. We tested this hypothesis by investigating the correlation between retrieval-induced forgetting and the extent to which individuals imagine positive and negative episodic future events. First, we measured performance on a task requiring participants to imagine personal episodic events (either positive or negative), and then we correlated that measure with retrieval-induced forgetting. As predicted, individuals who exhibited higher levels of retrieval-induced forgetting imagined fewer negative episodic future events than did individuals who exhibited lower levels of retrieval-induced forgetting. This finding provides new insight into the possible role of retrieval-induced forgetting in autobiographical memory.     

Précis of The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality

The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out "if only" something had been different. The "fault lines" of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative thought is more rational than scientists have imagined. People exhibit remarkable similarities in the sorts of things they change in their mental representation of reality when they imagine how the facts could have turned out differently. For example, they tend to imagine alternatives to actions rather than inactions, events within their control rather than those beyond their control, and socially unacceptable events rather than acceptable ones. Their thoughts about how an event might have turned out differently lead them to judge that a strong causal relation exists between an antecedent event and the outcome, and their thoughts about how an event might have turned out the same lead them to judge that a weaker causal relation exists. In a simple temporal sequence, people tend to imagine alternatives to the most recent event. The central claim in the book is that counterfactual thoughts are organised along the same principles as rational thought. The idea that the counterfactual imagination is rational depends on three steps: (1) humans are capable of rational thought; (2) they make inferences by thinking about possibilities; and (3) their counterfactual thoughts rely on thinking about possibilities, just as rational thoughts do. The sorts of possibilities that people envisage explain the mutability of certain aspects of mental representations and the immutability of other aspects.     

It could have been better: The effects of counterfactual communication on impression formation

While research on counterfactuals has closely examined the psychological antecedents and consequences of thinking counterfactually (imagining alternatives to past events), little is known about the effects of counterfactual communication, and in particular, how such thoughts are interpreted by others. In this paper, I argue that counterfactual communication differentially affects impressions formed of speakers by receivers depending on the general content of the counterfactual. Findings from an archival study and a scenario study demonstrated convergent results: Individuals who communicated upward counterfactuals (thoughts of how things could have been better) were more positively perceived by receivers than were individuals who communicated downward counterfactuals (thoughts of how things could have been worse). This difference stemmed from an enhancement effect of upward counterfactuals. Further analysis revealed that the relationship between counterfactual communication and impression formation was mediated by receivers' perceptions of the extent to which speakers took responsibility for their actions. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spiritual,but not religious?: On the nature of spirituality and its relation to religion

Recent years have seen a rise in those who describe themselves as “spiritual, but not religious”. At a popular level, there has been a lot of debate about this label and what it represents. But philosophers have in general paid little attention to the conceptual issues it raises. What is spirituality, exactly, and how does it relate to religion? Could there be a non-religious spirituality? In this paper, I try to give an outline account of the nature of spirituality and of religion, and then close with some thoughts on the prospects for a non-religious spirituality.     

Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal explanations

We report two Experiments to compare counterfactual thoughts about how an outcome could have been different and causal explanations about why the outcome occurred. Experiment 1 showed that people generate counterfactual thoughts more often about controllable than uncontrollable events, whereas they generate causal explanations more often about unexpected than expected events. Counterfactual thoughts focus on specific factors, whereas causal explanations focus on both general and specific factors. Experiment 2 showed that in their spontaneous counterfactual thoughts, people focus on normal events just as often as exceptional events, unlike in directed counterfactual thoughts. The findings are consistent with the suggestion that counterfactual thoughts tend to focus on how a specific unwanted outcome could have been prevented, whereas causal explanations tend to provide more general causal information that enables future understanding, prediction, and intervention in a wide range of situations.     

From pilot fish to analyst: Finding a path between symbiotic and autistic defences

This paper presents the clinical case of a patient with autistic features. One of the main difficulties in his treatment was the particular rapid rhythm of his projections, introjections and re‐projections that constrained the analyst's capacity for reverie and hindered the use of effective projective identification processes. These alternating defensive constellations lead either to an expelling autistic barrier or to an engulfing symbiotic fusion. Their combination can be seen as the expression of a defence against an unintegrated and undifferentiated early experience of self that was in this way kept at bay to prevent it from invading his whole personality. Maintaining the symbiotic link, in which I kept included by staying partially fused to what was being projected and using my analytic function in a reduced way, helped to relate to what was in the patient's inside. Leaving this symbiotic link let my interpretations appear to ‘force’ their way through the autistic barrier. Yet as the process developed they allowed to show the patient how he ejected me and what was happening in his inside, behind his autistic barrier. So I found myself on the one hand accepting the symbiotic immobilization and on the other hand interpreting in a way that seemed forced to the patient, because it implied a breaking of the symbiotic position. The inordinate speed of projections and introjections could thus be interrupted, creating a space for awareness, reflection and transformation, and allowed the emergence of a connection between the patient's inside and outside. In the course of treatment I realized that this kind of dual defence system has been described by the late Argentinian analyst José Bleger. He assumes the existence of an early “agglutinated nucleus” that is held together by a psychic structure he calls the “glischro‐caric” position, in which projective identification cannot take place because there is no self/object differentiation. I have considered the rapid and fugitive use of projection and re‐introjection I met in my patient to be a manifestation of the dual defence system Bleger describes. Although he does not specifically mention this particular vicissitude of operative defences he does give hints about a rhythm in the patients’ projections and introjections.     

The Reflective Epistemic Renegade

Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant to the disagreement. This looks epistemically irresponsible. I offer a detailed investigation of this problem of the reflective epistemic renegade. I argue that although in some cases the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy, and the renegade situation is significantly less common than most would think, in a troublesome number of cases in which the situation arises the renegade is blameworthy in her disagreement with recognized epistemic superiors. I also offer some thoughts on what it would mean for philosophical practice for us to refrain from being renegades. Finally, I show how a new kind of radical skepticism emerges from modest theses regarding the renegade.     

Domain-Specific Principles Affect Learning and Transfer in Children

In this paper I discuss the curious lack of contact between developmental psychologists studying the principles of early learning and those concentrating an later learning in children, where predispositions to learn certain types of concepts are less readily discussed. Instead, there is tacit agreement that learning and transfer mechanisms are content-independent and age-dependent. I argue here that one cannot study learning and transfer in a vacuum and that children's ability to learn is intimately dependent on what they are required to learn and the context in which they must learn it. Specifically, I argue that children learn and transfer readily, even in traditional laboratory settings, if they are required to extend their knowledge about causal mechanisms that they already understand. This point is illustrated in a series of studies with children from 1 to 3 years of age learning about simple mechanisms of physical causality (pushing-pulling, wetting, cutting, etc.). In addition, I document children's difficulty learning about causally impossible events, such as pulling with strings that do not appear to make contact with the object they are pulling. Even young children transfer on the basis of deep structural principles rather than perceptual features when they have access to the requisite domain-specific knowledge. I argue that a search for causal explanations is the basis of broad understanding, of wide patterns of generalization, and of flexible transfer and creative inferential projections—in sum, the essential elements of meaningful learning.     

Imaginative Transportation

Actors, undercover investigators, and readers of fiction sometimes report ‘losing themselves’ in the characters they imitate or read about. They speak of ‘taking on’ or ‘assuming’ the beliefs, thoughts, and feelings of someone else. I offer an account of this strange but familiar phenomenon—what I call imaginative transportation.     

Embodying the False-Belief Tasks

Embodied approaches to mindreading have tended to define themselves in contrast to cognitive approaches to social mindreading. One side effect of this has been a lack of engagement with key areas in the study of social cognition??in particular the topic of how we gain an understanding of the referential nature of others?? thoughts, and how that understanding develops from infancy. I argue that embodied accounts of mindreading are well equipped to enter into this debate, by making use of the notion of a joint mental state, but that doing so will require taking a less antagonistic attitude towards mainstream cognitive approach.     

For my eyes only: gaze control, enmeshment, and relationship quality

Perceived closeness that preserves the distinctness of each partner enhances intimate relationship quality, whereas pseudocloseness or enmeshment--reflecting an inability to distinguish one's own thoughts and emotions from a partner's--may have more negative outcomes (R. J. Green & P. D. Werner, 1996). Two studies investigated whether a dispositional inability to differentiate self from other is manifested at the attentional level as reduced capacity to inhibit following the gaze of another (A. Frischen, A. P. Bayliss, & S. P. Tipper, 2007). Among healthy elderly spouses in Study 1, superior gaze control predicted superior sociocognitive functioning, and those with poorer gaze control abilities were perceived by the partner as constricting the perceiving partner's autonomy, which in turn predicted lower relationship satisfaction among the latter. Moreover, these links were mediated by enmeshment, as indicated by the percentage of "we"-focused versus "I"- or partner-focused thoughts and emotions in the partners' independent accounts of the same relationship events. Extending these findings in a sample of Parkinson's disease patients and their spouses, Study 2 revealed a biphasic effect of self-other differentiation on relationship dynamics: In the early stages of the disease, increased couple focus promoted superior relationship quality, whereas lack of self-other differentiation predicted poorer relationship quality later. Thus, dispositional variations in fundamental social-perceptual processes predict both close relationship dynamics and long-term relationship quality.     

Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: a systems-level proposal for the neural substrates of recall and recognition

This article outlines a theoretical framework for the understanding of the neural basis of memory and consciousness, at systems level. It proposes an architecture constituted by: (1) neuron ensembles located in multiple and separate regions of primary and first-order sensory association cortices ("early cortices") and motor cortices; they contain representations of feature fragments inscribed as patterns of activity originally engaged by perceptuomotor interactions; (2) neuron ensembles located downstream from the former throughout single modality cortices (local convergence zones); they inscribe amodal records of the combinatorial arrangement of feature fragments that occurred synchronously during the experience of entities or events in sector (1); (3) neuron ensembles located downstream from the former throughout higher-order association cortices (non-local convergence zones), which inscribe amodal records of the synchronous combinatorial arrangements of local convergence zones during the experience of entities and events in sector (1); (4) feed-forward and feedback projections interlocking reciprocally the neuron ensembles in (1) with those in (2) according to a many-to-one (feed-forward) and one-to-many (feedback) principle. I propose that (a) recall of entities and events occurs when the neuron ensembles in (1) are activated in time-locked fashion; (b) the synchronous activations are directed from convergence zones in (2) and (3); and (c) the process of reactivation is triggered from firing in convergence zones and mediated by feedback projections. This proposal rejects a single anatomical site for the integration of memory and motor processes and a single store for the meaning of entities of events. Meaning is reached by time-locked multiregional retroactivation of widespread fragment records. Only the latter records can become contents of consciousness.     

On Death—Preliminary Communication

I try to show that throughout the analytical process, real issues arise which require analysis; these may relate to time changes, fees, endings of the week or of the term and ultimately the ending of the analysis. The patient's capacity to handle the pain of feeling excluded relates to the patient's internal objects as they are re-experienced in relation to real events in the analysis. These patients ‘experiences of real events, past and current, may be closely bound up with early unconscious phantasies which colour and even dominate the way these events were and are experienced and negotiated. I have particularly emphasised the intersection of real events in the patients’ past and current lives with real events in the analysis and have tried to indicate ways in which they might be addressed in analytic work     

Contribution of past and future self-defining event networks to personal identity

Personal identity is nourished by memories of significant past experiences and by the imagination of meaningful events that one anticipates to happen in the future. The organisation of such self-defining memories and prospective thoughts in the cognitive system has received little empirical attention, however. In the present study, our aims were to investigate to what extent self-defining memories and future projections are organised in networks of related events, and to determine the nature of the connections linking these events. Our results reveal the existence of self-defining event networks, composed of both memories and future events of similar centrality for identity and characterised by similar identity motives. These self-defining networks expressed a strong internal coherence and frequently organised events in meaningful themes and sequences (i.e., event clusters). Finally, we found that the satisfaction of identity motives in represented events and the presence of clustering across events both contributed to increase in the perceived centrality of events for the sense of identity. Overall, these findings suggest that personal identity is not only nourished by representations of significant past and future events, but also depends on the formation of coherent networks of related events that provide an overarching meaning to specific life experiences.     

Development and validation of a scale to measure perceived control of internal states

One of the key developments in the psychological literature on control has been the growing recognition of the multidimensional nature of the control construct. Recent research suggests that perceived control of internal states may be just as important as perceived control of external events. The Perceived Control of Internal States Scale was developed to provide a measure of the degree to which people feel they have control of their internal states (emotions, thoughts, physical reactions). I report the results of 2 studies (N= 689), supporting the reliability, construct, and incremental validity of the scale. The buffering effects of perceived control for people facing major life events was also explored, with higher levels of perceived control being associated with less physical and psychological symptoms of strain.