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On the logic of demonstratives 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
David Kaplan 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》1979,8(1):81-98
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Derek Henry Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):377-394
I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both
stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are
not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges
from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role
this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. I argue that indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory
role in such judgements, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the
indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to the criticisms of Snowdon and Smith. The discussion
is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs.
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Derek Henry BrownEmail: |
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Jeffrey C. King 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):209-242
In “Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account” (MIT Press 2001) (henceforth CD), I argued that complex demonstratives
are quantifiers. Many philosophers had held that demonstratives, both simple and complex, are referring terms. Since the publication
of CD various objections to the account of complex demonstratives I defended in it have been raised. In the present work,
I lay out these objections and respond to them.
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Jeffrey C. KingEmail: |
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David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
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David BraunEmail: |
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Lawrence D. roberts 《Philosophia》1994,23(1-4):91-116
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A M Honig 《Psychoanalytic review》1966,53(1):112-133
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Albert Casullo 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):77-90
There are four approaches to analyzing the concept of a priori knowledge. The primary target of the reductive approach is
the concept of a priori justification. The primary target of the nonreductive approach is the concept of a priori knowledge.
There are two approaches to analyzing each primary target. A theory-neutral approach provides an analysis that does not presuppose
any general theory of knowledge or justification. A theory-laden approach provides an analysis that does presuppose some general
theory of knowledge or justification (call it the background theory). Those who embrace a theory-laden analysis incur a special burden: they must separate the features of their analysis that
are constitutive of the a priori from those that are constitutive of the background theory. My goal is to illustrate how the
failure to separate these features leads to erroneous conclusions about the nature of a priori knowledge.
相似文献
Albert CasulloEmail: |
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《Multivariate behavioral research》2013,48(2):163-179
The heuristic strategy proposed by Campbell and Fiske for investigating convergent and discriminant validity is rephrased within a more precise statistical framework. First of all, several indices are defined that mirror the properties within a multitrait-multimethod matrix that are supposed to reflect the two notions of validity. Then, based on a simple nonparametric model, a general significance testing procedure is developed that may be used to evaluate the size of each index. Although the suggested inference technique does add a formal structure to the intuitive methods advocated by Campbell and Fiske, the intent of the discussion remains close to their original philosophy. 相似文献