Understanding Affirmative Action

The purpose of this article is to lay a conceptual groundwork that is needed if social scientists and policy makers are to design and implement fair and effective affirmative action programs. Because affirmative action is not well understood, in or out of the academy, the article starts with definitions, both general and technical, contrasts affirmative action with equal opportunity, and touches on the distinction between policy and practice. I then argue that affirmative action is a necessary policy, that it can be effective, and that it is fair. But the policy is for three other reasons: (a) it focuses on deficiencies, (b) it disturbs expectations, and (c) it poses a threat to individualism, interfering with self-congratulations.     

Polarized Opinions on Racial Progress and Inequality: Measurement and Application to Affirmative Action Preferences

This study presents new measures of opinion about progress toward racial equality and provides a multifaceted rationale for preferring the new measures to the old ones. To reduce several sources of measurement error and improve analytic bite by breaking progress into its constituent elements, surveys should ask about past, present, and ideal conditions, not “progress.” These questions reveal racially polarized opinions: Black and White Americans agree on the goal of equality and agree that conditions were worse in the past, but Blacks think conditions were much worse than Whites do. They especially differ in opinions on current conditions and thus in how much change is required to achieve the goal of equality. Blacks see much more current inequality than Whites do. These opinions help explain preferences for affirmative action (AA). Contrary to previously published findings, reactions to AA do not depend on opinions on progress but depend strongly on something related but distinct: how much current racial conditions differ from the ideal. Implications for theories of policy preferences, racial attitudes, progress, and equality are discussed.     

Attributional Ambiguity of Affirmative Action

We propose that affirmative action policies that are perceived to give preference to individuals solely or primarily on the basis of their group membership create attributional ambiguity about the personal deserving of individuals affected by these procedures. This ambiguity about the extent to which outcomes are deserved is hypothesized to be self-protective for people who are denied a position, but to have detrimental consequences among beneficiaries, especially if they are members of groups whose competence is doubted (either by themselves or others). Selection procedures that are perceived to be based both on individual merit and group membership, in contrast, are hypothesized to reduce attributional ambiguity about deserving and thus attenuate the effects of group-based preferential selection procedures on those who are benefited and bypassed by these procedures. An experiment was conducted to test these hypotheses. Men and women were randomly selected or rejected for a leadership role under one of three procedures: outcomes based (a) solely on sex, (b) solely on merit, or (c) on both sex and merit. Results provided partial support for our hypotheses.     

The Challenge to Affirmative Action

The Bakke case is the latest and most serious challenge to the constitutionality of voluntary affirmative action programs. Bakke, a white male, challenged the constitutionality of the University of California Davis Medical School Special Admissions Program, which admitted 16 minority students with lower objective scores. Although a poor case for Supreme Court review, it was brought before the Court by the Davis Medical School despite the protests of many minority groups. If Bakke is upheld, it could virtually wipe out efforts to include minorities in most professional schools and some government employment.     

Procedural Justice and Affirmative Action

There is widespread agreement among both supporters and opponents that affirmative action either must not violate any principle of equal opportunity or procedural justice, or if it does, it may do so only given current extenuating circumstances. Many believe that affirmative action is morally problematic, only justified to the extent that it brings us closer to the time when we will no longer need it. In other words, those that support affirmative action believe it is acceptable in nonideal theory, but not ideal theory. This paper argues that affirmative action is entirely compatible with equal opportunity and procedural justice and would be even in an ideal world. I defend a new analysis of Rawlsian procedural justice according to which it is permissible to interfere in the outcomes of procedures, and thus I show that affirmative action is not morally problematic in the way that many have supposed.     

In Defense of Affirmative Action

Affirmative action refers to positive steps taken to hire persons from groups previously and presently discriminated against. Considerable evidence indicates that this discrimination is intractable and cannot be eliminated by the enforcement of laws. Numerical goals and quotas are justified if and only if they are necessary to overcome the discriminatory effects that could not otherwise be eliminated with reasonable efficiency. Many past as well as present policies are justified in this way.     

Affirmative Action as Help: A Review of Recipient Reactions to Preferential Selection and Affirmative Action

We review research on four areas of recipient reactions to affirmative action: (a) self-evaluations of ability and performance, (b) motivation and task interest, (c) performance and achievement, and (d) evaluations of selection procedures. Not surprisingly, the process by which affirmative action was implemented strongly affected the findings. Self-evaluations of ability and specific components of performance were adversely affected when selection procedures did not provide unambiguous, explicit, and focused evidence of recipient qualifications. In contrast, measures of motivation were largely unaffected by any type of selection, although task choice was adversely affected when the selection process did not provide clear evidence of recipient qualifications. Task performance was complexly affected by selection process and other contextual variables. Finally, selection procedures that did not provide unambiguous, explicit, and focused evidence of qualifications were regarded by recipients as less fair than procedures that did not provide evidence of competencies. We interpret the literature using a model of affirmative action as help (Turner, Pratkanis, & Hardaway, 1991), draw further parallels to research on recipient reactions to aid, and develop strategies for the effective management of affirmative action programs.     

Abstract Thinking Increases Support for Affirmative Action

Sex Roles - Affirmative action is the proactive process of using resources to ensure that people are not discriminated against based on their group membership, such as gender or ethnicity. It is an...     

Shared Being,Old Promises,and the Just Necessity of Affirmative Action

Although the residues of official segregation are widespread, affirmative action continues to meet resistance in both official and everyday life, even in such recent Supreme Court decisions as Grutter v Bollinger (539 U.S. 306). This is due in part to a governing ontology that draws the line between individual and collective. But there are other possibilities for conceiving the social, and I offer one here in a theory of affirmative action that is developed through close examination of sharing and promising as elemental qualities of equitable communal life. The nature and value of these actions are demonstrated in narrative formulations of fairness as exemplified in triage and the situation at the end of slavery; of the difference between equality and equity and how justice depends on their conjunction; and finally of theorizing how these may come together in the permutable, opaque, yet resilient interdependence of person and community that represents most deeply the Greek idea of two in one, that is, of one two, not two ones. In these respects the paper is successful insofar as it discloses the kinds of reasoning that underlie both resistance and commitment to affirmative action.     

The Doctrine of Double Effect and Affirmative Action

ABSTRACT William Cooney has recently argued ( The Journal of Applied Philosophy , Vol. 6, pp. 201–204) that the social programme of affirmative action, though controversial, can be supported by the doctrine of double effect in that, according to the doctrine, responsibility falls on the side of intended consequences and not on that of unintended consequences. The point of affirmative action is to include certain disadvantaged groups; it is not to exclude other groups, though this is an inevitable and foreseeable by-product. In this article I contend that Cooney's argument ignores two important conditions of the doctrine of double effect; namely, that the good which results from the intended effect must be at least commensurate with the harm that results from the unintended effect; and, that the intended good effect is causally separate from the unintended harmful effect. Any use of the doctrine which neglects these conditions leads to morally problematic cases. Further, once we take the conditions into account, we have good reason to think that the doctrine of double effect has no relevance to the affirmative action debate.     

Attitudes Toward Different Methods of Affirmative Action1

It was found that the men's and women's attitudes toward affirmative action (AA) in general were related to differences in self-interest. In addition, consistent with predictions drawn from notions of organizational justice and attribution principles, it was found that people held different attitudes toward different methods of affirmative action. People were most favorable toward AA involving special training programs and least favorable toward AA that employed differential selection criteria for target group members. Attitudes toward quota-based systems were intermediate.