The Problem of Confucian Moral Cultivation and Its Solution: Using Ritual Propriety to Support Rule by Law

Thinking about the decline of morality in post-reform China,the author analyzes the development of virtuous governance based on moral education,and concludes that the reason why ancient rulers were so infatuated with it was the inhibitive function of public evaluation on moral transgressions in familiar neighborhoods.However,as China transforms into a dynamic and commercial society,and its people move from familiar neighborhoods to alienated communities in the cities,public evaluation is losing its power over moral transgressors.To prevent the collapse of the moral system,it is necessary to use rule by law to foster people's sense of justice and rule-consciousness-not to simply hope for the appearance of more altruists.This is possible because law is the embodiment of moral principle,and because legal restraints and penalties can be internalized as habits.After a sense of justice and rule-consciousness has been established in people,we can again take up Confucian virtue education to nurture people's sense of shame and dignity,and their humane and righteous mind.However,to stop the current chaos and corruption,it is urgent that we adopt rule by law and supplement it with moral education.     

Joining the Transformation of Nature—The Post-Natural and Confucian Perspective on Earth Stewardship in the Anthropocene

The emergence of the Anthropocene creates a new set of conditions for understanding the relationship between human power and the natural world. These conditions include an increasingly humanized and de-natured natural world, and greater responsibilities of stewardship for human beings. In current literature, there are diverse views on the meaning of the Anthropocene and the role of modern technology in future earth stewardship. Post-natural thought regards the Anthropocene as representing the end of nature, and thus appeals to disenchantment with respect to the idea that nature is an external moral norm. Although this approach correctly addresses the significance of locality and the mutuality between humans and the environment, it fails to provide us with adequate normative boundaries for preventing the endless artificialization of nature. Alternatively, this article defends the position that Confucianism is a more plausible philosophical ground for earth stewardship in the context of the Anthropocene. The Confucian approach is an inclusive humanism which is established on the cosmological ideal of realising the virtue of shengsheng 生生 (life generation) in all beings. Moreover, Confucian ethics draw much attention to the self-regulation of human beings as virtuous persons. This is indeed what is needed in the age of the Anthropocene.     

Beyond a Theory of Human Nature： Towards an Alternative Interpretation of Mencius＇ Ethics

By following the Wittgensteinian view that the sense of an ethical term such as “nature” (xing 性) should be understood through an examination of its function in its actual philosophical context, this article takes a look at the notion of xing in the Mencius from an alternative perspective. Proceeding from this perspective, it re-examines the view that xing in the Mencius should be understood in biological terms. A discussion of xing in relation to the “Why be moral?” question follows. I then offer an alternative interpretation of Mencius’ ethics by focusing on the meaning of the ethical particulars. Contrary to common perception, I argue that Mencius’ theory of human nature (renxing 人 性) need not occupy a central place in his moral philosophy; the ultimate foundation of Mencius’ moral philosophy lies in the meaning or sense of morality. Through participating in concrete, ethical thinking and by paying attention to the ethical particulars, human beings develop their grasp of moral and ethical meaning.     

Introduction: Finding out the Right Way to Understand Virtue Ethics

It is very apparent that a discussion on virtue ethics—perhaps even a hot debate,the origin of which can be traced back to the late 1950s,has been going on during the past two decades,and has marked the philosophical domain we call ethics.Three authors' views on this topic will be seriously examined in this special theme. Chen Lai treats the topic in the context of Confucianism.He carefully explores Mencius' theory of virtue,and sees two main contrasts between the ideas of Mencius and those of Confucius,as well as three main features they both share.     

BOOK REVIEW——Stephen C. Angle,Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy.

Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy can be regarded as a creative development and comprehensive expression of Stephen C. Angle＇s former works integrating Neo-Confucian tradition and contemporary ethical and political thought. He cites the idea of conservatism from Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi to propose his own idea that conservatism is rooted in creative practice. It is in the affirmation of basic Confucian values that he sets up his view of progress, which means growing ethically and making the world better （18-19）. In this light, Progressive Confucianism can be seen as a theory that interprets and conserves traditional Confucian values in agreement with contemporary demands. Thus it can be compared with Western ethics, especially with liberalism, which also emphasizes civic virtue and moral education. And so Progressive Confucianism aims at opening up dimensions like constitutionalism and democracy that accord with Western traditions while remaining consistent with Confucian ethics and rituals.     

Emotional Attachment and Its Limits: Mengzi,Gaozi and the Guodian Discussions

Mengzi maintained that both benevolence (ren 仁) and rightness (yi義) are naturally-given in human nature. This view has occupied a dominant place in Confucian intellectual history. In Mencius 6A, Mengzi’s interlocutor, Gaozi, contests this view, arguing that rightness is determined by (doing what is fitting, in line with) external circumstances. I discuss here some passages from the excavated Guodian texts, which lend weight to Gaozi’s view. The texts reveal nuanced considerations of relational proximity and its limits, setting up requirements for moral action in scenarios where relational ties do not play a motivational role. I set out yi’s complexity in these discussions, highlighting its implications for (i) the nei-wai debate; (ii) the notion of yi as “rightness,” or doing the right thing; and (iii) how we can understand the connection between virtue and right action in these early Confucian debates. This material from the excavated texts not only provides new perspectives on a longstanding investigation of human nature and morality, it also challenges prevailing views on Warring States Confucian intellectual history.     

On the Academic Differences between Xihe School and Zhusi School

Ever since Han Fei proposed that “Confucianism has divided into eight schools,” the divisions among Confucius’ followers have been a complicated puzzle in Chinese academic history. After the demise of Confucius, two schools, Xihe 西河 School and Zhusi 洙泗 School, founded by Zixia and Zengzi respectively, had the biggest influence. Inheriting and developing Confucianism, these two schools each had their own unique insights. If we compare their thoughts, the development of early Confucianism can be found has two different approaches: (1) Zixia attached great importance to study. He practiced Confucianism by means of learning comprehensively and belonged to the school of knowledge seeking. On the other hand, Zengzi valued one’s perfect inner personality. He paid much more attention to searching inwardly, and honored “morality” at all times. (2) Zixia paid special attention to the ritual system, emphasizing the external ritual specifications of human behavior, and advocating cultivating one’s morality from outside to inside. Zengzi maintained cultivating one’s morality from inside to outside, especially through self- reflection. (3) Zixia emphasized self-cultivating and being harmonious to others, therefore he focused on external achievements, while Zengzi paid more attention to moral integrity. (4) While Zixia rarely discussed filial piety, Zengzi regarded filial piety as the most important virtue. Since filial piety is applicable universally, Zengzi’s philosophy is a filial piety-rooted philosophy. Broadly speaking, Zengzi and Zixia’s main difference lies in their different approaches to learning. Despite these differences, as firm Confucians they are “the same in Dao and different in methods.”     

Benti, practice and state: On the doctrine of mind in the four chapters of Guanzi

“Xin 心 (Mind)” is one of the key concepts in the four chapters of Guanzi. Together with Dao, qi 气 (air, or gas) and de 德 (virtue), the four concepts constitute a complete system of the learning of mind which is composed of the theory of benti 本体 (root and body), the theory of practice and the theory of spiritual state. Guanzi differentiates the two basic layers of mind—the essence and the function. It tries to attain a state of accumulated jing 精 (essence, anima) and nourished qi, in which qi is concentrated in a miraculous way, through a series of methods of mind cultivation and nurturing, including being upright, calm, tranquil and moderate, and to concentrate the mind and intention. The doctrine of mind of the four chapters of Guanzi influenced Daoism and Confucianism and is a key link in the history of Chinese thought. It is a prelude to the merger of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism.     

Developing Ethical Leadership in China: The Value of Confucian Virtue Ethics

Most research into ethical leadership depends on Western corporate experience, however current research findings may not fit the Chinese context. As a result, it is necessary to appeal to indigenous and traditional Chinese sources of wisdom when defining and evaluating ethical leadership in China. Both rule-following ethics and instrumental approaches, which are mainly used in recent empirical studies about ethical leadership, cannot enable people to have inner motivation to behave ethically. Accordingly, this article intends to establish an ethical leadership model in China by appealing to Confucian virtue ethics. A Confucian ethical leader possesses benevolence (ren 仁) inside and treats others in a proper way according to ritual and rites (li 禮). He/she makes self-cultivation as the first priority and is a virtuous role model, influencing others in a natural way by of his/her moral charisma. For such a person, economic profitableness is not a primary concern, where instead the goals, strategies and practices of his/her organization are defined by the principle of righteousness (yi 義).     

Liangzhi and the Interpretative Obfuscation Regarding Knowledge

This article aims to argue that interpreting liangzhi良知 as innate,original,or cognitive knowledge is likely to fall into "interpretative obfuscation regarding knowledge." First,for Wang,what is inherent in mankind is moral agency rather than innate or original knowledge.Therefore,the focus ofzhizhi 知 and gewu格物 is instead on moral practice and actualization of virtue rather than on either "the extension of knowledge" or "the investigation of things."Apart from that,drawing support from cognitive knowledge to explicate liangzhi also leads to three related but distinct misconceptions:liangzhi as perfect knowledge,the identity of knowledge and action,and liangzhi as recognition or acknowledgement.By clarifying the above misinterpretations,the meaning and implication of liangzhi will,in turn,also become clearer.     

Criticism of the Theory of Motivation

The theory of motivation is a theory which takes the executora＇s motivation as the basis of moral judgment. One presupposition of the theory is that motivation can be a common object of understanding. However, motivation exists only in the heart of the executor, and cannot be known exactly by others, so motivation cannot be perceived like a common object, and thus, logically, cannot be the basis of moral judgment. Even if the executor＇s motivation is accepted by others and turned into a common object, the motivation still cannot become the valid basis of a moral judgment. This is the dilemma of the theory of motivation. In practice, the dilemma appears as follows： if one insists on the theory of motivation, one can be led to the result that people do evil with good intentions. However, just because motivation cannot be the basis of moral judgment does not mean that motivation is of no significance. Good motivation is always better than evil motivation. Therefore, in moral education we should carry out motivation education and teach people to strive to have good motivations for their behavior. This is the value of motivation theory.     

On the Philosophical Relevance of Marx＇s Views Today

This paper revisits some of Marx＇s central philosophical ideas with the attempt to understand the thinker＇s real place in the history of the Western philosophical tradition. It does not only show that the philosophical dimension is central to Marx＇s economic and political works, and therefore his contributions to philosophy merit special investigation, but it also argues that Marx is a descendant of classic German philosophy, and thus his views should be assessed in the context of the development of the philosophical ideas that emerged within that tradition.     

Joseph Adler,Reconstructing the Confucian Dao: Zhu Xi's Appropriation of Zhou Dunyi.

Reconstructing the Confucian Dao offers up the carefully tended fruits of Joseph Adler's research and reflections on a long standing mystery in the annals of Song dynasty (960-1279) Neo-Confucianism (lixue).The mystery surrounds a striking addition Zhu Xi (1130-1200) made to the Confucian Dao succession (Daotong),1 an addition that augured far-reaching consequences for Neo-Confucianism.It must be stressed that the Dao succession not only served to define the orthodox tradition but also underscored the religious dimension of Confucianism by honoring those masters whose teachings most perfectly clove to,and expressed what was deemed to be Confucianism's essence.2 In Confucian the Dao,Adler brings the implications of this religious dimension,and related practice,into play.Zhu Xi's striking addition was not just his inclusion of Zhou Dunyi (1017-73) in the Confucian Dao succession;it was his identification of Zhou as the progenitor of the Song rebirth of the Dao succession,nearly 1,500 years after the passing of its last classical participant,Mencius (372-289 BCE).     

From “Practice” to “Living”: Main Trends of Chinese Aesthetics in the Past 40 Years

In the past 40 years, Chinese research in the field of philosophical aesthetics has made great progress in basic research and academic contributions. The Chinese approach to the ontology of contemporary aesthetics has played the most important role in this historical transition. A shifting paradigm of the ontology of aesthetics—from the concept of “practice” (shijian實踐) to the concept of “living” (shenghuo 生活)—is assisting to integrate Chinese aesthetics into the context of globalization, and the future of Chinese aesthetics is both Chinese and global. “Aesthetics” is not just Ganxue 感学 in the sense of Aesthetica, it is also is a Juexue 觉学 that is closer to the sense of Aisthetik in Chinese context.     

A Zero-Relationship Justification of Rights： A Contractual Approach Based on Rawls＇ Device of the ＂Original Position＂

In contemporary moral and political philosophy, there are two leading approaches to the justification of rights. These could be broadly identified as deontological theories and consequential theories. These two schools of theories each have their own strengths and weakness, while there is also a third contractual approach that is under represented. Because Rawls＇ and Scanlon＇s well-known contractual theories are designed for purposes other than the justification of rights, the purpose of this paper is to establish a principle of rights on the basis of Rawls＇ justification device of the ＂original position.＂ First, it supplies a criterion based on human conduct or action. Second, based on this account of human conduct, different types of relationships are constructed and presented to the parties in the ＂original position.＂ Third, it will show that the parties in the ＂original position＂ would choose one of these relationships as the principle of rights. Finally, Rawls＇ first principle of justice will be reformulated. The procedure of choosing a principle of rights in this paper could also be viewed as a demonstration that, when properly situated and motivated, human beings exhibit their potential as rational beings.     

The Meaning of Xing 形and Moral Transformation in Wuxing

The popular reading of xing yu nei 形於內 (being actualized from the internal) in Wuxing creates a predicament in the understanding of “xing 行 (behaviors)” which is not xing yu nei. As stated in Wuxing and other early Confucian texts, including The Doctrine of the Mean, The Great Learning, the Mencius and Xunzi, xing 形 is a process involving multidimensional content including not only deliberated decisions and actions, but also attitudes, facial expressions, and even the charisma that possesses power to transform the world. Xing 形 always operates in an effortless natural style, rather than under cognitive control. Xing yu nei signifies that virtues are possessed to a perfectly deep degree. Therefore, “not xing yu nei” does not mean that “behaviors” are forced by external pressure and thus hypocritical, but rather that although they also originate from internal virtues, the virtues in this case are not deep enough to enable multidimensional and natural manifestations. Xing 行, representing the way of the “human,” is the approach to and is on a continuum with “de zhi xing 德之行 (the behavior of Virtue),” which matches the way of Heaven. Shendu 慎 獨requires paying close attention to and regulating the intentions and emotions emerging at the heart/mind, which is the fundamental work when making the effort of “xing” towards “de zhi xing.”     

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,Moral Psychology Volume 4： Free Will and Moral Responsibility

This book is the fourth volume of a series on moral psychology edited by philosopher Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Each of these volumes is organized in debate format, with ten or so main essays each followed by responses from two critics, with an opportunity for the author of the main essay to make a final reply.The present volume takes on the question of free will and moral responsibility, and addresses the question of what implications recent discoveries in neuroscience and social psychology have for our traditional notions of moral and legal responsibility, as well as for popular and philosophical notions of free will. Given the constant barrage of media coverage of scientists declaring that science has now proven that free will is an illusion, and even that morality itself is an illusion, this volume covers a topic that is timely, relevant, and important.