Disadvantaged by Diversity? The Effects of Diversity Goals on Competence Perceptions1

This research examined how efforts to ensure demographic diversity in a work group affected perceptions of the competence of individuals who are likely targets of such efforts. In three experiments, 262 undergraduates gave their impressions and performance expectations of members of a group assembled to work on a task. When a diversity rationale rather than a merit rationale was provided for how the work group was assembled, both women (Studies 1 and 2) and Black men (Study 3) were perceived as less competent and were expected to be less influential. This effect occurred regardless of the proportional representation of women or the degree of the groups' heterogeneity. The diversity rationale also produced more negative characterizations than did another non‐merit‐based rationale: scheduling convenience.     

Are Conductive Arguments Possible?

Conductive Arguments are held to be defeasible, non-conclusive, and neither inductive nor deductive (Blair and Johnson in Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. College, London, 2011). Of the different kinds of Conductive Arguments, I am concerned only with those for which it is claimed that countervailing considerations detract from the support for the conclusion, complimentary to the positive reasons increasing that support. Here’s an example from Wellman (Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Southern Illinois University Press, Chicago, 1971): Although your lawn needs cutting, you ought to take your son to the movies because the picture is ideal for children and will be gone by tomorrow. (1971: 57) I argue that Conductive Arguments are not possible—the “ought” conclusion only holds if countervailing considerations are nullified.     

The Janus of Diversity: May the Ideology of Individual Diversity Rationalize Social Inequalities?

Some popular ideas about diversity today emphasize the uniqueness and potential in each individual and posit that all differences across individuals count the same as long as they are “true to themselves.” These ideas saturate current antidiscrimination discourses, but their impact on what might be perceived as discrimination has hardly been tested empirically. This article argues that the direction of that impact may not be taken for granted and advances two hypotheses. First, individual diversity (ID) ideology may direct attention to the alleged psychological attributes of minority group members, rather than to social inequalities and discrimination. Secondly, ID ideology may direct attention towards discrimination only if the target is seen as “authentically unique” (the prototype of ID). Both hypotheses were tested and supported in two studies addressing Greek participants’ perceptions of immigrant children’s difficulties. Study 2 further controlled for possible mediation effects. The discussion suggests that ID ideology might paradoxically rationalize inequalities and discrimination, as well as implicitly raise elitist expectations from minority group members.     

How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?

A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid of? This article seeks to show how recalcitrant emotion is possible. I argue that reductive theories that identify emotions with judgments, desires, or some combination thereof, cannot explain the possibility of emotional irrationality without contradiction. I then show that the appeal to sui generis attitudes also fails to solve the puzzle of recalcitrant emotions, and diagnose this failure as stemming from a misleading analogy between emotions and perceptions, and in particular, between recalcitrant emotions and perceptual illusions. The solution can be found in a different analogy: between emotions and actions; more specifically, between recalcitrant emotions and weakness of the will, akrasia. Like akratic actions, recalcitrant emotions entail responding to reasons, but to inferior reasons. Irrational but non-contradictory emotions are possible just as weakness of will is possible.     

Is an Apophatic Trinitarianism Possible?

A good deal of recent theology has been characterized by a robust, self‐confident trinitarianism. Is it possible, by contrast, to develop something like an apophatic trinitarianism? This article attempts to sketch what such a thing might look like and defend it against some obvious objections.     

Is a Tenseless Language Possible?

Whether it takes the form of a translation or of giving truth-conditions, any putative reduction of tensed language to tenseless language will be undermined if it can be shown that there could be no genuinely tenseless language. A similar problem faced traditional phenomenalism: it was far from clear that there could be a 'language of sense-data'. Either the imagined language was no language at all, or it was dependent upon object-language, not the other way around. A parallel dilemma faces tenseless reductionism. In spelling out what a tenseless language would be like, one either ends up with something that no creature could have as a language, or with something that is parasitic upon tensed language - not the other way around.     

How is Akrasia Possible After All?

I attempt to save akrasia from the skeptical doubt and denial as to its possibility in a new way. I argue that the akratic agent – the akrates – has unconscious reason(s) for the akratic action. Moreover, the akrates does not weigh and value the reasons for and against the akratic action in full awareness, including their emotive significance, consciously experienced as feelings. He follows his feelings favoring the akratic action (since he does not tolerate or resist them), and does not let his unconscious emotions, supporting the wanted, chosen action, play a causal role in impelling him to perform this action.     

Is Synthesis of World Religions Possible?

Introduction

All major religions appear to follow a pattern of social contract with an additional feature of ‘termination of the contract’ and its ‘aftermath’, for the soul. This way, religion is known as ‘dissolution mechanism’ (DM). It contains both social and metaphysical terms, where the former is subsidiary to the latter. The metaphysical term is represented by the mokṣa. A given DM not only explicates the state of soul after the termination of contract, but also it endeavours to point out the nature of the ultimate reality it conceives.

Method

DM provides a geometrical/mathematical picture of the universe to locate the ultimate reality and the individual souls in it; three views of the universe—destruction, creation and sustenance—are obtained for three basic religions or thoughts. Buddhist ‘Nothingness’ forms the psychological background for these views of universe. Architectural designs of worship places, yantras or manḍalas, etc., show both the nature of universe and the location of the ultimate in it. Understanding these figures is the key method to be employed for arriving at synthesis.

Conclusion

Synthesis consists in noting the identical common metaphysical generic essence as running through all the religions, and identifying the unique specific root-essence on such a generic essence. Specific root-essence of a given DM consists in the way the unification of cognitions of the universe is carried out. When the unification of all the specific root-essences on the generic essence is carried out with a further psychological background of Buddhism, we get a specimen of metaphysical synthesis of world religions. Thus, synthesis is a distinct and sure possibility.

     

Is a kantian Musical Formalism Possible?

In this article, I consider whether a suitably stripped‐down version of Kant's aesthetic theory could nevertheless provide philosophical foundations for musical formalism. I begin by distinguishing between formalism as a view about the nature of music and formalism as an approach to music criticism, arguing that Kant's aesthetics only rules out the former. Then, using an example from the work of musicologist and composer Edward T. Cone, I isolate the characteristics of formalist music criticism. With this characterization in mind, I conclude by showing that even if Kant's aesthetic theory is reduced to its most fundamental claims, the logic of formalist music criticism precludes its practice within even a kantian perspective.     

Can Counterfactuals Really Be about Possible Worlds?

The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A > C) is true if and only if the A‐worlds most similar to the actual world @ are C‐worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non‐trivial truth‐values under physical determinism. I show that the possible‐worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P > (Q > R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true if the contingent falsity of (Q > R) is to be explained. If (P > (Q > R)) has a backtracking reading then the contingent facts that (Q > R) needs to be true in the closest P‐worlds are absent. If (P > (Q > R)) has a forwardtracking reading, then the laws required by (Q > R) to be true in the closest P‐worlds will be absent, because they are violated in those worlds. Solutions like lossy laws or denial of embedding won't work. The only approach to counterfactuals that explains the embedding is a pragmatic metalinguistic approach in which the whole idea that counterfactuals are about a modal reality, be it abstract or concrete, is given up.     

Six Ways of Salvation: How Does Jesus Save?

Abstract : Using the model method for comparative analysis of theological theories, this article compares and contrasts six models of atonement: (1) Jesus as teacher of true knowledge; (2) Jesus as moral example and influence; (3) Jesus as the victorious champion and liberator; (4) Jesus as our satisfaction; (5) Jesus as the happy exchange; and (6) Jesus as the final scapegoat.     

Which Worlds are Possible? A Judgment Aggregation Problem

Suppose the members of a group (e.g., committee, jury, expert panel) each form a judgment on which worlds in a given set are possible, subject to the constraint that at least one world is possible but not all are. The group seeks to aggregate these individual judgments into a collective judgment, subject to the same constraint. I show that no judgment aggregation rule can solve this problem in accordance with three conditions: “unanimity,” “independence” and “non-dictatorship,” Although the result is a variant of an existing theorem on “group identification” (Kasher and Rubinstein, Logique et Analyse 160:385–395, 1997), the aggregation of judgments on which worlds are possible (or permissible, desirable, etc.) appears not to have been studied yet. The result challenges us to take a stance on which of its conditions to relax.     

What's Possible? What Matters? Reply to Commentaries

The three discussants agree that a definition of psychoanalysis tied to session frequency is problematic and needs to change. Yet none supports my recommendation to redefine the practice of psychoanalysis in terms of the practitioner's training. This prompted me to look more closely at my proposal and push my thinking further. I argue that psychoanalysis, like many other professions, needs to define its practice as the application of its complex and evolving knowledge and skill base, grounded in its unique field of inquiry. Although there are individual exceptions, the inculcation of this knowledge and skill base is generally best accomplished through psychoanalytic training. This assertion, however, rests on the premise that our training curricula keep pace with our rapidly evolving field of inquiry and knowledge. To further clarify my vision I examine the nature of psychoanalytic expertise. I suggest that such expertise amounts to the inculcation and integration of a large number of psychoanalytic frames of reference. I contend further that the nature of contemporary psychoanalytic theories is such that important psychoanalytic frames of reference are proliferating more rapidly than in the past, that the relationships among them are becoming more complex, and that consequently the application of psychoanalytic theory to practice is also becoming more complex. Psychoanalytic training programs need to recognize this expanding complexity and revise curricula and pedagogic methods on an ongoing basis to reflect this evolution within our field.     

An Alternative to an Assessment Centre on Six Pieces of Paper?

The application form currently used in police officer recruitment neither measures competencies necessary ‘on the job’, nor screens out inappropriate applicants. To improve this situation, a competency-based application form was developed and trialled in three police forces. Results were compared with those obtained via the assessment centre acting as the first competency screening stage of the current selection process. A high level of correspondence was found between the two sets of results raising a query as to whether the application form could be a valid replacement for the assessment centre. A future validation study, in which the performance of recruited police officers is compared with application form results, will better answer this question. In the meantime, it is proposed that the competency-based application form questions are incorporated into the current form to reduce the number of inappropriate applicants reaching expensive, labour-intensive stages of the selection process.     

Fundamental British values? Possible implications for children’s spirituality

This article argues that the statement of fundamental British values, as introduced in England’s education system in the period 2012–2014, is problematic, not least in relation to children’s spirituality. The context of the introduction of fundamental British values is outlined. The values chosen are more contested than they may seem, being neither fundamental nor distinctively British. How the idea has been conceptualised and implemented has adverse consequences for children’s understanding of identity, especially for some already marginalised groups, and may encourage a limited, superficial view of spiritual, moral, social and cultural development. This risks excluding some groups, especially Muslims, in the current political context, and discouraging open discussion in schools of controversial topics, when such discussion helps to reduce the danger of radicalisation. Consideration of the impact of statements of values, however apparently uncontroversial, must take account of the power of those formulating such statements and the wider context.     

Possible worlds semantics: A research program that cannot fail?

Providing a possible worlds semantics for a logic involves choosing a class of possible worlds models, and setting up a truth definition connecting formulas of the logic with statements about these models. This scheme is so flexible that a danger arises: perhaps, any (reasonable) logic whatsoever can be modelled in this way. Thus, the enterprise would lose its essential tension. Fortunately, it may be shown that the so-called incompleteness-examples from modal logic resist possible worlds modelling, even in the above wider sense. More systematically, we investigate the interplay of truth definitions and model conditions, proving a preservation theorem characterizing those types of truth definition which generate the minimal modal logic.