Variations in constrained retrieval

Mentally reinstating encoding operations at retrieval might improve access to memories; however, such constrained retrieval is an effortful process that may not always be used. The memory-for-foils procedure (Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, & Rhodes, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 12, 852-857, 2005) infers participant-initiated mental reinstatement of encoding operations during attempts at recognition from the differential memory that accrues to foils during a test of deeply processed items versus during a test of shallowly processed items, as indicated by performance on a final recognition memory test for the foils. Experiment 1 tested whether differential memory for foils is due to the evocation of task context during recollection of neighboring old items. Experiment 2 tested whether inducing a set to respond without much effort on a prior recognition test affects the likelihood of constrained retrieval on later tests. Experiment 3 tested whether constrained retrieval is less likely to occur when the deep versus shallow source of test items is intermixed, rather than blocked in separate tests. These experiments provide evidence that people query memory by mentally reinstating encoding operations and identify conditions that affect the probability of constrained retrieval.     

Source-constrained retrieval influences the encoding of new information

Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, and Rhodes (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 852–857, 2005) showed that new words presented as foils among a list of old words that had been deeply encoded were themselves subsequently better recognized than new words presented as foils among a list of old words that had been shallowly encoded. In Experiment 1, by substituting a deep-versus-shallow imagery manipulation for the levels-of-processing manipulation, we demonstrated that the effect is robust and that it generalizes, also occurring with a different type of encoding. In Experiment 2, we provided more direct evidence for context-related encoding during tests of deeply encoded words, showing enhanced priming for foils presented among deeply encoded targets when participants made the same deep-encoding judgments on those items as had been made on the targets during study. In Experiment 3, we established that the findings from Experiment 2 are restricted to this specific deep judgment task and are not a general consequence of these foils being associated with deeply encoded items. These findings provide support for the source-constrained retrieval hypothesis of Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, and Rhodes: New information can be influenced by how surrounding items are encoded and retrieved, as long as the surrounding items recruit a coherent mode of processing.     

Mixed-handedness advantages in episodic memory obtained under conditions of intentional learning extend to incidental learning

The existence of handedness differences in the retrieval of episodic memories is well-documented, but virtually all have been obtained under conditions of intentional learning. Two experiments are reported that extend the presence of such handedness differences to memory retrieval under conditions of incidental learning. Experiment 1 used Craik and Tulving’s (1975) classic levels-of-processing paradigm and obtained handedness differences under incidental and intentional conditions of deep processing, but not under conditions of shallow incidental processing. Experiment 2 looked at incidental memory for distracter items from a recognition memory task and again found a mixed-handed advantage. Results are discussed in terms of the relation between interhemispheric interaction, levels of processing, and episodic memory retrieval.     

联想启动与知觉启动的比较研究

采用快速命名方法探讨不同加工水平对联想启动效应的影响。被试分别在深、浅加工条件下学习一系列颜色词,然后完成颜色命名和再认任务,并设立词命名任务,以比较联想启动和知觉启动的异同。结果表明,在颜色命名任务中,深、浅加工条件下均可形成对颜色词的启动效应,但浅加工条件下的再认成绩明显低于深加工,出现了联想启动和再认的分离现象。词命名表现出与颜色命名相似的结果,但它们在有意识回忆方面仍存在一定的差异,提示知觉表征系统单独并不能支持联想启动,联想启动可能是多个记忆系统共同作用的结果。     

Working memory predicts the rejection of false memories

The relationship between working memory capacity (WMC) and false memories in the memory conjunction paradigm was explored. Previous research using other paradigms has shown that individuals high in WMC are not as likely to experience false memories as low-WMC individuals, the explanation being that high-WMC individuals are better able to engage in source monitoring. In the memory conjunction paradigm participants are presented at study with parent words (e.g., eyeglasses, whiplash). At test, in addition to being presented with targets and foils, participants are presented with lures that are composed of previously studied features (e.g., eyelash). It was found that high-WMC individuals had lower levels of false recognition than low-WMC individuals. Furthermore, recall-to-reject responses were analysed (e.g., “I know I didn't see eyelash because I remember seeing eyeglasses”) and it was found that high-WMC individuals were more likely to utilise this memory editing strategy, providing direct evidence that one reason that high-WMC individuals are not as prone to false memories is because they are better able to engage in source monitoring.     

编码与提取干扰对内隐和外显记忆的非对称性影响

以往研究表明在外显记忆中,编码与提取加工存在着非对称性,但在内隐记忆中,二者的关系并不明确,因此实验采用“学习-再认”范式,考察在编码或提取中分别附加的干扰任务对词汇判断或再认产生的影响。结果证实编码与提取干扰对内隐或外显记忆都具有非对称性的影响,但又存在着差异,即编码干扰会导致随后外显记忆成绩显著减少,而提取干扰对其影响较小,相反,编码干扰对随后内隐测验中启动效应的影响较小,但提取干扰会破坏启动效应,从而为内隐记忆和外显记忆的分离提供了进一步的证据     

提取干扰对知觉和概念启动的影响

通过学习—测验范式,分别以词汇判断、语义分类任务为测验,探讨提取干扰对不同识别式记忆的影响差异。结果发现,实验1验证了识别式知觉内隐记忆的提取干扰效应,实验2发现识别式概念内隐记忆在提取干扰下也明显降低;两个实验启动量联合分析发现,相比无干扰条件,概念启动比知觉启动受到提取干扰的破坏更大。上述结果说明识别式内隐记忆的提取干扰具有普遍性,提取干扰产生了不同识别式内隐记忆之间的分离,识别式概念内隐记忆更容易受到提取干扰的影响。     

Semantic and visual relatedness of distractors impairs episodic retrieval of pictures in a divided attention paradigm

We used a divided attention (DA) paradigm to infer the representational codes needed to support episodic retrieval of pictures, by measuring susceptibility to memory interference from different distracting tasks. Participants made recognition memory decisions to semantically categorized sets of pictures while simultaneously making size judgments to a set of visually-presented distractor pictures. Recognition accuracy was worse and response times were slower under DA conditions relative to full attention (FA), regardless of semantic relatedness of distractors to targets (Experiment 1). Similarly, we found no differential memory interference under DA relative to FA when distractor pictures were either visually (but not semantically), semantically (but not visually), or unrelated to the targets (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, memory interference was significantly larger under DA at retrieval when distractors were both semantically and visually similar to the targets. Findings suggest episodic memory for pictures requires access to either visually- or semantically-based representations for optimal performance.     

Episodic generation can cause semantic forgetting: Retrieval-induced forgetting of false memories

In two experiments, we tested whether false recognition and false recall were prone to retrieval-induced forgetting, using the retrieval practice paradigm (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). Participants encoded lists of cue-target word pairs associated with a nonpresented, critical theme word and then engaged in retrieval practice for half of the word pairs from half of the lists. As expected, unpracticed targets from practiced lists were recognized (Experiment 1) and recalled (Experiment 2) less well than those from unpracticed lists. In addition, false recognition and false recall of critical items associated with practiced lists was lower than false recognition and false recall of items associated with unpracticed lists. We argue that false memories are prone to inhibitory mechanisms engendered by the retrieval practice paradigm. The results are consistent with the claim that semantically activated critical themes interfere with the episodic retrieval of list words and that inhibition decreases the activation level of these interfering memory representations during retrieval practice.     

No Benefit of Eye-Closure Rehearsal in a Unimodal Recognition Memory Test for Word Items

Recent studies have suggested that closing the eyes helps memory retrieval in recall tests for audiovisual clips that contain multimodal information. In two experiments, we examined whether eye-closure improves recognition memory performance for word lists presented unimodally (i.e., visually or aurally). In the encoding phase, participants saw or heard a list of unrelated, meaningful word items. After a fixed retention interval of 1 week (Experiment 1, n = 110) and 5 min (Experiment 2, n = 44), the participants were asked to mentally rehearse the items with their eyes open or closed, and then they performed a recognition test. The results revealed no effect of eye-closure rehearsal on recognition performance. We discuss the possible reasons why no eye-closure benefit was found in recognition memory tests for unrelated word items.     

Re-exposure to studied items at test does not influence false recognition

In two experiments, we investigated whether re-exposure to previously studied items at test affects false recognition in the DRM paradigm. Furthermore, we examined whether exposure to the critical lure at test influences memory for subsequently presented study items. In Experiment 1, immediately following each studied DRM list, participants were given a recognition test. The tests were constructed such that the number of studied items preceding the critical lure varied from zero to five. Neither false recognition for critical lures nor accurate memory for studied items was affected by this manipulation. In Experiment 2, we replicated this pattern of results under speeded conditions at test. Both experiments confirm that exposure to previously studied items at test does not affect true or false recognition in the DRM paradigm. This pattern strongly suggests that retrieval processes do not influence false recognition in the DRM paradigm.     

Re-exposure to studied items at test does not influence false recognition

In two experiments, we investigated whether re-exposure to previously studied items at test affects false recognition in the DRM paradigm. Furthermore, we examined whether exposure to the critical lure at test influences memory for subsequently presented study items. In Experiment 1, immediately following each studied DRM list, participants were given a recognition test. The tests were constructed such that the number of studied items preceding the critical lure varied from zero to five. Neither false recognition for critical lures nor accurate memory for studied items was affected by this manipulation. In Experiment 2, we replicated this pattern of results under speeded conditions at test. Both experiments confirm that exposure to previously studied items at test does not affect true or false recognition in the DRM paradigm. This pattern strongly suggests that retrieval processes do not influence false recognition in the DRM paradigm.     

The role of retrieval mode and retrieval orientation in retrieval practice: insights from comparing recognition memory testing formats and restudying

The effectiveness of retrieval practice for aiding long-term memory, referred to as the testing effect, has been widely demonstrated. However, the specific neurocognitive mechanisms underlying this phenomenon remain unclear. In the present study, we sought to explore the role of pre-retrieval processes at initial testing on later recognition performance by using event-related potentials (ERPs). Subjects studied two lists of words (Chinese characters) and then performed a recognition task or a source memory task, or restudied the word lists. At the end of the experiment, subjects received a final recognition test based on the remember–know paradigm. Behaviorally, initial testing (active retrieval) enhanced memory retention relative to restudying (passive retrieval). The retrieval mode at initial testing was indexed by more positive-going ERPs for unstudied items in the active-retrieval tasks than in passive retrieval from 300 to 900 ms. Follow-up analyses showed that the magnitude of the early ERP retrieval mode effect (300–500 ms) was predictive of the behavioral testing effect later on. In addition, the ERPs for correctly rejected new items during initial testing differed between the two active-retrieval tasks from 500 to 900 ms, and this ERP retrieval orientation effect predicted differential behavioral testing gains between the two active-retrieval conditions. Our findings confirm that initial testing promotes later retrieval relative to restudying, and they further suggest that adopting pre-retrieval processing in the forms of retrieval mode and retrieval orientation might contribute to these memory enhancements.     

Involuntary memory and the development of retrieval skills in young children

An incidental memory paradigm was used to study involuntary encoding processes and voluntary retrieval strategies in children's memory. Preschool (mean age: 4 years, 4 months) and kindergarten (mean age: 5 years, 10 months) children sorted pictures according to their color or category membership, and then received either a recall test (Experiment 1) or a recognition test (Experiment 2). Better retention of category- than color-sorted items was observed for kindergarten children in free recall, preschool and kindergarten children in cued recall, and neither group in recognition. These results were interpreted in terms of the retrieval strategies used by children in each of the memory tasks. The importance of distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary memory processes, and between acquisition and retrieval, in studies of depth-of-processing was emphasized. Developmental differences in performance appear to derive primarily from the role of voluntary search strategies in retrieval, rather than from age differences in involuntary encoding processes.     

Top-down constraint on recognition memory

Can recognition memory be constrained “at the front end,” such that people are more likely to retrieve information about studying a recognition-test probe from a specified target source than they are to retrieve such information about a probe from a nontarget source? We adapted a procedure developed by Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, and Rhodes (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 12:852–857, 2005) to address this question. Experiment 1 yielded evidence of source-constrained retrieval, but that pattern was not significant in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 (nor in several unpublished pilot experiments). In Experiment 5, in which items from the two studied sources were perceptibly different, a pattern consistent with front-end constraint of recognition emerged, but this constraint was likely exercised via visual attention rather than memory. Experiment 6 replicated both the absence of a significant constrained-retrieval pattern when the sources did not differ perceptibly (as in Exps. 2, 3 and 4) and the presence of that pattern when they did differ perceptibly (as in Exp. 5). Our results suggest that people can easily constrain recognition when items from the to-be-recognized source differ perceptibly from items from other sources (presumably via visual attention), but that it is difficult to constrain retrieval solely on the basis of source memory.     

Comparative difficulty and the strategic regulation of accuracy: The impact of test-list context on monitoring and meta-metacognition

A growing body of research has shown that context manipulations can have little or no impact on accuracy performance, yet still significantly influence metacognitive performance. For example, participants in a test-list context paradigm study one list of words with a medium levels-of-processing task and a second word list with either a shallow or deep task: Recognition for medium words does not differ across conditions, however medium words are significantly more likely to be labeled as “remembered” (vs. merely familiar) if they had been studied with a shallow word list (Bodner & Lindsay, 2003). The goal of the current studies was to extend the test-list context paradigm to strategic regulation (report/withhold recognition test), and broaden it to incorporate different types of stimuli (i.e., face stimuli in place of a medium word list). The paradigm also was modified to include separate answer (studied/new) confidence and decision (report/withhold) confidence ratings at test. Results showed that context did not impact recognition accuracy for faces across the context conditions, however participants were more likely to report (i.e., volunteer) their face responses if they had studied the shallow word list. The results also demonstrated a difference between answer confidence and decision confidence, and the pattern of this difference depended on whether responses were reported or withheld (Experiment 1). Overall, the data are presented as support for the functional account of memory, which views memory states as inferential and attributional rather than static categories.     

What makes recognition without awareness appear to be elusive? Strategic factors that influence the accuracy of guesses

Various factors could conceivably promote the accuracy of guesses during a recognition test. Two that we identified in previous studies are forced-choice testing format and high perceptual similarity between the repeat target and novel foil. In restricted circumstances, the relative perceptual fluency of the target can be compared with that of the foil and used as a reliable cue to guide accurate responses that occur without explicit retrieval—a phenomenon we referred to as “implicit recognition.” In this issue, Jeneson and colleagues report a failure to replicate accurate guesses and also a tendency on the part of subjects to hazard guesses infrequently, even though testing circumstances were very similar to those that we used. To resolve this discrepancy, we developed a simple manipulation to encourage either guessing or confident responding. Encouraging guessing increased both the prevalence of guesses and the accuracy of guesses in a recognition test, relative to when confident responding was encouraged. When guessing was encouraged, guesses were highly accurate (as in our previous demonstrations of implicit recognition), whereas when confident responding was encouraged, guesses were at chance levels (as in Jeneson and colleagues'' data). In light of a substantial literature showing high accuracy despite low confidence in certain circumstances, we infer that both the prevalence and accuracy of guessing can be influenced by whether subjects adopt guessing-friendly strategies. Our findings thus help to further characterize conditions likely to promote implicit recognition based on perceptual fluency.In several prior experiments, we reported findings indicative of recognition without awareness (Voss et al. 2008; Voss and Paller 2009). The experiments involved recognition tests for colorful and complex geometric shapes (kaleidoscope images). Subjects attempted to discriminate repeat stimuli (targets) from novel stimuli (foils). In some of our experiments, subjects made recognition responses and also rated the quality of their recognition experience or their confidence in their decision. For example, recognition often occurred with awareness of memory retrieval and with some level of confidence. On the other hand, correct recognition of a target sometimes occurred with no discernable awareness of memory retrieval or confidence; essentially, subjects felt that their response was merely a guess—and yet they were correct.Of course, the reason that a guess might be correct in a recognition test might have nothing at all to do with the subject having retrieved relevant information; the response might be merely a “lucky guess.” Our results, however, provided evidence that processes of implicit memory were operative in producing at least a subset of the correct guesses. In recognition tests using a forced-choice format, targets and foils shared a high degree of perceptual similarity and were displayed side-by-side, and we found that, for guess responses, the repeat stimulus was correctly selected remarkably often. With no stored information (and given that the target occurred equally often on the left side and the right side, and that targets and foils were counterbalanced across subjects), the repeat stimulus should be selected correctly 50% of the time in the long run. In our original report, we found that 82% of the guess responses were correct, which was more accurate than responses when trials with high- or low-confidence responses were pooled together (56%; data combined for all study conditions) (Experiment 2 of Voss et al. 2008). We referred to this phenomenon as recognition without awareness or implicit recognition. For the present discussion, we will use the latter term.Indeed, our results provided several additional reasons for linking implicit memory with this phenomenon of implicit recognition. In one experiment, each trial was classified as either (1) a recognition experience in which subjects recollected episodic information from their initial experience with the target; (2) recognition with familiarity for the target, but no other recall of prior information concerning the target; or (3) a guess with no confidence in the accuracy of the response (Voss and Paller 2009). We found that guesses were approximately as accurate as recollection responses (73% vs. 79%, respectively, averaged across encoding conditions), and that guesses were more accurate than decisions based on familiarity (59%, averaged across encoding conditions).Another feature of these experiments was that we contrasted two types of learning conditions. In one condition, to-be-remembered stimuli were viewed while subjects simultaneously performed a verbal working memory task. This task required that the subject listen to a spoken digit on each trial and respond according to whether the digit on the prior trial was odd or even (i.e., a one-back task). In the other condition, there were no spoken digits, and attention could be allocated fully to viewing the to-be-remembered stimuli. In several different experiments, recognition accuracy was higher with divided-attention study than with full-attention study. Although this is a highly unusual outcome for recognition performance, it was clear that divided attention during the study led to relatively less confidence during the recognition test, such that guessing was more prevalent, and these guess responses were highly accurate.Notably, these two key results—highly accurate guessing, and a recognition advantage for divided over full attention at study—were not obtained when recognition was tested with a yes–no format (targets and highly similar foils randomly intermixed and shown one stimulus at a time), or when a forced-choice test was prepared such that each target was paired with a random foil rather than a highly similar foil (Voss et al. 2008). On the basis of these findings, as well as additional results from electrophysiological recordings (described below in the Discussion section), we argued that subjects were able to weigh the relative perceptual fluency of the target and the foil only for forced-choice tests with high target/foil similarity, and then they could use this fluency cue to guide accurate selection of the target (Voss and Paller 2009).We aim to develop a line of reasoning to clarify why implicit recognition might tend to operate preferentially in certain circumstances, such as when the relative perceptual fluency of targets versus foils is likely to serve as a useful cue, and when the ability to remember specific stimulus details does not provide a useful cue (as is the case when these details are largely shared between the target and the foil). In many situations, however, perceptual fluency may not be a good basis for making recognition judgments. Often, accurate recognition reflects conceptual elaboration about the meaning of an event, and the conceptual features are typically remembered more robustly than the set of stimulus features perceived during the course of the event. Thus, implicit recognition may be less likely to guide a response in a recognition test in the presence of confident memory for the target. Dividing attention during encoding resulted in lower confidence during the recognition test, and this may have been one factor that promoted reliance on signals of relative perceptual fluency. Of course, there may be other factors that also promote or inhibit this type of strategy in a recognition test.     

Overcoming Misinformation Effects in Eyewitness Memory: Effects of Encoding Time and Event Cues

Eyewitness memory is often distorted when misleading information is presented to subjects after encoding. Three experiments explored ways to overcome these misinformation effects. In Experiment 1, subjects viewed slides of a robbery, at a rate of four or seven seconds per slide. Five minutes later subjects were given a recognition test with few (1–3) or numerous (6–13) event cues. Providing numerous retrieval cues improved overall performance, but did not reduce the effects of misinformation. W ith week-long delays (Experiment 2) numerous retrieval cues did eliminate misinformation effects, but only when subjects viewed slides at the slower rate (seven seconds per slide). Experiment 3 essentially replicated this pattern, using a modified test to eliminate any biasing effects of distractors. Given adequate encoding and numerous retrieval cues, misinformation effects were eliminated, suggesting that under some conditions misinformation makes event memory inaccessible, but not unavailable.     

Delayed memory for visual—haptic exploration of familiar objects

Long-term memory of haptic, visual, and cross-modality information was investigated. In Experiment 1, subjects briefly explored 40 commonplace objects visually or haptically and then received a recognition test with categorically similar foils in the same or the alternative modality both immediately and after 1 week. Recognition was best for visual input and test, with haptic memory still apparent after a week's delay. Recognition was poorest in the cross-modality conditions, with performance on the haptic-visual and visual-haptic cross-modal conditions being nearly identical. Visual and haptic information decayed at similar rates across a week delay. In Experiment 2, subjects simultaneously viewed and handled the same objects, and transfer was tested in a successive cue-modality paradigm. Performance with the visual modality again exceeded that with the haptic modality. Furthermore, initial errors on the haptic test were often corrected when followed by the visual presentation, both immediately and after 1 week. However, visual test errors were corrected by haptic cuing on the immediate test only. These results are discussed in terms of shared information between the haptic and visual modalities, and the ease of transfer between these modalities immediately and after a substantial delay.     

Memory for temporally dynamic scenes

Recognition memory was investigated for individual frames extracted from temporally continuous, visually rich film segments of 5–15 min. Participants viewed a short clip from a film in either a coherent or a jumbled order, followed by a recognition test of studied frames. Foils came either from an earlier or a later part of the film (Experiment 1) or from deleted segments selected from random cuts of varying duration (0.5 to 30?s) within the film itself (Experiment 2). When the foils came from an earlier or later part of the film (Experiment 1), recognition was excellent, with the hit rate far exceeding the false-alarm rate (.78 vs. 18). In Experiment 2, recognition was far worse, with the hit rate (.76) exceeding the false-alarm rate only for foils drawn from the longest cuts (15 and 30?s) and matching the false-alarm rate for the 5?s segments. When the foils were drawn from the briefest cuts (0.5 and 1.0 s), the false-alarm rate exceeded the hit rate. Unexpectedly, jumbling had no effect on recognition in either experiment. These results are consistent with the view that memory for complex visually temporal events is excellent, with the integrity unperturbed by disruption of the global structure of the visual stream. Disruption of memory was observed only when foils were drawn from embedded segments of duration less than 5?s, an outcome consistent with the view that memory at these shortest durations are consolidated with expectations drawn from the previous stream.