The Value of Information as Ontological Pluralism

In my paper I will focus my attention on some philosophical aspects of the Information Ethics displayed by Luciano Floridi. Floridi’s Information Ethics has the methodological merit of providing the interpretation of the Informational Turn with a solid philosophical basis, the roots of which deserve a careful investigation. In this perspective, I will analyse a key question, which is essential not only from a theoretical but also from a practical (moral, political and legal) point of view, i.e. whether or not Floridi’s construction of information is consistent with a pluralistic conception of Being.     

Further Notes on Feminist Ethics and Pluralism: A Reply to Lindgren

In a comment on my paper, “Moral Understandings: Alternative Epistemology for a Feminist Ethics” (1989) Ralph Lindgren questions the wisdom of confronta' tional rhetoric in my paper and much feminist moral philosophy, and the consistency of this stance with pluralism about ethics. I defend both the rebellious rhetoric and the inclusivity of my own approach, but suggest that pluralism in moral philosophy is harder to define than Lindgren's comments suggest.     

The Susceptibility of Intuitive Knowledge to Akrasia in Spinoza's Ethical Thought

Spinoza unequivocally states in the Ethics that intuitive knowledge is more powerful than reason. Nonetheless, it is not clear what exactly this greater power promises in the face of the passions. Does this mean that intuitive knowledge is not liable to akrasia? Ronald Sandler offers what, to my knowledge, is the only explicit answer to this question in recent Spinoza scholarship. According to Sandler, intuitive knowledge, unlike reason, is not susceptible to akrasia. This is because, intuitive knowledge enables the knower to greater power over the passions due to its immediacy, its foundation and because it engenders the boundlessly powerful intellectual love of God. In this paper, I consider to what extent (if at all) intuitive knowledge is liable to akrasia by exploring whether Sandler's claim can justifiably be attributed to Spinoza. I argue that, given our modal status, it is not plausible to claim that akrasia would never apply to intuitive knowledge. Since intuitive ideas are the ideas of a finite mind actually existing as a part of Nature, even the intellectual love of God accompanying these ideas cannot provide a boundless power guaranteeing that the power of these ideas will not be overridden by passionate ideas.     

Ethical issues in therapy: therapist self-disclosure of sexual feelings

Although therapist sexual attraction to clients is common, and therapist self-disclosure is an often-used intervention, therapist self-disclosure of sexual feelings to clients is an understudied phenomenon. In this article, I critically review the small base of literature on therapist self-disclosure of sexual feelings, including information on prevalence rates, empirical research, and case studies. By incorporating these findings with information from relevant sections of the American Psychological Association (2002) Ethics Code, my intent is to evaluate different aspects of therapist self-disclosure of sexual feelings and arrive at conclusions regarding therapists' use of these disclosures. It appears that direct, explicit disclosure of sexual feelings can run the risk of harming clients and may therefore be unethical. Therefore, the use of this technique is discouraged. I discuss the issue of using less explicit interventions.     

A personal odyssey

In this autobiography, I tried to capture important aspects of my personal and professional development from my childhood in the ethnic ghettos of South Philadelphia to Pennsylvania State University and the University of Chicago and eventually to over 45 years on faculty at Yale. It has been a journey that I could never have anticipated and that has given me a sense of the unpredictability of psychological development. We all evolve in an open system and a significant portion of the variance of the outcome is determined by fate. But much is also determined by the ability to recognize opportunities and the willingness to take chances and to work hard when opportunities arise. As I reflect on my career of over 50 years, I have been delighted that I opted for a career as a clinical psychologist because it has provided me with opportunity to develop clinical skills and to combine these skills with scholarship and research. While I take considerable satisfaction in the recognition that my contributions have received, the most important aspect of my career has been my relationship with students and colleagues. These collaborations have clearly enriched my work; but more important, they have enriched my life.     

Reply to Catriona Mackenzie

In her excellent critique of my book Self to Self (2006), Catriona Mackenzie highlights three gaps in my view of the self. First, my effort to distinguish among different applications of the concept ‘self’ is not matched by any attempt to explain the interactions among the selves so distinguished. Second, in analyzing practical reasoning as aimed at self-understanding, I speak sometimes of causal-psychological understanding (e.g. in the paper titled ‘The Centered Self’) and sometimes of narrative self-understanding (e.g. in ‘The Self as Narrator’), but I never explain how these two modes of self-understanding are related. Third, I never explain how my account of autonomous agency can be reconciled with my interpretation of Kant's (e.g., in ‘A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics’). In this reply to Mackenzie, I agree with her about all three of these gaps, and I offer some (admittedly incomplete) ideas about how they might be filled.     

Seven ways to plagiarize: handling real allegations of research misconduct

As the research integrity officer at my university for two years, I handled eight allegations of plagiarism. These eight cases show that initial appearances can be mistaken, that policies for handling allegations of research misconduct cannot cover every contingency, and that many cases can be resolved collegially without resort to formal procedures. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, February 28 – March 3, 2002, Cincinnati, Ohio. The views, opinions, and recommendations expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.     

Research ethics and the principle of Justice as Fairness – A restatement

In my recent article, I addressed the question of whether a potential categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired patients from non-therapeutic medical research would be inaccordance with the Principle of Justice as Fairness. I came to the conclusion that a categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired persons from relevant research projects may collide with Rawls’s understanding of Justice as Fairness. Derek Bell has criticized my paper by denying that it is legitimate to apply Rawls to this bioethical problem. In my restatement I try to show that an extrapolation of John Rawls’s thought to such bioethical cases is possible, because Rawls himself has written that his orientation towards decisionally non-impaired persons is an idealized situation that allows extrapolations. In a second part I try to show that Bell hasroughly misunderstood my concept of “presumed consent” which I make a prerequisite for the legitimisation of research on decisionally impaired persons. In using advance consent as a proposal for resolving the problem, Bell has indirectly confirmed my approach because he is using a similar construct of consent, which operates with similar hypotheses and probabilities of error. I see here no categorical difference between Bell’s conclusion and my discussion. Thus, Bell’s reply does not represent a refutation of my thoughts, but rather it is a para phrased confirmation of my central theses. I conclude by showing the relevance of Rawls, pointing out that the discussion between Bell and me illustrates how Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium is an appropriate approach to finding a solution to this bioethical problem. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Spinoza’s Critique of Humility in the Ethics

In the Ethics Spinoza denies that humility is a virtue on the grounds that it arises from a reflection on our lack of power, rather than a rational understanding of our power (Part IV, Proposition 53, Demonstration). He suggests that humility, to the extent that it involves a consideration of our weakness, indicates a lack of self‐understanding. However, in a brief remark in the same demonstration he also allows that conceiving our lack of power can be conducive to self‐understanding and an increase in power, on the condition that we “conceive [it] because [we] understand [intelligit ] something more powerful than [ourselves].” Unfortunately, Spinoza does not flesh out this remark, nor does he specify the name of the affect that arises from thus conceiving our weakness. Commentators have not been much help in this regard either. What does it mean, in the Spinozistic framework, to conceive our weakness because we understand something more powerful than ourselves? And what exactly is the difference between this instance of conceiving our lack of power and the one that is involved in humility? This paper will examine the nature of this difference by analyzing its metaphysical and epistemological underpinnings, as well as its ethical implications within Spinoza’s Ethics . In doing so, it will highlight the ethical importance and epistemological conditions of recognizing our weakness in the Spinozistic universe. Abraham Wolf takes Spinoza’s denial of humility’s virtue in the Ethics to imply that “the rational man should think of what he can do, not of what he cannot do.” While I agree with Wolf’s remark, my reading in this paper will show that as the rational person thinks of her power and what she can do, she never loses sight of her ineliminable weakness as a finite mode.     

Retraction of "construing collective concerns: increasing cooperation by broadening construals in social dilemmas"

The following article has been retracted by the Editor and publishers of Psychological Science at the request of the lead author, Lawrence J. Sanna: Sanna, L. J., Chang, E. C., Parks, C. D., & Kennedy, L. A. (2009). Construing collective concerns: Increasing cooperation by broadening construals in social dilemmas. Psychological Science, 20, 1319-1321. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02458.x In a letter to the Editor (Eric Eich), Dr. Sanna wrote: The data reported in this article are invalid and should not be considered part of the scientific literature. The responsibility for this problem rests solely with the first author, Lawrence J. Sanna. Coauthors Edward C. Chang, Craig D. Parks, and Lindsay A. Kennedy are in no way responsible for this problem. In response, the Editor noted that Psychological Science follows the retraction guidelines developed by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE). Dr. Sanna was urged to follow these guidelines carefully in drafting a retraction notice, particularly with respect to stating the reasons for the retraction, to distinguish misconduct from honest error. To assist Dr. Sanna with this task, the Editor provided Dr. Sanna with a copy of the COPE guidelines (http://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines) and a link to a retraction notice that was published in Psychological Science last year. This notice was considered a "model" by Retraction Watch, and Dr. Sanna was advised that, in keeping with this notice, he "must specify clearly the reasons for the retraction in such language that all of your coauthors agree to it." While awaiting Dr. Sanna's reply, the Editor sought to contact Dr. Sanna's three coauthors. Although one coauthor was aware of Dr. Sanna's request to retract the 2009 Psychological Science article, the other two were not. All of the coauthors have agreed to retraction of the article, and each has received a copy of this notice. Dr. Sanna replied by noting with regret that "research errors" have made it necessary for him to request retraction. The letter concluded with the following: "At the direction of legal counsel, I am unable to say anything further than that contained in my previous letter at this time." Because it is unclear when, if ever, details on these research errors will be forthcoming, the Editor owes it to the journal's readership to retract the article now, even though this notice does not reflect COPE guidelines or journal policy.     

Revisiting Competitive Categories: A Reply to Royce

In this article, I respond to the criticisms that Richard Royce has made of my theory of competition in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy. While I find some of his attacks misplaced, a number of his criticisms address key difficulties to which I offer clarification and defense.     

Thinking Morality Interpersonally: A Reply to Burgess-Jackson

In a comment on my paper “Feminism, Ethics, and the Question of Theory” ( Walker 1992 ), Keith Burgess-Jackson argues that I have misdiagnosed the problem with modem moral theory. Burgess-Jackson misunderstands both the illustrative—“theoretical-juridical”—model I constructed there and how my critique and alternative model answer to specifically feminist concerns. Ironically, his own view seems to reproduce the very conception of morality as an individually internalized action-guiding code of principles that my earlier essay argued is the conception central to modern moral theories.     

Backward Referral,Flash-Lags,and Quantum Free Will: A Response to Commentaries on Articles by Pockett,Klein, Gomes,and Trevena and Miller

The first priority of this response is to address Libet's rebuttal of my reinterpretation of his data. Then, because many authors have commented on various aspects of the debate, the rest of the response is organized in terms of subject matter, not as replies to each individual commentator. First, I reply to an objection expressed by two separate commentators to part of my reinterpretation of those of Libet's data supposedly supporting backward referral. This leads to a brief discussion of the whole concept of backward referral. The relevance of the flash-lag illusion to possible measurement errors in the Libet/Trevena and Miller paradigm is addressed next. Finally, I have a few words to say on the relationship between quantum mechanical ontology and free will.     

Free Choice

In everyday language, the central question raised by “free choice” is not causation but whether I do what I want. We can, however, grant that our wants are caused. We commonly fail to appreciate this because there is no consciousness of these causal processes. Nevertheless a question about the causation of my want may on occasion become relevant to the freedom of my choice. Thus one may ask if my want is caused by my knowledge and values, or by causes alien to these. This is not a question about the truth, or implications, of the theory of universal determinism.     

Free Choice

In everyday language, the central question raised by “free choice” is not causation but whether I do what I want. We can, however, grant that our wants are caused. We commonly fail to appreciate this because there is no consciousness of these causal processes. Nevertheless a question about the causation of my want may on occasion become relevant to the freedom of my choice. Thus one may ask if my want is caused by my knowledge and values, or by causes alien to these. This is not a question about the truth, or implications, of the theory of universal determinism.     

How should utilitarians think about the future?

Abstract

Utilitarians must think collectively about the future because many contemporary moral issues require collective responses to avoid possible future harms. But current rule utilitarianism does not accommodate the distant future. Drawing on my recent books Future People and Ethics for a Broken World, I defend a new utilitarianism whose central ethical question is: What moral code should we teach the next generation? This new theory honours utilitarianism’s past and provides the flexibility to adapt to the full range of credible futures – from futures broken by climate change to the digital, virtual and predictable futures produced by various possible technologies.     

Negotiating international bioethics: a response to Tom Beauchamp and Ruth Macklin

Can the bioethical theories that have served American bioethics so well, serve international bioethics as well? In two papers in the previous issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, I contend that the form of principlist fundamentalism endorsed by American bioethicists like Tom Beauchamp and Ruth Macklin will not play on an international stage. Deploying techniques of postmodern scholarship, I argue that principlist fundamentalism justifies neither the condemnation of the Nazi doctors at Nuremberg, nor, as the Report of the Advisory Committee on the Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE) demonstrates, condemnation of Cold War radiation researchers. Principlist fundamentalism thus appears to be philosophy bankrupt. In this issue of the Journal, Beauchamp and Macklin reject this claim, arguing that I have misread the ACHRE report and misunderstood Nazism. They also argue that the form of post-postmodern negotiated human rights theory that I proffer is adequate only insofar as it is itself really fundamentalist; insofar as I take postmodernism seriously, however, I mire international bioethics in relativism. In this response, I reaffirm my anti-fundamentalism, provide further evidence in support of my reading of the ACHRE report, and defend my post-postmodern version of rights theory. I also develop criteria for a minimally adequate theoretical framework for international bioethics.     

Report of the ACA Ethics Committee: 1995–1996

This report contains data about ethical complaints and inquiries processed by the American Counseling Association (ACA) Ethics Committee from 1995 to 1996. This report also includes a discussion of the findings of the committee, information about the approval of the new ACA Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice, and educational efforts undertaken by the committee.     

Reference Ethics: Theological Librarianship in Conversation with ALA Reference Ethics Guidelines

This particular article will look at one ethical concern that is likely to be very familiar to most theological reference librarians. This question is what the theological reference librarian's ethical responsibilities are when the American Library Association's Code of Ethics seems to conflict with an institution's expectations for an employee of that institution. In order to adequately solve this question, the article will first summarize the basic elements of the American Library Association's Code of Ethics that relate to the reference interview. Next, the special nature of theological reference librarianship will be discussed. Third, the Association of Theological Schools accreditation guidelines will be examined to determine the relationships that theological librarians have to their religious institutions. Fourth, in light of the theological librarian reference ethics that emerge from the proposed investigation, possible ethical solutions will be suggested. The article will conclude that the article's research question is actually a false question, not because theological librarians have not raised it or because it is not worth considering, but because the American Library Association's Code of Ethics and the Association of Theological Schools accreditation standards expect the same thing from their librarians.     

Continuing the dialogue: a reply to Bernard Gert

Continuing the dialogue begun in the March 2006 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, I suggest that Bernard Gert's response to my paper does not adequately address the criticisms I make of his theory's application to bioethics cases.