Emergentism by default: A view from the bench

For the last 50 years the dominant stance in experimental biology has been reductionism in general, and genetic reductionism in particular. Philosophers were the first to realize that the belief that the Mendelian genes were reduced to DNA molecules was questionable. Soon, experimental data confirmed these misgivings. The optimism of molecular biologists, fueled by early success in tackling relatively simple problems has now been tempered by the difficulties encountered when applying the same simple ideas to complex problems. We analyze three examples taken from experimental data that illustrate the shortcomings of this sort of reductionism. In the first, alterations in the expression of a large number of genes coexist with normal phenotypes at supra-cellular levels of organization; in the second, the supposed intrinsic specificity of hormonal signals is negated; in the third, the notion that cancer is a cellular problem caused by mutated genes is challenged by data gathered both from the reductionist viewpoint and the alternative view proposing that carcinogenesis is development gone awry. As an alternative to reductionism, we propose that the organicist view is a good starting point from which to explore these phenomena. However, new theoretical concepts are needed to grapple with the apparent circular causality of complex biological phenomena.     

Responding to unemployment and inequalities in income and health

This paper discusses the social and economic context in which counselling and psychotherapy are practised. The use of ‘outplacement counselling’ and personal skills training programmes for dealing with unemployment and redundancy is criticized. It is argued that they involve a form of psychological reductionism which fails to acknowledge socio-economic realities. Research showing a strong link between inequalities of income and physical and mental health is reviewed. It is suggested that counsellors and psychotherapists have a professional obligation to acknowledge the social and economic circumstances likely to contribute to clients' mental distress and avoid the dangers of reductionism.     

Foundations of psychoanalysis reconsidered

Grünbaum's approach to psychoanalysis suffers from several difficulties. It imposes a standard of logical reductionism and methodological purity that not only violates the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge, but imposes an invalid standard of verification and scientific confirmation. It utilizes a brand of dichotomous reasoning that forces psychoanalytic propositions into artificial positions that do not reflect the actuality of analytic practice. It imposes a standard of verification that is impossible for psychoanalysis, along with all forms of psychological knowledge, to reach. It visualizes psychoanalysis as encompassing only one form of knowledge of human psychic life, forcing it into a model that eliminates other aspects of the psychoanalytic process, so that psychoanalysis is subjected to criticism only on one dimension among several--a kind of psychoanalytic straw man. The psychoanalysis that is so impaled often is difficult for the psychoanalytic practitioner to recognize. To the extent that Grünbaum's skillful and highly informed criticism of the philosophical bases of psychoanalysis encounters these difficulties, the value of his argument falls short of providing a useful basis for advancing psychoanalytic knowledge and particularly for promoting the quest for pertinent standards of validation within psychoanalysis.     

Reductionism and the Micro–Macro Mirroring Thesis

This paper concerns reductionist views about psychology and the special sciences more generally. I identify a metaphysical assumption in reductionist views which I dub the ‘Micro–Macro Mirroring Thesis’. The Mirroring Thesis says that the relation between the entities of any legitimate higher-level science and their lower-level realizers is similar to that between the entities of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. I argue that reductionism implies the Thesis, and that the Thesis is not a priori. It is more difficult to tell whether the Thesis is true, and I indicate some relevant considerations.     

Reductionism's Demise: Cold Comfort

Abstract. Nonreductive physicalism, as opposed to reductionism, enjoys wide popularity by virtue of being regarded as comporting with the traditional image of human beings as free and ontologically unique without the difficulties of mind‐body dualism. A consideration of reasons, both good and bad, for which reductionism is rejected suggests instead that the move to nonreductive physicalism does nothing to mitigate the implications of a physicalist account of human nature.     

In defence of gullibility: the epistemology of testimony and the psychology of deception detection

Research in the psychology of deception detection implies that Fricker, in making her case for reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, overestimates both the epistemic demerits of the antireductionist policy of trusting speakers blindly and the epistemic merits of the reductionist policy of monitoring speakers for trustworthiness: folk psychological prejudices to the contrary notwithstanding, it turns out that monitoring is on a par (in terms both of the reliability of the process and of the sensitivity of the beliefs that it produces) with blind trust. The consequence is that while (a version of) Fricker’s argument for the necessity of a reduction succeeds, her argument for the availability of reductions fails. This does not, however, condemn us to endorse standard pessimistic reductionism, according to which there is no testimonial knowledge, for recent research concerning the methods used by subjects to discover deception in non-laboratory settings suggests that only a more moderate form of pessimism is in order.     

A Neurathian Conception of the Unity of Science

An historically important conception of the unity of science is explanatory reductionism, according to which the unity of science is achieved by explaining all laws of science in terms of their connection to microphysical law. There is, however, a separate tradition that advocates the unity of science. According to that tradition, the unity of science consists of the coordination of diverse fields of science, none of which is taken to have privileged epistemic status. This alternate conception has roots in Otto Neurath’s notion of unified science. In this paper, I develop a version of the coordination approach to unity that is inspired by Neurath’s views. The resulting conception of the unity of science achieves aims similar to those of explanatory reductionism, but does so in a radically different way. As a result, it is immune to the criticisms facing explanatory reductionism. This conception of unity is also importantly different from the view that science is disunified, and I conclude by demonstrating how it accords better with scientific practice than do conceptions of the disunity of science.     

A matter of facts

We discuss the justification of Bickle's “ruthless” reductionism. Bickle intends to show that we know enough about neurons to draw conclusions about the “whole” brain and about the mind. However, his reductionism does not take into account the complexity of the nervous system and the fact that new properties emerge at each significant level of integration from the coupled functioning of elementary components. From a methodological point of view, we argue that neuronal and cognitive models have to exert a mutual constraint(MC) on each other. This approach would refuse to award any priority of cognitive approaches over neuroscience, and reciprocally, to refuse any priority of neuroscience over cognitive approaches. MC thus argues against radicalreductionism at the methodological level.     

论心理学中的还原论

心理学中的还原论主要指方法论意义上的“理论的还原论”,可分为心理学理论向物理学、生理学与生物学理论还原等三种还原论类型。它并不像其攻击者所误解的那样,就是本体论的还原论、必然导致决定论、与整体论截然对立或者仅仅就是还原方法。相反地,还原论是研究心理现象的重要途径,与方法论的多元主义并行不悖,符合人类进行认识的规律。只要使用者注意其适用的边界条件,还原论还是不失为心理学研究的一种不错的“没有选择的选择”。     

层次,形式与实在

Scientific progress in the 20th century has shown that the structure of the world is hierarchical. A philosophical analysis of the hierarchy will bear obvious significance for metaphysics and philosophy in general. Jonathan Schaffer’s paper, “Is There a Fundamental Level?”, provides a systematic review of the works in the field, the difficulties for various versions of fundamentalism, and the prospect for the third option, i.e., to treat each level as ontologically equal. The purpose of this paper is to provide an argument for the third option. The author will apply Aristotle’s theory of matter and form to the discussion of the hierarchy and develop a theory of form realism, which will grant every level with “full citizenship in the republic of being.” It constitutes an argument against ontological and epistemological reductionism. A non-reductive theory of causation is also developed against the fundamental theory of causation.     

Genesis and Intersubjectivity: Levels of Mediation

I will make a brief comment on the thesis of José C. Loredo-Narciandi and José C. Sánchez-González (2012) “Neither Dichotomies Nor Dualism; Simply Genesis”. Denying any reductionism and reification, they insists the importance of inseparable relation between subject and object, then discuss about genesis. I pointed out that their argument lacks an important element, i.e., mediator that differ from mere physical object. After discussing mediators nature, I discriminate the three level of interaction which mediated by mediator. The first is the pre-interaction level, the second is physical interaction level and the third is sign or language interaction level. The last argument of mine is about how we can solve the problem of reification and reductionism. In the argument it is pointed out that intersubjectivity is key concept for understanding and solving the problem appropriately.     

Disintegrated Persons and Distributive Principles

In this paper I consider Derek Parfit's attempt to respond to Rawls' charge that utilitarianism ignores the distinction between persons. I proceed by arguing that there is a moderate form of reductionism about persons, one stressing the importance of what Parfit calls psychological connectedness, which can hold in different degrees both within one person and between distinct persons. In terms of this form of reductionism, against which Parfit's arguments are ineffective, it is possible to resuscitate the Rawlsian charge that the utilitarian maximizing approach to matters of distribution ignores something that is of moral relevance, viz., the difference between the degrees of connectedness that hold between different stages of the same person, and between that person and his nearest and dearest, and the lack of connectedness between that person and distant others who may be benefitted at his cost. To Parfit's charge that reductionism sees the differences between persons as being 'less deep', I reply that the sense in which they are less deep is not at odds with their retaining their original moral importance, perhaps now better understood.     

INDEFENSIBLE MIDDLE GROUND FOR LOCAL REDUCTIONISM ABOUT TESTIMONY

Local reductionism purports to defend a middle ground in the debate about the epistemic status of testimony-based beliefs. It does so by acknowledging the practical ineliminability of testimony as a source of knowledge, while insisting that such an acknowledgment need not entail a default-acceptance view, according to which there exists an irreducible warrant for accepting testimony. The present paper argues that local reductionism is unsuccessful in its attempt to steer a middle path between reductionism and anti-reductionism about testimonial justification. In particular, it challenges local reductionism 'from within', without appealing to anti-reductionist intuitions. By offering novel arguments to the effect that local reductionism fails by its own standards, the present paper considerably strengthens the case against this version of reductionism. Local reductionism, it is argued, fails for three main reasons. First, it cannot account for the rationality of testimonial rejection in paradigmatic cases, even though the possibility of rational rejection is thought to be of central justificatory importance. Second, it does not provide a sufficiently distinct non-testimonial basis to which testimonial justification can be successfully reduced. Finally, local reductionism is shown to be an intrinsically unstable position, in danger of collapsing into full-fledged 'credulism' of the kind historically associated with Thomas Reid.     

Has the last decade of challenges to the multiple realization argument provided aid and comfort to psychoneural reductionists?

The previous decade has seen renewed critical interest in the multiple realization argument. These criticisms constitute a “second wave” of challenges to this central argument in late-20th century philosophy of mind. Unlike the first wave, which challenged the premise that multiple realization is inconsistent with reduction or type identity, this second wave challenges the truth of the multiple realization premise itself. Since psychoneural reductionism was prominent among the explicit targets of the multiple realization argument, one might think that this second wave of challenges provides important aid and comfort to reductionists. In this paper, however, I provide reasons for thinking it does not. This is not to the detriment of psychoneural reductionism because, as I also argue here, and unrecognized by the current non-reductive orthodoxy in philosophy of mind, one key argument among the first wave of criticisms of the multiple realization argument has never been adequately rejoined.     

Metaphysical presuppositions and scientific practices: Reductionism and organicism in cancer research

Metaphysical presuppositions are important for guiding scientific practices and research. The success of twentieth‐century biology, for instance, is largely attributable to presupposing that complex biological processes are reducible to elementary components. However, some biologists have challenged the sufficiency of reductionism for investigating complex biological phenomena and have proposed alternative presuppositions like organicism. In this article, contemporary cancer research is used as a case study to explore the importance of metaphysical presuppositions for guiding research. The predominant paradigm directing cancer research is the somatic mutation theory, in which mutated genes are presumed to be ultimately responsible for explaining carcinogenesis. This reductionistic approach to cancer has been criticised recently, and an organistic approach has been proposed. The article concludes with a discussion of the reciprocal interaction of metaphysical presuppositions and scientific practices for investigating cancer's complex nature.     

Medikamentierte Wut

Considering the attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHS), the most common disorder of male children and young boys, from the perspective of a psychoanalytic social psychology, one cannot explain its genesis solely in terms of neuroscience. It would be reductionism ignoring the fact, that it is not possible to define a neuronal deficit of self control without conceptualizing self control as a historically and culturally determined requirement profile of affect regulation. Thus, a social characterological analysis of the disorder is required. Every community and society expects their children to learn in the course of their socialization and education to transform external control into self control, in order to want to do, what is to be done. This process is conflict-ridden and aims at an adaptation by which conflicts are more or less defused. Modern societies propagate a sort of self control which is reduced to self-management with integrated spontaneity. Acquiring such self-management requires from children and adolescents to cope with contradictions. They should concentrate in a consum culture which is oriented on distraction. They should cope trouble-free with disappointments in a culture which is oriented on success. But first of all the boys have difficulties to achieve this. They have difficulties in acquiring the emotional competencies needed for the regulation of aggressive excitements due to disappointments appropriately and in socially acceptable form as well. Lacking this competencies they feel themselves at the mercy of fierce rage as if it was a force of nature. This is the self experience of the 60 boys who were questioned about their ADHS medication in the here presented research project. If the treatment is - against all consensus conferences - limited to medication – and this is much more often the case as so far known -, then the aggressive excitement is reduced indeed, but the patients do not obtain insight into the civilizing function of restraining aggression. And without understanding the sense of the own action they remain in the long run strangers to themselves.     

Pathways to Problems – The Evolution of 'Pathology'

This paper describes a qualitative research study which compared accounts from interviews with families where difficulties had evolved into serious problems with those where an escalation into pathology has been avoided. These accounts confirm that family life is commonly seen to be problematic and stressful, particularly during transitional stages. Specifically, it appears that it is not simply the severity of the initial stresses and problems that distinguishes families, but the meanings that these evoke and the corresponding patterns of responses, especially the 'attempted solutions' that are set in motion. These responses, fuelled by external interventions, can launch families along pathological pathways. It is suggested that the meanings ascribed to difficulties and the ensuing responses are predominantly shaped and constrained by three factors: the dominant societally shared discourses of mental health and distress; the emotional resources and attachments of family members; and systemic interpersonal processes. Some therapeutic implications, especially the importance of assisting families to resist pathologizing processes are indicated.     

Models of reduction and categories of reductionism

A classification of models of reduction into three categories — theory reductionism, explanatory reductionism, and constitutive reductionism — is presented. It is shown that this classification helps clarify the relations between various explications of reduction that have been offered in the past, especially if a distinction is maintained between the various epistemological and ontological issues that arise. A relatively new model of explanatory reduction, one that emphasizes that reduction is the explanation of a whole in terms of its parts is also presented in detail. Finally, the classification is used to clarify the debate over reductionism in molecular biology. It is argued there that while no model from the category of theory reduction might be applicable in that case, models of explanatory reduction might yet capture the structure of the relevant explanations.Thanks are due to David Hull, Michael Martin, Ken Schaffner, Abner Shimony and William Wimsatt for many valuable discussions of these issues and for comments and criticism of an earlier version of this paper. This paper was partly written during the tenure of a grant from the Boston University Graduate School.     

Motivating Reductionism about Sets

The paper raises some difficulties for the typical motivations behind set reductionism, the view that sets are reducible to entities identified independently of set theory.     

"气"概念几个层次意义的分殊

In Chinese philosophy, although the concept of “qi” has numerous meanings, it is not completely without order or chaotic. Generally speaking, “qi” has several different levels of meanings, such as in philosophy, physics, physiology, psychology, ethics, and so on. On the philosophical level, “qi” is similar to “air,” and it is essentially similar to the “matter-energy” or “field” in physics, which refers to the origin or an element of all things in the world. It is from this point that the meanings of “qi” in physiology, psychology, ethics as well as aesthetics are derived. This paper analyzes the meanings of “qi” on five levels and seeks to clarify misunderstandings about “qi,” such as its alleged pan-vitalistic, conscious and pan-ethical characters. Translated by Yan Xin from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2006, (9): 34–41