Philosophy of science and the foundations of psychotherapy

The field of psychotherapy rests on a foundation of basic propositions, fundamental starting points or cornerstones, and ideas that are generally taken for granted as fundamental givens or truths. A case is presented that there are ways in which foundational beliefs may be kept essentially immune from careful explication, study, examination, analysis, and challenge, and therefore from constructive improvement and change. Borrowed largely from the neighboring field of philosophy of science, 5 solutions are presented to assist in explicating, challenging, improving, and changing foundational beliefs. The subsequent 2 articles (E. Erwin, 2000; J. F. Rychlak, 2000) illustrate how these philosophy of science methods may be applied to 2 foundational beliefs in the field of psychotherapy.     

The biological foundations of cognitive science

Cognitive Science originated in reactions against behaviorism that were motivated in significant part by the example of the computer. The computer raised the exciting possibility that mind could be understood almost entirely independently of brain: if the operations of the mind are akin to the execution of a program, then almost all the relevant aspects of mind would be captured by that program, independently of whatever was running it, be it transistors or neurons. This presumed independence of cognitive science from biology has waned considerably in recent decades, but in this paper, I argue that there is at least one crucial aspect of biology that has yet to be appreciated for its relevance to mental and other normative processes—the thermodynamics of living systems. In particular, I argue that the emergence of normativity in general—and normative function and representation in particular—depends on special systems that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium; these form the interface between the factual world of atoms and molecules and the normative world of mind. The nature of that emergence, in turn, imposes strong constraints on how the central nervous system functions, and, therefore, on how cognition is realized.     

Quasi-truth,paraconsistency, and the foundations of science

In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, but which still preserves some (partial) relations between old and new theories. The existence of these relations help to explain why the break between different theories is never too radical as to make it impossible for one to interpret the process in perfectly rational terms. We then defend the view that if scientific theories are taken to be quasi-true, and if the underlying logic is paraconsistent, it’s perfectly rational for scientists and mathematicians to entertain inconsistent theories without triviality. As a result, as opposed to what is demanded by traditional approaches to rationality, it’s not irrational to entertain inconsistent theories. Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that the view advanced here provides a new way of thinking about the foundations of science. In particular, it extends in important respects both coherentist and foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without the troubles that plague traditional views of scientific rationality.     

Socio-functional foundations in science: The case of measurement

We present a novel kind of “socio-functional” foundationalism rooted in the division of scientific labor. Our foundationalism is social in that it involves a socio-epistemic phenomenon we dub epistemic outsourcing, whereby claims from one group of scientists provide epistemological foundations for another group of scientists. We argue that: (1) epistemic outsourcing results in a legitimate form of epistemic foundationalism, (2) this sort of foundationalism can be used to shed light on the epistemology of measurement; and (3) epistemic outsourcing is a distinctively collective epistemic phenomenon.     

Arthur F. Bentley and the foundations of behavioral science

Arthur F. Bentley's early work on the foundations of behavioral science has been neglected by students of the history and philosophy of social science. Bentley believed that the development of behavioral science required extensive reflection on and criticism of the categorial presuppositions of both everyday and scientific knowledge. This paper is concerned with Bentley's criticism of psychological explanation, his theory of observation, and the basic concepts of his behavioral science.     

New foundations for counterfactuals

Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals. However, intuitions regarding counterfactual conditionals are notoriously shaky. The aim of this paper is to provide a principled account of the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. This principled account is provided by what I dub the Royal Rule, a deterministic analogue of the Principal Principle relating chance and credence. The Royal Rule says that an ideal doxastic agent’s initial grade of disbelief in a proposition \(A\) , given that the counterfactual distance in a given context to the closest \(A\) -worlds equals \(n\) , and no further information that is not admissible in this context, should equal \(n\) . Under the two assumptions that the presuppositions of a given context are admissible in this context, and that the theory of deterministic alethic or metaphysical modality is admissible in any context, it follows that the counterfactual distance distribution in a given context has the structure of a ranking function. The basic conditional logic V is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the resulting rank-theoretic semantics of counterfactuals.     

The triad of science foundations, instructional technology, and organizational structure

Over the centuries and across all societies educational achievement does not improve. The attempt to improve the instructional process has concentrated on instructional technology. But these attempts have overlooked the importance of two other factors: the science that should underlie the instructional technologies and the organization that must operate those technologies. A considerable step forward in handling the problems of instructional effectiveness has been the derivation of instructional technologies based on Skinnerian science. But the instructional technologies based on Skinner's analysis of behavior are promoted as if they were to operate in an organizational vacuum. The division of labor, and its necessary coordination and control, is taken for granted. But in any large scale enterprise, the organization of the division of labor must fit the technology through which that enterprise achieves its mission. Educational technology must tie directly to a pertinent science and to a proper organizational structure. To teach effectively requires an overhaul along three lines: 1) a relevant science that reflects and encapsulates an accurate understanding of behavior; 2) a contingency-based technology of instruction that directly derives its practices upon proper scientific principles; and 3) a suitable organization based on teaching teams that operate the new instructional technology.     

人因学发展的新取向

当前新技术、人机交互的新特征、社会和人的新需求给中国人因学(Human Factors)的进一步发展创造了一个有利时机。本文首先讨论和分析了一些具有代表性的开拓了人因学科研究深度和广度的新技术和新途径, 包括神经人因学, 认知工程, 协同认知系统, 社会技术系统; 以及人因学科应用中的一些挑战和策略。然后, 就进一步发展我国的人因学科, 本文提出首先要解决的问题是建立多学科交叉的人因学科的科研教育体制, 并在此基础上, 注重理论创新, 以创新设计为突破点, 在智能系统、用户体验、航天航空和医疗健康等领域中优先发展和应用。当前迫切需要解决的是, 建立完善的人因学科高校教育体系, 建立完善的人因学科多学科交叉的科研体系, 以及建立人因学科行业资质标准和设计标准体系。     

New trends in philosophy of psychiatry

The concept of mental disorder is often defined by reference to the notion of mental dysfunction, which is in line with how the concept of disease in somatic medicine is often defined. However, the notions of mental function and dysfunction seem to suffer from some problems that do not affect models of physiological function. Functions in general have a teleological structure; they are effects of traits that are supposed to have a particular purpose, such that, for example, the heart serves the goal of pumping blood. But can we single out mental functions in the same way? Can we identify mental functions scientifically, for instance, by applying evolutionary theory? Or are models of mental functions necessarily value-laden? I want to identify several philosophical problems regarding the notion of mental function and dysfunction and point out some possible solutions. As long as these questions remain unanswered, definitions of mental disorder that rest upon the concept of mental dysfunction will lack a secure foundation.