Relative correctness

John MacFarlane defends a radical form of truth relativism that makes the truth of assertions relative not only to contexts of utterance but also to contexts of assessment, or perspectives. Making sense of assessment-sensitive truth is a matter of making sense of the normative commitments undertaken by speakers in using assessment sensitive sentences. This paper argues against the possibility of making sense of such a practice. Evans raised a challenge to the coherence of relative truth. A modification of the challenge can be given against MacFarlane’s revised views on assertion. The main objection to the relativist is that rational and earnest speakers are not bound by assessment-relative standards of correctness.     

Relative Necessity Reformulated

This paper discusses some serious difficulties for what we shall call the standard account of various kinds of relative necessity, according to which any given kind of relative necessity may be defined by a strict conditional - necessarily, if C then p - where C is a suitable constant proposition, such as a conjunction of physical laws. We argue, with the help of Humberstone (Reports on Mathematical Logic, 31, 33–421, 1981), that the standard account has several unpalatable consequences. We argue that Humberstone’s alternative account has certain disadvantages, and offer another - considerably simpler - solution.     

Subsumption and Relative Identity

This paper is a modification of Nicola Guarino and Christopher Welty's conception of the subsumption relation. Guarino and Welty require that that whether one property may subsume the other should depend on the modal metaproperties of those properties. I argue that the part of their account that concerns the metaproperty carrying a criterion of identity is essentially flawed. Subsequently, I propose to constrain the subsumption relation not, as Guarino and Welty require, by means of incompatible criteria of absolute identity but by means of incompatible criteria of relative identity. After discussing the benefits of applying relative identity in ontological investigations I provide a formal framework in which to prove a counterpart of the identity criteria constraint.This revised version was published online in October 2005 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Necessity and Relative Contingency

The paper introduces a contingential language extended with a propositional constant τ axiomatized in a system named KΔτ , which receives a semantical analysis via relational models. A definition of the necessity operator in terms of Δ and τ allows proving (i) that KΔτ is equivalent to a modal system named K□τ (ii) that both KΔτ and K□τ are tableau-decidable and complete with respect to the defined relational semantics (iii) that the modal τ -free fragment of KΔτ is exactly the deontic system KD. In §4 it is proved that the modal τ -free fragment of a system KΔτw weaker than KΔτ is exactly the minimal normal system K. Presented by Daniele Mundici     

Future Contingents and Relative Truth

If it is not now determined whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, can an assertion that there will be one be true? The problem has persisted because there are compelling arguments on both sides. If there are objectively possible futures which would make the prediction true and others which would make it false, symmetry considerations seem to forbid counting it either true or false. Yet if we think about how we would assess the prediction tomorrow, when a sea battle is raging (or not), it seems we must assign the utterance a definite truth-value. I argue that both arguments must be given their due, and that this requires relativizing utterance-truth to a context of assessment. I show how this relativization can be handled in a rigorous formal semantics, and I argue that we can make coherent sense of assertion without assuming that utterances have their truth-values absolutely.     

Relative status and interpersonal presumptuousness

Previous research has shown that, in status-discrepant dyads, the higher-status member's verbal behavior tends to be more presumptuous, that is, to have a higher proportion of utterances that imply a presumption of knowledge of the other, including Advisements, Interpretations, Confirmations, and Reflections as defined by a taxonomy of verbal response modes (VRMs). However, members of these dyads have differed in absolute status in an external social hierarchy as well as in relative status within the dyad. The present study was designed to distinguish relative status from absolute status. Eighteen senior psychology majors each participated in two similar conversations—one with a freshman and one with a professor. Conversations were coded using the VRM system. In freshman-senior dyads, seniors were more presumptuous and in senior-professor dyads, professors were more presumptuous, replicating previous findings. Seniors' presumptuousness was greater toward freshmen than toward professors, supporting the hypothesis that presumptuousness varies with relative status. Absolute status was not highly predictive of presumptuousness; there were no significant differences between seniors with freshmen and professors with seniors or between freshmen with seniors and seniors with professors.     

绝对的公平和相对的公平

效率和公平是经济伦理的两大原则 ,也是制定和衡量经济政策的价值依据 ,但大部分经济学家都认为 ,效率和公平存在着不可调和的矛盾 ,使得人们在指导经济行为和制定经济政策时处于两难境地。本文通过对自由主义、平等主义和功利主义公平观的批判 ,试图说明 ,从历史唯物主义的立场出发 ,抛弃绝对的公平观 ,主张相对的公平观 ,便能够解决这个难题。     

Personal Relative Deprivation Boosts Materialism

Five studies investigated the relationship between personal relative deprivation and materialism. Study 1 was a cross-sectional survey that revealed a positive association between trait relative deprivation and materialism. In Studies 2a and 2b, we found that relative deprivation, as induced by unjust government policies in an imaginary scenario, increased individuals’ preferences for making more profit than others. Individuals may experience relative deprivation due to unjust treatment or other factors. Study 3 manifested that sense of relative deprivation, resulting from either being treated unjustly or not, gave rise to materialistic desires. In Study 4, we found that relative deprivation influenced materialistic aspirations, above and beyond negative outcomes. Moreover, the impact of relative deprivation could be generalized to aspirations for fame.     

Relative deprivation and referent cognitions

Determinants of relative deprivation were examined in a laboratory experiment. Discontent associated with relative deprivation was hypothesized to be a function of likelihood, or the perceived probability of actually obtaining a desired outcome under existing circumstances, and referent cognitions, which involve the subjunctive probability of obtaining that outcome under alternative (hypothetical) circumstances. Male and female undergraduates discovered that their alleged chances of receiving experimental credit were either poor (low likelihood) or good (high likelihood). They also learned that if a different procedure had been used, their chances of receiving credit would have been either poor (low referent) or good (high referent). Responses to a subsequent questionnaire indicated that whereas discontent did not differ by referent conditions under high likelihood, greater discontent was shown by low-likelihood/high-referent subjects than by low-likelihood/low-referent subjects. This low- versus high-referent difference under low likelihood was also found in two conceptual replications designed to eliminate any influence of social comparison. The relevance of this model to other findings and theoretical formulations is discussed.     

Relative consistency and accessible domains

This is a much expanded version of my essay Relative Konsistenz that was written in German and published in Börger (1987). That collection of papers was dedicated to the memory of Professor Dieter Rödding, my first logic teacher.     

Relative Necessity and Propositional Quantification

Following Smiley’s (The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28, 113–134 1963) influential proposal, it has become standard practice to characterise notions of relative necessity in terms of simple strict conditionals. However, Humberstone (Reports on Mathematical Logic, 13, 33–42 1981) and others have highlighted various flaws with Smiley’s now standard account of relative necessity. In their recent article, Hale and Leech (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46, 1–26 2017) propose a novel account of relative necessity designed to overcome the problems facing the standard account. Nevertheless, the current article argues that Hale & Leech’s account suffers from its own defects, some of which Hale & Leech are aware of but underplay. To supplement this criticism, the article offers an alternative account of relative necessity which overcomes these defects. This alternative account is developed in a quantified modal propositional logic and is shown model-theoretically to meet several desiderata of an account of relative necessity.