Children's Moral Evaluations of Ecological Damage: The Effect of Biocentric and Anthropocentric Intentions1

Moral evaluations of ecologically damaging events were studied in 5^th, 8^th, and 11^th graders and college students (N = 246). Participants made 4 kinds of judgments about 2 scenarios: decision rightness, damage rightness, blame of the decision maker, and blame of the agents causing the damage. In both scenarios, the decision maker's intentions varied (biocentric vs. anthropocentric) as did the damage severity. Overall, participants' judgments were less harsh when the decision maker had biocentric intentions and when the damage was less severe. However, there were age differences in use of intentions to judge decision rightness. The proposition that judgments of blame of the decision maker should be a joint function of decision and damage rightness was also supported.     

Framing Effects: Dynamics and Task Domains

The author examines the mechanisms and dynamics of framing effects in risky choices across three distinct task domains (i.e., life–death, public property, and personal money). The choice outcomes of the problems presented in each of the three task domains had a binary structure of a sure thing vs a gamble of equal expected value; the outcomes differed in their framing conditions and the expected values, raging from 6000, 600, 60, to 6, numerically. It was hypothesized that subjects would become more risk seeking, if the sure outcome was below their aspiration level (the minimum requirement). As predicted, more subjects preferred the gamble when facing the life–death choice problems than facing the counterpart problems presented in the other two task domains. Subjects’ risk preference varied categorically along the group size dimension in the life–death domain but changed more linearly over the expected value dimension in the monetary domain. Framing effects were observed in 7 of 13 pairs of problems, showing a positive frame–risk aversion and negative frame–risk seeking relationship. In addition, two types of framing effects were theoretically defined and empirically identified. Abidirectional framing effectinvolves a reversal in risk preference, and occurs when a decision maker's risk preference is ambiguous or weak. Four bidirectional effects were observed; in each case a majority of subjects preferred the sure outcome under a positive frame but the gamble under a negative frame. In contrast, aunidirectional framing effectrefers to a preference shift due to the framing of choice outcomes: A majority of subjects preferred one choice outcome (either the sure thing or the gamble) under both framing conditions, with positive frame augmented the preference for the sure thing and negative frame augmented the preference for the gamble. These findings revealed some dynamic regularities of framing effects and posed implications for developing predictive and testable models of human decision making.     

Decision-Making: A Dilemma and a Purpose for Counseling

A goal of counseling is to help decision makers make good decisions. But what is meant by “good”? Two views are discussed: outcome and process. The former is concerned with real-life results after the decision is made, the latter with the quality of the deliberations during the decision-making process. The counselor's interaction occurs during the process and is in terms of the decision maker's statements about reality (rather than reality itself). These statements are often unrealistic in that they inaccurately reflect conditions in real life. Counselors should help decision makers change their inaccurate perceptions so that (1) process deliberations are more likely to lead to expected outcomes, and (2) the decision maker is more likely to be prepared for whatever outcomes occur.     

Robustness of Additive Value Function Methods in MCDM

A simulation model is constructed of choice between a discrete number of non-dominated alternatives. The long-run goals of the decision maker are assumed to be consistent with a hypothetical preference structure which satisfies assumptions of completeness, transitivity and additive independence for an ideal set of criteria. The use of additive value functions to aid the decision maker in this choice is simulated for a variety of contexts and under a number of non-idealities such as the omission of criteria, confounding of criteria and inconsistent responses. It is found that ideal preference orderings are well identified by additive value functions provided that the non-idealities are moderate and that sufficient effort is put into modelling changing marginal values for different levels of performance. One of the potentially most sensitive areas is that of shifts in the decision maker's reference points as a result of the types of preference information asked.     

The Effects of Decision Outcome Dispersion Upon Organizational Decision Making

The effects of varying decision outcome dispersion on organizational decision making were investigated under individual and group decision making conditions. Thirty-six female and pg]36 male subjects made decisions for organizational decision scenarios in which outcomes affected primarily the decision maker, people other than the decision maker, or a group of which the decision maker was a member. Subjects rated their levels of perceived risk and confidence in their decisions and made decisions within a simulated context of either a small or a large organization. Results indicated that subjects perceived significantly less risk and more confidence in their decisions when outcomes affected primarily themselves rather than others regardless of whether the decisions were made individually or by a group. Males perceived their decisions as significantly more risky than females. Induced organizational size did not significantly influence decision making.

     

On the Robustness of Outcome Bias: No Constraint by Prior Culpability

Research on outcome bias has shown that blame attributions for behavioral decisions depend on the decision's consequences. Five studies of American undergraduates (N = 219, N = 83, N = 62, N = 279, and N = 45, respectively) demonstrated robust outcome effects across a variety of circumstances. A manipulation of prior negligence (Study 1), and attempts to keep prior negligence exceedingly low (Studies 2-4) produced converging results. In Study 5, a within-participants manipulation failed to eradicate outcome effects. Furthermore, outcome effects were not moderated by beliefs in a just world. Across all studies, mediational analyses suggested that participants adjusted estimates of negligence to match outcomes, which in turn led to more outcome-consistent attributions of blame. Study 5 showed that those low in belief in a just world were especially likely to adjust their negligence ratings in this way. These studies demonstrate that outcome effects contravene both the standards for rationality delineated by rational decision theorists, and also the more relaxed standards embodied in established legal doctrine.     

An interactive procedure for learning about preferences: Case study of a portfolio manager

This paper presents a new interactive procedure for learning and interpreting the choices available to a decision maker confronted with a discrete decision problem. The procedure guides a decision maker through the evaluation process, has an ability ‘to learn’ from previous choices and generates a set of rules that describe a decision maker's posterior preferences. The validity of the procedure was tested by creating an investment portfolio. The emphasis of the application is on assisting the portfolio manager to determine the decision consistency of a given portfolio selection process.     

Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? Making Choices for Non‐Human Animals

Animals are usually considered to lack the status of autonomous agents. Nevertheless, they do appear to make ostensible choices. This article considers whether, and how, I should respect animals' choices. I propose a concept of volitionality which can be respected if, and insofar as, doing so is in the best interests of the animal. Applying that concept, I (we) will argue that an animals' choices be respected when the relevant human decision maker's capacities to decide are potentially challenged or compromised. For example, it will be best to respect the animals' choice when the human decision maker: (1) lacks accurate knowledge of the animal's subjective experiences; (2) does not know what will lead to desirable experiences or allow for the avoidance of undesirable ones; (3) is biased; (4) is less aware of the animal's specific situation; (5) cannot appreciate all elements comprehensively, including considering any (content‐neutral) value to the animal being allowed to make and implement a choice, such as where a lack of control or liberty would be unpleasant or where an animal would usefully learn from the process of choice‐making; and (6) when the animal's choice is achievable. This additionally suggests that we may often beneficially choose to set up situations that empower animals to make better choices.     

Bridging the gap between joint and individual decisions: Deconstructing preferences in relationships

Most choice research has studied how people make decisions within a narrowly defined choice context and has not paid sufficient attention to the role of social context. We commend Simpson, Griskevicius, and Rothman for directing the attention of choice researchers to the study of joint decision making and current theories on relationships. Building on SGR, we propose that a relationship partner's influence varies with the type of decision at hand and with situational factors. We propose four possible types of decision episodes, defined by whether the decision stage and the consumption stage each occur singly or jointly, and explore how the decision type impacts the extent to which a decision maker will take a partner's preferences into account. We further discuss how situational factors, such as the environment in which the decision is made, as well as the mindset and cognitive resources of the decision maker, are likely to influence decision outcomes.     

Self‐framing of risky choice

Previous research on framing effects has largely focused on how choice information framed by external sources influences the response of a decision maker. This research examined how decision makers framed choice options and how the hedonic tone of self‐framing influenced their risk preference. By using pie charts and a complementary sentence‐completion task in Experiment 1, participants were able to interpret and frame the expected choice outcomes themselves before making a choice between a sure option and a gamble in either a life–death or a monetary problem. Each of these self‐frames (phrases) was then rated by a group of independent judges in terms of its hedonic tone. The hedonic tone of self‐frames was mostly positive and was more positive in the life–death than the monetary context, suggesting a motivational function of self‐framing. However, positive outcomes were still more likely to be framed positively than negative outcomes. In Experiment 2, choice outcomes were depicted with a whole‐pie chart instead of a pie slice in order to emphasize positive and negative outcomes equally. The results showed that the hedonic tone of self‐framing was still largely positive and more positive in the life domain than the monetary domain. However, compared to Experiment 1, the risk preference in the life–death domain was reversed, showing an outcome salience effect: when the pie‐slice chart emphasized only survival outcomes, participants were more risk taking under positive hedonic frames whereas when the whole‐pie chart depicted both survival and mortality outcomes, they became risk averse under positive frames. In sum, self‐framing reflected a positive bias in encoding risk information and affected the risk preference of the decision maker. Like the tone of voice used in communication, the hedonic tone of self‐framing, either positive or negative, can affect risk perception of a choice problem. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the relationship between empathy and the actor versus observer hypothesis

Subjects listened to a tape recording of a dyadic interaction. It was predicted that the observational set instructions received by the subjects (to empathize with one member of the dyad or not to empathize with this person) would create evaluation effects similar to those created for attributions of responsibility by actor-observer differences: The actor would receive credit for his positive outcome and blame for his negative outcome more when evaluated by nonempathizing observers, and the social environment would receive credit and blame for the actor's outcomes more when evaluated by empathizing observers. The predicted three-way interaction was obtained. Additional results are discussed in terms of previous empathy research.     

“The Group Knobe Effect”: evidence that people intuitively attribute agency and responsibility to groups

In the current paper, we present and discuss a series of experiments in which we investigated people’s willingness to ascribe intentions, as well as blame and praise, to groups. The experiments draw upon the so-called “Knobe Effect”. Knobe [2003. “Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] found that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of actions influences people’s assessment of whether those side-effects were brought about intentionally, and also that people are more willing to assign blame for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise for positive side-effect of actions. Building upon this research, we found evidence that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of group actions influences people’s willingness to attribute intentions to groups (Experiment 1a), and that people are more willing to assign blame to groups for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise to groups for positive side-effects of actions (Experiment 1b). We also found evidence (Experiments 2a, 2b, 3 and 4) that the “Group Knobe Effect” persists even when intentions and blame/praise are attributed to groups non-distributively, indicating that people tend not to think of group intentions and group blame/praise in distributive terms. We conclude that the folk are collectivist about group intentions, and also about the blameworthiness and praiseworthiness of groups.     

Stochastic pairwise comparative judgements and direct ratings of alternatives in the REMBRANDT system

The REMBRANDT system for multicriteria decision analysis consists of both the multiplicative variant of the AHP (which employs a method of pairwise comparative judgements by a decision maker to arrive at final impact scores for the alternatives under consideration) and SMART, the simple multiattribute rating technique (which utilizes direct rating of alternatives to achieve final impact scores). This paper examines the effect of imprecision or uncertainty in the decision maker's pairwise judgements or ratings of alternatives by expressing each pairwise judgement or rating as a probability distribution, and the structure of REMBRANDT's component models is exploited to derive interval judgements or interval ratings of the alternatives’ final impact scores. These interval judgements or interval ratings can be used to determine the probability of rank reversal amongst alternatives, i.e. to assess the stability of the final impact score vector. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multi-attribute choice and affect: The influence of naturally occurring and manipulated moods on choice processes

Based on a two-dimensional model of affect that views Pleasantness and Arousal as affect's two primary dimensions, this study investigates the effects of emotions on choice processes and outcomes. In Study 1, subjects first described their naturally occurring emotional state and then performed two multi-attribute product choice tasks. Subjects in more pleasant mood deliberated longer, used more decision-related information, re-examined more previously examined information, and made more interdimensional moves. Subjects in more aroused mood spent less time deliberating, revealed less information, ignored more product-describing attributes, and re-examined less of previously examined information. Study 2 replicated many of these effects with experimentally manipulated emotions and using a managerial decision-making task. The results are interpreted in terms of (1) a congruency between one's hedonic state and selected decision strategy and (2) a restriction in attentional capacity induced by increased Arousal.     

Outcome Knowledge,Regret, and Omission Bias

Subjects made or evaluated decisions in hypothetical scenarios. We manipulated knowledge about the outcome and act vs omission in four cases. In case 1 (production processes), acts (changing the process) were considered better than omissions when the decision maker did not know the outcome or knew that it was better than the status quo. Acts were considered worse than omissions once the decision maker learned that the foregone option would have led to an even better outcome. In case 2 (medical treatment), act vs omission again interacted with gain vs loss (relative to the status quo) unless the outcome of the foregone option was known, in which case act vs omission interacted with better vs worse (of the two options). In case 3 (fetal testing), subjects tolerated less risk of miscarriage when a potential for regret was present (because the test with the risk of miscarriage, although better, might miss disorders that another test would detect). This effect was greater for actions than omissions. In case 4 (vaccination), subjects showed less tolerance of vaccine risk when the decision maker would know about the outcome of vaccination or nonvaccination. Thus, the bias toward omission (not vaccinating) is greater when potential regret is present, and potential regret is greater when knowledge of outcomes is expected.     

Methodology to select solutions for multiobjective optimization problems: Weighted stress function method

The weighted stress function method is proposed here as a new way of identifying the best solution from a set of nondominated solutions according to the decision maker's preferences, expressed in terms of weights. The method was tested using several benchmark problems from the literature, and the results obtained were compared with those of other methods, namely, the reference point evolutionary multiobjective optimization (EMO), the weighted Tchebycheff metric, and a goal programming method. The weighted stress function method can be seen to exhibit a more direct correspondence between the weights set by the decision maker and the final solutions obtained than the other methods tested.     

自我框架、风险认知和风险选择

对行为决策中“框架效应”(Framing Effect)的研究进行了拓展：探讨了自我框架对风险决策的影响及其机制。面对运用图示方法表示的管理,健康,及投资方面的风险决策问题,参与者自主地选择对方案的描述（自我框架）。研究有四个主要发现：1）自我框架对风险选择的效应部分显著,而且对风险选择的影响方向因情境的不同而不同;2）机会威胁认知是自我框架效应的一个中介变量;3）自我框架在情绪语气上的差异对风险决策有显著影响：决策者对一个备选方案（确定性或风险性方案）相对于另一个备选方案的自我描述的情绪语气越积极正面,这个方案被选择的可能性越大;4）决策者的机会-威胁认知是这一自我框架效应的部分中介变量。也就是说,对备选方案的自我描述语气作为一种对决策信息的编码影响了风险（机会和威胁）认知,进而影响决策者的风险偏好和选择