Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-analysis of human lie judgments

Decades of research has shown that people are poor at detecting lies. Two explanations for this finding have been proposed. First, it has been suggested that lie detection is inaccurate because people rely on invalid cues when judging deception. Second, it has been suggested that lack of valid cues to deception limits accuracy. A series of 4 meta-analyses tested these hypotheses with the framework of Brunswik's (1952) lens model. Meta-Analysis 1 investigated perceived cues to deception by correlating 66 behavioral cues in 153 samples with deception judgments. People strongly associate deception with impressions of incompetence (r = .59) and ambivalence (r = .49). Contrary to self-reports, eye contact is only weakly correlated with deception judgments (r = -.15). Cues to perceived deception were then compared with cues to actual deception. The results show a substantial covariation between the 2 sets of cues (r = .59 in Meta-Analysis 2, r = .72 in Meta-Analysis 3). Finally, in Meta-Analysis 4, a lens model analysis revealed a very strong matching between behaviorally based predictions of deception and behaviorally based predictions of perceived deception. In conclusion, contrary to previous assumptions, people rarely rely on the wrong cues. Instead, limitations in lie detection accuracy are mainly attributable to weaknesses in behavioral cues to deception. The results suggest that intuitive notions about deception are more accurate than explicit knowledge and that lie detection is more readily improved by increasing behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers than by informing lie-catchers of valid cues to deception.     

Victimization,social anxiety,and body dysmorphic concerns: Appearance-based rejection sensitivity as a mediator

Body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) is characterized by extreme preoccupation with perceived deficits in physical appearance, and sufferers experience severe impairment in functioning. Previous research has indicated that individuals with BDD are high in social anxiety, and often report being the victims of appearance-based teasing. However, there is little research into the possible mechanisms that might explain these relationships. The current study examined appearance-based rejection sensitivity as a mediator between perceived appearance-based victimization, social anxiety, and body dysmorphic symptoms in a sample of 237 Australian undergraduate psychology students. Appearance-based rejection sensitivity fully mediated the relationship between appearance-based victimization and body dysmorphic symptoms, and partially mediated the relationship between social anxiety and body dysmorphic symptoms. Findings suggest that individuals high in social anxiety or those who have a history of more appearance-based victimization may have a bias towards interpreting further appearance-based rejection, which may contribute to extreme appearance concerns such as BDD.     

First Impressions After Various Types of Deception: Less Favorable Following Expectancy Violation

This experiment involving 96 undergraduates tested whether the expectancy-violation model could explain how different types of discovered verbal deception influence first impressions. A female confederate responded to a participant's question about her weight with a lie, true, secretive, or technically true (i.e., equivocal) statement. The confederate who lied or kept her weight a secret was less well liked, was seen as less moral, was less likely to be recommended as a dating partner, and made a worse overall impression than one who told the truth or equivocated. Violation of expectations for an honest answer mediated the relation between type of deception and both liking and recommendation as a dating partner. Thus, violating people's expectations for an honest answer can cause one to be seen in a less favorable light.     

Deception in research: distinctions and solutions from the perspective of utilitarianism

The use of deception in psychological research continues to be a controversial topic. Using Rawls's explication of utilitarianism, I attempt to demonstrate how professional organizations, such as the American Psychological Association, can provide more specific standards that determine the permissibility of deception in research. Specifically, I argue that researchers should examine the costs and benefits of creating and applying specific rules governing deception. To that end, I offer 3 recommendations. First, that researchers who use deception provide detailed accounts of the procedures they used to minimize the harm created by deception in their research reports. Second, that the American Psychological Association offer a definition of deception that describes techniques commonly used in research. Finally, I recommend that the informed consent procedure be revised to indicate that the researcher may use deception as part of the study.     

Telling lies

Men and women (20 each) were videotaped while describing someone they liked, someone they disliked, someone they were ambivalent about, someone they were indifferent about, someone they liked as though they disliked him or her, and someone they disliked as thought they like him or her. Accuracy at detecting that some deception had occurred was far greater than accuracy at detecting the true underlying affect, and people who were good at detecting that deception was occurring were not particularly skilled at reading the speakers' underlying affects. However, people whose deception attempts were more easily detected by others also had their underlying affects read more easily. Speakers whose lies were seen more readily by men also had their lies seen more readily by women, and observers better able to see the underlying affects of women were better able to see the underlying affects of men. Skill at lying successfully was unrelated to skill at catching others in their lies. A histrionic strategy (hamming) was very effective in deceiving others, and this strategy was employed more by more Machiavellian people, who also tended to get caught less often in their lies. Methodological considerations and systematic programs for future research are discussed.     

自主欺骗决策过程与结果评价的ERPs研究

本研究基于事件相关电位技术,以32名大学生为研究对象,采用2(诱发条件：高奖赏、低奖赏)×3(反馈类型：欺骗成功、欺骗失败、诚实)的组内实验设计,以点判断任务操控被试的自主欺骗水平,并结合欺骗及时反馈范式来操纵被试的结果评价。结果发现：(1)在决策过程,做出欺骗决策比诚实决策诱发更大波幅的P300;(2)在结果评价过程,相比欺骗成功反馈和诚实反馈,欺骗失败反馈诱发更负的FRN波幅。结果显示个体做出欺骗决策比诚实决策需要更多的注意资源参与和心理努力,并且对欺骗失败反馈的敏感度远高于欺骗成功反馈和诚实反馈。这一定程度上揭示了个体做出欺骗决策和面对欺骗结果时的心理和神经机制,为教育者采取必要措施来降低和预防青少年欺骗行为奠定了研究基础。     

The effects of suspiciousness of deception and the perceived legitimacy of deception on task performance in an attitude change experiment1

Subjects participated in two immediately consecutive experiments In the first, they either experienced a deception and debriefing, learned about deception in the abstract, did not learn about deception In the second, they either did or did not hear a reference to the possibility of a deception in that experiment A measure of incidental learning of the message in the second experiment showed that experiencing deception and learning about it in the abstract were not functionally equivalent, that only experiencing deception tended to produce absolute bias, that this bias was probably caused by “vigilance” rather than by “negativism,” that the reference to deception before the second experiment did not itself cause bias, and that the reference eliminated the difference in performance due to experiencing a deception as opposed to only learning about it in the abstract Furthermore, suspiciousness and the reported legitimacy of deception were positively related to each other at the group mean level Separating out their contribution to experimental performance showed that they complexly interacted to determine performance. These results were discussed with reference to the fear that subjects who have heard about deception from friends might perform differently from subjects who have not, with reference to the necessity for deception in some attitude change research, with reference to one alternative to deception, and with reference to explanations of why some experiments have shown no relationship between suspiciousness and experimental performance while others have shown a negative relationship     

Collective interviewing: A transactive memory approach towards identifying signs of truthfulness

Group interviewing has been neglected in the deception literature, yet it coincides with recent collective memory research. The present experiment applied the transactive memory theory to a collective interviewing situation and explored whether signs of truthfulness emerged through measuring joint memory recall. Truth-tellers were real couples who had been in a relationship for at least one year and cohabiting. Lying pairs were friends who pretended to be in a relationship for at least one year and cohabiting. All couples were interviewed in their pairs about their ‘real’ or ‘fictitious’ relationships. It was found that truth-telling pairs posed questions to one another, provided cues to one another, handed over remembering responsibility, and finished each others’ sentences significantly more than lying pairs, supporting the idea that real couples have a transactive memory system, unlike pretending couples. Implications for a collective interview approach that considers memory within deception detection are discussed.     

Adults' difficulties in identifying concealment among children interviewed with the putative confession instructions

The putative confession (PC) instructions (“[suspect] told me everything that happened and wants you to tell the truth”) increases children's honesty. However, research has shown that children who maintain secrecy despite the PC are more convincing. We examined whether (a) the PC undermines adults' deception detection abilities or (b) children who conceal despite the PC are better deceivers. Adults evaluated truthful and deceptive children interviewed with the PC where the PC portion of the interview was either present or absent. Adults' deception detection was no worse when the PC was present; in fact, it was slightly better. Rather than negatively affecting adults' ability to detect deception, the PC selects an unusually convincing group of concealers.     

“COME TO THINK OF IT…”

In Phase 1 of this study, communicators responded truthfully or deceptively to positive or negative interrogative probes. In Phase 2, the interviews were shown, at four levels of probe exposure, to observers who rated the communicators' eracity. In Phase 3, verbal and nonverbal cues were correlated with actual and perceived deception. Although exposure level had no effect on detection accuracy, liars and trulhtellers exposed to negative interrogative probes were judged more truthful than those exposed to positive probes. Analysis of the verbal and nonverbal cues revealed that none of the nonverbal cues relied on as indicators of deception were related to actual deception, and only one of the verbal cues (verbal content) was related to actual message veracity. Implications of these findings and suggestions for future research are offered.     

The "frozen in time" effect in evaluations of the dead

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that evaluations of the dead are more resistant to change than are evaluations of the living. In Experiment 1, perceivers formed an impression of a target person who performed either a moral or an immoral action and then either died or remained alive. Perceivers were later given new inconsistent information about the target's morality. The results revealed that perceivers' original impressions of the target were significantly less likely to change in response to the inconsistent information when the target was believed to be dead than when she was believed to be alive. Experiment 2 replicated the effect in impressions of real-world targets. The implications of these findings for research on posthumous impression processes are discussed.     

On-the-Job Experience and Skill at Detecting Deception1

The role of on-the-job experience in fostering skill at detecting deception was examined. A deception-detection test was administered to three samples of more than 100 subjects each: a group of undergraduates with no special experiences at detecting deceit; a group of new recruits to a federal law enforcement training program, who had some limited on-the-job experience at detecting deceit; and a group of advanced federal law enforcement officers, with years of experience working at jobs in which the detection of deception is very important. Although the officer samples were more confident about their judgments of deceptiveness than were the students, they were no more accurate than the students. None of the three groups showed a significant improvement in deception-detection success from the first half to the second half of the test; however, the advanced officers felt increasingly confident about their performance as they progressed through the test. Correlational analyses of the relationship between accuracy and confidence provided further evidence that experience does not improve people's awareness oi the accuracy or inaccuracy of their judgments. The findings from this research are compared to the results of research on other kinds of professional decision-makers (e.g., clinical psychologists), and several theoretical perspectives on the role of experience in decision making are discussed.     

Online deception: prevalence, motivation, and emotion.

This research has three goals: first, to find out how prevalent online deception is within a sample of Israeli users, second, to explore the underlying motivations to deceive online, and third, to discover the emotions that accompany online deception. A web-based survey was distributed in 14 discussion groups, and the answers of 257 respondents were analyzed. It was found that, while most of the respondents believe that online deception is very widespread, only about one-third of them reported engaging in online deception. Frequent users deceive online more than infrequent users, young users more than old, and competent users more than non-competent. The most common motivations to deceive online were "play" on the one hand and privacy concerns on the other. Most people felt a sense of enjoyment while engaging in online deception. The results are discussed in light of a possible mechanism for changing personal moral standards.     

Remembering first impressions: Effects of intentionality and diagnosticity on subsequent memory

People rely on first impressions every day as an important tool to interpret social behavior. While research is beginning to reveal the neural underpinnings of first impressions, particularly through understanding the role of dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), little is known about the way in which first impressions are encoded into memory. This is surprising because first impressions are relevant from a social perspective for future interactions, requiring that they be transferred to memory. The present study used a subsequent-memory paradigm to test the conditions under which the dmPFC is implicated in the encoding of first impressions. We found that intentionally forming impressions engages the dmPFC more than does incidentally forming impressions, and that this engagement supports the encoding of remembered impressions. In addition, we found that diagnostic information, which more readily lends itself to forming trait impressions, engages the dmPFC more than does neutral information. These results indicate that the neural system subserving memory for impressions is sensitive to consciously formed impressions. The results also suggest a distinction between a social memory system and other explicit memory systems governed by the medial temporal lobes.     

Cultural differences in the primacy effect for person perception

Previous work has shown there are robust differences in how North Americans and East Asians form impressions of people. The present research examines whether the tendency to weigh initial information more heavily—the primacy effect—may be another component of these cultural differences. Specifically, we tested whether Americans would be more likely to use first impressions to guide person perception, compared to Japanese participants. In this experiment, participants read a vignette that described a target person's behaviour, then rated the target's personality. Before reading the vignette, some trait information was given to create an expectation about the target's personality. The data revealed that Americans used this initial information to guide their judgments of the target, whereas the Japanese sample based their judgments on all the information more evenly. Thus, Americans showed a stronger primacy effect in their impression formation than Japanese participants, who engaged in more data‐driven processing.     

Impression formation: the role of expressive behavior

This research examined the effects of personality/social skills and individual differences in expressive style on impression formation. Particular attention was given to the role of nonverbal behaviors in the formation of initial impressions. Sixty-two subjects were measured on self-report personality and communication skill scales, on posed emotional sending ability, and on physical attractiveness. Subjects were then videotaped while giving a spontaneous "explanation." Trained coders measured five separate nonverbal cue factors displayed by the subjects in the videotapes. Groups of untrained judges viewed the tapes and rated their impressions of the subjects on scales of likability, speaking effectiveness, and expressivity-confidence. Male subjects who were nonverbally skilled and extraverted tended to display more outwardly focused and fluid expressive behaviors, and made more favorable impressions on judges, than did males who scored low on the measures of nonverbal skills and extraversion. Females who were nonverbally skilled displayed more facial expressiveness, which led to more favorable initial impressions. Sex differences may reflect basic differences in the acquisition and use of expressive nonverbal cues by males and females.     

Can intuition improve deception detection performance?

Two studies examined the role of processing style (intuitive vs. deliberative processing) in a deception detection task. In the first experiment, a thin slicing manipulation was used to demonstrate that intuitive processing can lead to more accurate judgments of deception when compared with traditional deliberative forms of processing. In the second experiment, participants who engaged in a secondary (concurrent) task performed more accurately in a deception detection task than participants who were asked to provide a verbal rationale for each decision and those in a control condition. Overall, the results converge to suggest that intuitive processing can significantly improve deception detection performance.     

When Accurate Beliefs Lead to Better Lie Detection1

This study tested the hypothesis that people with accurate beliefs about the cues that predict deception are better at detecting deception only when those beliefs are cognitively available and activated. To test the hypothesis, participants viewed video fragments of people who were being either honest or dishonest. A questionnaire assessed participants' beliefs about the cues involved in deception, and activation of participants' belief cues was accomplished by manipulating suspicion. The results provided support for the hypothesis, where participants whose beliefs were activated and had accurate beliefs were better at detecting deception compared to other participants. Gender differences were also found, where lies communicated by women were more accurately detected than were lies communicated by men.     

Deception in psychotherapy: Frequency,typology and relationship

Deception in therapy has been documented anecdotally through various narratives of therapists. The investigation of its occurrence within therapy has largely been overlooked. We explored the reported frequency of deception within psychotherapy, the types of deception used within therapy, the likelihood of people lying to a therapist compared to other groups of people, and client perceptions of the types of deception that therapists use. Ninety‐one participants were provided with a series of deception examples, asked questions about the use of these types of deception within therapy, and asked generally about their use of deception in therapy. We found that a majority of the participants had been deceptive in therapy, and a majority were willing to be deceptive in future therapeutic contexts. Participants were more likely to use white lies than other forms of deception in therapy. Lastly, participants were less likely to lie to therapists compared to strangers and acquaintances. Implications for research and practice are discussed.