The relation between infants' perception of catchableness and the control of catching

The authors studied how infants come to perceive and act adaptively by presenting 35 three- to nine-month-olds with balls that approached at various speeds according to a staircase procedure. They determined whether infants attempted to reach for the ball and whether they were successful (i.e., contacted the ball). In addition, the time and distance of the ball at the onset of the catching movements were measured for the successful interceptions. The authors found that not only catching skill but also the perceptual judgments of the catchableness improved with age; infants started to take their catching ability into account when judging whether a ball was catchable. Moreover, the authors observed that infants who made imprecise perceptual judgments were more likely to use a distance control strategy, whereas infants who made accurate perceptual judgments were more likely to use the more adaptive time strategy to control the catching movements. They conclude that the present study supports the proposal that, even in prelocomotor infants, the development of perception is intricately linked to or constrained by development in the visual control of action.     

Impact of action planning on spatial perception: Attention matters

Previous research suggested that perception of spatial location is biased towards spatial goals of planned hand movements. In the present study I show that an analogous perceptual distortion can be observed if attention is paid to a spatial location in the absence of planning a hand movement. Participants judged the position of a target during preparation of a mouse movement, the end point of which could deviate from the target by a varying degree in Exp. 1. Judgments of target position were systematically affected by movement characteristics consistent with perceptual assimilation between the target and the planned movement goal. This effect was neither due to an impact of motor execution on judgments (Exp. 2) nor due to characteristics of the movement cues or of certain target positions (Exp. 3, Exp. 5A). When the task included deployment of attention to spatial positions (former movement goals) in preparation for a secondary perceptual task, an effect emerged that was comparable with the bias associated with movement planning (Exp. 4, Exp. 5B). These results indicate that visual distortions accompanying manipulations of variables related to action could be mediated by attentional mechanisms.     

Motor learning enhances perceptual judgment: a case for action-perception transfer

Transfer from perception to action is well documented, for instance in the form of observational learning. Transfer from action to perception, on the other hand, has not been researched. Such action-perception transfer (APT) is compatible with several learning theories and has been predicted within the framework of common coding of perceptual and motor events (Prinz, 1992, 1997). Our first experiment aimed at an empirical evaluation of APT and involved motor practice of timed two-cycle arm movements on verbal command without visual feedback. In a transfer test, visual judgments of similar patterns had to be made. In addition, transfer from the visual to the motor task was studied. In Experiment 2 we separated kinesthetic aspects of motor practice from preparatory and efferent contributions to APT. The experiments provide evidence that transfer between perception and action is bi-directional. Transfer from perception to action and, more importantly, from action to perception was found. Furthermore, APT was equally pronounced for participants who had actively practiced movements during training and for passive participants who had received merely kinesthetic feedback about the movement. This kinesthetic-visual transfer is likely to be achieved via visuomotor-kinesthetic matching or via timekeeping mechanisms that are involved in both motor and visual performance. Received: 2 June 1999 / Accepted: 20 June 2000     

On the signals underlying conscious awareness of action

To investigate whether conscious judgments of movement onset are based solely on pre-movement signals (i.e., premotor or efference copy signals) or whether sensory feedback (i.e., reafferent) signals also play a role, participants judged the onset of finger and toe movements that were either active (i.e., self initiated) or passive (i.e., initiated by the experimenter). Conscious judgments were made by reporting the position of a rotating clock hand presented on a computer screen and were then compared to the actual measured time of movement onset. In line with previous studies, judgment errors were found to be anticipatory for both finger and toe movements. There was a significant difference between judgment errors for active and passive movements, with judgments of active movements being more anticipatory than judgments of passive movements. This is consistent with a pre-movement (from here on referred to as an “efferent”) account of action awareness because premotor and efference copy signals are only present in active movements, whereas the main source of movement information in passive movements is sensory feedback which is subject to time delays of conduction (and hence predicts later judgment times for passive movements). However, judgments of active toe movement onset time were less anticipatory than judgments of active finger movement onset time. This pattern of results is not consistent with a pure efferent account of conscious awareness of action onset - as this account predicts more anticipatory judgments for toe movements compared to finger movements. Instead, the data support the idea that conscious judgments of movement onset are based on efferent (i.e., premotor, efference copy) and reafferent (i.e., feedback from the movement) components.     

Visual illusions affect both movement planning and on-line control: a multiple cue position on bias and goal-directed action

Over the last decade, there has been an interest in the impact of visual illusions on the control of action. Much of this work has been motivated by Milner and Goodale's two visual system model of visual processing. This model is based on a hypothesized dissociation between cognitive judgments and the visual control of action. It holds that action is immune to the visual context that provides the basis for the illusion-induced bias associated with cognitive judgments. Recently, Glover has challenged this position and has suggested that movement planning, but not movement execution is susceptible to visual illusions. Research from our lab is inconsistent with both models of visual-motor processing. With respect to the planning and control model, kinematic evidence shows that the impact of an illusion on manual aiming increases as the limb approaches the target. For the Ebbinghaus illusion, this involved a decrease in the time after peak velocity to accommodate the 'perceived' size of the target. For the Müller-Lyer illusion, the influence of the figure's tails increased from peak velocity to the end of the movement. Although our findings contradict a strong version of the two visual systems hypothesis, we did find dissociations between perception and action in another experiment. In this Müller-Lyer study, perceptual decisions were influenced by misjudgment of extent, while action was influenced by misjudgment of target position. Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that it is often necessary to use visual context to make adjustments to ongoing movements.     

Action-dependent perceptual invariants: from ecological to sensorimotor approaches

Ecological and sensorimotor theories of perception build on the notion of action-dependent invariants as the basic structures underlying perceptual capacities. In this paper we contrast the assumptions these theories make on the nature of perceptual information modulated by action. By focusing on the question, how movement specifies perceptual information, we show that ecological and sensorimotor theories endorse substantially different views about the role of action in perception. In particular we argue that ecological invariants are characterized with reference to transformations produced in the sensory array by movement: such invariants are transformation-specific but do not imply motor-specificity. In contrast, sensorimotor theories assume that perceptual invariants are intrinsically tied to specific movements. We show that this difference leads to different empirical predictions and we submit that the distinction between motor equivalence and motor-specificity needs further clarification in order to provide a more constrained account of action/perception relations.     

How information guides movement: intercepting curved free kicks in soccer

Previous studies have shown that balls subjected to spin induce large errors in perceptual judgments ( [Craig et al., 2006] and [Craig et al., 2009] ) due to the additional accelerative force that causes the ball’s flight path to deviate from a standard parabolic trajectory. A recent review however, has suggested that the findings from such experiments may be imprecise due to the decoupling of perception and action and the reliance on the ventral system (van der Kamp, Rivas, van Doorn, & Savelsbergh, 2008). The aim of this study was to present the same curved free kick trajectory simulations from the perception only studies ( [Craig et al., 2006] and [Craig et al., 2009] ) but this time allow participants to move to intercept the ball. By using immersive, interactive virtual reality technology participants were asked to control the movement of a virtual effector presented in a virtual soccer stadium so that it would make contact with a virtual soccer ball as it crossed the goal-line. As in the perception only studies the direction of spin had a significant effect on the participants’ responses with significantly fewer balls being intercepted in the spin conditions when compared to no-spin conditions. A significantly higher percentage of movement reversals for the spin conditions served to highlight the link between information specifying ball heading direction and subsequent movement. The coherence of the findings for both the perception and perception/action study are discussed in light of the dual systems model for visual processing.     

Visual guidance of walking through apertures: body-scaled information for affordances

A necessary condition for visually guided action is that an organism perceive what actions are afforded by a given environmental situation. Warren (1984) proposed that an affordance such as the climbability of a stairway is determined by the fit between properties of the environment and the organism and can be characterized by optimal points, where action is most comfortable or efficient, and critical points, where a phase transition to a new action occurs. Perceiving an affordance, then, implies perceiving the relation between the environment and the observer's own action system. The present study is an extension of this analysis to the visual guidance of walking through apertures. We videotaped large and small subjects walking through apertures of different widths to determine empirically the critical aperture-to-shoulder-width ratio (A/S) marking the transition from frontal walking to body rotation. These results were compared with perceptual judgments of "passability" under static and moving viewing conditions. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that such judgments are based on intrinsic or body-scaled information specifying aperture width as a ratio of the observer's eyeheight. We conclude (a) that the critical point in free walking occurs at A/S = 1.30, (b) that static monocular information is sufficient for judging passability, and (c) that the perception of passability under such conditions is based on body-scaled eyeheight information.     

Grasping visual illusions: no evidence for a dissociation between perception and action

Neuropsychological studies prompted the theory that the primate visual system might be organized into two parallel pathways, one for conscious perception and one for guiding action. Supporting evidence in healthy subjects seemed to come from a dissociation in visual illusions: In previous studies, the Ebbinghaus (or Titchener) illusion deceived perceptual judgments of size, but only marginally influenced the size estimates used in grasping. Contrary to those results, the findings from the present study show that there is no difference in the sizes of the perceptual and grasp illusions if the perceptual and grasping tasks are appropriately matched. We show that the differences found previously can be accounted for by a hitherto unknown, nonadditive effect in the illusion. We conclude that the illusion does not provide evidence for the existence of two distinct pathways for perception and action in the visual system.     

Tracking without perceiving: a dissociation between eye movements and motion perception

Can people react to objects in their visual field that they do not consciously perceive? We investigated how visual perception and motor action respond to moving objects whose visibility is reduced, and we found a dissociation between motion processing for perception and for action. We compared motion perception and eye movements evoked by two orthogonally drifting gratings, each presented separately to a different eye. The strength of each monocular grating was manipulated by inducing adaptation to one grating prior to the presentation of both gratings. Reflexive eye movements tracked the vector average of both gratings (pattern motion) even though perceptual responses followed one motion direction exclusively (component motion). Observers almost never perceived pattern motion. This dissociation implies the existence of visual-motion signals that guide eye movements in the absence of a corresponding conscious percept.     

Perception of movement in American Sign Language: Effects of linguistic structure and linguistic experience

In order to reveal the psychological representation of movement from American Sign Language (ASL), deaf native signers and hearing subjects unfamiliar with sign were asked to make triadic comparisons of movements that had been isolated from lexical and from grammatically inflected signs. An analysis of the similarity judgments revealed a small set of physically specifiable dimensions that accounted for most of the variance. The dimensions underlying the perception of lexical movement were in general different from those underlying inflectional movement, for both groups of subjects. Most strikingly, deaf and hearing subjects significantly differed in their patterns of dimensional salience for movements, both at the lexical and at the inflectional levels. Linguistically relevant dimensions were of increased salience to native signers. The difference in perception of linguistic movement by native signers and by naive observers demonstrates that modification of natural perceptual categories after language acquisition is not bound to a particular transmission modality, but rather can be a more general consequence of acquiring a formal linguistic system.     

Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity

Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend a normative claim that it is reasonable to accept the general reliability of our perceptual judgments, instead of a factual claim that our perceptual judgments are generally reliable. More specifically, I offer a normative practical argument which explains why it is reasonable to accept the general reliability of our perceptual judgments, even though we cannot establish the general reliability of our perceptual judgments by means of theoretical reasoning.     

Effects of motor intention on the perception of somatosensory events: a behavioural and functional magnetic resonance imaging study

The intention to execute a movement can modulate our perception of sensory events, and this modulation is observed ahead of both ocular and upper limb movements. However, theoretical accounts of these effects, and also the empirical data, are often contradictory. Accounts of "active touch", and the premotor theory of attention, have emphasized how movement intention leads to enhanced perceptual processing at the target of a movement, or on the to-be-moved effector. By contrast, recent theories of motor control emphasize how internal "forward" model (FM) estimates may be used to cancel or attenuate sensory signals that arise as a result of self-generated movements. We used behavioural and functional brain imaging (functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) to investigate how perception of a somatosensory stimulus differed according to whether it was delivered to a hand that was about to execute a reaching movement or the alternative, nonmoving, hand. The results of our study demonstrate that a somatosensory stimulus delivered to a hand that is being prepared for movement is perceived to have occurred later than when that same stimulus is delivered to a nonmoving hand. This result indicates that it takes longer for a tactile stimulus to be detected when it is delivered to a moving limb and may correspond to a change in perceptual threshold. Our behavioural results are paralleled by the results of our fMRI study that demonstrated that there were significantly reduced blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) responses within the parietal operculum and insula following somatosensory stimulation of the hand being prepared for movement, compared to when an identical stimulus was delivered to a nonmoving hand. These findings are consistent with the prediction of FM accounts of motor control that postulate that central sensory suppression of somatosensation accompanies self-generated limb movements, and with previous reports indicating that effects of sensory suppression are observed in higher order somatosensory regions.     

Recognition of dance-like actions: Memory for static posture or dynamic movement?

Dance-like actions are complex visual stimuli involving multiple changes in body posture across time and space. Visual perception research has demonstrated a difference between the processing of dynamic body movement and the processing of static body posture. Yet, it is unclear whether this processing dissociation continues during the retention of body movement and body form in visual working memory (VWM). When observing a dance-like action, it is likely that static snapshot images of body posture will be retained alongside dynamic images of the complete motion. Therefore, we hypothesized that, as in perception, posture and movement would differ in VWM. Additionally, if body posture and body movement are separable in VWM, as form- and motion-based items, respectively, then differential interference from intervening form and motion tasks should occur during recognition. In two experiments, we examined these hypotheses. In Experiment 1, the recognition of postures and movements was tested in conditions in which the formats of the study and test stimuli matched (movement–study to movement–test, posture–study to posture–test) or mismatched (movement–study to posture–test, posture–study to movement–test). In Experiment 2, the recognition of postures and movements was compared after intervening form and motion tasks. These results indicated that (1) the recognition of body movement based only on posture is possible, but it is significantly poorer than recognition based on the entire movement stimulus, and (2) form-based interference does not impair memory for movements, although motion-based interference does. We concluded that, whereas static posture information is encoded during the observation of dance-like actions, body movement and body posture differ in VWM.     

Painful semantic context modulates the relationship between action words and biological movement perception

Studies have revealed a close relationship between action–word processing and the detection of point-light biological movements and that this effect can be modulated by the context of action-verb presentation. The goal of the present study was to further examine the extent to which motor representation activation plays a role in this relationship by testing the influence of painless/painful sentence understanding during a listening task. Participants judged the presence or absence of a point-light biological movement that was embedded in a scrambled mask after a congruent or incongruent action sentence was presented. The sentences varied according to the context of action-verb presentation (painful, painless). Perceptual judgments of human movements improved after a prior presentation of a congruent action sentence but only in the painless context. Thus, our findings show that pain included in a semantic context of sentence presentation can preclude the relationship between action–word understanding and point-light biological movement judgments.     

Visual information underpinning skilled anticipation: The effect of blur on a coupled and uncoupled in situ anticipatory response

Coupled interceptive actions are understood to be the result of neural processing—and visual information— which is distinct from that used for uncoupled perceptual responses. To examine the visual information used for action and perception, skilled cricket batters anticipated the direction of balls bowled toward them using a coupled movement (an interceptive action that preserved the natural coupling between perception and action) or an uncoupled (verbal) response, in each of four different visual blur conditions (plano, +1.00, +2.00, +3.00). Coupled responses were found to be better than uncoupled ones, with the blurring of vision found to result in different effects for the coupled and uncoupled response conditions. Low levels of visual blur did not affect coupled anticipation, a finding consistent with the comparatively poorer visual information on which online interceptive actions are proposed to rely. In contrast, some evidence was found to suggest that low levels of blur may enhance the uncoupled verbal perception of movement.     

Pursuit compensation during self-motion

The pattern of motion in the retinal image during self-motion contains information about the person's movement. Pursuit eye movements perturb the pattern of retinal-image motion, complicating the problem of self-motion perception. A question of considerable current interest is the relative importance of retinal and extra-retinal signals in compensating for these effects of pursuit on the retinal image. We addressed this question by examining the effect of prior motion stimuli on self-motion judgments during pursuit. Observers viewed 300 ms random-dot displays simulating forward self-motion during pursuit to the right or to the left; at the end of each display a probe appeared and observers judged whether they would pass left or right of it. The display was preceded by a 300 ms dot pattern that was either stationary or moved in the same direction as, or opposite to, the eye movement. This prior motion stimulus had a large effect on self-motion judgments when the simulated scene was a frontoparallel wall (experiment 1), but not when it was a three-dimensional (3-D) scene (experiment 2). Corresponding simulated-pursuit conditions controlled for purely retinal motion aftereffects, implying that the effect in experiment 1 is mediated by an interaction between retinal and extra-retinal signals. In experiment 3, we examined self-motion judgments with respect to a 3-D scene with mixtures of real and simulated pursuit. When real and simulated pursuits were in opposite directions, performance was determined by the total amount of pursuit-related retinal motion, consistent with an extra-retinal 'trigger' signal that facilitates the action of a retinally based pursuit-compensation mechanism. However, results of experiment 1 without a prior motion stimulus imply that extra-retinal signals are more informative when retinal information is lacking. We conclude that the relative importance of retinal and extra-retinal signals for pursuit compensation varies with the informativeness of the retinal motion pattern, at least for short durations. Our results provide partial explanations for a number of findings in the literature on perception of self-motion and motion in the frontal plane.     

Contribution of perceptual fluency to recognition judgments.

Following a shallow (count vowels) or deep (read) study task, old and new words were tested for both fluency of perception and recognition memory. Subjects first identified a test word as it came gradually into view and then judged it as old or new. Old words were identified faster than new words, indicating implicit, perceptual memory for old words. Independently of this effect, words judged old were identified faster than words judged new, especially after shallow study. Eight experiments examined the possible causal relationship between perceptual fluency and recognition judgements. Experiments 1 to 4 showed that fast identifications per se do not promote old judgments. Accelerating the identification of test items by semantically priming them or making them come more quickly into view did not affect recognition judgments. Experiment 5 showed that the usual association of fast identifications with old judgments is not an artifact of item selection because the association disappeared when the identifications and judgements were segregated into different phases of the test task. Experiments 6 and 7 showed tha the likelihood of old judgments increases directly with the pretested perceptibility of test words, but only after shallow study. Experiment 8 showed that the dependency of recognition judgments on perceptual fluency continues to hold when the requirement to identify the words before judging them is eliminated. We conclude that fluency of perception contributes to recognition judgments, but only when the fluency is produced naturally (e.g., through perceptual memory) and explicit memory is minimal.     

Attention modulates sensory suppression during back movements

Tactile perception is often impaired during movement. The present study investigated whether such sensory suppression also occurs during back movements, and whether this would be modulated by attention. In two tactile detection experiments, participants simultaneously engaged in a movement task, in which they executed a back-bending movement, and a perceptual task, consisting of the detection of subtle tactile stimuli administered to their upper or lower back. The focus of participants’ attention was manipulated by raising the probability that one of the back locations would be stimulated. The results revealed that tactile detection was suppressed during the execution of the back movements. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 2 revealed that when the stimulus was always presented to the attended location, tactile suppression was substantially reduced, suggesting that sensory suppression can be modulated by top-down attentional processes. The potential of this paradigm for studying tactile information processing in clinical populations is discussed.     

Searching for the minimal essential information for skilled perception and action

Summary A common concern for both cognitive/computational and ecological/dynamical models of human motor control is the isolation of the minimal essential information needed to support skilled perception and action. In perception isolating essential features of the optic flow field, which are reliably informative regarding the nature of current events, from nonessential features provides a valuable step towards understanding how the computational complexity of perceptual information processing may be reduced to manageable levels and how relatively direct linkages of low dimensionality may be established between information and control variables. Likewise, in the study of action, discrimination of the movement features that remain immutable (invariant?) across changes in task conditions from the variables that are situationally determined provides a principled insight into the structural framework upon which skilled movement is built. Controversy abounds, however, in the study of perception and action as to whether features isolated as informative and immutable are centrally represented (in the form of a template or program) or are rather directly picked up (in the case of perceptual variables) or are simply an emergent consequence of the underlying dynamics (in the case of action variables). In this paper some examples of putative minimal essential information sources in perception and action are provided, strategies for uncovering such sources are discussed, and attention is directed, with the use of some recent data collected on natural skills, to some systematic expert-novice differences in the utilization of essential information and control variables. Expert-novice differences are highlighted because of the insight they may provide regarding the nature of perceptual-motor skill acquisition.