Affordances,context and sociality

Affordances, i.e. the opportunity of actions offered by the environment, are one of the central research topics for the theoretical perspectives that view cognition as emerging from the interaction between the environment and the body. Being at the bridge between perception and action, affordances help to question a dichotomous view of perception and action. While Gibson’s view of affordances is mainly externalist, many contemporary approaches define affordances (and micro-affordances) as the product of long-term visuomotor associations in the brain. These studies have emphasized the fact that affordances are activated automatically, independently from the context and the previous intention to act: for example, affordances related to objects’ size would emerge even if the task does not require focusing on size. This emphasis on the automaticity of affordances has led to overlook their flexibility and contextual-dependency. In this contribution I will outline and discuss recent perspectives and evidence that reveal the flexibility and context-dependency of affordances, clarifying how they are modulated by the physical, cultural and social context. I will focus specifically on social affordances, i.e. on how perception of affordances might be influenced by the presence of multiple actors having different goals.

     

Social Affordances and Interaction II: Autism and the Affordances of the Human Environment

The interaction between informational support or task constraints and functional motor performance was explored using kinematic profiles of the arms and hands of 40 participants with and without multiple sclerosis (MS). Three functional tasks were performed under three conditions: impoverished (i.e., participants mimed the tasks), partial (i.e., participants mimed the tasks with a limited array of the objects normally used), and natural (i.e., participants performed the actual tasks). Results indicated that each of the three conditions elicited unique kinematic profiles. Movement time, maximum displacement, and velocity variability were significantly different among each of the three conditions. An ecological interpretation suggested that functional performance emerged from the interaction of the task demands of each condition and of the action capabilities of the participants. Participants with and without MS responded to the three conditions in similar ways, except that those with MS performed the tasks more slowly. We speculated that the slower performance was a function of the reduced and inconsistent action capabilities of the participants with MS.     

Persons and Affordances

Abstract

Interdisciplinary interest in affordances is increasing. This paper is a philosophical contribution. The question is: Do persons offer affordances? Analysis of the concepts ‘person’ and ‘affordance’ supports an affirmative answer. On a widely accepted understanding of what persons are, persons exhibit many of the features typical of socionormative affordances. However, to understand persons as offering affordances requires, on the face of it, stretching traditional understandings of the concept of affordance: persons, in contrast to the organisms that partially constitute persons, do not seem to be available to perception. This and similar worries are responded to.     

Perceptual Learning of Tooling Affordances of a Jointed Object via Dynamic Touch

We investigated whether perceptual learning via dynamic touch can facilitate the discovery of tooling affordances. Twelve blindfolded participants manipulated two structurally identical aluminum objects consisting of a blade and a shaft; one object was seven and a half times heavier than and twice as large as the other object. Flexions/extensions at two joints in the shaft changed the configuration and functionality of each object. A rigid shaft (one of four possible configurations) rendered each object a functional hoe. The number of changes in the configuration produced prior to determining that the grasped object had been rendered a functional hoe greatly exceeded the number of possible configurations and declined with experience, whereas the rate of change in configuration increased with experience. Inertial properties specifically support perception via dynamic touch and explained the observed differences in actions with the two objects. These findings demonstrate that perceptual learning via dynamic touch can facilitate the discovery of tooling affordances.     

Personality and Daily Experience: The Promise and the Challenge

This special issue of the Journal of Personality is devoted to personality and daily experience. Through historical analysis of the daily event literature, empirical inquiry, and methodological and statistical commentary, the contributors to this issue convey both the possibilities and the problems of studying everyday life. These articles demonstrate how people's dispositions, goals, and commitments can influence daily emotional well-being and health, their inner experience, their reactions to events, and perhaps even which events they encounter. The introduction of personality to the study of daily experience holds the promise of enriching our studies of both.     

Reification of phonological storage

We question the arguments and data presented by Larsen and Baddeley (this issue 2003) in support of the phonological loop account of verbal short-term memory on a number of grounds. These include the correlation between effect size and the presence of a phonological similarity effect in the data, and the existence elsewhere in the literature of effects of articulatory suppression and interference between verbal and nonverbal information that undermines the phonological loop account. We question the idea that short-term memory phenomena are best conceived of in terms of phonological storage, and we sketch an alternative perspective that does not rely on the notion of a bespoke phonological store, an entity that we argue represents a reification.     

Affordances and the Nature of Perceptual Content

Abstract

According to John McDowell, representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. This paper criticizes this view by claiming that there is a certain kind of representational and non‐conceptual perceptual content that is sensitive to bodily skills. After a brief introduction to McDowell’s position, Merleau‐Ponty’s notion of body schema and Gibson’s notion of affordance are presented. It is argued that affordances are constitutive of representational perceptual content, and that at least some affordances, the so‐called ‘conditional affordances’, are essentially related to the body schema. This means that the perceptual content depends upon the nature of the body schema. Since the body schema does not pertain to the domain that our conceptual faculties operate upon, it is argued that this kind of perceptual content cannot be conceptual. At least some of that content is representational, yet it cannot feature as non‐demonstrative conceptual content. It is argued that if it features as demonstrative conceptual content, it has to be captured by private concepts. Since McDowell’s theory does not allow for the existence of a private language, it is concluded that at least some representational perceptual content is non‐conceptual.     

Social Affordances and the Possibility of Ecological Linguistics

This paper includes an effort to extend the notion of affordance from a philosophical point of view the importance of ecological approach for social psychology, ethics, and linguistics. Affordances are not always merely physical but also interpersonal and social. I will conceptualize affordance in general and social affordance in particular, and will elucidate the relation between intentional action and affordances, and that between affordances and free will. I will also focus on the relation between social institution and affordance. An extended theory of affordances can provide a way to analyze in concrete ways how social institution works as an implicit background of interpersonal interactions. Ecological approach considers social institution as the producer and maintainer of affordances. Social institutions construct the niches for human beings. Finally, I will argue the possibility of the ecological linguistics. Language is a social institution. The system of signs is the way to articulate and differentiate interpersonal affordances. Language acquires its meaning, i.e. communicative power in the interpersonal interactions, and interpersonal interactions, in turn, develop and are elaborated through the usage of signs. Communication is seen as never aimed to transmit inner ideas to others, but to guide and adjust the behaviors of others thorough articulating the affordance of responsible-ness.     

Affordances as Properties of the Animal-Environment System

In this article, I argue that affordances are properties of the animal-environment system, that is, that they are emergent properties that do not inhere in either the environment or the animal. I critique and review the formal definition of affordance offered by Turvey (1992). Turvey defined affordances as properties of the environment; I discuss some consequences of this and argue that Turvey's strategy of grounding the definition of affordance in terms of dispositional properties is problematic. I also suggest that Turvey's definition of affordance may lead to problems for the specification and direct perception of affordances. Motivated by these problems, I propose a new definition of affordance, in which affordances are properties of the animal-environment system. This definition does not rely on the concept of dispositional properties and is consistent with direct perception.     

On Stoffregen's Definition of Affordances

Stoffregen (2003) has proposed a formal definition of affordances as emergent or relational properties of animal-environment systems. This definition contrasts with Turvey's (1992) formal definition of affordances as properties of the environment. In this commentary, my purpose is not to take sides on this issue but instead to bring to light what I believe to be a crucial flaw in Stoffregen's definition. Specifically, I show that Stoffregen's definition places no constraint on which relational or emergent properties legitimately deserve to be counted as affordances, thus allowing any relational property that can be predicated of an animal-environment system to be considered as an affordance. As such, Stoffregen's definition lacks any substantive linkage to the "opportunity for action" notion that has accounted for the scientific utility of the concept to date, a linkage I suggest should be preserved in any definition of affordances.     

Cognition as the Cooperative Appropriation of Affordances

Michaels (2000) expressed concerns about the implications of the notion of 2 visual systems (Milner &; Goodale, 1995) for ecological psychology. This leads her to suggest a decoupling of perception and action, by which action is separate from perception. It is suggested that although Michaels noted, on the one hand, that Milner and Goodale's approach to perception is a constructivist one, she mistakenly adopts their view that separates vision for perception from vision for action. An alternative position is presented, based on a recent article (Norman, in press), in which the parallels between the 2 visual systems, dorsal and ventral, and the 2 theoretical approaches, ecological and constructivist, are elucidated. According to this dual-process approach to perception, both systems are perceptual systems. The ecological-dorsal system is the system that picks up information about the ambient environment allowing the organism to negotiate it. It is suggested that this type of perception always processes the relevant information for action and that there is no need to sever the perception-action coupling. Ecological psychology and the 2 visual systems are quite compatible, and there is no need for concern.     

Gibson's Affordances and Turing's Theory of Computation

The concept of affordance is a central component of the ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson (1966, 1977, 1979/1986). Affordances are properties of the environment taken relative to an observer. Ecological theorists have developed formal models for the analysis of affordances. Models proposed by Shaw and Turvey (1981), Turvey (1992), and Greeno (1994) are described and evaluated, and another approach, using Turing's (1936-1937/1965) theory of computation, is outlined. Affordances are characterized as the configurations of Turing machines. It is shown that Turing's work provides a natural vehicle for exploring Gibson's ideas.     

A Rich Landscape of Affordances

Mark (1987) reported that observers, whose sitting capabilities had been altered by having them wear 10-cm blocks, were able to discover their own maximum height of a surface that afforded sitting on (SHmax), in the absence of an opportunity to practice sitting while wearing blocks. The current investigation attempted to identify conditions under which returning of an observer's SHmax, occurred. Returning of SH@, judgments readily occurred when observers were able to locomote between trials (Experiment 1), and rotate their heads, lean forward and to the side while making their judgments (Experiments I-2). However, they were unable to retune their SHmax, when the viewing conditions restricted all but the most basic actions (Experiments 3-5). Observers' actions during and between trials also were critical to the accuracy of their judgments when they did not wear the blocks. Overall, these findings strongly implicate observers' own activities as crucial for revealing information about their own S@ under both conditions when they are and are not familiar with their own sitting capabilities. Experiment 6 bolstered this conclusion by showing that prior practice with the act of sitting was not sufficient to enable observers to retune their own SHmax, (block condition) or to perceive their own SHmax under familiar circumstances (no block).     

Analytic Meditative Therapy as the Inverse of Symbol Formation and Reification

Western psychotherapy tends to regard the mind and mental distress in terms of differing theoretical models. Mental distress can be also be usefully viewed as the result of erroneous reification—the confusing of symbols and concepts with reality. This paper describes the theory and practice of analytic meditative therapy. Inspired by non-dual Buddhist and other eastern wisdom traditions, it uses meditative and cognitive processes to control anxiety, deconstruct reified symbols and encourage contemplative resting in non-dual mental space, where reality and its appearance are coemergent and coalesced but distinct, and healing occurs naturally without the need for any specific additional effort.Jonathan R. Harrison was born in Manchester, England in 1943. He has a master’s degree in physics and mathematics from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. He studied non-dual therapy with Dr. Peter Fenner in France and Israel and during a personal retreat at a Tibetan Buddhist monastery in India. Inspired by non-dual Buddhist and other wisdom traditions—Dzogchen and Mahamudra, Zen and Madhyamika, Advaita and Taoism—he currently lives and works in Israel, teaching analytical meditative therapy to individuals and groups.     

Contours of Cairo Revolt: Street Semiology,Values and Political Affordances

Topoi - This article contemplates symbols and values inscribed on Cairo’s landscape during the 2011 revolution and the period since, focusing on Tahrir Square and the role of the Egyptian...     

Emotional Environments: Selective Permeability,Political Affordances and Normative Settings

Topoi - I begin this article with an increasingly accepted claim: that emotions lend differential weight to states of affairs, helping us conceptually carve the world and make rational decisions. I...     

Affordances and Events: Theory and Research

In replying to the commentaries, I focus on issues relating to theory, empirical practice (i.e., to how research on events and affordances has been conducted), and empirical research that I think is needed. I reiterate my argument that because they differ qualitatively, affordances might be perceived without prior or concurrent perception of the underlying events. I suggest that research on event perception might, in principle, inform research on the perception of affordances, but existing research has made no explicit attempt to do this. I conclude by stressing the need for new research and for exponents of event perception to identify a theoretical motivation, within ecological theory, for why events should be perceived.     

Affordances as constraints on the control of stance

In this article we present an ecological treatment of the control of stance by multi-segment organisms. We treat the organism as a black box, and the organism-environment interaction as a closed-loop system. We argue that different ways of controlling stance can have differing utility (affordances) for perception and action. We further argue that the affordances of a particular control strategy are in part determined by (a) the mechanical properties of the organism, (b) the mechanical properties of the surface on which stance takes place, and (c) the goals of behavior. Our conclusion is that the control of stance is based on, or constrained by, perception of the kinematic consequences, or affordances, of control actions. Finally, we argue that the relationship between affordances and constraints on control actions should be investigated using geometrical methods.