Member Preferences for Discussion Content in Anticipated Group Decisions: Effects of Type of issue and Group Interactive Goal

Preferences for discussion content in three future group decision-making sessions were sought from individuals. Each session would deal with a different topic, and discussion would be limited to content items to be determined by compiling individual-member item rankings. Topics varied in the degree to which they were judgmental or intellective. An induced interactive goal stressed either group relations (group goal) or decision quality (task goal). For each topic, subjects ranked 12 potential discussion items, 6 reflecting normative and 6 informational material. Normative material was preferred if the anticipated topic was clearly judgmental, and informational material was preferred for an intellective topic, agreeing with prior research in which actual discussion followed the same type of issue-influence mode pattern. When given false feedback regarding the items (predominantly normative or informational) that had been chosen by compiling members' votes, subjects were most satisfied if selections were congruent with their interactive goal, that is, if they anticipated discussing normative items under a group goal and informational items under a task goal. In sum, preference for normative versus informational content in an anticipated discussion was driven by issue type, but satisfaction with expected content was driven by interactional goal. Though preferred influence mode in anticipated group decisions was affected by whether conditions fostered concern for group relations versus gathering facts, specific manifestations (ranking or satisfaction) varied with invoking conditions (issue type or goal).     

How do people influence in jury deliberation? a social psychological view

Research in small-group decision making suggests two means by which discussion shifts the responses of individual members—Nonmative influence and informational influence. The former is based on pressure to conform to the normative positions of group members, and the latter involves changes due to the informational content of persuasively or passively shared facts. Which influence mode is used depends on the group decision rule, whether the response is public or private, the perceived nature of the task, and the nature of the issue. Specifically, normative influence is likely to prevail in public judgments, under group cohesion sets, and with value-laden issues, while informational influence will emerge when responses are private, the group is oriented toward the immediate task, and the issue is intellective. Suggestions are made regarding strategy and tactics for anticipating, harnessing, and shaping the form of influence that will take place during deliberation.     

Memory prediction accuracy in younger and older adults: a cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis

Across three experiments, the effects of age and normative information on memory prediction accuracy were examined. In Experiment 1, younger and older adults were given an arbitrary midpoint anchor and made global predictions about how they expected to perform on subsequent verbal, visual, and name-face memory tasks. In Experiment 2, the normative information was varied by providing participants with a midpoint anchor, accurate anchor, or no anchor. Across both experiments, older adults successfully adjusted their predictions in accordance with the task demands, regardless of the type of normative information given. In Experiment 3, older adults' prediction accuracy was measured at a 5-year follow-up. Memory performance predictions were found to be just as accurate as they had been at the first assessment. In general, the findings indicate that older adults were as accurate as younger adults in assessing their memory performance abilities. Older adults also did not operate on a negative stereotype of global cognitive decline with age, as they provided varying performance estimates across the different domains and types of memory tasks.     

Promoting systematic processing in low-motivation settings: effect of incongruent information on processing and judgment

Ss received consensus information that was either congruent or incongruent with the valence of persuasive message content. In Experiment 1 Ss believed that their processing task was either important or unimportant whereas in Experiment 2 all Ss believed that their task was unimportant. In accord with the heuristic-systematic model's sufficiency principle, high-task-importance Ss exhibited a great deal of systematic processing regardless of congruency, whereas low-importance Ss processed systematically only when they received incongruent messages; in the congruent conditions heuristic processing dominated. Attitude data generally reflected these processing differences and confirmed the additivity and attenuation assumptions of the model. The utility of the sufficiency principle for understanding motivation for elaborative processing and the relevance of the findings to understanding the processing and judgmental effects of expectancy disconfirmation are discussed.     

Blushing-fearful individuals overestimate the costs and probability of their blushing

It has been proposed that blushing-fearful individuals overestimate both the probability and the interpersonal costs of blushing. To study these judgmental biases, we presented a treatment-seeking sample of blushing-fearful individuals a series of vignettes describing social events and tested whether this clinical sample would overestimate the costs and probability of blushing compared to non-fearful controls. To test if blushing-fearfuls overestimate and/or low-fearful individuals underestimate the cost of displaying a blush, a second experiment examined the effects of blushing in these situations on observers' judgments. Experiment 1 showed that blushing-fearfuls indeed have judgmental biases for the probability and costs of blushing. Experiment 2 showed that the observers' judgments were very similar to the judgments anticipated by the low-fear group in Experiment 1. Thus the judgmental biases that were evident in the high-fearfuls can be best interpreted as an overestimation of the social costs of displaying a blush. These findings help improving our understanding of the mechanisms that may drive blushing phobia and also point to the clinical implication that it might be worthwhile to challenge blushing-fearfuls' judgmental biases.     

Not only base rates are neglected in the Engineer-Lawyer problem: An investigation of reasoners’ underutilization of complementarity

The standard Engineer-Lawyer problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) points to the failure of reasoners to integrate mentioned base-rate information in arriving at likelihood estimates. Research in this area nevertheless has presupposed that participants respect complementarity (i.e., participants ensure that competing estimates add up to 100%). A survey of the literature leads us to doubt this pre-supposition. We propose that the participants' non-normative performance on the standard Engineer-Lawyer problem reflects a reluctance to view the task probabilistically and that normative responses become more prominent as probabilistic aspects of the task do. In the present experiments, we manipulated two kinds of probabilistic cues and determined the extent to which (1) base rates were integrated and (2) the complementarity constraint was respected. In Experiment 1, six versions of an Engineer-Lawyer-type problem (that varied three levels of cue to complementarity and two base rates) were presented. The results showed that base-rate integration increased as cues to complementary did. Experiment 2 confirmed that Gigerenzer, Hell, and Blank's (1988) random-draw paradigm facilitates base-rate integration; a second measure revealed that it also prompts respect for complementarity. In Experiment 3, we replicated two of our main findings in one procedure while controlling for the potential influence of extraneous task features. We discuss approaches that describe how probabilistic cues might prompt normative responding.     

Individual judgment and group interaction: A variable perspective approach

An extension of the T. M. Ostrom and H. S. Upshaw perspective model (1968, in A. Greenwald, T. Brock, and T. Ostrom (Eds.), Psychological foundations of attitudes, New York: Academic Press) of attitudinal judgments, incorporating a subjective scale range concept, was examined in relation to the effects of group interaction on individual members' attitudinal judgments. Subjects made attitudinal judgments after reading a criminal case history and then, either individually or as members of four person groups, decided on the appropriate sentence for the criminal for two different cases. The results showed that the subjective scale range concept was useful to account for the subjects' attitudinal judgments. Further analysis showed that the group interaction provided both informational and normative influences on the individual members' judgments in different ways. These findings are discussed in terms of judgmental processes postulated by Ostrom and Upshaw.     

The "relative self": informational and judgmental consequences of comparative self-evaluation

Results of 5 studies demonstrated that self-evaluative comparisons have 2 distinct informational consequences with opposing judgmental effects: They selectively increase the accessibility of standard-consistent self-knowledge and provide an evaluative reference point. The first informational consequence produces assimilation in self-evaluative judgments, whereas the latter yields contrast. Using a lexical decision task, Study 1 demonstrated that a social comparison selectively increases the accessibility of standard-consistent self-knowledge. Study 2 showed that this effect also holds for comparisons with objective standards. Studies 3 and 4 revealed that the same comparison may lead to assimilation on objective and contrast on subjective self-judgments. Finally, Study 5 demonstrated that assimilation results for comparisons with relevant and irrelevant standards, whereas contrast occurs only for relevant standards.     

Neural mechanisms of social influence

The present investigation explores the neural mechanisms underlying the impact of social influence on preferences. We socially tagged symbols as valued or not – by exposing participants to the preferences of their peers – and assessed subsequent brain activity during an incidental processing task in which participants viewed popular, unpopular, and novel symbols. The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) differentiated between symbols that were and were not socially tagged – a possible index of normative influence – while aspects of the striatum (the caudate) differentiated between popular and unpopular symbols – a possible index of informational influence. These results suggest that integrating activity in these two brain regions may differentiate objects that have become valued as a result of social influence from those valued for non-social reasons.     

The “Black Sheep Effect”: Extremity of judgments towards ingroup members as a function of group identification

The present study proposes an extension to the phenomenon of ingroup favouritism, based on the hypothesis that judgments about ingroup members may be more positive or more negative than judgments about similar outgroup members. It contrasts predictions issued from the complexity-extremity hypothesis (Linville, 1982; Linville and Jones, 1980), from the ingroup favouritism hypothesis (Tajfel, 1982) and from Tesser's (1978; Millar and Tesser, 1986) attitude polarization model. Our main prediction, based on Social Identity Theory, is that judgments about both likeable and unlikeable ingroup members are more extreme than judgments about outgroup members. This phenomenon, coined the Black Sheep Effect, is viewed as due to the relevance that ingroup members'behaviour, as compared to that of outgroup members, has for the subjects' social identity. Three experiments supported our predictions. Experiment I additionally showed that inter-trait correlations were stronger for the ingroup than for the outgroup. Experiment 2 showed that the black sheep effect occurs only when the judgmental cues are relevant for the subjects' social identity, and Experiment 3 showed that levels of information about the target of the judgment were ineffective in generating judgmental extremity. Results are discussed in light of a cognitive-motivational alternative explanation to a purely cognitive interpretation of outgroup homogeneity.     

Online information-sharing: A qualitative analysis of community,trust and social influence amongst commuter cyclists in the UK

Research into the use and behavioural effects of travel information has concentrated on top-down information from transport providers, but little is known about the role of informal information, shared through word-of-mouth, in everyday travel behaviour. Social interactions about travel may exert not only an informational influence, whereby beliefs are updated based on the experience of other individuals, but also a more subtle normative influence: conveying information about norms of behaviour within a particular social milieu. This research aimed to explore, using a qualitative approach, the social processes which occurred when a group of 23 commuter cyclists interacted with one another through a specially designed, map-based website over six weeks, sharing their routes and other cycling-related information. Methods comprised observation of website interactions, participant questionnaires and semi-structured interviews; the analysis drew on the theory of normative and informational social influence, and self-categorisation theory. It was found that the process of sharing information could perform not only a functional role in diffusing instrumental travel information, but also a social one whereby perceived in-group membership and high levels of trust reinforced positive views of cycling as a commuter mode. Both roles were found to offer particular encouragement to those who were new to cycling or new to a particular workplace. This suggests that ‘user-generated’ information may hold potential as one of the tools for promoting sustainable travel within a group setting such as the workplace.     

Inferences about others from their reports about themselves

Subjects in this study were asked to infer an attribute of a target person on the basis of his report about himself: Two informational determinants of such inferences were varied: (a) reliability of the report, i.e. the belief that the target person would correctly report events that had actually occurred and (b) diagnosticity of the actual events, i.e. the belief that the actual events are indicative of the attribute. Normative considerations require that the effect of diagnosticity be dependent on reliability so that as reliability increases, judgment should become less regressive, i.e. vary more as a function of events' diagnosticity. The results indicate that subjects employed a simple but inappropriate averaging rule in combining reliability and diagnosticity information. This rule, like many other simplifying judgmental heuristics, resulted in inferences that were more extreme than warranted by normative models. The inappropriate combination of reliability and diagnosticity information may thus contribute to observers' tendency to over-attribute personal characteristics to others.     

Informational mood impact on effort-related cardiovascular response: the diagnostic value of mood counts

Drawing on the mood-behavior model (G. H. E. Gendolla, 2000), 2 experiments examined moods' informational impact on effort-related cardiovascular response. After being induced into positive versus negative moods, participants performed a memory task (Experiment 1) or a letter-cancellation task (Experiment 2). Half the participants received a cue that their mood could have been manipulated. As expected, both studies found stronger reactivity of systolic blood pressure in a negative mood than in a positive mood when no cue was provided. This effect diminished in the cue conditions. Additionally, achievement corresponded to systolic blood pressure reactivity (Experiment 1), the cue manipulation had no effect on mood, and mood had a congruency effect on subjective task difficulty in the no-cue conditions (Experiment 2).     

Self-enhancement and theory-based correction processes

Two studies examined bias correction by manipulating a perceived chronic judgmental bias (i.e., overestimator/underestimator) using a modified dot estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants corrected for this perceived estimation bias by making adjustments away from the arbitrary feedback about their personal bias tendencies. In Experiment 2, the perceived desirability of the same estimation bias was manipulated. Results indicated that self-enhancement concerns impacted perceivers’ motivation to correct, at a cost to accuracy. These studies expand our current understanding of theory-based correction by including self-enhancement motives as causes of correction, demonstrating that such corrections can decrease rather than increase judgment accuracy, and illustrating the usefulness of a new perceived bias manipulation in theory testing.     

时间压力下你想听什么? 参照组影响对冲动购买的调节

本文研究时间压力下消费者冲动性购买怎样受参照组的影响。通过二手数据和实验的方法发现时间压力和参照组影响类型对冲动性购买具有交互作用:时间压力低,信息性影响更能激发冲动性购买;时间压力高,规范性影响更能起作用;即时喜悦和规范性评估起中介作用。而且不同的信息性影响类型也会产生差异:时间压力高,数量性信息更容易使消费者冲动性购买;时间压力低,内容性信息更能起作用。本文的研究丰富了冲动性购买的相关理论和管理经验。     

The effect of invalid task parameters on short-term motor memory

Two experiments tested the influence of information from an invalid movement parameter on short-term motor memory for a valid task parameter. Experiment 1 showed that invalid task distance information affected location retention. Experiment 2 showed that invalid task location information affected task distance retention. These findings strengthen the evidence that the codes important for short-term motor retention are affected by a variety of factors within the movement context.     

The negative feedback dysregulation effect: losses of motor control in response to negative feedback

Negative feedback has paradoxical features to it. This form of feedback can have informational value under some circumstances, but it can also threaten the ego, potentially upsetting behaviour as a result. To investigate possible consequences of the latter type, two experiments (total N?=?159) presented positive or negative feedback within a sequence-prediction task that could not be solved. Following feedback, participants had to control their behaviours as effectively as possible in a motor control task. Relative to positive feedback, negative feedback undermined control in a manner suggesting emotional upset (Experiment 1). These reactions lasted for at least three seconds and were especially pronounced among people reporting that they typically lose control in the context of their negative emotions (Experiment 2). The findings document a novel form of behavioural dysregulation that occurs in response to negative feedback while also highlighting the utility of motor control perspectives on self-control.