内隐学习中表征与意识的关系

近年来研究者分别从表征的质量和表征的外显等级两个方面探讨了内隐学习中表征与意识的关系。有关表征质量与意识的研究,清晰地揭示了影响表征进入意识的因素;而有关表征外显等级与意识的研究,则明确地阐明了什么样的表征才是有意识的。但表征与意识的关系是一个十分复杂的问题,目前仍存在着很大的争议,还有待于进一步的探讨     

Evidence for abstract, schematic knowledge of three spatial diagram representations

Spatial diagram representations such as hierarchies, matrices, and networks are important tools for thinking. Our data suggest that college students possess abstract schemas for these representations that include at least rudimentary information about their applicability conditions. In Experiment 1, subjects were better able to select the appropriate spatial diagram representation for a problem when cued to use general category information in memory about those representations than when cued to use specific example problems given during the experiment. The results of Experiment 2 showed that the superior performance in the general category condition was not based on a comparison of the test problems with examples in memory. The results of Experiment 3 showed that the superior performance was not due to learning that occurred during the experiment or to transfer appropriate processing. The General Discussion section considers the nature of students' representation schemas and the question of why college students have only rudimentary schemas for common and widely applicable diagrammatic representations.     

Learning new problem-solving strategies leads to changes in problem representation

Children sometimes solve problems incorrectly because they fail to represent key features of the problems. One potential source of improvements in children's problem representations is learning new problem-solving strategies. Ninety-one 3rd- and 4th-grade students solved mathematical equivalence problems (e.g., 3 + 4 + 6 = 3 + __) and completed a representation assessment in which they briefly viewed similar problems and either reconstructed each problem or identified it in a set of alternatives. Experimental groups then received a lesson about one or both of two solution strategies, the equalize strategy and the add–subtract strategy. A control group received no instruction. All children completed posttest assessments of representation and problem solving. Children taught the equalize strategy improved their problem representations more than those not taught it. This pattern did not hold for the add–subtract strategy. These results indicate that learning new strategies is one source of changes in problem representation. However, some strategies are more effective than others at promoting accurate problem representation.     

Learned changes in the sensitivity of stimulus representations: Associative and nonassociative mechanisms

Central to associative learning theory is the proposal that the concurrent activation of a pair of event representations will establish or strengthen a link between them. Associative theorists have devoted much energy to establishing what representations are involved in any given learning paradigm and the rules that determine the degree to which the link is strengthened. They have paid less attention to the question of what determines that a representation will be activated, assuming, for the case of classical conditioning, that presentation of an appropriately intense stimulus from an appropriate modality will be enough. But this assumption is unjustified. Ipresent the results of experiments on the effects of stimulus exposure in rats that suggest that mere exposure to a stimulus can influence its perceptual effectiveness—that the ability of a stimulus to activate its representation can be changed by experience. This conclusion is of interest for two reasons. First, it supplies a direct explanation for the phenomenon of perceptual learning—the enhancement of stimulus discriminability produced by some forms of stimulus exposure. Second, it poses a theoretical challenge in that it seems to require the existence of a learning mechanism outside the scope of those envisaged by current formal theories of associative learning. I offer some speculations as to how this mechanism might be incorporated into such theories.     

两种数量表征系统

数量表征是人类数学能力的基础,数量表征研究中的一个争论焦点在于是否存在两种不同的数量表征系统：对小数的精确表征系统和对大数的近似表征系统。通过综述不同研究领域对数量表征的研究,总结了支持两种表征系统分离的证据：对1~3范围内小数的表征受数量大小的限制,基于指向物体本身的注意,更依赖于物体的知觉特征,对物体及其数量进行精确表征;而对4以上的数量的近似表征系统则受韦伯定律的限制,基于指向数量的模拟幅度的表征,而不依赖单个物体的知觉特征,是对数量的近似的、心理的表征。fMRI、PET和ERP的脑成像研究结果迄今尚无定论,但认知神经科学研究的深入开展将最终阐明数量表征的机制     

A One-to-One Bias and Fast Mapping Support Preschoolers' Learning About Faces and Voices

A multimodal person representation contains information about what a person looks like and what a person sounds like. However, little is known about how children form these face-voice mappings. Here, we explored the possibility that two cognitive tools that guide word learning, a one-to-one mapping bias and fast mapping, also guide children's learning about faces and voices. We taught 4- and 5-year-olds mappings between three individual faces and voices, then presented them with new faces and voices. In Experiment 1, we found that children rapidly learned face-voice mappings from just a few exposures, and furthermore spontaneously mapped novel faces to novel voices using a one-to-one mapping bias (that each face can produce only one voice). In Experiment 2, we found that children's face-voice representations are abstract, generalizing to novel tokens of a person. In Experiment 3, we found that children retained in memory the face-voice mappings that they had generated via inference (i.e., they showed evidence of fast mapping), and used these newly formed representations to generate further mappings between new faces and voices. These findings suggest that preschoolers' rapid learning about faces and voices may be aided by biases that are similar to those that support word learning.     

The Nature of External Representations in Problem Solving

This article proposes a theoretical framework for external representation based problem solving. The Tic-Tac-Toe and its isomorphs are used to illustrate the procedures of the framework as a methodology and test the predictions of the framework as a functional model. Experimental results show that the behavior in the Tic-Tac-Toe is determined by the directly available information in external and internal representations in terms of perceptual and cognitive biases, regardless of whether the biases are consistent with, inconsistent with, or irrelevant to the task. It is shown that external representations are not merely inputs and stimuli to the internal mind and that they have much more important functions than mere memory aids. A representational determinism is suggested—the form of a representation determines what information can be perceived, what processes can be activated, and what structures can be discovered from the specific representation.     

Aligning Logical and Psychological Contributions to the Understanding of Human Reasoning

Modern logic is an abstract study of consequence rather than a mechanistic study of reasoning. This abstract view has much to offer psychological studies of the representations which implement human reasoning. This paper reviews recent results showing the abstract equivalence of all the main psychological competence models of syllogistic reasoning. Their apparently contrasting representations are computationally equivalent for the kind of data presented. The true empirical contrasts between theories lie in other details of implementation — in whether integrated representations are constructed and in the sequence of cases considered. These contrasts are independent of sentential, graphical or mental model representation.Logic is also a guide to representation requirements. Linear syllogism models are representable by sequences of tokens, whereas categorial syllogism models generally require attribute binding. However, one consequence of the present semantic analysis is that all categorial syllogism competence models converge on an algorithm which avoids representation of more than a single sequence.The paper goes on to consider what evidence could distinguish the representations implementing reasoning in working memory. The example of dual task paradigms is considered and some conceptual questions are raised about the identification of the modalities of working memory subsystems with linguistic and spatial representations. Carefully distinguishing memory medium from memory interpretation leads to the conclusion that it is the interpretation of the contents of memory which determines whether it holds spatial or linguistic information. It is argued that the critical dimension for understanding reasoning processes is the expressiveness of interpretation of representations.     

In which direction to move? Facilitative and interference effects of gestures on problem solver's thinking

Recent research shows that co-speech gestures can influence gesturers’ thought. This line of research suggests that the influence of gestures is so strong, that it can wash out and reverse an effect of learning. We argue that these findings need a more robust and ecologically valid test, which we provide in this article. Our results support the claim that gestures not only reflect information in our mental representations, but can also influence gesturer's thought by adding action information to one's mental representation during problem solving (Tower of Hanoi). We show, however, that the effect of gestures on subsequent performance is not as strong as previously suggested. As opposed to what previous research indicates, gestures' facilitative effect through learning was not nullified by the potentially interfering effect on subsequent problem-solving performance of incompatible gestures. To conclude, using gestures during problem solving seems to provide more benefits than costs for task performance.     

Representation as the Representation of Experience

This essay deals, mainly, with the notion of representation. Representation is associated with texts and, as such, is contrasted to the true singular statement. It is argued that the relationship between the text and what the text represents can never be modeled on the relationship between a true singular statement and what the statement is true of, and, furthermore, that the former relationship is aesthetic while the latter is epistemological in nature. This aesthetic relationship between the represented and its representation is investigated from the perspective of historical writing. This offers an interesting perspective because historical texts are representations, but they also aim at giving us "the truth" about the past. Historical representation, therefore, is the kind of representation coming closest to the cognitive claims traditionally investigated by epistemology. The notion of aesthetic and historical experience is explored in order to define the relationship between historical representation and what it represents.     

Exemplars, prototypes, similarities, and rules in category representation: an example of hierarchical bayesian analysis

This article demonstrates the potential of using hierarchical Bayesian methods to relate models and data in the cognitive sciences. This is done using a worked example that considers an existing model of category representation, the Varying Abstraction Model (VAM), which attempts to infer the representations people use from their behavior in category learning tasks. The VAM allows for a wide variety of category representations to be inferred, but this article shows how a hierarchical Bayesian analysis can provide a unifying explanation of the representational possibilities using 2 parameters. One parameter controls the emphasis on abstraction in category representations, and the other controls the emphasis on similarity. Using 30 previously published data sets, this work shows how inferences about these parameters, and about the category representations they generate, can be used to evaluate data in terms of the ongoing exemplar versus prototype and similarity versus rules debates in the literature. Using this concrete example, this article emphasizes the advantages of hierarchical Bayesian models in converting model selection problems to parameter estimation problems, and providing one way of specifying theoretically based priors for competing models.     

View-invariant object category learning, recognition, and search: how spatial and object attention are coordinated using surface-based attentional shrouds

How does the brain learn to recognize an object from multiple viewpoints while scanning a scene with eye movements? How does the brain avoid the problem of erroneously classifying parts of different objects together? How are attention and eye movements intelligently coordinated to facilitate object learning? A neural model provides a unified mechanistic explanation of how spatial and object attention work together to search a scene and learn what is in it. The ARTSCAN model predicts how an object's surface representation generates a form-fitting distribution of spatial attention, or "attentional shroud". All surface representations dynamically compete for spatial attention to form a shroud. The winning shroud persists during active scanning of the object. The shroud maintains sustained activity of an emerging view-invariant category representation while multiple view-specific category representations are learned and are linked through associative learning to the view-invariant object category. The shroud also helps to restrict scanning eye movements to salient features on the attended object. Object attention plays a role in controlling and stabilizing the learning of view-specific object categories. Spatial attention hereby coordinates the deployment of object attention during object category learning. Shroud collapse releases a reset signal that inhibits the active view-invariant category in the What cortical processing stream. Then a new shroud, corresponding to a different object, forms in the Where cortical processing stream, and search using attention shifts and eye movements continues to learn new objects throughout a scene. The model mechanistically clarifies basic properties of attention shifts (engage, move, disengage) and inhibition of return. It simulates human reaction time data about object-based spatial attention shifts, and learns with 98.1% accuracy and a compression of 430 on a letter database whose letters vary in size, position, and orientation. The model provides a powerful framework for unifying many data about spatial and object attention, and their interactions during perception, cognition, and action.     

Representation and the active consumer

One of the central tasks for naturalistic theories of representation is to say what it takes for something to be a representation, and some leading theories have been criticised for being too liberal. Prominent discussions of this problem have proposed a producer-oriented solution; it is argued that representations must be produced by systems employing perceptual constancy mechanisms. However, representations may be produced by simple transducers if they are consumed in the right way. It is characteristic of representations to be consumed by systems which are capable of independent action. This paper defends this claim; discusses more precise, naturalistic formulations; and shows how it can illuminate the explanatory payoffs which science achieves by appealing to representation.

     

Seeing the Problem: An Explanation From Pólya

In this article, we focus on the instructional explanation of guessing as a heuristic for solving the Five Planes Problem (FPP), given in a lesson by George Pólya. We use the analysis of the lesson to test the applicability of what is known about instructional explanations in elementary mathematics to higher mathematics. The most salient characteristic of Pólya's lesson is the profusion of models and representations used to develop a sense of the problem and to support the instructional explanation. Pólya used analogical models to transform the complex FFT to a simpler one, and he used representations to extend the perspective on the problem. Introducing such models and representations requires keeping track of the links between them and the original problem. Pólya excelled in this endeavor, and his passage to each new representation or model was generally justified in terms of the goals of the explanation. Another very important feature of an instructional explanation is problem identification, a fragile goal state that needs to be constantly maintained when the problem being explained is complex. For this lesson, we examine how Pólya established and maintained that goal. Finally, we offer some insight on instructional explanations in a situation in which the teacher needs to fulfill two goals at the same time. Here, the first goal was to teach students both how to solve FPP and how to use guessing as a problem-solving heuristic or strategy; the second goal was to show us how to teach guessing. Keeping these goals in mind, we offer some suggestions on how to teach metaskills through mathematical problems in accordance with the current understanding of constructivist approaches to learning.     

Iconic Representations and Representative Practices

I develop an account of scientific representations building on Charles S. Peirce's rich, and still underexplored, notion of iconicity. Iconic representations occupy a central place in Peirce's philosophy, in his innovative approach to logic and in his practice as a scientist. Starting from a discussion of Peirce's approach to diagrams, I claim that Peirce's own representations are in line with his formulation of iconicity, and that they are more broadly connected to the pragmatist philosophy he developed in parallel with his scientific work. I then defend the contemporary relevance of Peirce's approach to iconic representations, and specifically argue that Peirce offers a useful ‘third way’ between what Mauricio Suárez has recently described as the ‘analytical’ and ‘practical’ inquiries into the concept of representation. As a philosophically minded scientist and an experimentally inclined philosopher, Peirce never divorced the practice of representing from questions about what counts as a representation. I claim that his account of iconic representations shows that it is the very process of representing, construed as a practice which is coextensive with observing and experimenting, that casts light on the nature of representative relations.     

手指的感知、运动以及数量表征对数字认知的促进作用

手指是儿童在习得数字符号之前最常使用的表征数量的工具,大量研究都表明手指在数字认知中具有促进作用。但是,目前仍不清楚手指在数字认知中的作用机制。综述从手指感知、手指运动以及手指数量表征三个方面总结了手指在数字认知中所起的作用。手指感知可能通过影响儿童的数量表征能力间接地影响其它数学能力;与表征量有关的手指运动可能促进了数量大小的加工。关于手指数量表征在数字认知中的作用存在两种有争议的观点：一种认为手指数量表征促进了儿童由非符号数量表征向符号数量表征的转化;另一种认为手指数量表征可能是一种数量语义表征方式。未来应该在发展、作用机制、性别差异等方向继续开展研究,进一步探讨手指在数字认知中所起的作用。     

Exploring Positive Learning Experiences in the Context of Practical Theological Education

Abstract. This article presents findings from an empirical study exploring student and teacher perspectives on positive learning experiences in practical theological education. Forty‐five students and twenty teachers were interviewed in focus groups in four educational institutions delivering programs in practical theology. The findings indicated that students valued practical theological education when it enabled them to think critically in relation to their personal or professional experience, and that students valued tutors, their peers and a flexible curriculum design in promoting this kind of learning. There was a high correlation between students’ views of positive learning experiences and what tutors perceived as important qualities that they hoped their students would develop. Difficulties associated with the students’ lack of clarity about the learning process and the tensions between academic and professional contexts are also discussed.     

Basing Categorization on Individuals and Events

Exemplar, prototype, and connectionist models typically assume that events constitute the basic unit of learning and representation in categorization. In these models, each learning event updates a statistical representation of a category independently of other learning events. An implication is that events involving the same individual affect learning independently and are not integrated into a single structure that represents the individual in an internal model of the world. A series of experiments demonstrates that human subjects track individuals across events, establish representations of them, and use these representations in categorization. These findings are consistent with “representationalism,” the view that an internal model of the world constitutes a physical level of representation in the brain, and that the brain does not simply capture the statistical properties of events in an undifferentiated dynamical system. Although categorization is an inherently statistical process that produces generalization, pattern completion, frequency effects, and adaptive learning, it is also an inherently representational process that establishes an internal model of the world. As a result, representational structures evolve in memory to track the histories of individuals, accumulate information about them, and simulate them in events.     

Social representations,group affiliation,and projection: Knowing the limits of validity

It is argued that social representations and similar constructs can only be conceived of as mental structures containing meta-information about the group, within which the representation was formed and where it is part of social identity. The most important information will be to know the limits of its validity, that is, to know to which social group a representation pertains. Experiments on social projection have shown that people tend to project their opinions onto others, if they are perceived as being similar in background values. Such projection cannot be expected with idiosyncratic attitudes and beliefs. Consequently it is hypothesized that idiosyncratic and private attitudes, opinions, etc., are not attributed to specific social groups, whereas knowledge pertaining to social representations the subject subscribes to is projected onto the ingroup and less on the outgroup. This effect is expected to be independent of the relative number of people holding this opinion. This is what was found in a quasi-experimental questionnaire study. Implications of the findings are discussed with regard to the definition and criteria ofsociul representations and to the structure of the theory.