Just ignore or counterattack? On the effects of different strategies for dealing with political attacks

During political races, candidates have to decide how to deal with the negative remarks from opposing candidates: just ignore or counterattack? In two studies, we investigated some of the consequences of this choice. In Study 1, participants were presented with a political candidate who systematically attacked his opponent and with the reactions of the attacked candidate: across conditions, the attacked candidate only focused on his political program or counterattacked. Results showed an overt condemnation of the choice to counterattack but a higher spontaneous conformity toward the candidate who counterattacked. Study 2 replicated and extended these results indicating that the gender of the attacked candidate did not affect the results. Moreover, Study 2 showed that conformity toward the attacked candidate was positively related to the predicted chances of winning the election. Results are discussed in relation to their theoretical and applied implications. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Socially Constructed Technology

The concepts of omniscience and omnipotence are defined in 2 × 2 ordinal games, and implications for the optimal play of these games, when one player is omniscient or omnipotent and the other player is aware of his omniscience or omnipotence, are derived. Intuitively, omniscience allows a player to predict the strategy choice of an opponent in advance of play, and omnipotence allows a player, after initial strategy choices are made, to continue to move after the other player is forced to stop. Omniscience and its awareness by an opponent may hurt both players, but this problem can always be rectified if the other player is omniscient. This pathology can also be rectified if at least one of the two players is omnipotent, which can override the effects of omniscience. In some games, one player's omnipotence ‐ versus the other's ‐ helps him, whereas in other games the outcome induced does not depend on which player is omnipotent. Deducing whether a player is superior (omniscient or omnipotent) from the nature of his game playing alone raises several problems, however, suggesting the difficulty of devising tests for detecting superior ability in games.     

Myopic social prediction and the solo comparison effect

Four experiments explored the psychological processes by which people make comparative social judgments. Each participant chose how much money to wager on beating an opponent on either a difficult or a simple trivia quiz. Quiz difficulty did not influence the average person's probability of winning, yet participants bet more on a simple quiz than on a difficult quiz in the first 3 experiments. The results suggest that this effect results from a tendency to attend more closely to a focal actor than to others. Experiment 4 directly manipulated focusing; when participants were led to focus on the opponent instead of themselves, the effect was reversed. The discussion relates the results to other literatures including overly optimistic self-evaluation, false consensus, overconfidence, and social comparison.     

Quantity versus uncertainty: When winning one prize is better than winning two

We predicted that a state of uncertainty would prolong a positive mood, but that people would not anticipate this when making affective forecasts. In Study 1, participants learned that they had won one prize (certain condition), two prizes (two-gift condition), or one of two prizes (uncertain condition). People in the uncertain condition were in a positive mood longer than people in the other two conditions. In Study 2, forecaster participants underestimated the benefits of uncertainty and overestimated the benefits of quantity (getting two gifts instead of one). Under some circumstances, and contrary to people’s predictions, uncertainty can prolong positive mood, and winning one prize under a state of uncertainty can bring more short-term pleasure than winning two prizes.     

Reverse Discrimination and Aggressive Behavior

Aggression of each of 32 white male and female university students toward an opponent who had just defeated him in a competition was assessed in a 2 x 2 experimental design in which the winning opponent was either a black or a white and the loss was for one of two reasons: because the opponent 1) was economically deprived or 2) had superior ability. It was assumed that those S s who had lost to a black opponent because this person was economically deprived experienced reverse discrimination based on race. Results indicated that white S s were more aggressive toward a black when the loss was based on economic deprivation (reverse discrimination) than towards a white when the loss was due to economic deprivation (an arbitrary loss but not based on race), whereas white S s were less aggressive towards a black opponent than towards a white opponent when the S s lost because of the other's superior ability. The practical and theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

An experimental test of a game‐theoretical model of reciprocity

In this contribution the norm of reciprocity is defined as a basic internal motivation. Using formal tools of game theory, a model of social utility function is presented. The reciprocity model predicts that social actors should reciprocate costs and benefits they receive, even when there are costs in conforming to the norm. Hypotheses about actors' behavior, expectations and evaluations are derived from the model. The hypotheses were tested in an experimental situation, the reciprocity game, consisting of a prisoner's dilemma game (PD) followed by a dictator game (DG). The sample was composed of 74 Italian undergraduate students. In line with the model's predictions, the experimental results showed that participants reciprocate the behavior of the opponent in the PD. In the DG, if the opponent cooperated, participants gave back an almost equal share, whereas if the opponent defected, participants gave a minimal amount. These reciprocity effects are modulated by individual differences in the concern for reciprocity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cyber-dehumanization: Violent video game play diminishes our humanity

Across two studies we show that engaging in violent video game play diminishes perceptions of our own human qualities. In addition, when other players are the targets of this violence it reduces our perceptions of their humanity also. In Study 1, we demonstrate that playing Mortal Kombat against another player reduces the perceived humanity of the self as well as the humanity of one's opponent (compared to playing a non-violent game). In Study 2 we replicate this effect on perceived humanity of the self when playing a violent game with a co-player. However, we find no dehumanization of co-players who are not the targets of violence. We demonstrate these effects cannot be reduced to mood, self-esteem, gender, or other characteristics of the game such as excitement and enjoyment. The findings provide a broader perspective from which to view previous work on the adverse effects of violent video games.     

“That's the one I wanted”: when do competitors copy their opponents' choices?

This paper explores the interactive effect of competitiveness and choice structure on symbolic (noninstrumental) choices in competitive situations. When individuals in competitive situations learn the stated preference of their opponent, their own choice depends on their competitiveness and on whether they are in an inclusive‐choice situation (in which both competitors can end up with the same option) or an exclusive‐choice situation (in which they cannot). We obtained this predicted interaction in an imagined video game challenge (Studies 1 and 3), cooking contest (Study 2), and March Madness bracket competition (Study 4). Highly competitive people copied their opponent's choices in exclusive‐choice situations, and seemed to do this because they wanted to frustrate their opponent (Studies 3 and 4).     

Full House of Fears: Evidence That People High in Attachment Anxiety Are More Accurate in Detecting Deceit

Lying is deep‐rooted in our nature, as over 90% of all people lie. Laypeople, however, do only slightly better than chance when detecting lies and deceptions. Recently, attachment anxiety was linked with people's hypervigilance toward threat‐related cues. Accordingly, we tested whether attachment anxiety predicts people's ability to detect deceit and to play poker—a game that is based on players' ability to detect cheating. In Study 1, 202 participants watched a series of interpersonal interactions that comprised subtle clues to the honesty or dishonesty of the speakers. In Study 2, 58 participants watched clips in which such cues were absent. Participants were asked to decide whether the main characters were honest or dishonest. In Study 3, we asked 35 semiprofessional poker players to participate in a poker tournament, and then we predicted the amount of money won during the game. Results indicated that attachment anxiety, but not other types of anxiety, predicted more accurate detection of deceitful statements (Studies 1–2) and a greater amount of money won during a game of poker (Study 3). Results are discussed in relation to the possible adaptive functions of certain personality characteristics, such as attachment anxiety, often viewed as undesirable.     

Electromyographic Analyses of Responses to Intergroup Threat

Two studies tested predictions from intergroup threat theory concerning emotional responses to intergroup threat. Study 1 employed threatening video clips of the 9/11/01 World Trade Center attacks. Study 2 employed video clips of a threatening “opponent” in a competition. Facial electromyography (EMG) was employed to capture emotion‐related muscle activity. As participants viewed videos in Study 1, they were instructed to consider Americans' reactions or their personal reactions. In Study 2, an “opponent” presented individually directed or group‐directed stereotype threat. Both studies provide support for the theory: Participants experiencing individual threats displayed greater EMG activity in muscles corresponding to inwardly directed emotions (fear), while participants experiencing group threats displayed greater EMG activity in muscles corresponding to outwardly directed emotions (anger).     

Predicting World Cup results: Do goals seem more likely when they pay off?

Bar-Hillel and Budescu (1995) failed to find a desirability bias in probability estimation. The World Cup soccer tournament provided an opportunity to revisit the phenomenon in a context in which desirability biases are notoriously rampant. Participants estimated the probabilities of various teams’ winning their upcoming games. They were promised money if one team—randomly designated by the experimenter—won its upcoming game. Participants assigned a higher probability to a victory by their target team than did other participants, whose promised monetary reward was contingent on the victory of its opponent. Prima facie, this seems to be a desirability bias. However, in a follow-up study that made one team salient, without promising monetary rewards, participants also judged their target team to be more likely to win. On grounds of parsimony, we conclude that what appears to be a desirability bias may just be a salience/marking effect, and—although optimism is a robust and ubiquitous human phenomenon—that wishful thinking still remains elusive.     

Planning, personality, and prediction: The role of future focus in optimistic time predictions

The present studies examined cognitive processes underlying the tendency to underestimate project completion times. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that people generate overly optimistic predictions, in part, because they focus narrowly on their future plans for the target task and thus neglect other useful sources of information. Consistent with the hypothesis, instructing participants to adopt a “future focus”—in which they generated concrete, specific plans for the task at hand—led them to make more optimistic predictions about when they would complete their intended Christmas shopping (Study 1) and major school assignments (Study 2). The future focus manipulation did not have a corresponding effect on actual completion times, and thus increased the degree of optimistic bias in prediction. The studies also demonstrated that the optimistic prediction bias generalized across different task domains, relevant individual differences (i.e., trait optimism and procrastination), and other contextual variations.     

Children and chess expertise: The role of calibration

Summary Three studies of calibration are reported. Calibration refers to the accuracy with which one can predict one's own performance. In the first study child chess players, non-chess playing parents, and statistics students were asked to predict chances of winning chess games against hypothetical opponents. These subjective probabilities were compared to the actual probabilities, based on the Elo rating system. Better players' predictions were better calibrated. Confidence and ratings are negatively correlated, indicating that with lower ratings, players are overconfident. Skilled child players' predictions were better calibrated than any of the adults'. In the second study subjects were asked to estimate chances of winning in conjunctive situations, e. g., winning all the rounds in a tournament. Again, better child players were more accurate in their predictions and more accurate than adults. In the third study, child players were asked to predict their chances of winning in a non-chess domain after hearing a hypothetical win/loss history. Higher-rated players' predictions were again better calibrated, even though the domain was outside their expertise. The motivational and cognitive implications of calibration are discussed.     

Would I bet on beating you? Subtly increasing other-focus helps overcome egocentrism

Two studies investigated egocentrism in competitive situations. Specifically, the aim was to test novel subtle debiasing techniques for the shared-circumstance effect whereby people bet more money on winning in easy than difficult knowledge quizzes. In Study 1, participants took part in a quiz competition with a friend. Being asked to complete 10 sentence stems about the opponent eliminated the shared-circumstance effect, compared to completing 10 sentences about the self. In Study 2, circling third-person pronouns in an unrelated task eliminated the shared-circumstance effect compared to circling first-person pronouns. The research is the first to show that subtly directing attention to the opponent or to a generic third person can eliminate egocentrism effects.     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

One Night of Sleep Loss Impairs Innovative Thinking and Flexible Decision Making

Recent findings with clinically oriented neuropsychological tests suggest that one night without sleep causes particular impairment to tasks requiring flexible thinking and the updating of plans in the light of new information. This relatively little investigated field of sleep deprivation research has real-world implications for decision makers having lost a night's sleep. To explore this latter perspective further, we adapted a dynamic and realistic marketing decision making “game” embodying the need for these skills, and whereby such performance could be measured. As the task relied on the comprehension of a large amount of written information, a critical reasoning test was also administered to ascertain whether any failure at the marketing game might lie with information acquisition rather than with failures in decision making. Ten healthy highly motivated and trained participants underwent two counterbalanced 36 h trials, sleep vs no sleep. The critical reasoning task was unaffected by sleep loss, whereas performance at the game significantly deteri orated after 32–36 h of sleep loss, when sleep deprivation led to more rigid thinking, increased perseverative errors, and marked difficulty in appreciating an updated situation. At this point, and despite the sleep-deprived participants' best efforts to do well, their play collapsed, unlike that of the nonsleep-deprived participants.     

Team allegiance can lead to both optimistic and pessimistic predictions

Although team allegiance is usually associated with optimistic predictions about team performance, the authors hypothesized that preferences for one’s group can also lead to pessimistic predictions. Upon arrival to the laboratory, groups of four participants were split into teams of two based on bogus criteria. Participants were informed that their teammate would compete against a member of the other team in a trivia game consisting of both easy (e.g., “pop culture”) and hard (e.g., “50’s movies”) categories. They provided likelihood estimates regarding outcomes for each category. As predicted, team allegiance inflated participants’ optimism about their teammate winning the easy categories, but deflated optimism about their teammate winning the hard categories. Path analyses supported the proposed account indicating that preferences for a teammate to win led to an enhanced focus on the teammate’s strengths and weaknesses (and neglect of the strengths and weaknesses of the other competitor).     

Self-Control Depletion Does Not Diminish Attitudes About Being Prosocial But Does Diminish Prosocial Behaviors

In three studies, ego-depleted participants reported the same level of affective/cognitive concern for others as control participants, but behaved less prosocially. In Study 1, participants had to sustain cooperation to increase the joint payout to themselves and another player. In Study 2, participants had to restrict their use of a shared resource. In Study 3, ego-depletion failed to produce effects on several measures of concern for others despite large effects found with other manipulations. Results suggest ego-depletion influences behavior by reducing one's ability or motivation to overcome egotistic desires when helping others comes at a cost to the self.