Nonhierarchical control of rapid movement sequences: a comment on Rosenbaum, Kenny, and Derr

In a recent article, Rosenbaum, Kenny, and Derr (1983) described a hierarchical storage and execution model for a class of repetitive, discrete response sequences. With a few modifications, this model can match the performance of subjects performing sequences from this class. The authors claimed that this provides an "existence proof" for hierarchical control during movement execution, at least for these sequences. My purpose is to show by counterexample that this claim is too strong. I present a logogen activation model for the rapid execution of stored motor sequences which assumes that (a) logogens corresponding to responses are activated via association and repetition; (b) activation decays; and (c) interresponse time is inversely related to activation of the correct response at each position in the sequence. This model can also fit the results of Rosenbaum et al. A much richer data base, designed to discriminate between competing formulations, will be needed to prove the existence of the hierarchical, tree-traversal control process proposed by Rosenbaum et al.     

Learning from implicit learning literature: Comment on Shea, Wulf, Whitacre, and Park (2001)

In their analysis of complex motor skill learning, Shea, Wulf, Whitacre, and Park (2001) have overlooked one of the most robust conclusions of the experimental studies on implicit learning conducted during the last decade--namely that participants usually learn things that are different from those that the experimenter expected them to learn. Weshow that the available literature on implicit learning strongly suggests that the improved performance in Shea et al.'s Experiments 1 and 2 (and similar earlier experiments, e.g., Wulf & Schmidt, 1997) was due to the exploitation of regularities in the target pattern different from those on which the postexperimental interview focused. This rules out the conclusions drawn from the failure of this interview to reveal any explicit knowledge about the task structure on the part of the participants. Similarly, because the information about the task structure provided to an instructed group of participants in Shea et al.'s Experiment 2 did not concern the regularities presumably exploited by the standard, so-called implicit, group, Shea et al.'s claim that explicit knowledge may be less effective than implicit knowledge is misleading.     

基于fNIRS的运动执行与运动想象脑激活模式比较

使用《运动想象问卷−修订版》筛选出的30名被试(男女各半), 采用功能性近红外光谱成像技术(fNIRS)监测被试在执行实际举哑铃(男生, 4磅和8磅; 女生, 2磅和4磅)任务和想象举同等重量哑铃任务时, 其大脑皮层氧合血红蛋白浓度的变化。结果发现：男女被试在运动执行与运动想象任务下都激活了主运动皮层; 且运动执行的大脑激活水平高于运动想象。在执行实际运动任务时, 运动强度显著影响大脑皮层血氧浓度的变化, 表现出左半球偏侧化优势; 在执行想象运动任务时, 运动强度没有影响大脑皮层血氧浓度的变化, 且无偏侧化现象。     

PERSONALITY TESTS AT THE CROSSROADS: A RESPONSE TO MORGESON, CAMPION, DIPBOYE, HOLLENBECK, MURPHY, AND SCHMITT (2007)

Despite widespread and growing acceptance that published personality tests are valid predictors of job performance, Morgeson et al. (2007) propose they be abandoned in personnel selection because average validity estimates are low. Our review of the literature shows that Morgeson et al.'s skepticism is unfounded. Meta-analyses have demonstrated that published personality tests, in fact, yield useful validity estimates when validation is based on confirmatory research using job analysis and taking into account the bidirectionality of trait–performance linkages. Further gains are likely by use of narrow over broad measures, multivariate prediction, and theory attuned to the complexities of trait expression and evaluation at work. Morgeson et al. also suggest that faking has little, if any, impact on personality test validity and that it may even contribute positively to job performance. Job applicant research suggests that faking under true hiring conditions attenuates personality test validity but that validity is still sufficiently strong to warrant personality test use in hiring. Contrary to Morgeson et al., we argue that the full value of published personality tests in organizations has yet to be realized, calling for programmatic theory-driven research.     

On the science of Rorschach research

Wood et al.'s (1999b) article contained several general points that are quite sound. Conducting research with an extreme groups design does produce effect sizes that are larger than those observed in an unselected population. Appropriate control groups are important for any study that wishes to shed light on the characteristics of a targeted experimental group and experimental validity is enhanced when researchers collect data from both groups simultaneously. Diagnostic efficiency statistics--or any summary measures of test validity--should be trusted more when they are drawn from multiple studies conducted by different investigators across numerous settings rather than from a single investigator's work. There should be no question that these points are correct. However, I have pointed out numerous problems with specific aspects of Wood et al.'s (1999b) article. Wood et al. gave improper citations that claimed researchers found or said things that they did not. Wood et al. indicated my data set did not support the incremental validity of the Rorschach over the MMPI-2 when, in fact, my study never reported such an analysis and my data actually reveal that the opposite conclusion is warranted. Wood et al. asserted there was only one proper way to conduct incremental validity analyses even though experts have described how their recommended procedure can lead to significant complications. Wood et al. cited a section of Cohen and Cohen (1983) to bolster their claim that hierarchical and step-wise regression procedures were incompatible and to criticize Burns and Viglione's (1996) regression analysis. However, that section of Cohen and Cohen's text actually contradicted Wood et al.'s argument. Wood et al. tried to convince readers that Burns and Viglione used improper alpha levels and drew improper conclusions from their regression data although Burns and Viglione had followed the research evidence on this topic and the expert recommendations provided in Hosmer and Lemeshow's (1989) classic text. Wood et al. oversimplified issues associated with extreme group research designs and erroneously suggested that diagnostic studies were immune from interpretive confounds that can be associated with this type of design. Wood et al. ignored or dismissed the valid reasons why Burns and Viglione used an extreme groups design, and they never mentioned how Burns and Viglione used a homogeneous sample that actually was likely to find smaller than normal effect sizes. Wood et al. also overlooked the fact that Burns and Viglione identified their results as applying to female nonpatients; they never suggested their findings would characterize those obtained from a clinical sample. Wood et al. criticized composite measures although some of the most important and classic findings in the history of research on personality recommend composite measures as a way to minimize error and maximize validity. Wood et al. also were mistaken about the elements that constitute an optimal composite measure. Wood et al. apparently ignored the factor-analytic evidence that demonstrated how Burns and Viglione created a reasonable composite scale, and Wood et al. similarly ignored the clear evidence that supported the content and criterion related validity of the EMRF. With respect to the HEV, Wood et al. created a z-score formula that used the wrong means and standard deviations. They continued to use this formula despite being informed that it was incorrect. Subsequently, Wood et al. told readers that their faulty z-score formula was "incompatible" with the proper weighted formula and asserted that the two formulas "do not yield identical results" and "do not yield HEV scores that are identical or even very close." These published claims were made even though Wood et al. had seen the results from eight large samples, all of which demonstrated that their wrong formula had correlations greater than .998 with the correct formula. At worst, it seems that Wood et al. (199     

The influence of context and fluency

Simonson et al. propose a framework that emphasizes the roles of context and fluency in perception and choice. The importance of context has been emphasized throughout a very long tradition of research, and fluency has been a more recent and active topic of investigation. Simonson et al. combine them in a way that should organize a multitude of studies and make new predictions possible. However I suggest two portions of their framework that might be pruned without jeopardizing the value of their model: their motion of “latitude of acceptance” and the System1/System 2 distinction.     

Right, left or both? Brain hemispheres and apraxia of naturalistic actions

Neuropsychology allows us to see more clearly how brain processes are organized by looking at the way they fall apart. For example, a hundred years of research on brain-damaged individuals with deficits of higher-level motor abilities have shed light on the organization of normal motor abilities. A consistent finding has been the dominant role of the left hemisphere in motor control in right-handers. However, the recent paper of Hartmann et al. challenges this tradition by suggesting that both hemispheres can contribute to complex object and tool use.     

Neuroprediction,Truth-Sensitivity,and the Law

A recent argument by Nadelhoffer et al. defends a cautious optimism regarding the use of neuroprediction in relation to sentencing based, in part, on an assessment of the offender’s dangerousness. While this optimism may be warranted, Nadelhoffer et al.’s argument fails to justify it. Although neuropredictions provide individualized, non-statistical evidence they will often be problematic for the same reason that basing sentencing on statistical evidence is, to wit, that such predictions are insensitive to the offender’s dangerousness in relevant counterfactual situations and, accordingly, fail to provide the court with knowledge of the offender’s dangerousness. Admittedly, it could be replied that standard clinical assessments of dangerousness possess the same objectionable feature, but doing so undermines a different part of Nadelhoffer et al.’s argument. Finally, I criticize an incentives-based rationale for sentencing informed by neuropredictions of dangerousness.     

Accounting for belief bias in a mental model framework: comment on Klauer, Musch, and Naumer (2000)

K. C. Klauer, J. Musch, and B. Naumer (2000; see record 2000-02818-008) presented a general multinomial model of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. They claimed to map a particular mental model account of belief bias (J. V. Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird, & A. Garnham, 1989; see record 1989-38845-001)) onto this model and to show empirically that it is incorrect. The authors argue that this mental model account does not map onto the multinomial model and that it can account for the data presented by Klauer et al. (Experiments 1-4). The authors further argue that additional data Klauer et al. presented in support of a new model of their own (Experiments 5-8) are explained by this mental model account. The mental model account is, therefore, refuted neither by Klauer et al.'s theoretical analysis nor by any of the results they presented. Furthermore, the account can accommodate more recent findings on belief bias in a more satisfactory way than can alternative models that have been proposed.     

Predicting Athletic Performance with Self- Confidence and Somatic and Cognitive Anxiety as a Function of Motor and Physiological Requirements in Six Sports

The purpose of the present study is to examine the ability of certain psychological attributes to predict performance in six National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I collegiate sports. Eighty-four athletes from the varsity sports teams of cross country running, alpine and nordic skiing, tennis, basketball, and track and field at the University of Colorado completed a questionnaire adapted from Martens (1977; Martens et al., 1983) that measured their trait levels of self-confidence (Bandura, 1977), somatic anxiety, and cognitive anxiety (Martens, 1977; Martens et al., 1983). In addition, at three to six competitions during the season, the members of the cross country running and tennis teams filled out a state measure (Martens et al., 1983) of the three attributes from one to two hours prior to the competition. Following each competition, subjective and objective ratings of performance were obtained, and, for all sports, coaches' ratings of performance and an overall seasonal team ranking were determined as seasonal performance measures. The sports were dichotomized along motor and physiological dimensions. Results indicate that all three psychological attributes were significant predictors of performance in both fine motor, anaerobic sports and gross motor, aerobic sports. Further, clear differences in these relationships emerged as a function of the dichotomization. In addition, unexpected sex differences emerged. The findings are discussed relative to prior research and their implications for future research.     

Vivid RET II: Disputing methods

Summary In this article, I have outlined a variety of ways in which therapists can make the disputing process more vivid and memorable for clients. I have underlined that tailoring interventions to fit clients' idiosyncracies is most important and have suggested ways of doing this. The point was made that what might work for one client may very well not work for another. In conclusion, I would encourage therapists to adopt an experimental attitude toward their interventions and to continually monitor the effect of them by requesting feedback from clients as Beck et. al. (1979) advocate. This would help therapists to construct, for each client, a profile of the types of disputing tactics that are effective and the types that prove ineffective.     

Community-based services and resources: The significance of choice and diversity

Conclusions We are reminded by the growth of consumer-run approaches of the value of diversity and individual choice in community support of persons with severe mental illness. These ideas are evident in the alternative approaches that have been developed to serve persons who have not been reached by more traditional services. The ACT program, described by Bond et al. (1990), is an example of a service approach designed to be responsive to individuals' day-to-day needs as they define them. Continued development of this type of alternative service should be encouraged.Persons coping with severe mental illness benefit from a variety of community supports and resources. Strategies that encourage consumer involvement, ownership, and control help to provide diversity of services and to empower the consumer. Our efforts, as professionals, to provide community services can be enhanced by (a) supporting diversity of service and resource options, both inside and outside of the professional mental health system; (b) developing services that are responsive to individuals needs as they define them; and (c) facilitating the process of consumer choice in selecting resources options.The author expresses thanks to Marc A. Zimmerman and Richard H. Price for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Methodological vs. strategic control in artificial grammar learning: A commentary on Norman, Price and Jones (2011)

Norman et al. (2011) reported that participants exposed in succession to two artificial grammars could be able to learn implicitly about them, and could apply their knowledge strategically to select which string corresponds to one of these two grammars. In this commentary, I identify an artifact that could account for the learning obtained not only in this study, but also in some previous studies using the same procedures. I claim that more methodological control is needed before jumping to conclusions on the kind of strategic control that could be achieved unconsciously.     

Bridging the divide: comments on the Restructured Clinical Scales of the MMPI-2

In this comment, I discuss the target articles written by Nichols (2006/this issue) and Rogers, Sewell, Harrison, and Jordan (2006/this issue) regarding the Restructured Clinical (RC) Scales (Tellegen et al., 2003) of the MMPI-2 (Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989). Both articles provide thoughtful discussion of the extent to which the RC Scales achieved the primary goals set forth by Tellegen et al., but they set different tones and come to somewhat different conclusions. I argue that the initial studies conducted on the RC Scales suggest a promising future for them. However, further studies are needed to explore the construct validity of the scales, assess their incremental validity with respect to other more established MMPI-2 scale sets, and determine their interpretive meaning in clinical contexts.     

Features versus redundancy: comments on Massaro, Venezky, and Taylor's "Orthographic regularity, positional frequency, and visual processing of letter strings"

Massaro, Venezky, and Taylor (1979) found only a modest effect of familiarity on letter search, apparently because they pitted pseudowords (rather than real words) against nonwords and used lowercase rather than uppercase letters. Precuing the target letter seemed to reduce the familiarity effect they found yet further, but this conclusion is clouded by the fact that reaction time data were compared with accuracy data. Because similarity between target and nontarget letters tended to have more of an effect when familiarity had less of an effect. Massaro et al. proposed a successive model, with features being detected in the first stage and orthographic structure being used in a second stage. However, a concurrent model, with a self-terminating race between lower and higher level processes, can account for the data just as well. Data from Massaro et al. and from Krueger decisively demonstrate that there is a familiarity effect based on sequential redundancy over and above any effect based on spatial redundancy (Mason 1975). The Massaro et al. data also indicate that the relative familiarity effect is constant across various age groups (Krueger, Keen & Rublevich, 1974).     

Complexity-based Theories of Emergence: Criticisms and Constraints

In recent years, many philosophers of science have attempted to articulate a theory of non-epistemic emergence that is compatible with mechanistic explanation and incompatible with reductionism. The 2005 account of Fred C. Boogerd et al. has been particularly influential. They argued that a systemic property was emergent if it could not be predicted from the behaviour of less complex systems. Here, I argue that Boogerd et al.'s attempt to ground emergence in complexity guarantees that we will see emergence, but at the cost of rendering it either trivial or epistemic. There are three basic problems. First, neither the measures of complexity explicitly mentioned by Boogerd et al. nor the most popular measures in the literature can do the practical and theoretical work that they assign to complexity. Second, I argue that while the success of their view depends on restricting the base of information available to the reductionist, this cannot be done in a way that is metaphysically neutral with respect to emergence. Thus, their account renders emergence trivial. Third, I argue that grounding emergence in complexity can support only epistemic emergence. I conclude by considering the methodological import of their account.     

Can we model organismic causes of working memory,efficiency and fluid intelligence? A meta-subjective perspective

I critically examine the target paper by Demetriou et al. (2013) noticing that their epistemological perspective is meta-empiricist (i.e., taking the viewpoint of an external observer). This viewpoint is contrasted with to a metasubjective perspective (i.e., that of the subject-matter itself — organismic processes). I explain working memory (whose key developmental determinant is mental – M – attention), as well as processing speed, and Gf from a metasubjective perspective; and I emphasize that difficulty of an item/task is relative to the trade-off level between its item/task mental–attentional demand and the participant's mental–attentional capacity. I list principles of measurement for proper assessment of mental/executive/endogenous attention (M-capacity) and explain some of the results of Demetriou et al. as resulting from inadequate control of this M-demand/M-capacity trade off in their tasks. Demetriou et al. have achieved clear demonstration that WM, Gf, and processing speed are distinct latent variables whose inter-relations change with age. To clarify further their organismic causal determinants they should make a “metasubjective turn” in their theorizing.     

Phenomenal consciousness,collective mentality,and collective moral responsibility

Are corporations and other complex groups ever morally responsible in ways that do not reduce to the moral responsibility of their members? Christian List, Phillip Pettit, Kendy Hess, and David Copp have recently defended the idea that they can be. For them, complex groups (sometimes called collectives) can be irreducibly morally responsible because they satisfy the conditions for morally responsible agency; and this view is made more plausible by the claim (made by Theiner) that collectives can have minds. In this paper I give a new argument that they are wrong. Drawing on recent work in the philosophy of mind (what Uriah Kriegel calls “the phenomenal intentionality research program”) and moral theory (David Shoemaker’s tripartite theory of moral responsibility), I argue that for something to have a mind, it must be phenomenally conscious, and that the fact that collectives lack phenomenal consciousness implies that they are incapable of accountability, an important form of moral responsibility.     

The secular model of the multi‐cultural state

On what model should a modern multi‐cultural democracy work? Spinosa et al. have argued that the political order should be sustained by a set of common values instilled in the citizens, without, however, any common rank order among these values. I argue that the multi‐cultural state should rather conform to what I call the Secular Model, according to which the citizens need not share any basic values at all. On the Secular Model, people individually stick to the existing constitution (only) as long as they each feel that they have good reasons to do so. To be sure, each citizen of a multi‐cultural state does need a feeling of community identity, a ‘we’ ideology, but it is desirable that each individual can have more than one such identity. It is also important that each individual can shift as he or she pleases, from one such identity to another. So this kind of identity should not be moulded by the state, but by various different free associations, independent of the state.     

Choosing an optimal motor-task difficulty is not trivial: The influence of age and expertise

An accurate estimate of one’s performance is an important prerequisite for success, and prevents people from taking excessive risks. Based on the selection-margins paradigm (Riediger et al., 2006), the current paper assessed maximum speed rope-skipping (study 1), soccer dribbling (study 2), and the fine motor task of tracing (study 3) in 5- to 37-year-olds. Participants predicted their performances for the upcoming trial. The better the predicted performance, the more points were gained in case of success. To discourage overestimations, participants received no points for unsuccessful trials. In rope skipping, older and more experienced athletes outperformed the beginners, and had fewer trials with 0 points. In soccer dribbling and tracing, older individuals again showed less overestimation, as reflected by a smaller deviation of predicted and actual performance (selection margins) and fewer 0 point trials. Athletes and coaches should be aware that younger and less-experienced athletes tend to overestimate their motor performances.