Changing perspective within and across environments

Perspective change within a single environment is a slow and effortful process. However, little research has addressed perspective change across multiple environments. Using a task-set switching paradigm, subjects judged spatial relationships between target locations from differing perspectives. Response times were longer when successive trials probed different perspectives. However, this cost was greater when perspective was changed within a single environment compared to when it was changed across two environments. This result indicates that the processing of perspective change, and perhaps general spatial reasoning, differs in these two cases. Implications for theories of perspective change and environmental knowledge are discussed.     

Induced strategy shifts in spatial reasoning

Previous research on reasoning about spatial arrangements has revealed two major strategies used by adults: Series Formation and Elimination. It was hypothesized that all adults have both strategies available. An experiment was carried out in which subjects who showed no spontaneous tendency to shift strategy were induced to do so. The strategy shifts by the subjects are simulated by a computer program in the form of a homogeneous production system. The conditions under which homogeneous and hierarchical production system models will yield the same predictions are discussed.     

A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision

What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to take action to maximize utility. Their judgments contradicted a utilitarian principle they otherwise strongly endorsed. Exposure to this scenario led participants to revise their belief in the utilitarian principle, and this revision persisted over several hours. This method provides a new avenue for inducing belief revision.     

Diagnostic reasoning with circumstantial evidence

Individuals often evaluate hypotheses about the cause of particular events on the basis of circumstantial evidence. This article describes a quantitative model of belief revision with circumstantial evidence. The model assumes that subjects revise belief on the basis of a cascaded reasoning process that combines beliefs about three premises—the association of a clue and a possible cause, and forward and backward implications of the clue—to revise belief in a causal hypothesis. Subjects in three experiments solved fictional murder mysteries, reporting on each trial a subset of the beliefs specified by the model. Experiment 1 demonstrates that the model provides a good account of the reasoning process, over several contexts in which clues are evaluated. Subjects appear to develop causal models that affect the interpretation of clues. Experiment 2 provides further evidence on the development of causal models and compares the present model with a model based on Bayes' theorem. Experiment 3 is a control experiment which demonstrates that the belief assessments used in Experiments 1 and 2 do not alter the process of belief revision. Tests of subjects' memory for suspect-clue associations provide further support for the hypothesis that subjects develop causal models of the true cause and demonstrate the contrast between reasoning with currently available information and retrospective access to the facts on which belief revision is based. The present view is compared with other theories of causal thinking and belief revision.     

Representation and Reasoning about Evolutions of the World in the Context of Reasoning about Actions

The first step in reasoning about actions and change involves reasoning about how the world would evolve if a certain action is executed in a certain state. Most research on this assumes the evolution to be only a single step and focus on formulating the transition function that defines changes between states due to actions. In this paper we consider cases where the evolution is more than just a single change between one state and another. This is manifested when the execution of an action may trigger execution of other actions, or when multiple agents act on the environment following certain strategies.     

The influence of power and reason on young Maya children's endorsement of testimony

Two important parenting strategies are to impose one's power and to use reasoning. The effect of these strategies on children's evaluation of testimony has received very little attention. Using the epistemic vigilance framework, we predict that when the reasoning cue is strong enough it should overcome the power cue. We test this prediction in a population for which anthropological data suggest that power is the prominent strategy while reasoning is rarely relied on in the interactions with children. In Experiment 1, 4‐ to 6‐year‐old children from a traditional Maya population are shown to endorse the testimony supported by a strong argument over that supported by a weak argument. In Experiment 2, the same participants are shown to follow the testimony of a dominant over that of a subordinate. The participants are then shown to endorse the testimony of a subordinate who provides a strong argument over that of a dominant who provides either a weak argument (Experiment 3) or no argument (Experiment 4). Thus, when the power and reasoning cues conflict, reasoning completely trumps power.     

中外两种推理理论的实验比较研究

通过两个实验对中国学者提出的“推理题与推理者的推理知识双重结构模型”和Evans提出的“双重加工理论”进行了实验比较研究。实验一通过两种评定方法对相应性质命题进行评定后所得实验结果表明Evans等(1983)有关“信念效应”研究中的“结论可信性”变量可以视为与胡竹菁等(1996)实验中的“内容正确性”变量是同一性质的变量; 实验二根据“形式正确性”和“内容正确性”两个自变量设计的推理实验结果与Evans等(1983)的研究结果基本一致; 但增加“内容熟悉性”这一自变量设计的推理实验结果表明“推理题与推理者的推理知识双重结构模型”比Evans提出的“双重加工理论”能更好地解释推理者对性质三段论的推理结果。     

The Identity Status Approach: In Need of Fundamental Revision and Qualitative Change

This article is a response to the commentaries of Waterman (this issue) and Berzonsky and Adams (this issue) on my review of the identity status field (van Hoof, this issue). The commentaries illustrate that the identity status researchers attribute different meanings to the identity statuses and identity status research; while Waterman finds it difficult to recognize the field in my review, Berzonsky and Adams agree with several of my conclusions. The two commentaries represent two pillars on which the status approach rests. The difference between the review and the commentaries is that the first includes both pillars, whereas each commentary consists primarily of a selective presentation of assumptions and data. This response focuses on two main points of the commentaries: (a) are the statuses sufficiently validated? and (b) to what extent are they suitable for testing developmental identity hypotheses? Using specific examples I show that the line of reasoning in the commentaries and the data proposed in support of these arguments in fact often support the conclusions of my review, for I demonstrate that the statuses are insufficiently validated and that the statuses are unsuitable for measuring identity development. These conclusions call for a fundamental revision of the identity status approach and a qualitative change in identity theory and research. Finally, the alternative approaches presented by Berzonsky and Adams are evaluated with respect to their contribution to an indispensable qualitative change in the identity status field.     

A bird's eye view: biological categorization and reasoning within and across cultures

Many psychological studies of categorization and reasoning use undergraduates to make claims about human conceptualization. Generalizability of findings to other populations is often assumed but rarely tested. Even when comparative studies are conducted, it may be challenging to interpret differences. As a partial remedy, in the present studies we adopt a 'triangulation strategy' to evaluate the ways expertise and culturally different belief systems can lead to different ways of conceptualizing the biological world. We use three groups (US bird experts, US undergraduates, and ordinary Itza' Maya) and two sets of birds (North American and Central American). Categorization tasks show considerable similarity among the three groups' taxonomic sorts, but also systematic differences. Notably, US expert categorization is more similar to Itza' than to US novice categorization. The differences are magnified on inductive reasoning tasks where only undergraduates show patterns of judgment that are largely consistent with current models of category-based taxonomic inference. The Maya commonly employ causal and ecological reasoning rather than taxonomic reasoning. Experts use a mixture of strategies (including causal and ecological reasoning), only some of which current models explain. US and Itza' informants differed markedly when reasoning about passerines (songbirds), reflecting the somewhat different role that songbirds play in the two cultures. The results call into question the importance of similarity-based notions of typicality and central tendency in natural categorization and reasoning. These findings also show that relative expertise leads to a convergence of thought that transcends cultural boundaries and shared experiences.     

Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference

We propose a revision operator on a stratified belief base, i.e., a belief base that stores beliefs in different strata corresponding to the value an agent assigns to these beliefs. Furthermore, the operator will be defined as to perform the revision in such a way that information is never lost upon revision but stored in a stratum or layer containing information perceived as having a lower value. In this manner, if the revision of one layer leads to the rejection of some information to maintain consistency, instead of being withdrawn it will be kept and introduced in a different layer with lower value. Throughout this development we will follow the principle of minimal change, being one of the important principles proposed in belief change theory, particularly emphasized in the AGM model. Regarding the reasoning part from the stratified belief base, the agent will obtain the inferences using an argumentative formalism. Thus, the argumentation framework will decide which information prevails when sentences of different layers are used for entailing conflicting beliefs. We will also illustrate how inferences are changed and how the status of arguments can be modified after a revision process.     

Individual differences in syllogistic reasoning: deduction rules or mental models?

Two studies examined the correlates of reasoning ability on a syllogistic reasoning task in subjects who lacked formal background in logic. The main issue addressed was the extent to which reasoning proficiency arises from the consideration of multiple possible set relations (mental models) as opposed to explicit or implicit reliance on deduction rules. Evidence for the use of both models and rules was obtained. Although "good" and "poor" reasoners differed even when time constraints were imposed (consistent with the supposition of a better set of rules among good reasoners), good reasoners showed more improvement and chose to take longer amounts of time when time constraints were removed, suggesting that they considered more alternatives than did the poor reasoners. A comparison between these two groups and a third group of subjects, graduate students who had studied logic, reveals striking differences in both accuracy and speed.     

Bluffing and betting behavior in a simplified poker game

A pure‐strategy, simplified poker (PSP) game is proposed, where two players draw from a small and discrete number of hands. Equilibrium strategies of the game are described and an experiment is conducted where 120 subjects played the PSP against a computer, which was programmed to play either the equilibrium solution or a fictitious play (FP) learning algorithm designed to take advantage of poor play. The results show that players did not adopt the cutoff‐type strategies predicted by the equilibrium solution; rather they made considerable “errors” by: Betting when they should have checked, checking when they should have bet, and calling when they should have folded. There is no evidence that aggregate performance improved over time in either condition although considerable individual differences were observed among subjects. Behavioral learning theory (BLT) cannot easily explain these individual differences and cognitive learning theory (CLT) is introduced to explain the apparent anomalies. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Waffle Phenomenon: Negative Evaluations of Those Who Shift Attitudinally1

The past two presidential campaigns have been filed with charges that the Democratic nominee “changed his mind” on various issues. The present research explored the possibility that negative evaluations may be produced by attitude change per se. In the first experiment, subjects responded to a stranger whose attitudes remained stable or who changed his attitudes over a period of two months vs. one year. Individuals who changed their attitudes were generally evaluated more negatively than those whose attitudes remained stable; the amount of time over which the change occurred produced no effect. A second expcriment sought to determine if the direction of change (toward increased or decreased similarity with subjects) influenced evaluations of a stranger. Attitude change which resulted in decreased similarity was rated most negatively. Even when a stranger changed his attitudes in the direction of greater similarity with subjects, however, he was still regarded as less decisive, less reliable, and a worse leader than was an individual with stable attitudes. This negative evaluation of attitude change was labeled the “waffle phenomenon”, and the implications for political candidates were discussed.     

Interrogative Belief Revision Based on Epistemic Strategies

I develop a dynamic logic for reasoning about ??interrogative belief revision??, a new branch of belief revision theory that has been developed in a small number of papers, beginning with E. J. Olsson and D. Westlund??s paper ??On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change?? [12]. In interrogative belief revision, epistemic states are taken to include a research agenda, consisting of questions the agent seeks to answer. I present a logic for revision of such epistemic states based on the notion of an epistemic strategy, a stable plan of action that determines changes in the agent??s research agenda. This idea is a further development of an idea put forward in [6], that changes in the research agenda of an agent should be determined by stable, ??long term?? research interests. I provide complete axioms and a decidability result for the logic.     

智慧推理：概念、测量、影响因素及展望

智慧推理源于新皮亚杰主义与柏林智慧模式的研究。研究者进一步整合其内涵,不断推进与革新测量方法。年龄、文化与情境是影响智慧推理的主要因素。未来研究重点应包括考察物慧中的智慧推理内涵,开发“面对面”式的测量方法,探究智慧推理的脑神经机制并比较其与一般抽象推理的不同。     

Children can solve Bayesian problems: the role of representation in mental computation

Can children reason the Bayesian way? We argue that the answer to this question depends on how numbers are represented, because a representation can do part of the computation. We test, for the first time, whether Bayesian reasoning can be elicited in children by means of natural frequencies. We show that when information was presented to fourth, fifth, and sixth graders in terms of probabilities, their ability to estimate the Bayesian posterior probability was zero. Yet when the same information was presented in natural frequencies, Bayesian reasoning showed a steady increase from fourth to sixth grade, reaching an average level of 19, 39, and 53%, respectively, in two studies. Sixth graders' performance with natural frequencies matched the performance of adults with probabilities. But this general increase was accompanied by striking individual differences. More than half of the sixth graders solved most or all problems, whereas one third could not solve a single one. An analysis of the children's responses provides evidence for the use of three non-Bayesian strategies. These follow an overlapping wave model of development and continue to be observed in the minds of adults. More so than adults' probabilistic reasoning, children's reasoning depends on a proper representation of information.     

Feature-based versus category-based induction with uncertain categories

Previous research has suggested that when feature inferences have to be made about an instance whose category membership is uncertain, feature-based inductive reasoning is used to the exclusion of category-based induction. These results contrast with the observation that people can and do use category-based induction when category membership is known. The present experiments examined the conditions that drive feature-based and category-based strategies in induction under category uncertainty. Specifically, 2 experiments investigated whether reliance on feature-based inductive strategies is a product of the lack of coherence in the categories used in previous research or is due to the use of a decision-only induction procedure. Experiment 1 found that feature-based reasoning remained the preferred strategy even when categories with relatively high internal coherence were used. Experiment 2 found a shift toward category-based reasoning when participants were trained to classify category members prior to feature induction. Together, these results suggest that an appropriate conceptual representation must be formed through experience with a category before it is likely to be used as a basis for feature induction.     

Reasoning across continuous landscapes: A nonlinear dynamical systems theory approach to reasoning

Dual-processing theories of reasoning have gained renewed attention in recent years, particularly in the fields of decision-making under uncertainty, learning, and social judgment. Although the various accounts differ, the common thread is the distinction between two qualitatively different reasoning processes, such as automatic/controlled, fast/slow, and unconscious/conscious. Accordingly, much research is focused on elucidating the nature of the two processes in terms of the kinds of information they process and respond to. Less extensive are attempts to identify mediators that underlie changes between the two reasoning strategies. We argue that nonlinear dynamical systems theory may be able to provide a fresh perspective on reasoning. Nonlinear dynamical systems theory allows us to shift the perspective to the dynamic interactions and transitions among continuous yet qualitatively different reasoning processes. We apply the approach to reasoning in decision-making and judgment under uncertainty. Our primary claim is that using different reasoning strategies is better understood as phase transitions among a landscape of continuous reasoning capacities.     

主体关联性对贝叶斯推理概率估计的影响

用贝叶斯推理问题为实验材料,探讨了主体关联性对贝叶斯推理概率估计的影响。结果表明,当估计的事件与主体有关时,被试对消极事件概率估计较低,对积极事件概率估计值;当估计的事件与主体无关时,被试对消极事件和积极事件的概率估计无显著差异。反应时分析表明,被试对消极事件的概率估计比对积极事件的概率估计时间显著地长,当消极事件与主体有关时概率估计时间就更长;而对积极事件的概率估计,与主体有关和与主体无关时反应时差异不显著。这表明,被试对消极事件的概率估计(特别是消极事件与己有关时)更为慎重。     

Resource Bounded Belief Revision

The AGM paradigm for belief revision provides a very elegant and powerful framework for reasoning about idealized agents. The paradigm assumes that the modeled agent is a perfect reasoner with infinite memory. In this paper we propose a framework to reason about non-ideal agents that generalizes the AGM paradigm. We first introduce a structure to represent an agent's belief states that distinguishes different status of beliefs according to whether or not they are explicitly represented, whether they are currently active and whether they are fully accepted or provisional. Then we define a set of basic operations that change the status of beliefs and show how these operations can be used to model agents with different capacities. We also show how different operations of belief change described in the literature can be seen as special cases of our theory.