Sibling conflict and theory of mind

This study examined conflicts between siblings in an attempt to identify variables that are related to false‐belief understanding. The variables investigated were children's use of mental state terms and specific types of arguments (Slomkowski & Dunn, 1992) that occurred during conflict episodes. Twenty‐two children between 3 and 5 years of age were administered eight false‐belief tasks and were also videotaped while playing with an older sibling. Use of other‐oriented arguments by the target child was significantly associated with success on false‐belief tasks after controlling for age and general language ability. No use of argument was negatively related to performance on the false‐belief tasks after controlling for age and general language ability. Neither the use of self‐oriented arguments nor use of mental state terms was found to be associated with false‐belief performance. The findings indicate that specific features of sibling conflicts are related to children's developing false‐belief understanding.     

Limits on the Agent-First Strategy: Evidence from Children's Comprehension of a Transitive Construction in Korean

It has long been believed across languages that the Agent-First strategy, a comprehension heuristic that maps the first noun onto the agent role, is a general cognitive bias which applies automatically and faithfully to children's comprehension. The present study asks how this strategy interplays with such grammatical cues as the number of overt arguments and the presence of case-marking in Korean, an SOV language with case-marking by dedicated markers. To investigate whether and how these cues affect the operation of this strategy, we measure children's comprehension of a transitive construction (with scrambling and omission of sentential components) in a novel experimental setting where arguments and case markers were obscured to varying degrees through acoustic masking. We find that children do not demonstrate the agent-first interpretation strongly in the noun–verb pattern without case-marking, showing their uncertainty about the thematic role of the nominal when it is both the only argument in the sentence and lacks case-marking. They perform significantly better in the patterns with additional cues, the impact of which is asymmetric by age and by the nature of alignment between cues from word order and case-marking. These findings suggest that, for Korean-speaking children's comprehension of a transitive construction, the Agent-First strategy is activated properly only in conjunction with other types of interpretive cues.     

Blaming the Kids: Children's Agency and Diminished Responsibility

Children are less blameworthy for their beliefs and actions because they are young. But the relationship between development and responsibility is complex. What exactly grounds the excuses we rightly give to young agents? This article presents three distinct arguments for children's diminished responsibility. Drawing on significant resources from developmental psychology, it rejects views which base the normative adult/child distinction on children's inability to participate in certain kinds of moral communication or to form principled self‐conceptions which guide their actions. The article then argues that children's responsibility ought to be diminished because (and to the degree that) they are less competent at using features of their moral agency to meet social demands. This ‘normative competence’ view is philosophically defensible, supported by research in developmental psychology, and provides us with a method to evaluate whether things like peer pressure are relevant to responsibility.     

Argument,Inference, and Persuasion

This paper distinguishes between two types of persuasive force arguments can have in terms of two different connections between arguments and inferences. First, borrowing from Pinto (in Argument, inference, and dialectic, Kluwer Academic Pub, Dordrecht, 2001), an arguer's invitation to inference directly persuades an addressee if the addressee performs an inference that the arguer invites. This raises the question of how invited inferences are determined by an invitation to inference. Second, borrowing from Sorenson (J Philos 88:245–266, 1991), an arguer's invitation to inference indirectly persuades an addressee if the addressee performs an inference guided by the argument even though it is uninvited. This raises the question of how an invitation to inference can guide inferences that the arguer does not use the argument to invite. Focusing on belief-inducing inference, the primary aims here are (i) to clarify what is necessary for an addressee's belief-inducing inference to be invited by an argument used as an instrument of persuasion; and (ii) to highlight the capacity of arguments to guide such inferences. The paper moves beyond Pinto's (2001) discussion by using Boghossian's (Philos Stud 169:1–18, 2014) Taking Condition in service of (i) and (ii) in way that illustrates how epistemically bad arguments can rationally persuade addressees of their conclusions.

     

Why Doomsday Arguments are Better than Simulation Arguments

Inspired by anthropic reasoning behind Doomsday arguments, Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument says: people who think advanced civilisations would run many fully‐conscious simulated minds should also think they're probably simulated minds themselves. However, Bostrom's conclusions can (and should) be resisted, especially by sympathisers with Doomsday or anthropic reasoning. This paper initially offers a posterior‐probabilistic ‘Doomsday lottery’ argument against Bostrom's conclusions. Suggestions are then offered for deriving anti‐simulation conclusions using weaker assumptions. Anti‐simulation arguments herein use more (epistemically and metaphysically) robust reference classes than Bostrom's argument, require no Principles of Indifference, abide better by the total evidence requirement, and yet use empirically plausible priors and likelihoods. However, while Doomsday arguments are probabilistically, epistemically and metaphysically stronger than the Simulation Argument, anthropic reasoning can (and should) refrain from embracing either.     

Parents' Expressiveness and Young Children's Emotion Decoding With Parents and Unknown Adults

The authors investigated young children's ability to decode the emotions of happiness and anger expressed by their parent and an adult stranger. Parents and adult strangers (encoders) were videotaped while describing events that had elicited happiness or anger. Children viewed brief clips edited from these videotapes and indicated the emotion that their parent or the stranger was expressing. With male encoders, only children's age predicted accuracy. With female encoders, mothers' expressive style and children's age interacted to predict children's decoding accuracy. Compared with older children of less positively expressive mothers, older children of more positively expressive mothers were more accurate overall, because they were better at recognizing happiness. In general, children were no more or less accurate in decoding their parent's emotions than they were in decoding an unknown adult's emotions.     

Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature?

Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against only the most heavily committed kind, and leave the less heavily committed kinds untouched. Further, we argue that Williamson's elaboration of lessons from his arguments point in a direction opposite of his own conclusions and give vivid articulation and support to epistemological conceptions. We suggest also that skepticism about Williamson's larger metaphilosophical conclusions – according to which understanding plays no special role in the epistemology of philosophy – may be in order.     

Parental Socialization of Emotion

Recently, there has been a resurgence of research on emotion, including the socialization of emotion. In this article, a heuristic model of factors contributing to the socialization of emotion is presented. Then literature relevant to the socialization of children's emotion and emotion-related behavior by parents is reviewed, including (a) parental reactions to children's emotions, (b) socializers' discussion of emotion, and (c) socializers' expression of emotion. The relevant literature is not conclusive and most of the research is correlational. However, the existing body of data provides initial support for the view that parental socialization practices have effects on children's emotional and social competence and that the socialization process is bidirectional. In particular, parental negative emotionality and negative reactions to children's expression of emotion are associated with children's negative emotionality and low social competence. In addition, possible moderators of effects such as level of emotional arousal are discussed.     

Argument Structure,Argument Content,and Cognitive Change in Children's Peer Interaction

In this experimental study, the author examined whether children's conversations play a role in the processes of influence between peers. Children, aged 8 to 10 years, who were at different levels of moral development participated. The conversations of 120 children were coded and analyzed in terms of argument structure and content. Results indicated that the differences in structure between boys' and girls' arguments are stylistic and do not influence conversation outcomes. The children's use of the structural features of conversations suggested that when a more advanced position is adopted, the arguments themselves appear to inspire cognitive change. However, when a less advanced position is adopted, the children who influence their peers invoke a particular and insistent conversational style. Results are discussed in terms of transmission and constructivist accounts of the role of social interaction in cognitive development.     

Children's Moral Emotions,Narratives, and Aggression: Relations With Maternal Discipline and Support

ABSTRACT. Children who attribute more positive emotions to hypothetical moral victimizers are typically more aggressive and have more behavior problems. Little is known, however, about when individual differences in these moral emotion attributions first emerge or about maternal correlates of these differences. In this study, 63 4–6-year-olds judged how they would feel after victimizing peers for gain and enacted event conclusions using narrative methods adapted from the MacArthur Story Stem Battery. In addition, children's mothers completed assessments of their disciplinary styles and social support, and children's aggressive tendencies were assessed based on ratings from mothers and a second familiar adult. Results revealed that most preschoolers expected to feel happy after their victimizing acts, but variations in happy victimization were unrelated to children's aggression. Several of children's narrative themes, including making amends (e.g., apologizing, reparations), aggressive acts, and mentions of death/killing, however, were related to children's aggression. Moreover, two maternal disciplinary dimensions, higher warmth and reasoning, as well as greater social support were also related to lower child aggression. Children's emotion attributions and moral narratives, however, were unrelated to maternal disciplinary practices or social support.     

Domain‐Specificity of Creativity in Young Children: How Quantitative and Qualitative Data Support It

One of the most controversial issues in contemporary research of creativity, whether a person's creativity is domain‐specific or domain‐general, was investigated in the present study. This study is composed of two parts, Study 1 and Study 2. In study 1, the relationships among 109 children's creative performances in three domains, and the relationships between those children's general creative thinking skills and their creative performances in three domains have been examined. Study 2 examines how the domain‐specificity and ‐generality issue is addressed in individual children via case studies of three highly creative children, hoping to provide enriching and qualitative specification to the quantitative data of the present study. In both studies, children's performances in language, art, and math domains were respectively judged by three experts who rated children's creativity on story‐telling, collage making, and math word‐problem creating tasks. Children's general creative thinking skills were assessed by a battery of two divergent thinking tests, including the Wallach‐Kogan Creativity Test (Wallach & Kogan, 1965) and the Real World Divergent Thinking Test adapted from Okuda, Runco, and Berger (1991). The findings of this study support the position that creative ability in young children is rather (but not absolutely) domain‐specific.     

The effect of role change on intellectual ability and on the ability self-concept in Chinese children

According to the findings of the present study, the following conclusions are warranted: 1. The ability self-concept of Chinese schoolchildren was significantly enhanced by the role-changing procedure. Therefore, schools may be able to establish positive situations involving a change in the children's role as a means for improving children's ability self-concepts. 2. The children's motives for achievement and their language abilities were improved by the role-change procedure.     

Visual Acuity Performance of Normal and Chronic Focal-Head Irradiated Monkeys

The study reported by Griffiths, Shantz, and Sigel (4) on children's understanding of relational terms in conservation tasks is used in a case study to illustrate a number of problematic practices in the use of psychological literature. A number of examples are given that reflect a negligent or clearly inaccurate reading of the Griffiths et al. report. Common errors made by authors in citing the published research of others are failure to examine closely the study's methodology, uncritical acceptance of authors' conclusions, and misinterpretation or confusion of the study's findings.     

Croyances de contrôle et rendement scolaire chez des élèves francophones du primaire au Québec

Recent research in educational psychology, both in the United States and Europe, suggested that students' control beliefs must be considered to understand interindividual variations in students' personal engagement in learning and academic achievement. The present study was conducted with 780 French-speaking elementary school children from grade four to six. The objectives were to examine: (1) the relation between dimensions of control beliefs, (2) whether there were age-related changes in children's control beliefs, and (3) the relation between control beliefs and academic achievement across school grades. Results showed that the relations between dimensions of control beliefs and children's judgements about their importance in school achievement were stable across school grades. No relation was found between children's judgements about usefulness of specific means and academic achievement, but children's beliefs about their capacity to use these means was a powerful predictor of academic achievement. The discussion focuses on similarities and dissimilarities of these findings with those of studies conducted in the United States and Europe.     

Children's reasoning with peers in cooperative and competitive contexts

We report two studies that demonstrate how five‐ and seven‐year‐olds adapt their production of arguments to either a cooperative or a competitive context. Two games elicited agreements from peer dyads about placing animals on either of two halves of a playing field owned by either child. Children had to produce arguments to justify these decisions. Played in a competitive context that encouraged placing animals on one's own half, children's arguments showed a bias that was the result of withholding known arguments. In a cooperative context, children produced not only more arguments, but also more ‘two‐sided’ arguments. Also, seven‐year‐olds demonstrated a more frequent and strategic use of arguments that specifically refuted decisions that would favour their peers. The results suggest that cooperative contexts provide a more motivating context for children to produce arguments.

Statement of contribution

What is already known on this subject ?

• Reasoning is a social skill that allows people to reach joint decisions.
• Preschoolers give reasons for their proposals in their peer conversations.
• By adolescence, children use sophisticated arguments (e.g., refutations and rebuttals).

What the present study adds?

• Cooperation offers a more motivating context for children's argument production.
• Seven‐year‐olds are more strategic than five‐year‐olds in their reasoning with peers.
• Children's reasoning with others becomes more sophisticated after preschool years.

     

Children's Comprehension of Critical and Complimentary Forms of Verbal Irony

The existing research on children's comprehension of verbal irony has focused exclusively on children's understanding of ironic criticisms. Two experiments examined 5- and 6-year-old children's ability to detect the nonliteral nature and intended meaning of both ironic criticism and ironic praise as depicted in short, videotaped stories. Considered together, the results from these experiments permit several conclusions: First, the data confirm earlier research suggesting that children's detection of nonliteral utterances and their interpretation of the speaker's pragmatic intent are separable components of early irony comprehension. Second, children's ability to detect ironic statements is asymmetrical across critical and complimentary forms of irony. Finally, although children more readily detect ironic criticisms, explicit echoic cues play an important role in facilitating uniquely their detection of ironic compliments. We discuss these results in the context of social pragmatic theories of early communicative development (e.g., Bruner, 1983; Tomasello, 1992, 1995) and with reference to a recent allusional-pretense model of irony comprehension proposed for mature speakers (Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, & Brown, 1995).     

The Relatively Happy Fish

Zhuangzi and Hui Shi's discussion about whether Zhuangzi knows ‘fish’s happiness' is a Daoist staple. The interpretations, however, portray it as humorous miscommunication between a mystic and a logician. I argue for a fine inferential analysis that explains the argument in a way that informs Zhuangzi philosophical lament at Hui Shi's passing. It also reverses the dominant image of the two thinkers. Zhuangzi emerges as the superior dialectician, the clearer, more analytic epistemologist. Hui Shi's arguments betray his tendency (manifest elsewhere) to misstate the conclusions of their shared relativism leading him but not Zhuangzi to intuitive mysticism.     

"I GET PROUD WHEN I READ": FIRST-GRADERS TALK ABOUT READING

This interpretive research addressed five first-graders' perceptions of reading and of being readers, asking the questions: What does reading or being a reader mean to a group of children who are at the end of first grade? What are they see as its purpose? How do they view themselves as readers? The data is presented in the form of narratives describing the children and their views, followed by a discussion of the children's reading identities and purposes for reading as condensed into five categories: practice, people, power, pleasure, and performance. Practice, a main purpose for the children, entailed reading longer words and books, learning more words, and developing decoding skills. Reading as a social process included connections to people, both while being taught to read and when sharing texts with others. Mastery of reading provided varied feelings of power and control either over general textual ideas or over the words themselves. Pleasure and humor were emphasized in relation to children's reading, while instrumental motives were attributed to adults and to teacher-directed activities. Performance allowed for a display of knowledge and skills, but brought fear of ridicule for some. The children's rich perceptions of the reading process and of themselves as readers can guide educators as they support children in becoming strong, positive, and lasting readers. More in-depth qualitative research needs to be done on children's perceptions of reading at all levels of schooling, especially with beginning and struggling readers.