Affordances as Properties of the Animal-Environment System

In this article, I argue that affordances are properties of the animal-environment system, that is, that they are emergent properties that do not inhere in either the environment or the animal. I critique and review the formal definition of affordance offered by Turvey (1992). Turvey defined affordances as properties of the environment; I discuss some consequences of this and argue that Turvey's strategy of grounding the definition of affordance in terms of dispositional properties is problematic. I also suggest that Turvey's definition of affordance may lead to problems for the specification and direct perception of affordances. Motivated by these problems, I propose a new definition of affordance, in which affordances are properties of the animal-environment system. This definition does not rely on the concept of dispositional properties and is consistent with direct perception.     

Mutuality Relations,Observation, and Intentional Constraints

This commentary focuses on the implications of Stoffregen's (target article, this issue) theory, as they apply to current research on human biological motion. We take up his suggestion that affordances, not events, are perceived and that data generated within event-perception research may reflect conversion of affordance-based perception to "event-based scales." Research on point-light walkers has been classed with event perception; however, results from our current research on perception of point-light sports displays suggest that accurate detection of humans and their actions in these displays may be controlled by complex relations better explained within an affordance-based account. We report the results of an experiment that controlled the presence and absence of relations between biological motion and a discrete environmental object. Detection was best when these affordance-relevant relations were available. Finally, we consider the utility of Stoffregen's ontological distinction as it may inform our understanding of past, current, and future research on perception of point-light walker displays.     

动允直接知觉的共鸣原理

传统认知理论认为我们只能间接知觉动允,而生态认知心理学则认为对动允的知觉是个体与环境信息直接共鸣的过程。生态认知心理学首先判定动允并不是存在于我们头脑中的认识,而是实际存在于个体-环境系统中的事实,对动允的直接知觉就是对动允的检测而非推测,是对动允信息的拾取而非对记忆内容的提取。这种直接知觉表现为身体的相关动作机制（动作神经元、肌肉组织等）与环境中动允信息的共鸣。进化与学习在共鸣的形成与发展中具有重要作用。     

Inviting affordances and agency

Recently several authors have suggested that affordances are not mere possibilities for action but can also invite behavior. This reconceptualization of affordances asks for a reconsideration of the ecological approach to agency. After a portrayal of the role of agency in ecological psychology, we draw upon phenomenology to reveal what it means for an agent to be invited by affordances. We sketch a dynamical model of the animal-environment relationship that aims to do justice to this analysis. In the model, agency is conceptualized as the capacity to modulate the coupling strength with the environment—the agent can influence to what extent he or she is influenced by the different invitations. This account of agency keeps us far from the Cartesian idea that the agent imposes behavior. Indeed, by modulating the coupling strength, the agent simply alters the dynamics of the animal-environment interactions and thus the behavior that emerges.     

Part II: Applications of Process-Based Theories: Process and Emergence: Normative Function and Representation

Kim's argument appears to render causally efficacious emergence impossible: Hume's argument appears to render normative emergence impossible, and, in its general form, it precludes any emergence at all. I argue that both of these barriers can be overcome, and, in fact, that they each constitute reductions of their respective underlying presuppositions. In particular, causally efficacious ontological emergence can be modeled, but only within a process metaphysics, thus avoiding Kim's argument, and making use of non-abbreviatory forms of definition, thus avoiding Hume's argument. I illustrate these points with models of the emergent nature of normative function and of representation.     

Adaptive perception of changes in affordances for walking on a ship at sea

Ocean waves cause oscillatory motion of ships. Oscillatory ship motion typically is greater in roll (i.e., the ship rolling from side to side) than in pitch (i.e., tipping from front to back). Affordances for walking on a ship at sea should be differentially influenced by ship motion in roll and pitch. When roll exceeds pitch, the maximum walkable distance within a defined path should be greater when walking along the ship’s short, or athwart axis than when walking along its long, or fore-aft axis. When pitch exceeds roll, this relation should be reversed. We asked whether such changes in ship motion would be reflected in judgments of direction-specific affordances for walking. Participants (experienced maritime crewmembers) judged how far they could walk along a narrow path on the ship deck. On different days, sailing conditions were such that the relative magnitude of pitch and roll was reversed. Judgments of direction-specific affordances for walking mirrored these changes in ship motion. The accuracy of judgments was consistent across directions, and across changes in ship motion. We conclude that experienced maritime crewmembers were sensitive to dynamic variations in affordances for walking that were, themselves, a function of dynamic properties of the animal-environment system.     

Scaffolds for Social Meaning

The perception of social meanings traditionally deemed to be private is addressed by contrasting the perception of social affordances with the perception of the physical affordances of environmental objects. Assuming that (a) affordances are defined by relationships between properties of the environment and properties of an actor and that (b) information must exist to specify this relationship for the perception of affordances, the question is whether and how private social meanings can fulfill these criteria. The attack is twofold. First, one needs to take seriously the ontology of the social world by considering social environment properties and actors' social roles as real and embodied—existing in the world and not just in mental representations. Second and more problematically, one needs to understand how information exists that specifies these more abstract and temporally extended aspects of the environment and actor. I propose that these problems can be averted by taking seriously as conceptual scaffolds the reality of functionally defined properties of the environment and actor, J. J. Gibson's primacy of events, and his notion of the occluding edge (1979/1986).     

Affordances can invite behavior: Reconsidering the relationship between affordances and agency

The concept of agency has been central to ecological approaches to psychology. Gibson, one of the founders of this movement, made room for this concept by arguing against the mechanistic conceptions in psychology. In his view, the environment is not a collection of causes that pushes the animal around, but consist of action possibilities, which he coined affordances. In making their way in the world, animals regulate their behavior with respect to these possibilities. Reed later developed this ecological conception of agency, following Gibson in conceiving of affordances as action possibilities. However, drawing upon industrial design, architecture, and phenomenology, we argue that affordances are not mere action possibilities but that they can also invite behavior. We suggest a mutualist perspective on invitations, suggesting that they depend on the animal-environment relationship in multiple dimensions. The implications of this new conception of affordances for the ecological account of agency are explored.     

“Women Don't Get AIDS,They Just Die From It”: Memory,Classification, and the Campaign to Change the Definition of AIDS

In this paper, I examine activist group ACT UP's campaign to change the US Centers for Disease Control surveillance case definition of HIV and AIDS. This campaign's effects included a profound shift in how AIDS is understood, and thus in some real way in what it is. I argue that classification should be understood as a political formation with material effects, attending to the words of activists, most of them women, who contested the way AIDS was defined in a moment when no one else thought that definition needed to be changed. I argue that philosopher Sue Campbell's work on the importance of understanding memory and feeling as relational helps understand the histories of death and loss, resistance and fierce joy, crystallized in activist responses to HIV and AIDS.     

Understanding Humility and Its Role in Relational Therapy

Humility is a character trait and virtue that has received scant attention in psychotherapy literature. A panel of experts was assembled to confer on their beliefs about humility for this Delphi study. They responded to a proposed definition of humility and provided a variety of statements regarding the role of humility in client change and relational therapy in general. The results suggest that key elements of change that occur during the process of relational therapy (including certain “common factors”) seem to be related to humility. Also, humility’s unique relationship to self and other suggests it is often at work in relational change. The authors propose further exploration of humility and its role as a pre-cursor to client change efforts. Humility’s role in the Transtheoretical Model of Change is hypothesized and future directions for theory and research are suggested.     

Emergence for Nihilists

I defend mereological nihilism, the view that there are no composite objects, against a challenge from ontological emergence, the view that some things have properties that are ‘something over and above’ the properties of their parts. As the nihilist does not believe in composite wholes, there is nothing in the nihilist's ontology to instantiate emergent properties – or so the challenge goes. However, I argue that some simples (taken together) can collectively instantiate an emergent property, so the nihilist's ontology can in fact accommodate emergent properties. Furthermore, I show that employing plural instantiation does not bloat the nihilist's ontology or ideology.     

Perceiving Whether or Not the World Affords Stepping Onto and Over: A Developmental Study

Abstract

Children's perception of the critical (upper) limit of their stepping affordances, was tested at 6, 8, and 10 years of age for stepping onto (SON_max in Experiment I) and over (SOV_max in Experiment II) obstacles. Warren's (1984) proposition (similarity hypothesis) that adults perceive SON_max to be .88 of leg length (L) because the geometry of adults' legs is invariant over varying height was extended to varying height due to growth. Because the geometry of children's legs is both invariant over growth between 6 and 10 years and identical to adults, we predicted that children should both accurately perceive their critical limit and perceive it to be .88L. Experiment I confirmed these predictions and Experiment II demonstrated that children differentiate between the two stepping affordances. The similarity hypothesis is further supported by the fact that age does not interact with either observers' mean accuracy over conditions or variability within observers. This stable performance is interpreted to mean that children are continually adapted to these affordances and not continually retuning them in response to growth. The need for “action” studies to complement “perception” studies of affordances is discussed in terms of the possibility that the biodynamic effects of growth variations, such as the distribution of body mass, may affect perception only or principally when perception and action are dynamically linked in goal-directed behavior.     

Gibson's Affordances and Turing's Theory of Computation

The concept of affordance is a central component of the ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson (1966, 1977, 1979/1986). Affordances are properties of the environment taken relative to an observer. Ecological theorists have developed formal models for the analysis of affordances. Models proposed by Shaw and Turvey (1981), Turvey (1992), and Greeno (1994) are described and evaluated, and another approach, using Turing's (1936-1937/1965) theory of computation, is outlined. Affordances are characterized as the configurations of Turing machines. It is shown that Turing's work provides a natural vehicle for exploring Gibson's ideas.     

Realism,instrumentalism, and the intentional stance

One of Dennett's principal arguments for an instrumentalistic construal of intentional attributions (e.g., attributions of belief, etc.) is that such attributions are environment relative. I argue that one can and should adopt a realist perspective toward such attributions, but accommodate their environmental relativity by treating intentional properties as relational properties. By doing so one acquires a useful perspective on experimental cognitive psychology; in particular, one can overcome the temptation to treat ecological accounts and information processing accounts as incompatible alternatives and come to see them as mutually supportive. Treating intentional properties as relational may be counter-intuitive, but I provide examples of how other sciences have had to treat what seem to be intrinsic properties as relational.     

On Interaction Analysis and Dialogical Perspective: Emergent Patterns of Order and Relational Agency

This essay proposes to contribute with a continuing discussion on Grossen’s paper (2010) establishing a link between the analysis of interactions and dialogical perspective using what I call simplication-for-approaching-complexity (SFAC). This approach conceives of dialogical dynamics as a dynamic system of relationship that construct patterns. Moreover, these emergent patterns allow inferring the features of dialogical partners as relational agencies. The specific characteristics of the relational agency at any moment in dialogue can be inferred from the analysis of the specific pattern of order achieved by the historical development of dialogue. This proposal is illustrated by the analysis of mother-infant interactions.     

The Japanese Tea Ceremony and Pancultural Definitions of Art

Dominic McIver Lopes and Yuriko Saito claim that the Japanese tea ceremony, or chadō, is a non‐Western art form. Stephen Davies also defends that claim. In this article, I utilize the tea ceremony as a test case for pancultural definitions of art that claim to be inclusive of non‐Western cultures without relying on Western ethnocentrism to justify their status as artworks. I argue that Davies's (2015) hybrid definition is not justified in assuming a homogenous art tradition and/or a unified conception of artistic practices in a non‐Western culture. Moreover, the cladistic structure of his definition fails to accommodate the spontaneous instantiation of new art traditions. Additionally, Jerrold Levinson's Intentional‐Historical definition cannot satisfactorily accommodate chadō. First, the nonart origins that were formative for the regard that is required for appreciation of the tea ceremony mean that the relational interpretation of the definition fails. Second, Rikyū’s tea ceremony does not count as art incidentally, as it is not a form of mimesis nor does the Japanese wabi aesthetic that is central to chadō have a precursor in known Western art. Third, if chadō does satisfy Levinson's extended theory, it comes at the cost of embracing Western ethnocentrism.     

Data In Search Of A Principle: A Review Of Relational Frame Theory: A Post-Skinnerian Count Of Human Language And Cognition.

Responding to derived relations among stimuli and events is the subject of an accelerating research program that represents one of the major behavior analytic approaches to complex behavior. Relational Frame Theory: A Post‐Skinnerian Account of Human Language and Cognition (Hayes, Barnes‐Holmes, & Roche, 2001) offers a conceptual framework for this work and explores its implications for verbal behavior and a variety of other domains of complex human behavior. The authors dismiss Skinner's interpretation of verbal behavior as unproductive and conceptually flawed and suggest a new definition and a new paradigm for the investigation of verbal phenomena. I found the empirical phenomena important but the conceptual discussion incomplete. A new principle of behavior is promised, but critical features of this principle are not offered. In the absence of an explicit principle, the theory itself is difficult to evaluate. Counterexamples suggest a role for mediating behavior, perhaps covert, thus raising the question whether a new principle is needed at all. The performance of subjects in relational frame experiments may be a mosaic of elementary behavioral units, some of which are verbal. If so, verbal behavior underlies relational behavior; it is not defined by it. I defend Skinner's definition of verbal behavior and argue that an account of relational behavior must be integrated with Skinner's analysis; it will not replace it.     

A Behavioral Interactional Model for Assessing Family Relationships

A behavioral interactional model (B.I.M.) of the family is described, which is based upon Bertalanffy's definition of a “system.” The model has a logical structure derived from the formal properties of dyads. The features of dyadic interaction, combined with the “constituent analysis” of protocols, provide a method of analyzing and comparing views about family relationships. The method is illustrated by analyzing two parents' views of their family.