Is it emotion or is it stress? Gender stereotypes and the perception of subjective experience

Two studies of college undergraduates (ns = 95 and 92, primarily non-Hispanic whites and Asian Americans) investigated gender stereotypes of stress and emotion, as well as variables that influence the perception of gender-related differences. Study 1 assessed how gender stereotypes differ from the self-reports of men and women. When asked to choose a label for the subjective experience of the average man and the average woman in a series of problematic hypothetical situations, participants generally tended to believe that the average female would feel ‘emotional,” but that the average male would feel “stressed.” By contrast, the label participants chose to describe their own subjective experience was not significantly affected by their gender. In addition, participants believed the average woman and man differed more in the intensity of their emotions than in the intensity of their stress, a belief contradicted by their own self-reports. Results of Study 2 indicated that gender-related differences in estimations of stress and emotion for the self were reduced or eliminated when specific information about experience-eliciting situations was provided. We would like to thank Matthew Dank for his help in preparing the stimulus materials.     

He throws like a girl (but only when he's sad): emotion affects sex-decoding of biological motion displays

Gender stereotypes have been implicated in sex-typed perceptions of facial emotion. Such interpretations were recently called into question because facial cues of emotion are confounded with sexually dimorphic facial cues. Here we examine the role of visual cues and gender stereotypes in perceptions of biological motion displays, thus overcoming the morphological confounding inherent in facial displays. In four studies, participants’ judgments revealed gender stereotyping. Observers accurately perceived emotion from biological motion displays (Study 1), and this affected sex categorizations. Angry displays were overwhelmingly judged to be men; sad displays were judged to be women (Studies 2–4). Moreover, this pattern remained strong when stimuli were equated for velocity (Study 3). We argue that these results were obtained because perceivers applied gender stereotypes of emotion to infer sex category (Study 4). Implications for both vision sciences and social psychology are discussed.     

Emotional expressivity in men and women: Stereotypes and self-perceptions

Three studies were conducted to assess prevalent stereotypes regarding men's and women's emotional expressivity as well as self-perceptions of their emotional behaviour. Emotion profiles were employed to assess both modal emotional reactions and secondary emotional reactions to hypothetical events and personal experiences. In Study 1 we asked how men and women in general would react to a series of hypothetical emotional events. In Study 2 we asked how participants themselves expected to react to these same situations and in Study 3 we asked participants to report a personal emotional event in narrative form. Two gender differences emerged across all three studies. Specifically, women were expected to be more likely to react with sadness to negative emotion-eliciting events in general. They also expected themselves to be more likely to react with sadness as well as to cry and to withdraw more when experiencing negative emotional events. Finally, women report more sadness when describing personal events. In contrast, men were expected to react with more happiness/serenity during negative emotional situations. Also, they expect themselves to react more frequently this way as well as to laugh and smile more and to be more relaxed in negative situations. Finally, men tend to report more happiness when describing negative personal events. In sum, the present study gives a more detailed portrayal of how men and women are expected and expect themselves to react to specific emotional situations and presents some evidence that these expectations may influence the way they reconstruct emotional events from their past.     

Social Closeness and Decision Making: Moral, Attributive and Emotional Reactions to Third Party Transgressions

Decisions involving moral vectors are inherently social. This paper investigates social closeness to others as one of the important factors that mediate our evaluations of moral infractions. The influence of social closeness on participants?? third-party evaluations of moral transgressions was measured across development. Participants?? intentional attributions, punitive sentiments, moral judgments, and emotional reactions were measured using responses to hypothetical vignettes that describe socio-moral transgressions involving theft. Participants?? attribution judgments, punitive decisions, and emotional reactions differed when their social relationship with the perpetrator (Study One), and alternatively with the victim (Study Two), of the transgression was varied. Evidence is provided for the supposition that morality is a construct of social cooperative exchange and that social closeness influences socio-moral evaluations and judgments.     

BRIEF REPORT Functional and dysfunctional feelings in Ellis' cognitive theory of emotion: An empirical analysis

This study is to our knowledge the first to investigate how rational and irrational beliefs (RBs and IBs) generate qualitatively different feelings/emotions based on the same physiological arousal when the immediate environment is devoid of relevant cues. Participants in this study (N = 120) were evaluated for and primed with rational or irrational beliefs. Next, they exercised or sat still, and either immediately or after a delay, rated their emotional state. Consistent with the bifactorial theory of emotion and with Ellis' cognitive theory of emotion, participants in the exercise delayed‐rating condition, who lacked an obvious explanation for their residual arousal, interpreted their arousal in terms of primed beliefs. RBs were associated with positive emotions, while IBs were associated with dysfunctional negative emotions and their corresponding functional negative emotions (e.g., both depressed and sad). Participants in the exercise immediate‐rating condition and those in the no‐exercise condition were not influenced by their primed beliefs. Implications for Ellis' cognitive theory of emotion are discussed.     

THE GENDER STEREOTYPING OF EMOTIONS

Three studies documented the gender stereotypes of emotions and the relationship between gender stereotypes and the interpretation of emotionally expressive behavior. Participants believed women experienced and expressed the majority of the 19 emotions studied (e.g., sadness, fear, sympathy) more often than men. Exceptions included anger and pride, which were thought to be experienced and expressed more often by men. In Study 2, participants interpreted photographs of adults'ambiguous anger/sadness facial expressions in a stereotype-consistent manner, such that women were rated as sadder and less angry than men. Even unambiguous anger poses by women were rated as a mixture of anger and sadness. Study 3 revealed that when expectant parents interpreted an infant's ambiguous anger/sadness expression presented on videotape only high-stereotyped men interpreted the expression in a stereotype-consistent manner. Discussion focuses on the role of gender stereotypes in adults'interpretations of emotional expressions and the implications for social relations and the socialization of emotion.     

A Preliminary Investigation into Effects of Linguistic Abstraction on the Perception of Gender in Spoken Language

We investigated the role that linguistic abstraction may play in people’s perceptions of gender in spoken language. In the first experiment, participants told stories about their best friend and romantic partner. Variations in linguistic abstraction and gender-linked adjectives for describing their close others were examined. Participants used significantly more abstract language to describe men compared to women, possibly reflecting a gender stereotype associated with the dispositionality factor of linguistic abstraction. In a second experiment, a new group of participants judged the gender of the protagonists from the stories generated in Experiment 1, after the explicit linguistic gender cues were removed. Consistent with the dispositionality factor, linguistic abstraction moderated the effects of the gender stereotypicality of the context (masculine, feminine, or neutral) on participants’ gender judgments. Discussion focuses on the implications of the results for the communication of gender stereotypes and the effects of linguistic abstraction in more naturalistic language.     

What makes experiences satisfying? The interaction of approach-avoidance motivations and emotions in well-being

Two studies examined how dispositional approach-related and avoidance-related motivations moderate the degree to which people base satisfaction judgments on past experiences of positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA). Using both laboratory-based (Study 1) and experience sampling (Study 2) methodologies, the authors found that high approach participants, as compared with low approach participants, made satisfaction ratings that were more strongly tied to PA. In contrast, avoidance-related motivations did not moderate the degree to which satisfaction ratings were based on either PA or NA. Results indicate that approach motivations may influence well-being not only through emotion over time but also through the degree to which people weight particular emotional experiences in broader judgments of satisfaction.     

Adolescents' reasoning about exclusion from social groups

Ninth- and 11th-grade students (N = 379) were surveyed regarding their evaluations of excluding someone from a social group solely on the basis of his or her social reference group membership. Individuals evaluated exclusion in ambiguous and nonambiguous situations. Judgments and reasoning about exclusion were compared with judgments and reasoning about a more prototypically moral situation (denial of resources). Overall, participants evaluated exclusion as less wrong than denial of resources and used fewer moral and more conventional reasons to justify their judgments. Participants relied more on their group knowledge or stereotypes in evaluating ambiguous situations and more on their personal knowledge in evaluating nonambiguous situations. Age- and gender-related differences in evaluations, reasoning, and use of stereotypes were also found.     

The Cognitive Costs of the Counter-Stereotypic: Gender,Emotion, and Social Presence

We explored the concurrent and subsequent cognitive consequences of the experience of gender counter-stereotypic emotions. Participants experiencing gender counter-stereotypic emotions were expected to display less emotional expression and demonstrate poorer cognitive performance when in the public condition than when in the private condition. Seventy-one women and 66 men completed an anger- or sadness-inducing task privately or publicly. Participants completed two cognitive tasks: one during and one after the emotion-induction task. Participants exhibited poorer performance during and following gender counter-stereotypic emotions only in the public condition. Direct evidence for greater suppression of gender counter-stereotypic emotions in the public conditions was not obtained. These results suggest that the same public emotional events may be differentially cognitively depleting depending on one’s gender, potentially contributing to the perpetuation of stereotypes.     

Adult attachment and the perception of emotional expressions: probing the hyperactivating strategies underlying anxious attachment

According to adult attachment theory, individual differences in attachment-related anxiety reflect variation in individuals' vigilance to cues relevant to appraising and monitoring the availability and responsiveness of significant others. To investigate this assumption, the authors adopted a morph movie paradigm in which participants were shown movies of faces in which an emotional facial expression changed gradually to a neutral one (Study 1) or a neutral expression changed to an emotional one (Studies 2-4). Participants were asked to judge the point at which the emotional expression had disappeared or emerged, respectively. Individuals who were highly anxious with respect to attachment were more likely to perceive the offset (Study 1) as well as the onset (Studies 2 and 3) of the facial expressions of emotion earlier than other people. Moreover, this heightened state of vigilance may have led to poorer accuracy in judging facial expressions of emotion (Study 3), an effect that was reversed when anxious individuals were required to watch the movies for the same length of time as less anxious participants (Study 4). The results indicate that variation in attachment anxiety reflects, in part, differences in vigilance to cues of social and emotional significance.     

Matching Abilities to Careers for Others and Self: Do Gender Stereotypes Matter to Students in Advanced Math and Science Classes?

Interest in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) careers falls off more quickly for young women than for young men over adolescence, and gender stereotypes may be partially to blame. Adolescents typically become more stereotypical in their career interests over time, yet they seem to become more flexible in applying stereotypes to others. Models of career interest propose that career decisions result from the alignment of self-perceived abilities with occupation-required skills and that gender stereotypes may influence this process. To investigate the discrepancy between applying stereotypes to self and others, we examined if these models can be applied to perceptions of others. Focusing on students from fifth grade through college enrolled in advanced STEM courses, we investigated how STEM occupational stereotypes, abilities, and efficacy affect expectations for others’ and own career interests. U.S. participants (n = 526) read vignettes describing a hypothetical male or female student who was talented in math/science or language arts/social studies and then rated the student’s interest in occupations requiring some of those academic skills. Participants’ self-efficacy, interest, and stereotypes for STEM occupations were also assessed. Findings suggest that ability beliefs, whether for oneself or another, are powerful predictors of occupational interest, and gender stereotypes play a secondary role. College students were more stereotypical in their ratings of others, but they did not manifest gender differences in their own STEM self-efficacy and occupational interests. Experiences in specialized STEM courses may explain why stereotypes are applied differentially to the self and others.     

Ethnicity and Gender Stereotypes of Emotion

In three studies we investigated gender stereotypes of emotions among four ethnic groups in the U.S., using persons from these groups as informants about their own groups. European Americans’ reports of stereotypes were compared to those of African Americans (Study 1), Hispanic Americans (Study 2), and Asian Americans (Study 3). The examination of group differences was interpreted based on variations across ethnicities in norms concerning emotional expression and gender roles. Overall, gender stereotypes of emotion were evident among all ethnic groups studied, but European Americans’ gender stereotypes were the most gender differentiated. For example, European American stereotypes held that men express more pride than women do, but African Americans’ stereotypes of pride for men and women did not differ. Similarly, whereas among European Americans, women were stereotyped to express much more love than men do, the gender difference was smaller among Hispanic Americans and Asian Americans. These different norms may pose challenges for inter-cultural interactions, and they point to the importance of considering both gender and ethnicity simultaneously in the study of emotions.     

Monitoring of learning for emotional faces: how do fine-grained categories of emotion influence participants’ judgments of learning and beliefs about memory?

Researchers have evaluated how broad categories of emotion (i.e. positive and negative) influence judgments of learning (JOLs) relative to neutral items. Specifically, JOLs are typically higher for emotional relative to neutral items. The novel goal of the present research was to evaluate JOLs for fine-grained categories of emotion. Participants studied faces with afraid, angry, sad, or neutral expressions (Experiment 1) and with afraid, angry, or sad expressions (Experiment 2). Participants identified the expressed emotion, made a JOL for each, and completed a recognition test. JOLs were higher for the emotional relative to neutral expressions. However, JOLs were insensitive to the categories of negative emotion. Using a survey design in Experiment 3, participants demonstrated idiosyncratic beliefs about emotion. Some people believed the fine-grained emotions were equally memorable, whereas others believed a specific emotion (e.g. anger) was most memorable. Thus, beliefs about emotion are nuanced, which has important implications for JOL theory.     

Metacognition of emotional face recognition

While humans are adept at recognizing emotional states conveyed by facial expressions, the current literature suggests that they lack accurate metacognitions about their performance in this domain. This finding comes from global trait-based questionnaires that assess the extent to which an individual perceives him or herself as empathic, as compared to other people. Those who rate themselves as empathically accurate are no better than others at recognizing emotions. Metacognition of emotion recognition can also be assessed using relative measures that evaluate how well a person thinks s/he has understood the emotion in a particular facial display as compared to other displays. While this is the most common method of metacognitive assessment of people's judgments of learning or their feelings of knowing, this kind of metacognition--"relative meta-accuracy"--has not been studied within the domain of emotion. As well as asking for global metacognitive judgments, we asked people to provide relative, trial-by-trial prospective and retrospective judgments concerning whether they would be right or wrong in recognizing the expressions conveyed in particular facial displays. Our question was: Do people know when they will be correct in knowing what expression is conveyed, and do they know when they do not know? Although we, like others, found that global meta-accuracy was unpredictive of performance, relative meta-accuracy, given by the correlation between participants' trial-by-trial metacognitive judgments and performance on each item, were highly accurate both on the Mind in the Eyes task (Experiment 1) and on the Ekman Emotional Expression Multimorph task (in Experiment 2).     

Facial expressions can inhibit the activation of gender stereotypes

ABSTRACT

Using faces as the priming stimuli, the present study explored the influence of facial expressions on the activation of gender stereotypes using a lexical decision paradigm. Experiment 1 explored the activation of gender stereotypes when the facial primes contained only gender information. The results showed that gender stereotypes were activated. In Experiment 2, the facial primes contained both gender category and expression information. The results indicated that gender stereotypes were not activated. Experiment 3 required the participants to make emotion, gender, or impression decisions concerning the facial primes before the lexical decision task. The results showed that gender stereotypes were not activated in emotion and impression decisions conditions, whereas stereotypes were activated in gender decisions condition. These finding suggest that facial expressions can inhibit automatic activation of gender stereotypes, unless the perceivers perform gender categorization processing to prime faces intentionally.     

不确定性、情绪对公正判断的影响

本研究以不确定管理模型为理论来源,采用实验法探讨了公正判断中的情绪效应。实验1采用2（两种情绪状态：愉快/愤怒）×4（四种结果：比自己多/一样多/比自己少/不知道）被试间设计。实验2采用2（两种情绪状态：愉快/愤怒）×3（三种程序：有发言权/外显无发言权/无发言权信息）被试间设计。分别考察了分配公正与程序公正判断中的情绪影响。结果发现：不确定性调节了情绪与公平判断之间的关系。当用于公平判断的外部信息不明确时,情绪充当了公平判断的线索。     

Gender stereotypes and assumptions about expertise in transactive memory

This experiment investigated how people use gender stereotypes to infer the relative knowledge of interdependent others, and how those assumptions can affect the division of knowledge responsibilities in transactive memory systems. Participants indicated their expertise relative to the average male and female undergraduate student on six knowledge categories. Two of these were consistent with female stereotypes (soap operas and cosmetics), two were consistent with male stereotypes (sports and cars), and two were neutral (geography and history). Everyone then worked on a collective memorization task with an assumed partner. The design was a 2 × 2 factorial, with the participants’ gender and their assumed partners’ gender (same or different as the participant’s) as factors. The results showed that both male and female participants shared similar gender stereotypes across knowledge domains. Participants with opposite-sex partners were more likely to assign categories based on gender stereotypes than were participants with same-sex partners. As a result, participants with opposite-sex partners learned more information in categories consistent with those stereotypes. These findings suggest that transactive memory systems may perpetuate gender stereotypes.     

Facial identity and emotional expression as predictors during economic decisions

Two sources of information most relevant to guide social decision making are the cooperative tendencies associated with different people and their facial emotional displays. This electrophysiological experiment aimed to study how the use of personal identity and emotional expressions as cues impacts different stages of face processing and their potential isolated or interactive processing. Participants played a modified trust game with 8 different alleged partners, and in separate blocks either the identity or the emotions carried information regarding potential trial outcomes (win or loss). Behaviorally, participants were faster to make decisions based on identity compared to emotional expressions. Also, ignored (nonpredictive) emotions interfered with decisions based on identity in trials where these sources of information conflicted. Electrophysiological results showed that expectations based on emotions modulated processing earlier in time than those based on identity. Whereas emotion modulated the central N1 and VPP potentials, identity judgments heightened the amplitude of the N2 and P3b. In addition, the conflict that ignored emotions generated was reflected on the N170 and P3b potentials. Overall, our results indicate that using identity or emotional cues to predict cooperation tendencies recruits dissociable neural circuits from an early point in time, and that both sources of information generate early and late interactive patterns.     

The value-congruence model of memory for emotional experiences: an explanation for cultural differences in emotional self-reports

In 3 studies, the authors found support for the value-congruence model that accounts for cultural variations in memory for emotional experiences. In Study 1, the authors found that in the made-in-the-U.S. scenario condition, European Americans were more accurate than were Asian Americans in their retrospective frequency judgments of emotions. However, in the made-in-Japan scenario condition, European Americans were less accurate than were Asian Americans. In Study 2, the authors demonstrated that value orientation mediates the CulturexType of Event congruence effect. In Study 3 (a daily event sampling study), the authors showed that the congruence effect was explained by the importance of parental approval. In sum, emotional events congruent with personal values remain in memory longer and influence retrospective frequency judgments of emotion more than do incongruent events.