Dilemmatics in Public Sector Assessment: A Framework for Developing and Evaluating Selection Systems

This research examined the effects of a break (incubation) on solutions to a geometric insight problem. Experiment 1 showed that subjects receiving an analogical hint during incubation obtained more solutions than continuously working controls. Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that incubation effects are due to the total time (including intermittant problem solving during incubation) spent on a problem. Subjects given relaxation instructions and no task during a problem-solving break were more successful than those who worked continuously for 20 min or were given demanding mental work as an intervening task. Self-report data supported the explanation that incubation effects are a result of covert effort and that the effectiveness of an analogical hint depends on the solver's ability to relate it to the problem.     

The Experience of Insight Follows Incubation in the Compound Remote Associates Task

The phenomenon of insight is frequently characterized by the experience of a sudden and certain solution. Anecdotal accounts suggest that insight frequently occurs after the problem solver has taken some time away from the problem (i.e., incubation). However, the mechanism by which incubation may facilitate insight problem‐solving remains unclear. Here, we used compound remote associates problems to explore the likely mechanisms by which incubation may facilitate problem‐solving. First, we manipulated problem fixation to explore whether forgetting can explain incubation effects. Second, leveraging previous work linking the experience of insight to unconscious semantic integration, we asked participants to report their experience of insight after each problem solution, including problems solved after a period of distracted incubation. We hypothesized that incubation was not principally important for forgetting but rather frequently causes a shift to a more unconscious semantic integration strategy. Consistent with this we found that initial problem fixation did not predict the improvement in problem‐solving after incubation and that participants were more likely to report insight on problems solved after incubation. Our findings suggest that incubation may facilitate insight problem‐solving leading to a mind‐set shift to a more unconscious problem‐solving strategy involving semantic integration.     

My Ordinary Anti-Sceptical Beliefs Are Not Insensitive

An orthodox sceptical hypothesis claims that one’s belief that “I am not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)” (or any other ordinary anti-sceptical belief) is insensitive. A form of sensitivity-based scepticism, can thus be constructed by combining this orthodox hypothesis with the sensitivity principle and the closure principle. Unlike traditional solutions to the sensitivity-based sceptical problem, this paper will propose a new solution—one which does not reject either closure or sensitivity. Instead, I argue that sceptics’ assumption that one’s ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs are insensitive will give rise to self-contradiction. The orthodox sceptical hypothesis is thus revealed to be incoherent and arbitrary. Given that there is no coherent reason to presuppose our ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs to be insensitive, the argument for sensitivity-based scepticism can thus be blocked at a lower epistemological cost.     

Hans Jonas's diagnosis of nihilism: The case of Heidegger

This paper is concerned with the implications of Husserl's phenomenological reformulation of the problem of error. Following Husserl, I argue that the phenomenon of error should not be understood as the accidental failure of a fully constituted cogito, but that it is itself constitutive of the cogito's formation. I thus show that the phenomenon of error plays a crucial role in our self-understanding as unified subjects of experience. In order to unpack this 'hermeneutical function' of error, I focus on three inter-related notions which are recurrently used by Husserl to refer to the central aspects of error apprehension: explosion (Explosion), replacement (Ersatz), and cancellation (Durchstreichung). My discussion, however, does not remain committed to the Husserlian framework as such. This is not only because Husserl's notion of explosion proves itself untenable, but because the Husserlian paradigm does not make room for a linguistic dimension intrinsic, in my view, to the realization of error. Hence, I proceed by reconstructing the Husserlian terms as tropes of realization, as narratological devices in the 'language game' of error. I argue that these hermeneutical devices are necessary for maintaining what Nietzsche would call the self's 'semblance of unity'. The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis for our thought and our consciousness in general? (Nietzsche, The Will to Power #490)     

The Role of an Incubation Period in Creative Problem Solving

ABSTRACT

This experimental study tested the spreading-activation hypothesis that an incubation period helps to sensitize problem solvers to relevant concepts. The study also tested the selective forgetting hypothesis that an incubation period helps to desensitize problem solvers to irrelevant concepts. Chinese Chess GO players, 28 experts and 29 novices, solved 18 remote association tasks (RAT) and lexical decision tasks (LDTs) under immediate, rest, and incubation conditions. After each RAT, a set of LDTs incorporating the RAT solution and the irrelevant concept were presented, either immediately, or after a 2-min delay, or after a 2-min delay filled with incubation tasks. The findings of the study support the spreading activation hypothesis and suggest that spreading activation occurs only in a fixated mind. No support was found for the selective forgetting hypothesis.     

The politics of mental illness

What is needed today is a biologically grounded explanation of behavior, one that moves beyond the so‐called mind‐body problem. Yet no solution will be found by philosophers who refuse to learn about how brains and bodies work, or by neuroscientists pursuing experimental research based on outmoded or blatantly anti‐biological theories. Churchland's book proposes a solution: to come by a unified theory of the mind‐brain philosophers have to work together with neuroscientists. Yet Churchland's vision of a unified theory is based on an assumption that, while widely held, may not adequately reflect brain functioning in the production of behavior, namely, the assumption that brain processes represent. The present paper proposes an alternative view, suggesting that patterns of neural activity do not ‘represent’ anything, that brains do not ‘read’ or ‘transform’ representations, and that brains do not require representations to produce goal‐directed behavior. Representations are replaced by self‐organizing neural processes that achieve a certain end‐state of interaction between the organism and its environment in a flexible and adaptive manner. Some of the implications of this view for neuroscientific research and the philosophy of mind are outlined.     

Off‐Task Social Breaks and Group Creativity

This study investigates the effect of off‐task breaks, where individuals engage in a collective off‐task activity, on group creativity. Using an experimental method comprising 36 groups of 5 individuals, the relationships between different types of off‐task group break and performance in creative tasks post‐break are explored. When compared to the no‐break case, it is seen that off‐task breaks, in which all individuals participate in the group activity, lead to more original ideas being generated post‐break. On the other hand, individual incubation breaks and self‐organizing group breaks, lead to lower levels of post‐break idea originality when compared with the no‐break case. This research thus highlights the positive benefits of off‐task breaks involving full member participation, on the creative process in groups.     

Problem Variables that Promote Incubation Effects

Three studies sought to determine whether incubation effects could be reliably generated in a problem‐solving task. Experimental variables manipulated were the duration of the interval between two problem‐solving opportunities and the activity performed by the problem solvers during the interval. A multi‐solution anagram task was used which required problem solvers to generate five‐letter words from the letters in a ten‐letter “starter” word until they could produce no more words. After a break (the incubation period) the problem solvers returned to the anagram task anew. Some participants also engaged in an activity related to the anagram task during the break which was expected to prime potential solutions that would emerge during the second problem‐solving attempt. In all conditions problem solvers were able to generate new responses after the break, thus demonstrating a reliable incubation effect. The optimal incubation period was between 15 and 30 min long. The priming task increased the number of solutions to the anagram task on the second attempt, suggesting that exposure to solution ideas during the incubation period may facilitate an incubation effect during problem solving.     

Why does a mirror image look left-right reversed? A hypothesis of multiple processes

This paper proposes a solution to the mirror reversal problem: Why does a mirror reverse left and right but not up and down? The paper first reviews past hypotheses and shows that none of them has succeeded in explaining all the related phenomena. It then proposes a multiprocess hypothesis based on the insight that what is called a mirror reversal is actually composed of three different types of reversal: The Type I reversal is produced by the discrepancy between an orientational framework that is aligned with a viewer’s body and the one that is assumed in the viewer’s mirror image; the Type II reversal is produced by the discrepancy between the mental representation of an object and its mirror image; and the Type III reversal is produced by a mirror’s optical transformation. The proposed hypothesis is shown to provide reasonable accounts for all the related phenomena disputed in the past literature.     

Metaphors and creative thinking

This study examined how working memory plays different roles in open-ended versus closed-ended creative problem-solving processes, as represented by divergent thinking tests and insight problem-solving tasks. With respect to the analysis of different task demands and the framework of dual-process theories, the hypothesis was that the idea generation in a divergent thinking test relies more on associative, effortless system 1 processing, but insight problem solving requires rule-based, resource-limited system 2 processing, in addition to system 1 processing. Since system 1 was suggested to be more active in resource deprivation conditions, Experiment 1 adopted the dual-task paradigm, which increased participants' working memory load. The results showed that divergent thinking performance was enhanced and insight problem-solving performance was hindered. Experiment 2 using the individual differences approach found that individuals' working memory capacity correlated with insight problem solving but not with divergent thinking performance, indicating a possible involvement of system 2 processing in insight problem solving. These findings suggested that open-ended and closed-ended creative problem solving involve different processes and helped to clarify some past inconsistencies when considering the relationship of factors with creativity.     

A Philosophical Audacity: Barth's Notion of Experience between Neo‐Kantianism and Nietzsche

This article addresses Barth's dialectical notion of experience in the 1920s. I argue that the theoretical problem raised by recent studies on Barth's notion of experience after his break with liberalism (i.e. the apparent inconsistency between Barth's move towards an increasingly neo‐Kantian understanding of experience and his emphasis on the existential and psychological dimensions of experience) can be solved by the hypothesis of a Nietzschean influence on Barth's epistemology in the 1920s. I defend not only the historical plausibility but also the conceptual fecundity of such a hypothesis, which casts a new light on Barth's relation to philosophy and the notion of experience, and lays the basis for a consistent Barthian theology of experience.     

Using Reliability Generalization Methods to Explore Measurement Error: An Illustration Using the MMPI–2 PSY–5 Scales

This study empirically tested Bem's (1974) assumption that the BSRI Masculinity and Femininity scales measure sex-typed standards of desirable behavior for men and women in American society. The adequacy of items in the two scales was evaluated by Bem's (1974) criteria using two types of desirability and stereotype ratings. Results obtained in all the experimental conditions except one involving Bem's desirability instructions and Bem's rating scale did not support the tested assumption. Implications of these results for revising the BSRI scales were discussed.     

The Aha! moment: Is insight a different form of problem solving?

In everyday life, we mainly solve problems with a conscious solution search (non-insight). However, sometimes a perplexing problem is resolved by a quantum leap in understanding. This phenomenon is known as the Aha! experience (insight). Although insight has a distinct phenomenological and behavioral signature, its driving mechanism remains debated. Weisberg (2015) proposed an integrated theory of insight arguing that insight, like non-insight, mainly depends on conscious, cognitive operations with restructuring as a distinguishing feature of insight. However, only if those operations lead to an impasse, insight is achieved through unconscious processes. We assessed some of the premises of this theory by asking participants (N = 42) to solve 70 word puzzles (CRAT) that can either be solved with insight or non-insight. For each puzzle, participants indicated word puzzle difficulty, solution confidence, solution suddenness, and the experiences of impasse and restructuring. As expected, participants reported higher suddenness of and confidence in insight solutions than non-insightful ones. Surprisingly, we could not corroborate the otherwise consistently reported higher solution accuracy and faster solution speed for insight. Crucially, as suggested by the integrated theory of insight, impasse was not a prerequisite for insight to occur. Although restructuring, indeed, preceded insight solutions more often, it seemed a more general problem-solving skill also applied for non-insight solutions. Moreover, early on, participants reported an increased experience of problem difficulty for puzzles later solved with insight. This ability to report on the solution search of insight demonstrates that, as proposed by the theory, insight involves conscious, cognitive operations.     

When the Solution Is on the Doorstep: Better Solving Performance,but Diminished Aha! Experience for Chess Experts on the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem

Insight problems are difficult because the initially activated knowledge hinders successful solving. The crucial information needed for a solution is often so far removed that gaining access to it through restructuring leads to the subjective experience of “Aha!”. Although this assumption is shared by most insight theories, there is little empirical evidence for the connection between the necessity of restructuring an incorrect problem representation and the Aha! experience. Here, we demonstrate a rare case where previous knowledge facilitates the solving of insight problems but reduces the accompanying Aha! experience. Chess players were more successful than non‐chess players at solving the mutilated checkerboard insight problem, which requires retrieval of chess‐related information about the color of the squares. Their success came at a price, since they reported a diminished Aha! experience compared to controls. Chess players’ problem‐solving ability was confined to that particular problem, since they struggled to a similar degree to non‐chess players to solve another insight problem (the eight‐coin problem), which does not require chess‐related information for a solution. Here, chess players and non‐chess players experienced the same degree of insight.     

汉语字谜原型激活中的情绪促进效应

采用先学习原型字谜、接着进行正负情绪诱导、然后再进行靶字谜测验的三阶段实验设计,探讨了不同诱发情绪状态对汉语字谜原型激活的影响。结果发现,在本实验条件下：难度高的靶字谜的测试中没有发现正负诱发情绪状态对汉语字谜原型激活的不同影响;但是,在难度中等的靶字谜的测试中,诱发的正面情绪状态对汉语字谜原型激活有显著促进作用,而诱发的负面情绪状态与控制组相比对汉语字谜原型激活没有显著影响。性别变量在两种实验条件下都没有显著主效应     

THE REGRESS-PROBLEM: A REPLY TO VERMAZEN

This paper is intended to meet some objections that Vermazen has raised about the treatment of the regress-problem in the author's book on the philosophy of action. This problem is shown to involve a skeptical claim about the very existence of actions as distinct from happenings. It is argued, against Vermazen's contention, that only one version of the problem is at work in that book and that, while Danto's basic actions, McCann's volitions and O'Shaughnessy's and Hornsby's tryings do not solve, after analysis, that version of the problem, the author's proposal does in fact provide a solution to it.     

The Aspect‐Perception Passages: A Critical Investigation of Köhler's Isomorphism Principle1

In this paper I argue that Wittgenstein's aim in the aspect‐perception passages is to critically evaluate a specific hypothesis. The target hypothesis in these passages is the Gestalt psychologist Köhler's “isomorphism principle.” According to this principle, there are neural correlates of conscious perceptual experience, and these neural correlates determine the content of our perceptual experiences. Wittgenstein's argument against the isomorphism principle comprises two steps. First, he diffuses the substantiveness of the principle by undermining an important assumption that underpins this principle, namely, that there is a unitary concept of seeing. Next, Wittgenstein argues that some forms of aspect‐perception involve recognitional capacities, the exercise of which is normatively constrained. The normative nature of aspect‐perceiving plays a pivotal role in Wittgenstein's rejection of the isomorphism principle. Aside from the clear exegetical benefits gained from identifying the target hypothesis in the aspect‐perception passages as the isomorphism principle, construing the remarks in the way suggested here is also philosophically interesting in its own right: it shows Wittgenstein engaging directly in the mind–body problem, construed as the problem of intentionality.     

Divine Freedom and Free Will Defenses

This paper considers a problem that arises for free will defenses when considering the nature of God's own will. If God is perfectly good and performs praiseworthy actions, but is unable to do evil, then why must humans have the ability to do evil in order to perform such actions? This problem has been addressed by Theodore Guleserian, but at the expense of denying God's essential goodness. I examine and critique his argument and provide a solution to the initial problem that does not require abandoning God's essential goodness.     

Investigating the effect of mental set on insight problem solving

Mental set is the tendency to solve certain problems in a fixed way based on previous solutions to similar problems. The moment of insight occurs when a problem cannot be solved using solution methods suggested by prior experience and the problem solver suddenly realizes that the solution requires different solution methods. Mental set and insight have often been linked together and yet no attempt thus far has systematically examined the interplay between the two. Three experiments are presented that examine the extent to which sets of noninsight and insight problems affect the subsequent solutions of insight test problems. The results indicate a subtle interplay between mental set and insight: when the set involves noninsight problems, no mental set effects are shown for the insight test problems, yet when the set involves insight problems, both facilitation and inhibition can be seen depending on the type of insight problem presented in the set. A two process model is detailed to explain these findings that combines the representational change mechanism with that of proceduralization.