Review

I argue in this paper that anyone who accepts the ontology of scientific realism can only accept a pragmatic theory of truth, i.e., a theory on which truth is what it is epistemically right to believe. But the combination of realism with such a theory of truth is a form of internal realism; therefore, a scientific realist should be an internal realist. The strategy of the paper is to argue that there is no adequate semantic or correspondence theory of truth compatible with a realist ontology, that a redundancy theory cannot account for the value of truth, and that the only kind of truth theory which can account for the value of truth, and is compatible with a realist ontology, is a pragmatic theory. The kind of truth theory I wish to defend is objective and naturalistic, and the ontology is realistic. My position is, therefore, one of objective, naturalistic realism.     

Realism and social structure

Social constructionism is often considered a form of anti-realism. But in contemporary feminist philosophy, an increasing number of philosophers defend views that are well-described as both realist and social constructionist. In this paper, I use the work of Sally Haslanger as an example of realist social constructionism. I argue: (i) that Haslanger is best interpreted as defending metaphysical realism about social structures; (ii) that this type of metaphysical realism about the social world presents challenges to some popular ways of understanding metaphysical realism.     

Learning to visually perceive the relative mass of colliding balls in globally and locally constrained task ecologies

Novice observers differ from each other in the kinematic variables they use for the perception of kinetic properties, but they converge on more useful variables after practice with feedback. The colliding-balls paradigm was used to investigate how the convergence depends on the relations between the candidate variables and the to-be-perceived property, relative mass. Experiment 1 showed that observers do not change in the variables they use if the variables with which they start allow accurate performance. Experiment 2 showed that, at least for some observers, convergence can be facilitated by reducing the correlations between commonly used nonspecifying variables and relative mass but not by keeping those variables constant. Experiments 3a and 3b further demonstrated that observers learn not to rely on a particular nonspecifying variable if the correlation between that variable and relative mass is reduced.     

On Devitt’s Defence of Realism

In this paper I question the view that realism must delineate the basic ontological furniture of the world rather than giving arguments in semantic or epistemic terms for the existence of a mind-independent world. I call this view of stating and defending realism the Ontological Defence of Realism (or ODR) and take Devitt’s account of realism as a paradigmatic case of ODR. I argue that ODR cannot block ‘verificationist antirealism’ because the specific (physical) nature of what exists is not enough to secure the mind-independence of what exists and, additionally, every element purported to achieve this, it compromises seriously the idea that realism is primarily an ontological issue. I also stress that ODR is in tension with a plausible realist insight namely the priority of the world over our theorizing. Because of this tension ODR weakens realism in several domains with no good reason. Specifically, I argue that in these domains ODR faces a dilemma: either to reject realism or to take realism to be dependent on a reductive account violating the realist insight. My point is that we should keep realism and ontology distinct and that compliance with the realist insight initiates a better strategy for the defence of realism. I address three possible objections thereby further clarifying my point. I conclude by presenting my view about the relation between ontology and realism.     

LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

A main thread of the debate over mathematical realism has come down to whether mathematics does explanatory work of its own in some of our best scientific explanations of empirical facts. Realists argue that it does; anti-realists argue that it doesn't. Part of this debate depends on how mathematics might be able to do explanatory work in an explanation. Everyone agrees that it's not enough that there merely be some mathematics in the explanation. Anti-realists claim there is nothing mathematics can do to make an explanation mathematical; realists think something can be done, but they are not clear about what that something is.

I argue that many of the examples of mathematical explanations of empirical facts in the literature can be accounted for in terms of Jackson and Pettit's [1990] notion of program explanation, and that mathematical realists can use the notion of program explanation to support their realism. This is exactly what has happened in a recent thread of the debate over moral realism (in this journal). I explain how the two debates are analogous and how moves that have been made in the moral realism debate can be made in the mathematical realism debate. However, I conclude that one can be a mathematical realist without having to be a moral realist.     

Lewisian Realism: Methodology,Epistemology, and Circularity

In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall victim to the objection I lay against Lewis.     

Individual differences and the use of nonspecifying variables in learning to perceive distance and size: Comments on McConnell, Muchisky, and Bingham (1998)

McConnell, Muchisky, and Bingham (1998) showed that observers are able to judge the distance and size of falling, rolling, and swinging balls and that performance improves after practice with feedback. They concluded that observers use information that specifies the spatial scales of the different event types—namely, event duration in combination with event-specific constants. The improvement was interpreted as the calibration of the event-specific constants. We argue that their analyses should have considered the use of optical variables that do not specify the to-be-perceived metrics and individual differences in variable use. Furthermore, we propose convergence on the more useful variables as an alternative explanation for the observed improvement. The viability of these arguments is demonstrated with an experiment in which participants are trained with feedback to judge the distance and size of freely falling balls.     

What is the Manifestation Argument?

I consider the well known "manifestation challenge" to semantic realism propounded by Michael Dummett, and further developed by Crispin Wright and Bob Hale. I distinguish between strong and weak versions of the challenge, and show that anti–realists effectively concede that realism can meet the strong version. I then argue that the weak version is unmotivated. Building on work by John McDowell and Peter Strawson, and responding to criticisms from Wright, I argue further that the semantic realist can meet even the weak version. It emerges, inter alia , that there are some serious ambiguities in the standard anti–realist characterisations of semantic realism.     

The effect of semantic ambiguity on reading aloud: A twist in the tale

Despite numerous studies investigating whether semantic representations are involved in the process of reading aloud, the issue remains controversial. While some studies report significant effects of semantic variables on this task (e.g., Fera, Joordens, Balota, Ferraro, & Besner, 1992; Strain, Patterson, & Seidenberg, 1995), other studies have highlighted possible problems with these studies (e.g., Borowsky & Masson, 1996; Monaghan & Ellis, 2002). The experiments reported here use semantic ambiguity as a marker for semantic involvement and confirm that semantic representations can indeed affect reading aloud, but that the size of semantic effects is influenced by the consistency of the words and the speed with which participants respond.     

The Problem of Deep Competitors and the Pursuit of Epistemically Utopian Truths

According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis: Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two are axiological (that is, pertaining to the claim that science seeks truth). I also flag an additional axiological “challenge,” that of how one might justify the pursuit of a primary aim, such as truth. Bracketing epistemic realism, I argue that the axiological threats can be addressed by embracing a refined realist axiological hypothesis, one that specifies a specific subclass of true claims sought in science. And after identifying three potential responses to the axiological “challenge,” I contend that, while standard axiological realism appears to lack the resources required to utilize any of the responses, the refined realist axiology I embrace is well suited to each.     

From Standard Scientific Realism and Structural Realism to Best Current Theory Realism

I defend a realist commitment to the truth of our most empirically successful current scientific theories—on the ground that it provides the best explanation of their success and the success of their falsified predecessors. I argue that this Best Current Theory Realism (BCTR) is superior to preservative realism (PR) and the structural realism (SR). I show that PR and SR rest on the implausible assumption that the success of outdated theories requires the realist to hold that these theories possessed truthful components. PR is undone by the fact that past theories succeeded even though their ontological claims about unobservables are false. SR backpeddles to argue that the realist is only committed to the truth about the structure of relations implied by the outdated theory, in order to explain its success. I argue that the structural component of theories is too bare-bones thin to explain the predictive/explanatory success of outdated theories. I conclude that BCTR can meet these objections to PR and SR, and also overcome the pessimistic meta-induction.     

Brain signals do not demonstrate unconscious decision making: An interpretation based on graded conscious awareness

Neuroscientific studies have shown that brain activity correlated with a decision to move can be observed before a person reports being consciously aware of having made that decision (e.g., Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). Given that a later event (i.e., conscious awareness) cannot cause an earlier one (i.e., decision-related brain activity), such results have been interpreted as evidence that decisions are made unconsciously (e.g., Libet, 1985). We argue that this interpretation depends upon an all-or-none view of consciousness, and we offer an alternative interpretation of the early decision-related brain activity based on models in which conscious awareness of the decision to move develops gradually up to the level of a reporting criterion. Under this interpretation, the early brain activity reflects sub-criterion levels of awareness rather than complete absence of awareness and thus does not suggest that decisions are made unconsciously.     

On the Relationship between Truth and Liberal Politics

This paper examines the relationship between truth and liberal politics via the work of Bernard Williams and Richard Rorty. I argue that Williams is right to think that there are positive relations between truth, specifically a realist understanding of truth, and liberal politics that Rorty's abandonment of the realist vocabulary of truth undermines. At the heart of this concern is the worry that abandoning the realist vocabulary opens up the possibility that the standards of justification for our true beliefs can be manipulated by those with the power to do so in order to further their own political ends. The political benefit of realism is that it fixes the standards of justification and makes them immune to manipulation by the use of power. However, I suggest that there is a form of realism available that Rorty can accept which would deliver the political benefits of the realist vocabulary without requiring him to accept the thick realist metaphysics that he wants to avoid. My conclusion is that there is a positive and important relationship between truth and liberal politics, a relationship that can be sustained without any necessary commitment to realist metaphysics.     

Syntactic processing in the human brain: what we know, what we don't know, and a suggestion for how to proceed

For every claim in the neuroimaging literature about a particular brain region supporting syntactic processing, there exist other claims implicating the target region in different linguistic processes, and, in many cases, in non-linguistic cognitive processes (e.g., Blumstein, 2009). We argue that traditional group analysis methods in neuroimaging may obscure functional specificity because of inter-subject anatomical variability (Fedorenko & Kanwisher, 2009). In Fedorenko, Hsieh, Nieto-Castanon, Whitfield-Gabrieli, and Kanwisher (2010) we presented a functional localizer that allows quick and reliable identification of key language-sensitive regions in each individual brain. This approach enables pooling data from corresponding functional regions across subjects rather than from the same locations in stereotaxic space that may differ functionally due to inter-subject anatomical variability. In the current paper we demonstrate that the individual-subjects functional localization approach is superior to the traditional methods in its ability to distinguish among conditions in a brain region’s response. This ability is at the core of all neuroimaging research and is critical for answering questions of functional specialization (e.g., does a brain region specialize for processing syntactic aspects of the linguistic signal), which is in turn essential for making inferences about the precise computations conducted in each brain region. Based on our results, we argue that supplementing existing methods with an individual-subjects functional localization approach may lead to a clearer picture of the neural basis of syntactic processing, as it has in some other domains, such as high-level vision (e.g., Kanwisher, 2010) and social cognition (e.g., Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003).     

When what you say about others says something about you: Language abstraction and inferences about describers’ attitudes and goals

According to the linguistic category model ( [Semin and Fiedler, 1988] and [Semin and Fiedler, 1991]), a person’s behavior can be described at varying levels of abstraction from concrete (e.g., “Lisa slaps Ann”) to abstract (e.g., “Lisa is aggressive”). Research has shown that language abstraction conveys information about the person whose behavior is described (Wigboldus, Semin, & Spears, 2000). However to date, little research has examined the information that language abstraction may convey about describers themselves. In this paper, we report three experiments demonstrating that describers who use relatively abstract language to describe others’ behaviors are perceived to have biased attitudes and motives compared with those describers who use more concrete language.     

What constrains grammatical gender effects on semantic judgements? Evidence from Portuguese

Four studies investigated whether grammatical gender biases the semantic judgements of Portuguese speakers, relative to speakers of English. Some research reports that grammatical gender has a pervasive influence on speakers' cognitive representations (e.g., Boroditsky, Schmidt, & Philips, 2003; Sera, Elieff, Forbes, Burch, & Rodriguez, 2002). Others argue that effects of grammar arise through linguistic processing (e.g., Vigliocco, Vinson, Paganelli, & Dworzynski, 2005) and are restricted to animate categories for which gender is a pertinent feature. The present results found effects of gender in Portuguese speakers' judgements of inanimate objects, but only when gender was task relevant and/or when the stimuli were words, rather than pictures. These findings support the view that gender effects on cognitive judgements arise as a function of linguistic processing and/or task demands, rather than directly influencing conceptual or semantic representations.     

Reinstatement of odour context cues veridical memories but not false memories

ABSTRACT

The sense of smell has made a recent return to the forefront of research on episodic memory. Odour context cues can reactivate recently encoded memories during sleep-dependent memory consolidation [e.g., Rasch, B., Buchel, C., Gais, S., & Born, J. (2007). Odor cues during slow-wave sleep prompt declarative memory consolidation. Science, 315, 1426–1429], and reinstating the odour experienced during encoding at test results in superior recall and recognition [e.g., Isarida, T., Sakai, T., Kubota, T., Koga, M., Katayama, Y., & Isarida, T. K. (2014). Odor-context effects in free recall after a short retention interval: A new methodology for controlling adaptation. Memory & Cognition, 42, 421–433]. However, whether the impact of odour cues is restricted to the specific memories studied in the presence of the odour, or whether reinstating the odour also cues unstudied memories that are semantically related to the studied memories (i.e., false memories) is unknown. We used the Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm to quantify the impact of odour cues on both veridical memory and false memory. Reinstating the odour presented during the study of the DRM word lists at the test phase resulted in better free recall of the studied words, but had no statistically significant impact on the number of false memories produced. We argue that odour cues influence recall of the memories they co-occurred with during study but potentially not semantically related memories.     

Unitization,similarity, and overt attention in categorization and exposure

Unitization, the creation of new stimulus features by the fusion of preexisting features, is one of the hypothesized processes of perceptual learning (Goldstone Annual Review of Psychology, 49:585–612, 1998). Some argue that unitization occurs to the extent that it is required for successful task performance (e.g., Shiffrin & Lightfoot, 1997), while others argue that unitization is largely independent of functionality (e.g., McLaren & Mackintosh Animal Learning & Behavior, 30:177–200, 2000). Across three experiments, employing supervised category learning and unsupervised exposure, we investigated three predictions of the McLaren and Mackintosh (Animal Learning & Behavior, 30:177–200, 2000) model: (1) Unitization is accompanied by an initial increase in the subjective similarity of stimuli sharing a unitized component; (2) unitization of a configuration occurs through exposure to its components, even when the task does not require it; (3) as unitization approaches completion, salience of the unitized component may be reduced. Our data supported these predictions. We also found that unitization is associated with increases in overt attention to the unitized component, as measured through eye tracking.     

Exploring Genetic Counseling Communication Patterns: The Role of Teaching and Counseling Approaches

The educational and counseling models are often touted as the two primary professional approaches to genetic counseling practice. Yet, research has not been conducted to examine how these approaches are used in practice. In the present study, we conducted quantitative communication analyses of BRCA1 genetic counseling sessions. We measured communication variables that represent content (e.g., a biomedical focus) and process (e.g., passive listening) to explore whether genetic counselor approaches are consistent with prevailing professional models. The Roter Interaction Analysis System (RIAS) was used to code 167 pre-test genetic counseling sessions of members of a large kindred with an identified BRCA1 mutation. Three experienced genetic counselors conducted the sessions. Creating composite categories from the RIAS codes, we found the sessions to be largely educational in nature with the counselors and clients devoting the majority of their dialogue to providing biomedical information (62 and 40%, respectively). We used cluster analytic techniques, entering the composite communication variables and identified four patterns of session communication: Client-focused psychosocial, biomedical question and answer, counselor-driven psychosocial, and client-focused biomedical. Moreover, we found that the counselors had unique styles in which they combined the use of education and counseling approaches. We discuss the importance of understanding the variation in counselor communication to advance the field and expand prevailing assumptions.     

Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement

Wright argues that if there are moral disagreements that cannot be attributed to inferential error, ignorance of relevant data or some similar form of deficiency (i.e., what I call 'radical' disagreements), then moral realists are committed to the view that moral truths are evidence-transcendent. Moreover, since he thinks that this view is implausible and that moral disagreements can indeed be radical, he has suggested that we should reject realism here. I indicate how a realist can respond to this challenge, by offering two arguments to the effect that a realist might plausibly hold that moral disagreements can never be found to be radical. However, this is not so much intended to be a defence of moral realism as a critique of Wright's basic strategy, since a similar defence may be provided in support of realism about any (minimally truth-apt) discourse.