Group conversion versus group expansion as modes of change in majority and minority positions: all losses hurt but only some gains gratify

This study examined reactions to minority and majority positions that were either stable or reversed through group conversion that transformed opponents (supporters) of the minority (majority) into supporters (opponents) or through group expansion that brought new supporters (opponents) for the minority (majority) into the group. Minorities who became majorities through group expansion, compared with those who changed through group conversion, perceived their supporters and the overall group as significantly more similar to the self, and had significantly higher expectations for future positive interactions within the group. Perception of similarity with the supporters mediated the effect of the experimental conditions on perception of the overall group-self similarity. Implications of changes through conversion and expansion for the functioning of social groups are discussed.     

Candy and the brain: neural response to candy gains and losses

Incentive processing is a critical component of a host of cognitive processes, including attention, motivation, and learning. Neuroimaging studies have clarified the neural systems underlying processing of primary and secondary rewards in adults. However, current reward paradigms have hindered comparisons across these reward types as well as between age groups. To address methodological issues regarding the timing of incentive delivery (during scan vs. postscan) and the age-appropriateness of the incentive type, we utilized fMRI and a modified version of a card-guessing game (CGG), in which candy pieces delivered postscan served as the reinforcer, to investigate neural responses to incentives. Healthy young adults 22–26 years of age won and lost large and small amounts of candy on the basis of their ability to guess the number on a mystery card. BOLD activity was compared following candy gain (large/small), loss (large/small), and neutral feedback. During candy gains, adults recruited regions typically involved in response to monetary and other rewards, such as the caudate, putamen, and orbitofrontal cortex. During losses, they displayed greater deactivation in the hippocampus than in response to neutral and gain feedback. Additionally, individual-difference analyses suggested a negative relationship between reward sensitivity (assessed by the Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral Activation Scales) and the difference between high- and low-magnitude losses in the caudate and lateral orbitofrontal cortex. Also within the striatum, greater punishment sensitivity was positively related to the difference in activity following high as compared to low gains. Overall, these results show strong overlap with those from previous monetary versions of the CGG and provide a baseline for future work with developmental populations.     

Holding your place: Reactions to the prospect of status gains and losses

This paper examines individuals’ reactions to the prospect of gaining or losing status in groups. The results of three experiments provide evidence that individuals attach greater value to status when recalling the risk of status loss than when recalling the potential for status gain (Experiment 1), are willing to pay more to avoid a status loss than to achieve a status gain (Experiment 1), and put forth greater effort when striving to prevent status loss than when striving to gain status (Experiment 2). Finally, individuals who risk losing status allocate more resources toward personal status concerns (and away from group interests and potential monetary gain) than do individuals who have a chance of gaining status (Experiment 3). We discuss the implications of this research both in terms of individuals’ psychological experience of their status, as well as status attainment and maintenance concerns in groups.     

Sharing losses and sharing gains: Increased demand for fairness under adversity

There is ample experimental evidence showing that people have a strong preference for equity in wealth allocation and social interaction. Although the behavior of gain sharing and responses to (un)fairness in allocation of wealth has been extensively investigated in studies employing economic exchange games, few studies have focused on how people respond to an unfair division of loss between individuals. In this study we developed a new variant of the ultimatum game and examined the participants' reactions to (un)fairness in both gain and loss sharing. Results from three experiments showed that the rejection rates to unfair offers were generally higher in the loss than in the gain domain. Moreover, participants were inclined to associate loss with “unfair” and gain with “fair”, with stronger associations leading to higher rejection rates in the ultimatum game. Furthermore, in subjective rating, unfair offers were perceived as being more unfair in the loss than in the gain domain. These results demonstrate an increased demand for fairness under adversity and the importance of justice in liability sharing.     

Expectations,gains, and losses in the anterior cingulate cortex

The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) participates in evaluating actions and outcomes. Little is known on how action-reward values are processed in ACC and if the context in which actions are performed influences this processing. In the present article, we report ACC unit activity of monkeys performing two tasks. The first task tested whether the encoding of reward values is context dependent—that is, dependent on the size of the other rewards that are available in the current block of trials. The second task tested whether unexpected events signaling a change in reward are represented. We show that the context created by a block design (i.e., the context of possible alternative rewards) influences the encoding of reward values, even if no decision or choice is required. ACC activity encodes the relative and not absolute expected reward values. Moreover, cingulate activity signals and evaluates when reward expectations are violated by unexpected stimuli, indicating reward gains or losses.     

Perceptual identification across the life span: a dissociation of early gains and late losses

The age-correlated gains and losses in visual identification under backward pattern masking were studied in a representative sample of 226 individuals ranging from 6 to 88 years of age. Participants identified masked symbols at leisure under high and low stimulus quality and at varying Stimulus Onset Asynchronies. Performance increased from childhood to early adulthood and then decreased, describing the common inverted U-shaped function. However, measures of general processing speed accounted for the gains in childhood and adolescence but not for losses in older age. This asymmetry between child development and aging is inconsistent with general-factor lifespan theories of cognitive development and suggests that specific mechanisms underlying visual identification during child development and aging are different.     

Beyond gains and losses: the effect of need on risky choice in framed decisions

Substantial evidence suggests people are risk-averse when making decisions described in terms of gains and risk-prone when making decisions described in terms of losses, a phenomenon known as the framing effect. Little research, however, has examined whether framing effects are a product of normative risk-sensitive cognitive processes. In 5 experiments, it is demonstrated that framing effects in the Asian disease problem can be explained by risk-sensitivity theory, which predicts that decision makers adjust risk acceptance on the basis of minimal acceptable thresholds, or need. Both explicit and self-determined need requirements eliminated framing effects and affected risk acceptance consistent with risk-sensitivity theory. Furthermore, negative language choice in loss frames conferred the perception of high need and led to the construction of higher minimal acceptable thresholds. The results of this study suggest that risk-sensitivity theory provides a normative rationale for framing effects based on sensitivity to minimal acceptable thresholds, or needs.     

Neural correlates of adaptive decision making for risky gains and losses

Do decisions about potential gains and potential losses require different neural structures for advantageous choices? In a lesion study, we used a new measure of adaptive decision making under risk to examine whether damage to neural structures subserving emotion affects an individual's ability to make adaptive decisions differentially for gains and losses. We found that individuals with lesions to the amygdala, an area responsible for processing emotional responses, displayed impaired decision making when considering potential gains, but not when considering potential losses. In contrast, patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area responsible for integrating cognitive and emotional information, showed deficits in both domains. We argue that this dissociation provides evidence that adaptive decision making for risks involving potential losses may be more difficult to disrupt than adaptive decision making for risks involving potential gains. This research further demonstrates the role of emotion in decision competence.     

An analysis of item gains and losses in retroactive interference.

The repeated-testing paradigm is used to study both retroactive interference and hypermnesia (the improvement in memory across repeated tests). Considerable theoretical progress has been made by separately analyzing the 2 components of hypermnesia: the recovery of previously unrecalled items on later tests (item gains) and the forgetting of previously recalled items on later tests (item losses). Item gains increase with increases in item-specific processing, whereas item losses decrease with increases in relational processing. The authors suggest that separate analysis of item gains and losses in retroactive interference research may also prove fruitful. Three experiments showed that an interpolated list affects item gains but not losses, whereas processing similarity between the target and interpolated lists affects losses but not gains. These results are interpreted within the relational-item-specific processing framework.     

Selective exposure: The impact of framing information search instructions as gains and losses

Previous research has found that people prefer information that supports rather than conflicts with their decisions (selective exposure). In the present paper, we investigated whether selective exposure was influenced by the method of information collection. Based on Prospect Theory we hypothesized that the method of selection (MOS), where simply selected pieces of information are considered, would lead to a higher selective exposure compared to the method of elimination (MOE), where pieces of information are rejected and the remaining pieces of information are considered. In fact, we found that participants collected information more selectively when they were instructed to use the MOS compared to the MOE. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cheating: One common morality for gains and losses but two components of morality itself

Previous studies show that decision makers (DMs) lie more to avoid a loss than achieve a gain. Two compelling mechanisms might explain this observation. One assumes that lying is a risky activity and relates to the shape of the monetary value function described by prospect theory, which assumes (a) increased risk taking for loss frames and (b) an asymmetry between the perceived values of losses and gains. The other relates to the importance of self-esteem functions as expressed in self-concept maintenance models, self-esteem issues being weighed against monetary issues. This alternative explanation assumes that a loss frame serves as a factor lowering moral considerations. We report an experimental study presenting sets of lotteries to DMs, once in a moral context and once in a traditional probabilistic context. The results show that DMs take less risk when lotteries are presented in a moral context. It is also shown that DMs take more risk for losses than gains, this holding for both the moral and probabilistic contexts. This latter result suggests that loss/gain asymmetry can be completely explained by prospect theory factors, and framing makes no difference to the valuing of moral considerations.     

I owe you: age-related similarities and differences in associative memory for gains and losses

Older adults often experience associative memory impairments but can sometimes remember important information. The current experiments investigate potential age-related similarities and differences associate memory for gains and losses. Younger and older participants were presented with faces and associated dollar amounts, which indicated how much money the person “owed” the participant, and were later given a cued recall test for the dollar amount. Experiment 1 examined face-dollar amount pairs while Experiment 2 included negative dollar amounts to examine both gains and losses. While younger adults recalled more information relative to older adults, both groups were more accurate in recalling the correct value associated with high-value faces compared to lower-value faces and remembered gist-information about the values. However, negative values (losses) did not have a strong impact on recall among older adults versus younger adults, illustrating important associative memory differences between younger and older adults.     

The differential processing of price in gains and losses: the effects of frame and need for cognition

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of decision theory is that more money is preferred to less: the principle of desired wealth. Based on this and other principles such as reference dependence and loss aversion, researchers have derived and demonstrated mental accounting (MA) rules for multiple outcome situations. Experiment 1 tested the invariance of the desired wealth principle and two mental accounting rules (mixed gain, e.g. $100 gain and a $50 loss; mixed loss, e.g. $100 loss and a $50 gain) across types of decision maker and frame. The desired wealth principle and the MA rule for mixed gains were found to vary depending upon (1) the thoughtfulness of the decision maker (need for cognition, NC), and (2) the frame used to describe gains and losses (e.g. a gain of $x versus a gain of y%). The MA rule for mixed losses, however, was found to be immune to framing effects, even among people who are generally less thoughtful. The differential processing of gains and losses across frames (dollar versus percentage) and individuals (less versus more thoughtful) was tested further in Experiment 2 where evaluations of mixed losses were made at the level of the gestalt as well as the constituent (the gain and the loss being evaluated separately). Framing effects were evidenced only among subjects lower in NC and only when the constituent gain was evaluated. Evaluations of the overall mixed loss and the constituent loss were comparable across situation and individual, suggesting that losses motivate greater processing among people otherwise inclined toward cognitive miserliness. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When immediate losses are followed by delayed gains: Additive hyperboloid discounting models

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Discounting research has tended to focus on one simple situation, choice between an immediate, smaller gain and a larger, delayed gain, that is assumed by many...     

Choice patterns reveal qualitative individual differences among discounting of delayed gains,delayed losses,and probabilistic losses

A new probabilistic losses questionnaire as well as Kirby's delayed gains questionnaire and a previously developed delayed losses questionnaire were administered to a large online sample. Almost all participants showed the positive discounting choice pattern expected on the Kirby questionnaire, decreasing their choice of a delayed gain as time to its receipt increased. In contrast, approximately 15% of the participants showed negative discounting on the delayed losses questionnaire and/or the probabilistic losses questionnaire, decreasing their choice of an immediate loss as time to a delayed loss decreased and/or decreasing their choice of a certain loss as likelihood of the probabilistic loss increased. Mixture model analysis confirmed the existence of these negative discounting subgroups. The inconsistent findings observed in previous research involving delayed/probabilistic losses may be due to differences in the proportion of negative discounters who participated in previous studies. Further research is needed to determine how negative discounting of delayed and probabilistic losses manifests itself in everyday decisions. It should be noted that the presence of individuals who show atypical choice patterns when losses are involved may pose challenges for efforts to modify discounting in order to ameliorate behavioral problems, especially because many such problems concern choices that have negative consequences, often delayed and/or probabilistic.     

Differential effects of amount on temporal and probability discounting of gains and losses

In four experiments, we compared the effects of delay, probability, and monetary amount on the subjective value of gains and losses. For delayed gains, smaller amounts were discounted more steeply than larger amounts, whereas the opposite pattern was observed with probabilistic gains. For both delayed and probabilistic losses, however, amount had much smaller and less reliable effects on discounting. Taken together, the pattern of differential magnitude effects leads to delayed gains' being discounted significantly more steeply than delayed losses, but only at smaller amounts, whereas probabilistic gains are discounted significantly more steeply than probabilistic losses, but only at larger amounts. Even though the same hyperbola-like function described both individual and group discounting of delayed and probabilistic gains and losses, the present findings suggest that different processes are involved in discounting positive and negative outcomes. Raw data may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

Input integration and input weighting in decisions on allocations of gains and losses

Although the concept of relevance (or weight) of inputs plays a central role in equity theory, it has not been clearly defined. The present investigation attempts to answer the question of when, and which, inputs are taken into account in allocation decisions. Subjects were given a stimulus story in which two fictitious persons had, through joint work, produced a monetary gain or loss; further, information was provided on the relative effort (amount of time worked intensively) and /or ability (as determined by a test) that each stimulus person had contributed. Subjects were asked how they would allocate the gain or loss. Empirical evidence for the following three codeterminants of allocation decisions was obtained: (1) the type of input—personal and behavioural characteristics are [relevant] for allocation if they are perceived as (a) causallv important for outcome production, (b) variable, and (c) under the person's volitional control; (2) the type of outcome to be allocated—more equal allocations are observed when loss as opposed to gain must be allocated; and (3) the constellation of individual inputs on given dimensions—information is given on several input dimensions, a dimension which should be [irrelevant] according to criteria (a), (b), and (c) does codetermine allocations when recipients have contributed equally with respect to this dimension. The latter finding is discussed from the perspective of [cognitive algebra].     

Revising recognition judgments during noisy recognition evidence accumulation: The dynamics of losses versus gains

Outside the laboratory, we sometimes revise our recognition judgments of others—realizing, for example, that we have accidentally failed to greet an acquaintance we just passed in the hallway. These recognition reversals have rarely been studied. Here, using a basic noisy-accumulation framework, we simulated recognition response reversals in which initial speeded recognition judgments were followed by an opportunity to revise the initial judgment. The simulation predictions were compared to empirical data from two experiments in which we gave participants the opportunity to revise each of their initial speeded recognition judgments. The speeded old–new responses were restricted to either 300–800 ms (Exp. 1) or 200–600 ms (Exp. 2) after each probe’s onset, and the second response was self-paced in both experiments. The noisy-accumulation framework correctly anticipated three findings. First, gain rates (incorrect followed by correct responses) always exceeded loss rates (correct followed by incorrect responses). Second, despite being corrective, the raw gain rates exhibited a modest negative correlation with overall recognition skill. Third, when gain rates were conditioned on the opportunity to correct an initial error (conditional gain rate), they were then positively correlated with recognition skill but were less diagnostic than the conditional loss rates. Thus, the mechanics of noisy accumulation naturally predict that skilled recognizers will demonstrate infrequent corrective behavior but a high probability of correction, should an initial error occur.     

自身得失对朋友博弈结果评价的影响：来自ERPs的证据

本研究通过经典的金钱博弈任务, 以FRN和P300为反应指标, 探讨了自身获益或损失对朋友结果评价分别会产生何种影响, 以及这种影响模式是如何受到个体自我建构方式调节的。结果发现, 在自身获益条件下, 观看朋友损益之间的FRN和P300差异不再存在; 在自身损失条件下, 虽然观看朋友输赢之间的P300差异消失了, 但FRN差异依然显著。不仅如此, 无论自身得失, 独立型自我建构启动组在观看朋友损益上的FRN差异均不再显著, 但在自身获益后看到朋友损失能激发更强的P300波幅。本研究结果表明：(1) 对朋友的结果评价模式并非固定不变, 而是会随个体自身所处得失境遇的不同而有所区别; (2) 相对于互依型自我建构启动组, 独立型自我建构启动组在面对朋友的得失时表现得更为冷漠并更具竞争性。