Assertion: A Function First Account

This paper aims to develop a novel account of the normativity of assertion. Its core thesis is that assertion has an etiological epistemic function, viz. to generate knowledge in hearers. In conjunction with a general account of etiological functions and their normative import, it is argued that an assertion is epistemically good if and only if it has the disposition to generate knowledge in hearers. In addition, reason is provided to believe that it makes sense to regulate the practice of assertion by a speaker rule—and, more specifically, by a knowledge rule—as so regulating assertion contributes to ensuring that assertion fulfils its etiological function reliably.     

Wittgensteinian content‐externalism

Content‐externalism is the view that a subject's relations to a context can play a role in individuating the content of her mental states. According to social content‐externalists, relations to a socio‐linguistic context can play a fundamental individuating role. Åsa Wikforss has suggested that “social externalism depends on the assumption that individuals have an incomplete grasp of their own concepts”. In this paper, I show that this isn't so. I develop and defend an argument for social content‐externalism which does not depend on this assumption. The argument is animated by strands of thought in the later work of Wittgenstein. In addition to demonstrating that social externalists are not necessarily committed to thinking that a subject can have thoughts involving concepts which she incompletely understands, this argument is important insofar as it (a) supports a form of content‐externalism with extended scope, (b) avoids the controversy surrounding the claim that subjects can think with concepts which they incompletely understand, and (c) situates Wittgenstein's later work with respect to contemporary debates about content‐externalism.     

The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion

Many philosophers favour the simple knowledge account of assertion, which says you may assert something only if you know it. The simple account is true but importantly incomplete. I defend a more informative thesis, namely, that you may assert something only if your assertion expresses knowledge. I call this ‘the express knowledge account of assertion’, which I argue better handles a wider range of cases while at the same time explaining the simple knowledge account's appeal. §1 introduces some new data that a knowledge account of assertion well explains. §2 explains the simple knowledge account's advantage over two of its main competitors. §3 presents a problem for the simple account and offers a solution, which is to adopt the express knowledge account. §4 encapsulates the case for the express knowledge account, and offers a unifying vision for the epistemology of belief and assertion. §5 answers an objection. §6 briefly sums up. Even those who ultimately reject my conclusion can still benefit from the new data presented in §1, and learn an important lesson from the problem discussed in §3, which demonstrates a general constraint on an acceptable account of the norm of assertion.     

World‐Pictures and Wittgensteinian Certainty

Although certainty is a fundamental notion in epistemology, it is less studied in contemporary analytic epistemology than other important notions such as knowledge or justification. This paper focuses on Wittgensteinian certainty, according to which the very basic dimension of our epistemic practices, the elements of our world‐pictures, are objectively certain, in that we cannot legitimately doubt them. The aim of the paper is to offer the best philosophical way to clarify Wittgensteinian certainty, in a way that is consonant with Wittgenstein's fundamental insights. The paper critiques two alternative proposals for clarifying Wittgensteinian certainty that are philosophically unsatisfying: the rule view and the proposition view. Finally, it instead shows how viewing world‐pictures as pictures, in the sense of unclear conceptions, is a more philosophically fruitful approach to understanding world‐pictures.     

Epistemological Contextualism and the Knowledge Account of Assertion

In this paper, I take up an argument advanced by Keith DeRose (Philosophical Review, 111:167–203, 2002) that suggests that the knowledge account of assertion provides the basis of an argument in favor of contextualism. I discuss the knowledge account as the conjunction of two theses—a thesis claiming that knowledge is sufficient to license assertion KA and one claiming that knowledge is necessary to license assertion AK. Adducing evidence from Stalnaker’s account of assertion, from conversational practice, and from arguments often raised in favor of the knowledge account, I suggest that neither the AK nor the KA theses are plausible. That is, I argue that the knowledge account of assertion to which DeRose appeals is in fact not suitable as an account of assertion. Given that DeRose’s argument stands and falls with the knowledge account, I claim that the argument therefore fails.

Cyberattacks as Casus Belli: A Sovereignty‐Based Account

Since cyberattacks are nonphysical, standard theories of casus belli — which typically rely on the violent and forceful nature of military means — appear inapplicable. Yet, some theorists have argued that cyberattacks nonetheless can constitute just causes for war — generating a unilateral right to defensive military action — when they cause significant physical damage through the disruption of the target's computer systems. I show that this view suffers from a serious drawback: it is too permissive concerning the types of actions that generate casus belli since many essentially peaceful and non‐violent mechanisms can nonetheless cause physical damage. I resolve this difficulty by developing a sovereignty‐based account of casus belli and applying it to cyberwarfare. I argue that legitimate states have a constrained right to unilaterally respond with military force to unfriendly actions that bypass or overwhelm the political deliberations of the target state in order to force a change in behaviour contrary to the determinations of the people of the target state. This new account of casus belli avoids the problems of the consequence‐based view by plausibly restricting the types of unfriendly action that give rise to casus belli and yet offers an attractive explanation for why some cyberattacks nonetheless do generate a potential right to a unilateral defensive response.     

Advancing a Richer View of Identity at Work: The Role‐Based Identity Scale

Identity has been studied extensively in several fields including organizational behavior, sociology, and psychology. Even though there have been significant advances, 2 areas of work deserve more attention. First, most empirical investigations have looked only at 1 or 2 identities at a time despite theoretical perspectives that indicate a need to address multiple identities simultaneously. Second, limited work using identity theory has been done in the human resource management (HRM) domain. The purpose of our research is to serve as a catalyst for future work by identifying 5 work‐relevant role‐based identities and creating a parsimonious measure for each. These metrics were tested, and initial evidence of their validity is provided using 6 independent samples. The empirical results suggest that the new measures in the role‐based identity scale can be useful in representing a more realistic and richer view of identity at work by simultaneously assessing 5 distinct role‐based identities.     

The Use of Role‐Player Prompts in Assessment Center Exercises

So far, a substantial amount of assessment center (AC) studies have aimed to improve the quality of the AC method by focusing on the assessors. However, systematic studies about the role‐player in AC exercises are nonexistent. This is surprising as the role‐player might serve as a key figure for consistently evoking job‐relevant behavior across candidates. Therefore, this study focused on the ‘role’ of role‐players in ACs. We examined the effects of instructing role‐players to use prompts among 233 candidates. Results suggest that role‐players are able to use prompts and that their negative impact on candidates' reactions is negligible. In addition, some AC dimensions (problem solving and interpersonal sensitivity) were better measured when role‐players used prompts. No effects on interrater reliability were found.     

Role‐Induced Bias in Court: An Experimental Analysis

Criminal procedure is organized as a tournament with predefined roles. We show that assuming the role of a defense counsel or a prosecutor leads to role‐induced bias even if participants are asked to predict a court ruling after they have ceased to act in that role and if they expect a substantial financial incentive for being accurate. The bias is not removed either if participants are instructed to predict the court ruling in preparation of plea bargaining. In line with parallel constraint satisfaction models for legal decision making, findings indicate that role‐induced bias is driven by coherence effects, that is, systematic information distortions in support of the favored option. This is mainly achieved by downplaying the importance of conflicting evidence. These distortions seem to stabilize interpretations, and people do not correct for this bias. Implications for legal procedure are briefly discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Role‐Playing and Religion: Using Games to Educate Millennials

Abstract. I have been experimenting with using role‐playing and games in my religion classes for several years and have found that students respond well to these pedagogical tools and methods. After reviewing my experiences, I explore the reasons for students' positive response. I argue that role‐playing games capitalize on our students' educational expectations and fondness for game‐play, by drawing them into exploring significant texts and ideas. Of particular interest for religion and theology professors, these sorts of games also encourage empathy towards other viewpoints.     

Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion,Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account

Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account , all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge‐centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge‐centered accounts.     

A Multi‐Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness

In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and we propose a novel multi‐factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented, less salient, too generic, or flash‐like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations—their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability—and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. We conclude the paper by demonstrating why the original interpretations of certain empirical findings that apparently pose problems for our account are, in fact, flawed.     

A Wittgensteinian Solution to the Sorites

I develop a solution to the Sorites Paradox, according to which a concatenation of valid arguments need not itself be valid. I specify which chains of valid arguments are those that do not preserve validity: those that pass the vague boundary between cases where the relevant concept applies and cases where that concept does not apply. I also develop various criticisms of this solution and show why they fail; basically, they all involve a petitio at some stage. I criticise the conviction that if every short argument in a long concatenated argument is valid, so is the long argument: it is, I argue, the result of an unjustified generalisation from the case of arguments that do not employ vague concepts (as in mathematics) to arguments that do employ them. My approach is Wittgensteinian in its “leaving everything as it is,” in its claiming that the “beginning” has been searched too far back (see paper's epigraph) and in its claim that the paradox was generated by a misapplication of a partial picture of the behaviour of arguments. I conclude my paper by comparing and contrasting my approach to the few precedents found in the vagueness literature and by answering a few additional objections that were raised there.     

Simone de Beauvoir and Confucian Role Ethics: Role‐Relational Ambiguity and Confucian Mystification

This article argues that there has been a general misunderstanding of the nature of role relations in Confucian role ethics. Recasting constitutive role relations in light of Beauvoir's ethics of ambiguity will aid in developing Confucian role ethics as a contemporary vision of human flourishing that can internally accommodate the need for a feminist transformation.     

A Wittgensteinian View of Mind and Self-Knowledge

Philosophia - This paper defends a Wittgenstein-inspired conception of the nature of mind and self-knowledge. Thus, it is claimed that the mind is to be conceived as expressive behaviour; and that...     

The Competition Account of Achievement‐Value

A great achievement makes one's life go better independently of its results, but what makes an achievement great? A simple answer is—its difficulty. I defend this view against recent, pressing objections by interpreting difficulty in terms of competitiveness. Difficulty is determined not by how hard the agent worked for the end but by how hard others would need to do in order to compete. Successfully reaching a goal is a valuable achievement because it is difficult, and it is difficult because it is competitive. Hence, both virtuosic performances and lucky successes can be valuable achievements.     

The Relation of Social Support to Depression in Massively Multiplayer Online Role‐Playing Games

It has been suggested that involvement in massively multiplayer online role‐playing games (MMORPGs) provides users with a sense of support and community. In the present study, we examined the possible buffering effects of MMORPGs on depression. First, we examined whether higher involvement in MMORPGs was associated with higher levels of perceived social support. Second, we examined whether, consistent with past research, higher levels of perceived social support were associated with lower levels of nonclinical depression. Using structural equation modeling, we found that involvement in MMORPGs was not associated with perceived social support. However, we further confirmed that a lack of perceived social support is associated with higher levels of depression. Implications for MMORPGs and its players are discussed.