李土生网上护巫消极文化太猖狂

“博客中国”“李土生专栏”发表一篇文章,称《何祚庥之流就是美国反华势力的帮凶》,公然在网络上诋毁科学,为迷信巫术作辩护,煞是猖狂。这篇文章的影响能有多坏,我不好估计。明眼人一见文章中的那些夸张不实之辞,也就未必以为然。但网络是一个开放的空间,不明就里者多得是,假如真有人受了盅惑,变得仇视科学、神往巫术起来,就不是小事情了。我见到这篇混文时它才存在36个小时,却有了3649次点击,可谓观者甚众。这样,有人受到蛊惑怕是在所难免了。因此想说几句。李土生的文章从中国科学受到反华势力的遏制为起点,煽动读者的爱国之情,然后笔锋…     

Seeking professional help: Etiology beliefs about mental illness across cultures

In the present study, the authors examined the contributions of cultural beliefs about the etiology of mental illness to the seeking of help from mental health professionals among college students in 4 cultural groups, European Americans, Chinese Americans, Hong Kong Chinese, and Mainland Chinese. Group differences were found in help-seeking history and likelihood, with European and Chinese Americans being more likely to seek help than Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese. Multiple-group path analysis showed that lay beliefs about causes of mental illness and prior help-seeking history significantly predicted help-seeking likelihood, which was related positively to environmental/hereditary causes but negatively to social-personal causes. Our findings demonstrate the importance of understanding help-seeking patterns within specific cultural contexts and the effects of Western influences on shaping help-seeking propensities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).     

Letting go: some thoughts about termination

Termination of analysis is discussed from three perspectives. First, considered as a vicissitude of the analytic relationship, termination contains essential elements of the psychoanalytic process itself. Cycles of attachment, loss, mourning, and internalization mark moments in, as well as overviews of, every analysis from its beginning to well past its termination. Second, Freud's approach to the subject of termination is explored and widened, with an emphasis on its relation to mourning and on the depth and permanence of analytic transference--two dimensions relatively neglected by Freud, perhaps for personal reasons. Finally, clinical issues are presented that are meaningful to the author in his work with analysands, including his work as a training analyst.     

Holism Revisited: Its Principles 75 Years On

It was seventy five years ago that the book, Holism and Evolution by Jan Christiaan Smuts was published. Although the book was very popular at the time, it has not been accepted by either the scientific or the philosophical community. Its complex message was truncated to the truism "the whole is more than the sum of its parts," which became the definition of holism, but ensured its rejection by the skeptic as a too general statement to be of practical value. It is very unlikely that there was a sinister plot to sideline this important work. The simplest explanation is that Smuts' concepts, which suggest many of the later ideas of systems thinkers, were simply too far ahead of their time. Now however, at the dawn of the new millennium, the time is perfect to rediscover Smuts and to apply his ideas with a "holos consciousness" to the many burning issues that humanity faces. In this paper the main principles of Holism are explained.     

Holism a century ago: The elaboration of Duhem's thesis

Duhem first expounds the holistic thesis, according to which an experimental test always involves several hypotheses, in articles dating from the 1890s. Poincaré's analysis of a recent experiment in optics provides the incentive, but Duhem generalizes this analysis and develops a highly original methodological position. He is led to reject inductivism. I will endeavor to show the crucial role history of science comes to play in the development of Duhem's holism.     

Holism and Horizon: Husserl and McDowell on Non-conceptual Content

John McDowell rejects the idea that non-conceptual content can rationally justify empirical claims—a task for which it is ill-fitted by its non-conceptual nature. This paper considers three possible objections to his views: he cannot distinguish empty conception from the perceptual experience of an object; perceptual discrimination outstrips the capacity of concepts to keep pace; and experience of the empirical world is more extensive than the conceptual focusing within it. While endorsing McDowell’s rejection of what he means by non-conceptual content, and appreciating his insight into the experiential synthesis of intuition and conception (in particular, its role in grasping objects), I will argue that Edmund Husserl presents an even more comprehensive account of perceptual experience that explains how we experience the contribution of receptivity and sensibility and how they cooperate in perceptual discrimination. Further, it reveals “horizons”—a unique kind of contents, surplus content (rather than independent non-conceptual content)—beyond the synthesis of intuitive and conceptual contents through which objects are grasped. Such horizons play a constitutive role, making experience with its conceptual dimensions and justificatory potential possible; they in no way function like a bare given that is to fulfill some independent justificatory role. Whereas McDowell focuses on how experience does not take place in isolation from the exercise of conceptual capacities, Husserl complements his view by situating experience in a more encompassing whole and by elucidating the surplus-horizons that exceed the conceptual content of experience; play an inseparable, constitutive role within it; and indicate the limits of conceptual comprehension.

Women in labor: some issues about informed consent

Women wishing hospital admission for childbirth are asked to sign very general pre-admission consent forms. The use of such forms suggests that women in labor are considered incompetent to give informed consent. This paper explores some of the problems with advance directives and general consent, and argues that since women in labor are not generally incompetent, it is not appropriate to require this kind of consent of them.     

If you need help, just ask: underestimating compliance with direct requests for help

A series of studies tested whether people underestimate the likelihood that others will comply with their direct requests for help. In the first 3 studies, people underestimated by as much as 50% the likelihood that others would agree to a direct request for help, across a range of requests occurring in both experimental and natural field settings. Studies 4 and 5 demonstrated that experimentally manipulating a person's perspective (as help seeker or potential helper) could elicit this underestimation effect. Finally, in Study 6, the authors explored the source of the bias, finding that help seekers were less willing than potential helpers were to appreciate the social costs of refusing a direct request for help (the costs of saying "no"), attending instead to the instrumental costs of helping (the costs of saying "yes").     

Attachment-dissociation network: some thoughts about a modern complex theory

The paper revises the complex theory in the light of modern infant research, neurosciences and object relation theory. The author takes up Jean Knox's idea to understand complexes as analogies to the internal working models of attachment theory. The author proposes to understand complexes as dissociated sub-networks out of the network structure of the psyche; these sub-networks contain the internal working models, the characteristic affects and unconscious expectation phantasies. With this network model one can try to understand severe defensive organizations in some patients as a pathological organization of different complexes. This is illustrated by a clinical example.     

Intersubjectivity as Co-phenomenology: From the Holism of Meaning to the Being-in-the-world-with-others

I outline in this paper a pragmatical approach to meaning. Meaning is defined as a phenomenologically experienced construal. As such, it is a dynamic object whose first evidence comes from the first person rather than the third one. At the same time, the approach assumes that meaning is not an individual creation, but rather an intersubjective one. Origins of meaning are also to be founded not ‘in the head’ of a cognitive system or subject, but in the intersubjective space contingently formed between a subject (S), an other (O) and a common object (R), which they talk about. Approaching this minimal communicative situation therefore requires realizing that the phenomenological dimension is always implied in any intersubjective encounter. The observed synchronized co-feeling among subjects, upon which language comprehension takes place, I call ‘co-phenomenology’. When analyzed in this way, intersubjectivity shows at the same time its social, phenomenological and biological dimensions.