Preschool children's use of novel predicates to make inductive inferences about people

Preschool children's use of novel predicates to make inferences about people was examined in three studies. In a procedure adapted from Gelman and Markman [Cognition 23 (1986) 183.], participants (ages 3 years 5 months–4 years 11 months) saw line drawings of three different faces. In Study 1 (N=16), the drawings were described as depicting children, and participants were asked to predict whether one of the children would share properties with a child who has the same novel predicate (e.g., “is zav,” which is never defined for participants) but is dissimilar in appearance, or with a child who has a different novel predicate but is similar in appearance. Participants tended to use the novel predicates rather than superficial resemblance to guide their inferences about people. In Study 2 (N=16), in which the line drawings were described as depicting dolls rather than children, participants showed no such emphasis on the novel predicate information. Study 3 (N=38) replicated the results of the first two studies. The results suggest that children have a general assumption that unfamiliar words hold rich inductive potential when applied to people but not when applied to dolls.     

Speaker reliability guides children's inductive inferences about novel properties

Prior work shows that children can make inductive inferences about objects based on their labels rather than their appearance (Gelman, 2003). A separate line of research shows that children's trust in a speaker's label is selective. Children accept labels from a reliable speaker over an unreliable speaker (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005). In the current paper, we tested whether 3- and 5-year-old children attend to speaker reliability when they make inductive inferences about a non-obvious property of a novel artifact based on its label. Children were more likely to use a reliable speaker's label than an unreliable speaker's label when making inductive inferences. Thus, children not only prefer to learn from reliable speakers, they are also more likely to use information from reliable speakers as the basis for future inferences. The findings are discussed in light of the debate between a similarity-driven and a label-driven approach to inductive inferences.     

Preschool children's use of cues to generic meaning

Sentences that refer to categories - generic sentences (e.g., "Dogs are friendly") - are frequent in speech addressed to young children and constitute an important means of knowledge transmission. However, detecting generic meaning may be challenging for young children, since it requires attention to a multitude of morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic cues. The first three experiments tested whether 3- and 4-year-olds use (a) the immediate linguistic context, (b) their previous knowledge, and (c) the social context to determine whether an utterance with ambiguous scope (e.g., "They are afraid of mice", spoken while pointing to 2 birds) is generic. Four-year-olds were able to take advantage of all the cues provided, but 3-year-olds were sensitive only to the first two. In Experiment 4, we tested the relative strength of linguistic-context cues and previous-knowledge cues by putting them in conflict; in this task, 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, preferred to base their interpretations on the explicit noun phrase cues from the linguistic context. These studies indicate that, from early on, children can use contextual and semantic information to construe sentences as generic, thus taking advantage of the category knowledge conveyed in these sentences.     

Category label effects on Chinese children's inductive inferences: modulation by perceptual detail and category specificity

Inductive generalization of novel properties to same-category or similar-looking objects was studied in Chinese preschool children. The effects of category labels on generalizations were investigated by comparing basic-level labels, superordinate-level labels, and a control phrase applied to three kinds of stimulus materials: colored photographs (Experiment 1), realistic line drawings (Experiment 2), and cartoon-like line drawings (Experiment 3). No significant labeling effects were found for photos and realistic drawings, but there were significant effects for cartoon-like drawings. Children made mostly (>70%) category-based inferences about photographs whether or not labels were provided (Experiment 1). Children showed a bias toward category-based inferences about realistic drawings (Experiment 2) but did so only when labels were provided. Finally, children made mostly appearance-based generalizations for cartoon-like drawings (Experiment 3). However, labels (basic or superordinate level) reduced appearance-based responses. Labeling effects did not depend on having identical labels; however, identical superordinate labels were more effective than different basic-level labels for the least informative stimuli (i.e., cartoons). Thus, labels sometimes confirm the identity of ambiguous items. This evidence of labeling effects in Mandarin-speaking Chinese children extends previous findings beyond English-speaking children and shows that the effects are not narrowly culture and language specific.     

Preschool children's ability to visually represent relations

The developmental origins of mapping temporal relations onto space was investigated in N = 122 3- to 5-year-old children and adults. Spontaneous production and comprehension were investigated. Production was investigated in two conditions: an iconic condition (three-dimensional objects depicting the events or objects to be represented) and an abstract condition (plain discs). Consistent with findings by Tversky, Kugelmass and Winter (1991), 5-year-olds performed on an adult-like level. Developmental progress was observed between the ages of 3 and 4 years, with comprehension preceding production. Consistent with DeLoache's findings (2000), 4-year-olds' performance was better in abstract than in iconic conditions, indicating that dual representational demands may have affected task performance in the iconic condition. In sum, abilities to map temporal relations onto spatial relations appear to develop spontaneously, even before children have experience with conventional notational systems.     

The role of linguistic labels in inductive generalization

What is the role of linguistic labels in inductive generalization? According to one approach labels denote categories and differ from object features, whereas according to another approach labels start out as features and may become category markers in the course of development. This issue was addressed in four experiments with 4- and 5-year-olds and adults. In Experiments 1 to 3, we replicated Yamauchi and Markman’s findings with adults (Journal of Memory and Language, 1998, Vol. 39, pp. 124–148, and Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 2000, Vol. 26, pp. 776–795) and extended the paradigm to young children. In Experiment 4, we compared effects of labels with those of highly salient visual features. Overall, results of these experiments provide strong support for the idea that early in development labels function the same way as other features, but they may become category markers in the course of development. A related finding is that whereas categorization and induction may be different processes in adults, they seem to be equivalent in young children. These results are discussed with respect to theories of development of inductive generalization.     

Word, thought, and deed: the role of object categories in children's inductive inferences and exploratory play

Previous research (e.g., S. A. Gelman & E. M. Markman, 1986; A. Gopnik & D. M. Sobel, 2000) suggests that children can use category labels to make inductive inferences about nonobvious causal properties of objects. However, such inductive generalizations can fail to predict objects' causal properties when (a) the property being projected varies within the category, (b) the category is arbitrary (e.g., things smaller than a bread box), or (c) the property being projected is due to an exogenous intervention rather than intrinsic to the object kind. In 4 studies, the authors showed that preschoolers (M = 48 months; range = 42-57 months) were sensitive to these constraints on induction and selectively engaged in exploration when evidence about objects' causal properties conflicted with inductive generalizations from the objects' kind to their causal powers. This suggests that the exploratory actions children generate in free play could support causal learning.     

The efficiency of binding spontaneous trait inferences to actors’ faces

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that the process of binding spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) to actors’ representations is relatively independent of attentional resources. Participants were presented with faces paired with single behaviors. Binding of STIs to actors was revealed by a higher false recognition of implied traits paired with actors’ faces than of implied traits randomly paired with other familiar faces. This effect replicated when each face-behavior pair was presented for 2 s (Experiment 1), when the processing of the information was shallow (Experiment 2), and when participants performed a secondary task during the presentation of behaviors (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that explicit on-line trait judgments of the actor, but not explicit behavior judgments, predicted the false recognition of implied traits in the context of the actor. The possibility that the process of binding STIs to actors’ representations is automatic is discussed.     

Young children's emerging ability to make false statements

This study examined the origins of children's ability to make consciously false statements, a necessary component of lying. Children 2 to 5 years of age were rewarded for claiming that they saw a picture of a bird when viewing pictures of fish. They were asked outcome questions ("Do you win/lose?"), recognition questions ("Do you have a bird/fish?"), and recall questions ("What do you have?"), which were hypothesized to vary in difficulty depending on the need for consciousness of falsity (less for outcome questions) and self-generation of an appropriate response (more for recall questions). The youngest children (2? to 3? years old) were above chance on outcome questions, but it was not until age 3? that children performed above chance on recognition questions or were capable of maintaining false claims across question types. Findings have implications for understanding the emergence of deception in young children.     

Preschool children's understanding of causal connections

Preschool-aged children's understanding of causal mechanism was assessed by showing them a simple event sequence in which two objects moved in tandem. The central question was whether children would infer the presence of a mechanism linking the two objects whose movement covaried. This was tested by assessing five responses: actions when asked to move one object, explanations for how the object moved, predictions as to whether both objects would still move without a connection, inferences about the nature and location of the connection, and surprise when the objects moved without any apparent connection. The results from 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds indicated that an understanding of mechanism is firmly established by 5 years but fragile at 3 years and only revealed by some response modes. The implications of the results concerning how to characterize and test for early competence are discussed.     

Smart and easy: Co-occurring activation of spontaneous trait inferences and spontaneous situational inferences

Social perceivers have been shown to draw spontaneous trait inferences (STI’s) about the behavior of an actor as well as spontaneous situational inferences (SSI’s) about the situation the actor is in. In two studies, we examined inferences about behaviors that allow for both an STI and an SSI. In Experiment 1, using a probe recognition paradigm, we found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s. In Experiment 2, using a relearning paradigm, we again found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s, regardless of temporarily activated processing goals. Results are discussed in light of three-stage models of the process of social inference.     

The role of cues to differential absolute size in children's transitive inferences

To investigate the role that "nonlogical" cues might play in transitive inference, 6- and 7-year-olds were given a three-term transitive task in which perceptual cues to differential absolute size were either present or absent. Relationships between the taught premises and the relational information that was physically present were manipulated using four basic conditions: "congruent," "inverse," "pretended," or "persuaded." Both age groups showed identical overall premise memory, but the younger group tended to reason more on the basis of the perceptual information rather than on the successfully encoded premise information. Contrasts between the various conditions showed that categorical effects can be circumvented in three-term problems with appropriate controls, that there may be qualitative as well as quantitative differences in transitive inference with age, and that transitive inference is not based solely on memory. The findings also indicate that, although 7-year-olds are competent in "logic-based" transitive inference, they experience great difficulty on tasks involving pretend information.     

Effects of knowledge about cross-language equivalents on children's use of mutual exclusivity in interpreting novel labels

Young children seem to assume that words pick out mutually exclusive object categories. This assumption of mutual exclusivity can be useful in word learning, but it is fallible. This study examined the effects of knowledge about cross-language equivalents on children's use of mutual exclusivity in interpreting a novel label coming from a foreign language and in interpreting a novel label within their first language. It was found that 4-year-olds with such knowledge suspended the assumption of mutual exclusivity in interpreting a novel label coming from a foreign language. Furthermore, they were willing to accept multiple labels for an object even within a language, as long as the context suggested that they should do so. In contrast, 3-year-olds did not seem to make use of such knowledge in either case. Thus, it appeared that 4-year-olds could make use of knowledge about language to fine tune the use of mutual exclusivity, but that this seemed to be difficult for 3-year-olds.     

Children's evaluation of the certainty of another person's inductive inferences and guesses

In three studies, 5–10-year-old children and an adult comparison group judged another's certainty in making inductive inferences and guesses. Participants observed a puppet make strong inductions, weak inductions, and guesses. Participants either had no information about the correctness of the puppet's conclusion, knew that the puppet was correct, or knew that the puppet was incorrect. Children of all ages (but not adults) rated the puppet as more certain about statements the child knew to be correct than statements the child knew to be incorrect. When assessing another's certainty, children have difficulty inhibiting their own knowledge and focusing on the other's perspective. Children were more likely to differentiate between inductions and guesses when the puppet made an Incorrect Statement, but even the oldest children did not differentiate consistently. The distinction between induction and guessing appears to be only acquired gradually but is important as a contributor to more advanced forms of reasoning and epistemological understanding.     

Preschool children's comprehension and production of directive forms

Thirty preschool children, 10 each at the 3-,4-, and 5-year-old levels, participated in two structured tasks designed to assess both comprehension and production of a full range of directive forms. In contrast to previous reports, the results indicated no significant differences in directive comprehension or production as a function of age; children in all age groups demonstrated the ability to understand and verbally encode the intent of most types of directive forms. However, the two most implicit forms, Question Directives and Hints, were complied with significantly less frequently than the more explicit forms, and were uused less often in the production task. The present findings indicate the importance of analyzing directive forms along a continuum of explicitness rather than dichotomizing them as direct versus indirect. Finally, the results are interpreted as providing indirect support for the general notion that mastery of some implicit forms may be achieved later than the acquisition of more explicit forms.     

Semantic similarity of labels and inductive generalization: Taking a second look

Prior research suggests that preschoolers can generalize object properties based on category information conveyed by semantically-similar labels. However, previous research did not control for co-occurrence probability of labels in natural speech. The current studies re-assessed children’s generalization with semantically-similar labels. Experiment 1 indicated that adults made category-based inferences regardless of co-occurrence probability; however, 4-year-olds generalized with semantically-similar labels that co-occurred in child-directed speech (e.g., bunny–rabbit) but not with non-co-occurring labels (e.g., crocodile–alligator). Experiment 2 indicated that generalization with semantically-similar labels increased gradually between 4- and 6-years of age. These results are discussed in relation to theories of early learning.     

Children''s ability to make transitive inferences: The importance of premise integration and structural complexity

Four experiments investigated 4- to 6-year-olds' transitive inferences. In Experiments 1–3, there was a nonmapping condition in which inferences were made either about stacked blocks, or about sticks ordered left to right. In the mapping condition, inferences were made by mapping either from blocks to sticks, or the reverse. In Experiments 2–4, relational complexity was manipulated by requiring either 1 or 2 premise relations to be processed in a single decision. Mapping was harder than nonmapping, but relational complexity was the main source of variance, with 2 relations being harder in both mapping and nonmapping conditions. The percentage of participants integrating 2 relations in a single decision was estimated at 20% at age 4, 53% at age 5 and 57% at age 6, suggesting gradual development of transitive inference ability. Results suggest that relational complexity has a strong effect on transitive inference in 4- to 6-year-old children.