Cognitive functioning in delusions: a longitudinal analysis

BACKGROUND: This study explored the longitudinal course of the relationship between delusions and different aspects of cognitive functioning. METHODS: Deluded patients were compared to psychiatric and non-clinical controls on three tasks: negative priming, a probabilistic judgement task (the 'beads' task), and the pragmatic inference task (PIT). All groups were tested at two time points, once when actively symptomatic, and once when in remission. RESULTS: Deluded individuals exhibited a 'jump-to-conclusions' (JTC) reasoning bias: i.e., they made decisions on the basis of limited evidence and were more likely to revise their estimates when faced with disconfirmatory evidence. This JTC bias remained stable over time, although probability judgments seemed to normalise in remission. No deficits in cognitive inhibition were found on negative priming. The deluded group displayed an excessive self-focus on the PIT at both time points, but did not show a depressive attributional style. Only a small sub-sample, characterised by the "bad-me" type of paranoia [Trower & Chadwick, 1995 Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 2, 263-278.], demonstrated depressive schemas when symptomatic, but no longer did so when remitted. Few relationships were found between tasks, suggesting that different areas of functioning are relatively independent. The only measures associated with delusion symptom scores were from the 'beads' task. CONCLUSIONS: Overall these findings suggest that the JTC bias is a stable factor associated with delusional thinking, while the depressive attributional style characteristic of a small sub-sample of paranoid patients fluctuates with delusional course.     

On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: A response to Trakakis’ second critique

In this essay, I answer Nick Trakakis’ second critique of my argument against the adequacy of traditional free will theodicy. I argue, first, that Trakakis errs in his implicit assertion that my argument relies upon our being strongly malevolent by nature. I argue, second, that Trakakis errs in thinking that our being weakly benevolent, morally bivalent, or weakly malevolent by nature is sufficient to refute my critique of the traditional freewill theodicy. I still maintain that the argument from freedom of the will offers an explanation of moral evil that is, in the final analysis, manifestly inadequate. I thank Nick Trakakis for his continuing interest in my essay, “On the Alleged Connection Between Moral Evil and Human Freedom.” The exchange of ideas in an atmosphere of mutual respect is the very heart of philosophy and I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in such an exchange. I believe, as a consequence, that my thinking concerning the inadequacy of the traditional free will theodicy has become more fully articulated.     

Delusions and hallucinations of cocaine abusers and paranoid schizophrenics: a comparative study

We compared delusions and hallucinations of 100 cocaine abusers and 100 paranoid schizophrenic subjects admitted to an East Texas state psychiatric hospital. Subjects in both groups feared that individuals or organized groups might harm them in some way, but delusions of the paranoid schizophrenic subjects were more often bizarre than those of the cocaine abuse subjects. "Cocaine bugs" (parasitosis) were more often found in the cocaine abuse subjects. Command hallucinations were found in both groups, but the commands of the schizophrenic group more often related to harming or killing others. Cocaine abusers had a greater frequency of visual hallucinations (47 to 7), distinguished by shadows, flashing lights ("snow lights"), objects moving and bugs crawling on the arm. Finally, the most distinguishing characteristics were identity delusions, possession delusions, grandiose delusions (other than identities and possessions), and delusions that their families were imposters (Capgras Syndrome) reported by paranoid schizophrenics. No such delusions were reported by the cocaine abusers.     

Paranoid disorders: The core of truth behind the delusional system

This is the first paper of a series of articles reporting the findings, life course, and psychiatric outcomes of a group of 34 families in which at least one member of the family developed a delusional system. In this study the author discusses chiefly several issues regarding the genesis, ways of reinforcement, and perpetuation of the delusional ideation which, despite their great contributory importance to the success of treatment of the paranoid patient, seem neglected in the professional literature. The author draws attention to two basic findings that appeared consistently in the study group of 34 paranoid patients: (1) there is always a basis of truth and reality behind every delusional system; and (2) authentic past and current interpersonal transactions play a dominant role in generating and activating the paranoid beliefs.     

Paranoid disorders: The core of truth behind the delusional system

This is the first paper of a series of articles reporting the findings, life course, and psychiatric outcomes of a group of 34 families in which at least one member of the family developed a delusional system. In this study the author discusses chiefly several issues regarding the genesis, ways of reinforcement, and perpetuation of the delusional ideation which, despite their great contributory importance to the success of treatment of the paranoid patient, seem neglected in the professional literature. The author draws attention to two basic findings that appeared consistently in the study group of 34 paranoid patients: (1) there is always a basis of truth and reality behind every delusional system; and (2) authentic past and current interpersonal transactions play a dominant role in generating and activating the paranoid beliefs.(1981, Spring)     

Psychological processes and paranoia: implications for forensic behavioural science

Paranoid delusions have recently become the focus of empirical research. In this article, we review studies of the psychological mechanisms that might be involved in paranoid thinking and discuss their implications for forensic behaviour science. Paranoia has not been consistently associated with any specific neuropsychological abnormality. However, evidence supports three broad types of mechanism that might be involved in delusional thinking in general and paranoia in particular: anomalous perceptual experiences, abnormal reasoning, and motivational factors. There is some evidence that paranoia may be associated with hearing loss, and good evidence that paranoid patients attend excessively to threatening information. Although general reasoning ability seems to be unaffected, there is strong evidence that a jumping- to-conclusions style of reasoning about data is implicated in delusions in general, but less consistent evidence specifically linking paranoia to impaired theory of mind. Finally, there appears to be a strong association between paranoia and negative self-esteem, and some evidence that attempts to protect self-esteem by attributing negative events to external causes are implicated. Some of these processes have recently been implicated in violent behaviour, and they therefore have the potential to explain the apparent association between paranoid delusions and offending.     

Ethics of Immigration: The Issue of Convicted Criminals

In this paper, I explore and probe Joseph Carens’ remarks, in his recent book The Ethics of Immigration, on the immigration status of foreign convicted criminals who have served their sentence, and who wish either to immigrate into our country or who are already here. Carens rejects deportation when it is not called for by considerations of national security, and agrees that considerations of public order can justify barring convicted foreign criminals from entering the country. I broadly agree with his arguments against deportation: my remarks in this respect are clarificatory and exploratory as much as anything else. But (I argue) both his argument for open borders and his scepticism with respect to radical cosmopolitanism are in tension with his claim that past criminal convictions can act as a bar to entry.     

John Nash's Delusional Decade: A Case of Paranoid Schizophrenia

Continues the psychoanalytic study of mathematical genius John Nash in Capps (2003) by focusing on the decade, during his thirties, when he was most delusional. Explores the connections between the content of his delusions and his life history and immediate circumstances, with particular attention to the way in which his delusions reflected the bisexual confusion discussed in the previous essay. Uses Freud's analysis of the mechanism of paranoia in his Dr. Schreber study to account for the nature and progression of Nash's delusions.     

Assessing self-critical perfectionism in clinical depression

Several facets of perfectionism have been strongly associated with depression and anxiety. Dunkley and Blankstein (2000) combined these maladaptive traits with self-criticism to create a general construct labeled self-critical perfectionism. In this study, we employed confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate a model for assessing self-critical perfectionism in a clinically depressed sample using scales from 3 instruments. Participants were 356 depressed adult outpatients who completed 2 multidimensional measures of perfectionism and a measure of self-criticism. A confirmatory factor model that separated a self-critical perfectionism construct from a more adaptive, achievement-striving component of perfectionism was supported. A composite scale assessing self-critical perfectionism demonstrated much larger correlations with distress measures compared to a composite scale assessing achievement striving and also showed evidence of discriminant validity. In this study, we provided further support for the valid assessment of self-critical perfectionism and extended evidence for its assessment to a clinically depressed sample.     

Delusions,Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings

Psychopathological delusions have a number of features that are curiously difficult to explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument. Delusions are theoretically, affectively, and behaviorally circumscribed: delusional individuals often do not act on their delusions and often do not update beliefs on the basis of their delusions. Delusional individuals are occasionally able to distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, sometimes speaking of their “delusional reality.” To explain these features, I offer a model according to which, contrary to appearances, delusions are not beliefs at all. Delusions are acceptances that are generated by pathologically powerful cognitive feelings. This model has implications for the way that we should think about non‐pathological doxastic states and emotions.     

The effects of token reinforcement and feedback on the delusional verbal behavior of chronic paranoid schizophrenics

Prior research with token reinforcement in the psychiatric population has been directed at work adjustment, more than at major symptomatic behaviors. The purpose of the present research, on the other hand, was to investigate the effects of feedback and token reinforcement on the modification of delusional verbal behavior in chronic psychotics. Six male and four female paranoid schizophrenic patients participated in the study. The results indicated that the effects of feedback were effective about half the time in reducing percentage delusional talk, but in at least three cases produced adverse reactions. Token reinforcement, however, showed more consistency and reduced the percentage of delusional verbal behavior in seven of the nine subjects exposed to this procedure. The effects of both feedback and token reinforcement were quite specific to the environment in which they were applied and showed little generalization to other situations. It would appear that using token reinforcement can reduce the percentage delusional speech of chronic paranoid schizophrenics.     

Delusions and Personal Autonomy

This article will examine the claim that personal autonomy is impaired by a paradigmatic instance of serious psychopathology – namely, the condition of being delusional – in light of the hierarchical conception of personal autonomy. This conception of personal autonomy aims at yielding value‐neutral judgements about freedom and self‐governance. I will argue that when viewed from the perspective of this specific conception of autonomy, delusions do not necessarily impair an agent's personal autonomy. In order to establish this claim, I will probe the general idea that delusional subjects are beset by a mental disease that is rationally incapacitating, to which the hierarchical theorist might appeal. I argue that, understood within the parameters set by the commitment to value neutrality, this idea fails to provide support for the claim that delusion necessarily impairs personal autonomy. One contribution this article makes to the effort of understanding how delusion impairs personal autonomy is to help us pinpoint the ways in which our value commitments inform our judgements of impaired personal autonomy in delusional agents.     

History of Religious Delusions and Psychosocial Functioning Among Mexican Patients with Paranoid Schizophrenia

The association between global functionality and religiosity among patients from developing and predominantly Catholic countries warrants attention. To compare religiosity and psychosocial functioning in Mexican schizophrenia patients with and without a history of religious delusions, seventy-four patients with paranoid schizophrenia were recruited. Patients with a history of religious delusions had more psychiatric hospitalizations and poorer psychosocial functioning compared with those without a history of religious delusions. No differences emerged between groups in the total scores of religiosity scales. A history of religious delusions rather than religiosity itself may have an influence on psychosocial functioning among Mexican patients with schizophrenia.     

Helping patients by analyzing self-criticism

This paper is addressed to patients' need for help with punitive self-critical attitudes. Such help has not always been sufficiently provided by psychoanalysts, owing to an unrecognized failure of neutrality. Historically, a gradual overemphasis on the concept of an unconscious sense of guilt has acted as a barrier to the appreciation of shame. An alternative concept, punitive unconscious self-criticism, which stands in contrast to constructive self-criticism and is common to the painful affects of guilt, shame, humiliation, and depression, can facilitate helpful analytic treatment. Heinz Kohut's contributions are examined. His analytic stance is differentiated from his theories of development. In the former, characterized by an affirmative attitude, he takes a position of functional neutrality toward shame and pays consistent though unstated attention to the effects of punitive unconscious self-criticism. The affirmative attitude can be employed without adoption of Kohut's self psychology, i.e., without abandoning the basic psychoanalytic approach to mental conflict and development. The concept of punitive unconscious self-criticism and the concept of divergent conflict, provide sufficient explanatory power. Clinical examples are used to illustrate these ideas.     

On incomprehensibility in schizophrenia

This article examines the supposedly incomprehensibility of schizophrenic delusions. According to the contemporary classificatory systems (DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10), some delusions typically found in schizophrenia are considered bizarre and incomprehensible. The aim of this article is to discuss the notion of understanding that deems these delusions incomprehensible and to see if it is possible to comprehend these delusions if we apply another notion of understanding. First, I discuss the contemporary schizophrenia definitions and their inherent problems, and I argue that the notion of incomprehensibility in these definitions rests heavily on Jaspers’ notions of understanding and empathy. Secondly, I discuss two Wittgensteinian attempts to comprehend bizarre delusions: (a) Campbell’s proposal to conceive delusions as framework propositions and (b) Sass’s suggestion to interpret delusions in the light of solipsism. Finally, I discuss the phenomenological conception of schizophrenia, which conceives delusion formation as resulting from alterations of the structure of experiencing and from underlying self-disorders. I argue that although a psychological understanding that seeks to grasp meaning in terms of motivations, desires, and other more straightforward psychological connections between mental states is impossible in schizophrenia, we can in fact have a philosophical understanding of the schizophrenic world and of the emergence of delusions typically found in schizophrenia.     

Self-criticism and the therapeutic relationship

The relationship between self-criticism and the therapeutic alliance was examined in 169 clients attending counselling in a community clinic. Self-criticism was associated with lower client ratings of the working alliance, suggesting that clients with higher self-criticism had greater difficulties establishing and maintaining a therapeutic alliance. These findings extend previous studies on the working alliance and self-criticism from highly controlled clinical studies to a more ecologically valid community mental health setting. Regression analyses were conducted to examine the mediating effect of additional factors on the relationship between self-criticism and the working alliance. Sensitivity to a perceived subordinate role in therapy did not impact the working alliance, although a general resistance to subordination was related to self-criticism. Implications for counselling self-critical clients are discussed.