Same-different conceptualization by baboons (Papio papio): the role of entropy

The authors trained 6 baboons (Papio papio) to make 1 of 2 report responses to 16-icon same arrays versus 16-icon different arrays. In the same arrays, the icons were all the same as one another, whereas in the different arrays the icons were all different from one another. In Experiment 1, the baboons discriminated the same arrays from the different arrays, and they transferred their discriminative responding to arrays of novel icons. In Experiments 2 and 3, the baboons exhibited strong sensitivity to the degree of display variability when they were shown mixed arrays that comprised some same and some different items. The information theoretic measure "entropy" systematically described these results and outperformed several rival metrics. Finally, in Experiments 4 and 5, the baboons' responses to displays that contained jittered and blurred icons suggested that their same-different conceptual behavior was not based on the spatial orderliness of the visual arrays.     

Perception of pictorial eye gaze by baboons (Papio papio)

Pictorial faces looking left or right were presented to baboons (Papio papio) before the display of a target letter in the left or right hemifield of a monitor screen. Baboons had to provide go or no-go responses taking into account the identity of the target letter. The 1st 6 experiments showed no reliable effect of eye gaze on discrimination speed, using either schematic gazes or pictures of real gazes. Experiment 7 showed that eye gazes facilitated target processing when eye cues were perfect predictors of target location. Findings suggest that baboons do not spontaneously process eye-gaze direction but can learn to do so if the gaze has a predictive value. Implications of these findings on baboons' perspective-taking abilities are discussed.     

Effects of number of items and visual display variability onsame-different discrimination behavior

We explored college students' discrimination of complex visual stimuli that involvedmultiple-item displays. The items in each of the displays could be all the same, all different, or diverse mixtures of some same and some different items. The participants had to learn which of two arbitrary responses was correct for each of the displays without being told about the sameness or differentness of the stimuli. We observed a general improvement in discrimination performance--a rise in choice accuracy and a fall in reaction time-as the number of icons in the display was increased, even when the participants had been trained from the outset with displays containing different numbers of items and when smaller numbers of items were not randomly distributed but grouped in the center of the display. The participants' discrimination behavior also depended on the mixture of same and different items in the displays. Striking individual differences in the participants' discrimination behavior disclosed that people sometimes respond as do pigeons and baboons trained with a similar task. This and previous related research suggest that variability discrimination may lie at the root of same-different categorization behavior.     

Effects of number of items on the baboon's discrimination of same from different visual displays

Three experiments explored the baboon's discrimination of visual displays that comprised 2 to 24 black-and-white computer icons; the displayed icons were either the same as (same) or different from one another (different). The baboons' discrimination of same from different displays was a positive function of the number of icons. When the number of icons was decreased to 2 or 4, the baboons responded indiscriminately to the same and different displays, exhibiting strong position preferences. These results are both similar to and different from those of pigeons that were trained and tested under comparable conditions. Accepted after revision: 23 May 2001 Electronic Publication     

The structure of pigeon multiple-class same-different learning

Three experiments examined the structure of the decision framework used by pigeons in learning a multiple-class same-different task. Using a same-different choice task requiring the discrimination of odd-item different displays (one or more of the display's component elements differed) from same displays (all display components identical), pigeons were concurrently trained with sets of four discriminable display types. In each experiment, the consistent group was tested such that the same and different displays of four display types were consistently mapped onto their choice alternatives. The inconsistent group received a conflicting mapping of the same and different displays and the choice alternatives that differed across the four display types but were consistent within a display type. Experiment 1 tested experienced pigeons, and Experiment 2 tested naive pigeons. In both experiments, the consistent group learned their discrimination faster and to a higher level of choice accuracy than did the inconsistent group, which performed poorly in general. Only in the consistent group was the discrimination transferred to novel stimuli, indicative of concept formation in that group. A third experiment documented that the different display classes were discriminable from one another. These results suggest that pigeons attempt to generate a single discriminative rule when learning this type of task, and that this general rule can cover a large variety of stimulus elements and organizations, consistent with previous evidence suggesting that pigeons may be capable of learning relatively unbounded relational same-different concepts.     

Generalized relational matching by guinea baboons (Papio papio) in two-by-two-item analogy problems

Analogical reasoning is considered the hallmark of human reasoning, but some studies have demonstrated that language- and symbol-trained chimpanzees can also reason analogically. Despite the potential adaptive value of this ability, evidence from other studies strongly suggests that other nonhuman primates do not have this capacity for analogical reasoning. In our three experiments, 6 of 29 baboons acquired the ability to perform a relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) task in which pairs of shapes composed relational displays. Five of these 6 monkeys then transferred this ability to RMTS tasks using novel exemplars of identity (elements in a pair are the same) and nonidentity (elements in a pair are different) relations. This transfer occurred even on trials in which the incorrect pair shared an element with the sample pair with which it was being compared. The baboons retained this ability 12 months later. The findings from our study of symbol-naive monkeys indicate that although language and symbol training facilitate conceptual thinking in nonhuman primates, such training is not a prerequisite for analogical reasoning.     

Concept of uprightness in baboons: assessment with pictures of realistic scenes

How nonhuman primates process pictures of natural scenes or objects remains a matter of debates. This issue was addressed in the current research by questioning the processing of the canonical orientation of pictures in baboons. Two adult guinea baboons were trained to use an interactive key (IK) on a touch-screen to change the orientation of target pictures showing humans or quadruped mammals until upright. In experiment 1, both baboons successfully learned to use the IK when that key induced a 90 degrees rightward rotation of the picture, but post-training transfer of performance did not occur to novel pictures of natural scenes due to potential motor biases. In Experiment 2, a touch on IK randomly displayed the pictures in any of the four cardinal orientations. Baboons successfully learned the task, but transfer to novel pictures could only be demonstrated after they had been exposed to 360-480 pictures in that condition. Experiment 3 confirmed positive transfers to novel pictures, and showed that both the figure and background information controlled the behavior. Our research on baboons therefore demonstrates the development and use of an "upright" concept, and indicates that picture processing modes strongly depend on the subject's past experience with naturalistic pictorial stimuli.     

Processing of biological motion point-light displays by baboons (Papio papio)

Humans apply complex conceptual judgments to point-light displays (PLDs) representing biological motion (BM), but how animals process this kind of display remains uncertain. Four baboons (Papio papio) were trained to discriminate BM from nonbiological motion PLDs using an operant computerized test system. Transfer tests were given after training with novel BM stimuli representing humans or baboons (Experiment 1), with inverted PLDs (Experiment 2), and with BM stimuli in which body parts had been spatially disorganized (Experiment 3). Very limited transfer was obtained with the novel and inverted displays in Experiments 1 and 2, but transfer was much higher after spatial disorganization in Experiment 3. It is suggested that the baboons did not retrieve and interpret the articulated shape of the human or monkey body from the BM PLD stimuli, but rather focused their attention on the configural properties of subparts of the stimuli. Limits in perceptual grouping and restricted abilities in picture-object equivalence might explain why the baboons did not map BM PLD displays onto what they represent.     

Children’s representation of abstract relations in relational/array match-to-sample tasks

Five experiments compared preschool children’s performance to that of adults and of non-human animals on match to sample tasks involving 2-item or 16-item arrays that varied according to their composition of same or different items (Array Match-to-Sample, AMTS). They establish that, like non-human animals in most studies, 3- and 4-year-olds fail 2-item AMTS (the classic relational match to sample task introduced into the literature by Premack, 1983), and that robust success is not observed until age 6. They also establish that 3-year-olds, like non-human animal species, succeed only when they are able to encode stimuli in terms of entropy, a property of an array (namely its internal variability), rather than relations among the individuals in the array (same vs. different), whereas adults solve both 2-item and 16-item AMTS on the basis of the relations same and different. As in the case of non-human animals, the acuity of 3- and 4-year-olds’ representation of entropy is insufficient to solve the 2-item same-different AMTS task. At age 4, behavior begins to contrast with that of non-human species. On 16-item AMTS, a subgroup of 4-year-olds induce a categorical rule matching all-same arrays to all-same arrays, while matching other arrays (mixed arrays of same and different items) to all-different arrays. These children tend to justify their choices using the words “same” and “different.” By age 4 a number of our participants succeed at 2-item AMTS, also justifying their choices by explicit verbal appeals using words for same and different. Taken together these results suggest that the recruitment of the relational representations corresponding to the meaning of these words contributes to the better performance over the preschool years at solving array match-to-sample tasks.     

Control of the corridor illusion in baboons (Papio papio) by gradient and linear-perspective depth cues

The corridor illusion was recently demonstrated in baboons with background pictures containing rich depth information (Barbet and Fagot 2002, Behavioural Brain Research 132 111-115). In the current research we determined the contribution of gradient texture and perspective lines to that illusion. In experiment 1, the corridor illusion was tested in two baboons, with pictures of a hallway as backgrounds, or the same image of the hallway represented by perspective lines. Findings confirmed that the baboons experience the corridor illusion with the picture of the hallway, and showed that this illusion remained with the perspective-line backgrounds. The same procedure was adopted in experiment 2, but with a hallway drawn from gradient textures. The two baboons experienced the illusion in this experiment too. Thus both gradient and perspective line cues convey sufficient information to control the corridor illusion in baboons. In baboons, the processing of these two kinds of depth cues interacts with the perception of object size, suggesting homologous processes of pictorial depth perception in humans and non-human primates.     

Display variability and spatial organization as contributors to the pigeon's discrimination of complex visual stimuli

Three experiments assessed the contributions of display variability and spatial organization to the pigeon's discrimination of 16-icon visual displays. After training to discriminate 4 x 4 arrays of same and different computer icons, 4 pigeons were shown testing displays that systematically manipulated the variability of the depicted icons and their spatial organization on the display screen. Display variability and spatial organization each reliably controlled the pigeon's behavior. These seemingly separate effects could be collectively explained by the pigeon's discriminating the amount of variability or entropy in localized regions of the display.     

Decreasing influence of arbitrarily applicable verbal relations of recreational gamblers: A randomized controlled trial

Twenty‐one recreational gamblers were randomly assigned to two groups; one group was exposed to a conditional discrimination relational training task to bias choice allocation to a black machine presented concurrently with a red machine, and the other group underwent the same relational training task immediately followed by a defusion procedure, designed to expand upon the relations developed in the initial relational task. Both groups completed a simulated slot‐machine task before and after the relational training task, with or without the defusion procedure. Results showed that 9 of 11 participants in the relational training only group showed an increased bias toward the black machine, compared to only 4 of 10 in the relational training plus defusion group; this latter group also showed greater matched responding. Results suggest that expanding verbal–relational networks may reduce the influence of any single verbal relation on gambling choice behavior.     

Comparison of grouping abilities in humans (Homo sapiens) and baboons (Papio papio) with the Ebbinghaus illusion

This research comparatively assessed grouping mechanisms of humans (n = 8) and baboons (n = 8) in an illusory task that employs configurations of target and surrounding circles arranged to induce the Ebbinghaus (Titchener) illusion. Analyses of response behaviors and points of subjective equality demonstrated that only humans misjudged the central target size under the influence of the Ebbinghaus illusion, whereas baboons expressed a more veridical perception of target sizes. It is argued that humans adopted a global mode of stimulus processing of the illusory figure in our task that has favored the illusion. By contrast, a strong local mode of stimulus processing with attention restricted to the target must have prevented illusory effects in baboons. These findings suggest that monkeys and humans have evolved modes of object recognition that do not similarly rely on the same gestalt principles.     

Do humans and baboons use the same information when categorizing human and baboon faces?

What information is used for sorting pictures of complex stimuli into categories? We applied a reverse correlation method to reveal the visual features mediating categorization in humans and baboons. Two baboons and 6 humans were trained to sort, by species, pictures of human and baboon faces on which random visual noise was superimposed. On ambiguous probe trials, a human-baboon morph was presented, eliciting "human" responses on some trials and "baboon" responses on others. The difference between the noise patterns that induced the two responses made explicit the information mediating the classification. Unlike the humans, the baboons based their categorization on information that closely matched that used by a theoretical observer responding solely on the basis of the pixel similarities between the probe and training images. We show that the classification-image technique and principal components analysis provide a method to make explicit the differences in the information mediating categorization in humans and animals.     

Categorization and abstraction abilities in 3-year-old children: a comparison with monkey data

Three-year-old children were tested on three categorization tasks of increasing levels of abstraction (used with adult baboons in an earlier study): the first was a conceptual categorization task (food vs toys), the second a perceptual matching task (same vs different objects), and the third a relational matching task in which the children had to sort pairs according to whether or not the two items belonged to the same or different categories. The children were tested using two different procedures, the first a replication of the procedure used with the baboons (pulling one rope for a category or a relationship between two objects, and another rope for the other category or relationship), the second a task based upon childrens prior experiences with sorting objects (putting in the same box objects belonging to the same category or a pair of objects exemplifying the same relation). The children were able to solve the first task (conceptual categorization) when tested with the sorting into boxes procedure, and the second task (perceptual matching) when tested with both procedures. The children were able to master the third task (relational matching) only when the rules were clearly explained to them, but not when they could only watch sorting examples. In fact, the relational matching task without explanation requires analogy abilities that do not seem to be fully developed at 3 years of age. The discrepancies in performances between children tested with the two procedures, with the task explained or not, and the discrepancies observed between children and baboons are discussed in relation to differences between species and/or problem-solving strategies.     

SPELLING AND EMERGENT PICTURE-PRINTED WORD RELATIONS ESTABLISHED WITH DELAYED IDENTITY MATCHING TO COMPLEX SAMPLES

Students with academic deficits learned delayed matching-to-sample tasks that used complex sample stimuli, each consisting of a picture and a printed word. A touch to the sample complex removed it from the computer display and produced either picture comparisons or a choice pool of letters. If the comparisons were pictures, selecting the picture identical to the preceding sample was reinforced. If the letters appeared, letter-by-letter construction of the preceding printed word sample was reinforced. The procedure engendered new constructed-response spelling performances and arbitrary relations among pictures and printed words in matching to sample. The emergence of relations among different sets of printed words (paired with the same pictures) suggested classes of equivalent stimuli. Outcome tests involving spoken words as sample stimuli suggested expansion of subjects' spelling repertoires and stimulus classes.     

Visual search for global/local stimulus features in humans and baboons

Fagot and Deruelle (1997) demonstrated that, when tested with identical visual stimuli, baboons exhibit an advantage in processing local features, whereas humans show the “global precedence” effect initially reported by Navon (1977). In the present experiments, we investigated the cause of this species difference. Humans and baboons performed a visual search task in which the target differed from the distractors at either the global or the local level. Humans responded more quickly to global than to local targets, whereas baboons did the opposite (Experiment 1). Human response times (RTs) were independent of display size, for both local and global processing. Baboon RTs increased linearly with display size, more so for global than for local processing. The search slope for baboons disappeared for continuous targets (Experiment 2). That effect was not due to variations in stimulus luminance (Experiment 3). Finally, variations in stimulus density affected global search slopes in baboons but not in humans (Experiment 4). Overall, results suggest that perceptual grouping operations involved during the processing of hierarchical stimuli are attention demanding for baboons, but not for humans.     

A case for restricted-domain relational learning

Monkeys and pigeons learned a same/different task with pairs that were selected from a training set of eight picture stimuli. They showed no novel-stimulus transfer and hence no abstract-concept learning. They were also tested with novel pairs of the eight training pictures (i.e., combinations that had not been used in training) and with inverted pictures of the training pairs. If the subjects had learned the task item-specifically (e.g., if—then or configural learning), they should have failed these tests, but they performed well with novel combinations of training pictures and inverted pictures, suggesting that they learned the task relationally (i.e., on the basis of the relationship between the two pictures that were presented in each trial). This somewhat paradoxical conclusion of relational learning in the absence of abstract-concept learning is contrary to most theories of abstract-concept learning. The implications of this conclusion are discussed in the context of restricted-domain relational learning.     

Entropy and variability discrimination

Two experiments examined college students' discrimination of complex visual displays that involved different degrees of variability or "entropy." Displays depicted 16 black and white line drawings of various types (e.g., a brain, a clock, a hand); the participants were required to classify a display in terms of its variability (e.g., a low-variability display contains many identical items, whereas a high-variability display contains few identical items). The participants' accuracy and reaction time scores on a 2-alternative forced-choice discrimination disclosed that people can and do use entropy to classify different levels of visual display variability. Individuals differed in their use of absolute rather than relative entropy.     

Visual search by chimpanzees (Pan): assessment of controlling relations.

Three experimentally sophisticated chimpanzees (Pan), Akira, Chloe, and Ai, were trained on visual search performance using a modified multiple-alternative matching-to-sample task in which a sample stimulus was followed by the search display containing one target identical to the sample and several uniform distractors (i.e., negative comparison stimuli were identical to each other). After they acquired this task, they were tested for transfer of visual search performance to trials in which the sample was not followed by the uniform search display (odd-item search). Akira showed positive transfer of visual search performance to odd-item search even when the display size (the number of stimulus items in the search display) was small, whereas Chloe and Ai showed a transfer only when the display size was large. Chloe and Ai used some nonrelational cues such as perceptual isolation of the target among uniform distractors (so-called pop-out). In addition to the odd-item search test, various types of probe trials were presented to clarify the controlling relations in multiple-alternative matching to sample. Akira showed a decrement of accuracy as a function of the display size when the search display was nonuniform (i.e., each "distractor" stimulus was not the same), whereas Chloe and Ai showed perfect performance. Furthermore, when the sample was identical to the uniform distractors in the search display, Chloe and Ai never selected an odd-item target, but Akira selected it when the display size was large. These results indicated that Akira's behavior was controlled mainly by relational cues of target-distractor oddity, whereas an identity relation between the sample and the target strongly controlled the performance of Chloe and Ai.