The "Humpty Dumpty Problem" in the Study of Early Cognitive Development: Putting the Infant Back Together Again

ABSTRACT— In this article, I propose that the big question for the field of infant cognitive development is best characterized as the "Humpty Dumpty problem": Now that we have studied cognitive abilities in isolation, how do we put the developing cognitive system (and the infant) back together again? This problem is significant because cognitive abilities do not occur in isolation. Infants remember the items they have attended to and perceived, and their emotional state will influence their perception and representation of the events they encounter. Moreover, by examining the development of the whole cognitive system, or the whole child, we gain a deeper understanding of mechanisms developmental change. Thus, the big question for the study of infant cognition is like the question confronting all the king's horses and all the king's men: How do we put the infant's cognitive system back together again?     

From Daily Life to Philosophy

Abstract: This article argues that the little everyday things of life often provide excellent entries into the intellectual problems of academic philosophy. This is illustrated with an analysis of four small stories taken from daily life in which people are in agony because they do not know what to do. It is argued that the crucial question in these stories is a philosophical question—not a closed request for empirical or formal information but an open question about how best to conceive of human experience. A discussion follows of the merits and shortcomings of transcendentalism as an attempt by philosophers to make progress. It is argued that reformulating questions is what philosophers can do to contribute to people's comfort in life. This is illustrated with an argument showing that in the small stories discussed the question of what to do should be reformulated as the question of who to be.     

Are we born and do we die?

The stranglehold on our imagination by the mind-body dualisms that permeate the culture is such that most people seem to suppose that "body" and "soul" name distinct and separable entities. Resisting such dualisms in favour of an old-fashioned Aristotelean view of the soul as the form of the body, this essay considers two questions: do human parents produce human beings, and do human beings die? The doctrine of the special creation of the individual soul seems to require us to answer the first question in the negative because, according to this doctrine, parents only produce matter for the God-given soul to form. As to the second, many people seem to suppose that human beings do not die, only their bodies do. Arguing against the view that immortality is a natural property of human minds, the essay suggests (with the help of Joseph Ratzinger) that, whether we speak of "immortality" or of "resurrection", life from death is neither nature, nor achievement, but gift.     

Embryos created for research purposes.

The creation of embryos for research use has drawn a great deal of criticism. It is difficult to defend an ethical distinction between what one can do to "spare" embryos and what one can do to "research" embryos. The strongest ground on which to argue against the creation of embryos for research is a symbolic one, having to do with respect for human life. Ronald Dworkin's work in Life's Dominion on the symbolic meaning of the abortion debate throws a helpful light on this dispute. By understanding the basic question to be, Does the creation of research embryos weaken or insult our communal respect for the sanctity of human life in some way that in vitro fertilization (IVF) or the experimental use of "spare" embryos does not?, the debate can move in a more constructive direction.     

Does mentioning "some people" and "other people" in a survey question increase the accuracy of adolescents' self-reports?

A great deal of developmental research has relied on self-reports solicited using the "some/other" question format ("Some students think that… but other students think that…"). This article reports tests of the assumptions underlying its use: that it conveys to adolescents that socially undesirable attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors are not uncommon and legitimizes reporting them, yielding more valid self-reports than would be obtained by "direct" questions, which do not mention what other people think or do. A meta-analysis of 11 experiments embedded in four surveys of diverse samples of adolescents did not support the assumption that the some/other form increases validity. Although the some/other form led adolescents to think that undesirable attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors were more common and resulted in more reports of those attitudes and behaviors, answers to some/other questions were lower in criterion validity than were answers to direct questions. Because some/other questions take longer to ask and answer and require greater cognitive effort from participants (because they involve more words), and because they decrease measurement accuracy, the some/other question format seems best avoided.     

Free will and the Genome Project

...I want to argue that the Human Genome Project itself poses no special problem for human freedom, understood in relation to the philosophical issue of free will versus determinism. It seems to pose a problem only if one muddles the interpretation of the issue or of the project that is supposed to bear on it. There is a need for conceptual clarification to point this out, perhaps, but I see no need for "research" in the sense that implies original investigation. However, I also want to probe a bit deeper to identify a distinct set of philosophical worries about freedom that seem to have been misplaced onto the standard issue, the issue of freedom versus determinism, in this discussion and elsewhere. After arguing that the genome project has no real bearing on free will versus determinism, I shall attempt to identify the threat it poses to freedom partly by detaching it from this standard version of the free will question. I shall argue that the worrisome forms of genetic influence that the project might uncover do not really presuppose determinism. But what they do presuppose -- some form of internal or psychological constraint on behavior -- suggests an alternative version of the free will question as the source of popular fears about scientific explanation of human behavior. What is under threat on this version of the question is the Aristotelian notion of character formation and self-control.     

Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology as Non-Conventionally Utopian

This essay takes up the claim made recently by Simon Critchley in The Companion to Continental Philosophy that a feature common to many philosophers in the Continental tradition is the utopian demand that things be otherwise. The general question I pursue has to do with whether or not such a claim includes movements within Continental philosophy that do not self-identify with the utopian (like critical theory). The particular question has to do with whether or not the movement of phenomenology is utopian or does it, because of its other commitments, view the utopian as the antithesis to its orientation, which makes that claim that phenomenology is utopian seem strange. My thesis is that phenomenology can be seen as a utopian tradition but that some account must be given that demonstrates this connection to the utopian. In particular, I argue that Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology provides an understanding of the utopian, which I call a non-conventional view, that is vastly different from the one assumed by most when they see or hear the word utopian, which I label conventional. I show that such a non-conventional understanding can be developed in a way that neither requires us to view the utopian solely as opposed to finitude and contingency, nor a form of thought and action from which we necessarily need to dissociate ourselves. It is this non-conventional view of the utopian that in the end enables us to understand how Continental philosophy in general and phenomenology in particular are important bearers of the utopian demand that things be otherwise.     

Use It—and Keep It, Longer, Probably: A Reply to Salthouse (2006)

ABSTRACT— In this article, I call into serious question Salthouse's (2006) conclusions evaluating and disparaging the validity of the "use it or lose it" hypothesis regarding mental exercise and mental aging. I do so, in some part, by using data not discussed by Salthouse. The core of my argument relies heavily on a critical assessment of the conclusions that Salthouse derived from both his theoretical reasoning and his review of the literature. The more judicious conclusion I reach is that, although the whole story regarding cognitive function and aging is not known, at some level and to some degree, "using" it often delays the eventuality of "losing" it.     

What's in a name: what analyst and patient call each other

Awkward moments often arise between patient and analyst involving the question, "What do we call each other?" The manner in which the dyad address each other contains material central to the patient's inner life. Names, like dreams, deserve a privileged status as providing a royal road into the paradoxical analytic relationship and the unconscious conflicts that feed it. Whether an analyst addresses the patient formally, informally, or not at all, awareness of the issues surrounding names is important.     

Practical Reasons and the Redundancy of Motives

Jonathan Dancy, in his 1994 Aristotelian Society Presidential Address, set out to show 'why there is really no such thing as the theory of motivation'. In this paper I want to agree that there is no such thing, and to offer reasons of a different kind for that conclusion. I shall suggest that the so-called theory of motivation misconstrues the question which it purports to answer, and that when we properly analyse the question and distinguish it clearly from other questions with which it should not be confused, we do not need a theory of motivation at all.     

Appearances,antirealism, and Aristotle

Summary Nussbaum misconstrues the difference between Plato and Aristotle over what is real for a debate over a conception of truth. She seems to mistake Aristotle's arguments against Plato' version of realism as an argument against realism per se, though the texts do not permit such a reading. She claims Aristotle is convinced that realism involves a fatal failure of reference, yet she produces not a single text where Aristotle is even remotely concerned about such a failure of reference given the commitments of realism. And nowhere is the crucial question of the relationship between Aristotle's antirealism and his method of appearances explicitly addressed or resolved.Nussbaum offers us a fashionable Aristotle. I have argued that, far from being attractive and obviously right on a deep and recent metaphysuical debate, Nussbaum's Aristotle is confused and inconsistent and thus that it is a good thing the texts do not support such a characterization.     

Moral Responsibility and the Irrelevance of Physics: Fischer’s Semi-compatibilism vs. Anti-fundamentalism

The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer’s plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a better option for ensuring the irrelevance of physics than the embrace of semi-compatibilism, since there are reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary. There are two distinct reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities might be necessary for moral responsibility—one of which is to do with fairness, the other to do with agency itself. It is suggested that if one focuses on the second of these reasons, Fischer’s arguments for supposing that alternate possibilities are unnecessary for moral responsibility can be met by the incompatibilist. Some possible reasons for denying that alternate possibilities are necessary for the existence of agency are then raised and rejected.

How counting represents number: what children must learn and when they learn it

This study compared 2- to 4-year-olds who understand how counting works (cardinal-principle-knowers) to those who do not (subset-knowers), in order to better characterize the knowledge itself. New results are that (1) Many children answer the question "how many" with the last word used in counting, despite not understanding how counting works; (2) Only children who have mastered the cardinal principle, or are just short of doing so, understand that adding objects to a set means moving forward in the numeral list whereas subtracting objects mean going backward; and finally (3) Only cardinal-principle-knowers understand that adding exactly 1 object to a set means moving forward exactly 1 word in the list, whereas subset-knowers do not understand the unit of change.     

Easy Knowledge

Stewart Cohen has recently presented solutions to two forms of what he calls "The Problem of Easy Knowledge" ("Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV, 2, September 2002, pp. 309-329). I offer alternative solutions. Like Cohen's, my solutions allow for basic knowledge. Unlike his, they do not require that we distinguish between animal and reflective knowledge, restrict the applicability of closure under known entailments, or deny the ability of basic knowledge to combine with self-knowledge to provide inductive evidential support. My solution to the closure version of the problem covers a variation on the problem that is immune to Cohen's approach. My response to the bootstrapping version presents reasons to question whether the problem case, as Cohen presents it, is even possible, and, assuming it is, my solution avoids a false implication of Cohen's own. The key to my solutions for both versions is the distinction between an inference's transferring epistemic support, on the one hand, and its not begging the question against skeptics, on the other.     

Substantivity in feminist metaphysics

Elizabeth Barnes and Mari Mikkola raise the important question of whether certain recent approaches to metaphysics exclude feminist metaphysics. My own approach (from my book Writing the Book of the World) does not, or so I argue. I do define “substantive” questions in terms of fundamentality; and the concepts of feminist metaphysics (and social metaphysics generally) are nonfundamental. But my definition does not count a question as being nonsubstantive simply because it involves nonfundamental concepts. Questions about the causal structure of the world, including the causal structure of the social world, are generally substantive because their answers are not sensitive to any alternate, equally good conceptual choices we could have made. I also argue that such questions are substantive regardless of the ontology of social kinds.     

Comments on Jonathan Lear’s<Emphasis Type="Italic"> Radical Hope</Emphasis> (Harvard: 2006)

Cultural devastation, and the proper response to it, is the central concern of Radical Hope. I address an uncertainty in Lear’s book, reflected in a wavering over the difference between a culture’s way of life becoming impossible and its way of life becoming unintelligible. At his best, Lear asks the radical ontological question: when the cultural collapse is such that the old way of life has become not only impossible but retroactively unimaginable,––when nothing one can do (or did) makes sense anymore,––how can one go on? In raising this question, Lear’s book is a remarkable breakthrough; it comes close to raising the crucial ontological question of how to deal with the total collapse of a culture, and it may well become a classic by starting a conversation on the question: How should we live when our own culture is in the process of actually collapsing?

Lear suggests that

[w]hat would be required … would be a new Crow poet: one who could take up the Crow past and—rather than use it for nostalgia or ersatz mimesis—project it into vibrant new ways for the Crow to live and to be. (p. 51)

Later Heidegger had a similar suggestion for us and I try to spell it out briefly.     

Operationism in psychology: what the debate is about, what the debate should be about

I offer an analysis of operationism in psychology, which is rooted in an historical study of the investigative practices of two of its early proponents (S. S. Stevens and E. C. Tolman). According to this analysis, early psychological operationists emphasized the importance of experimental operations and called for scientists to specify what kinds of operations were to count as empirical indicators for the referents of their concepts. While such specifications were referred to as "definitions," I show that such definitions were not taken to constitute a priori knowledge or be analytically true. Rather, they served the pragmatic function of enabling scientists to do research on a purported phenomenon. I argue that historical and philosophical discussions of problems with operationism have conflated it, both conceptually and historically, with positivism, and I raise the question of what are the "real" issues behind the debate about operationism.     

Taking seriously the "what then?" question: an ethical framework for the responsible management of medical disasters

When healthcare resources become overwhelmed in medical disasters, as they inevitably will, we have to ask, in an unflinching fashion, the question: "What then?" or more precisely, "What should we do when we run out of resources?" In a mass casualty event worthy of the designation, we will indeed run out of resources, perhaps quite quickly. This article provides an ethical framework for the responsible management of medical disasters in which the "What then?" question must be asked. The framework begins with a critique of existing guidance from professional associations of physicians and then argues for an alternative approach that qualifies the obligation to preserve life, takes seriously the ethical challenges of overwhelmed healthcare resources, and countenances physician-assisted suicide as a last resort.     

The evocative power of words: activation of concepts by verbal and nonverbal means

A major part of learning a language is learning to map spoken words onto objects in the environment. An open question is what are the consequences of this learning for cognition and perception? Here, we present a series of experiments that examine effects of verbal labels on the activation of conceptual information as measured through picture verification tasks. We find that verbal cues, such as the word "cat," lead to faster and more accurate verification of congruent objects and rejection of incongruent objects than do either nonverbal cues, such as the sound of a cat meowing, or words that do not directly refer to the object, such as the word "meowing." This label advantage does not arise from verbal labels being more familiar or easier to process than other cues, and it does extends to newly learned labels and sounds. Despite having equivalent facility in learning associations between novel objects and labels or sounds, conceptual information is activated more effectively through verbal means than through nonverbal means. Thus, rather than simply accessing nonverbal concepts, language activates aspects of a conceptual representation in a particularly effective way. We offer preliminary support that representations activated via verbal means are more categorical and show greater consistency between subjects. These results inform the understanding of how human cognition is shaped by language and hint at effects that different patterns of naming can have on conceptual structure.     

Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer?

The question I address in this article is whether it is morally wrong for a lawyer to represent a client whose purpose is immoral or unjust. My answer to this question is that it is wrong, prima facie. This conclusion holds, even accepting certain traditional principles of lawyer's professional ethics, such as the right of defence and the so‐called principle of ‘adversarial’ litigation. Both the adversarial system and the right of defence are sufficient to support or justify the right of potential clients (and citizens in general) to defend their interests in the judicial system and to do so with the technical assistance of a lawyer. This right includes a right to pursue unjust or immoral purposes (within the law). However, having a right to do X does not mean that it is morally permissible to do X. We can have a right to do something morally wrong. This being so, the fundamental moral reason for a lawyer not to accept representation for a client with an immoral purpose is that it is, prima facie, morally wrong to help someone do something wrong.