The role of intuitive moral foundations in Britain's vote on EU membership

In June 2016, British voters took part in a referendum on the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union (EU). By a margin of 52% to 48%, they voted to leave. Studies have demonstrated that fixed demographic factors were the best predictors of voting intentions in either direction, or that “leave” voters were driven by perceived threats from immigration. In this paper, we examine the role of moral intuitions in referendum voting intentions. In Study 1 , demographic variables did not predict voting intentions after adding psychological variables to our statistical model. Instead, voting leave was predicted by political conservatism, social change insecurities, and placing moral importance on personal liberty. In contrast, only an adherence to the care foundation of morality predicted “remain” voting. These findings were also reflected in linguistic analyses of campaign materials and news items (Study 2 ). We discuss these data in relation to common discourses around the Brexit vote.     

Examining the role of moral foundations in promoting intergroup contact willingness

Improving people's motivation to seek meaningful intergroup contact is considered key to facilitating intergroup harmony. Based on moral foundations theory, this study examines how moral foundations as individual traits predict contact willingness with three minority groups (foreign domestic helpers, LGBT, and Chinese expats) and how moral emotions mediate such associations. We tested our hypotheses based on survey data across Hong Kong and Singapore. We found that care/harm foundation positively predicted contact willingness with foreign domestic helpers and LGBT people, mediated by compassion. Sanctity/degradation foundation negatively predicted contact willingness with LGBT people only in Singapore. Loyalty/betrayal foundation served as a positive predictor of willingness to contact Chinese expats. We also found care/harm foundation to be exclusively associated with compassion and promoted willingness to contact with helpers and LGBT people. Our findings highlight the influence of moral foundations, and possibly norms and intergroup dynamics at the societal level in predicting willingness to contact outgroups.     

Contextualizing clinical research: the epistemological role of clinical equipoise

Since its introduction in 1987, Benjamin Freedman’s principle of clinical equipoise has enjoyed widespread uptake in bioethics discourse. Recent years, however, have witnessed a growing consensus that the principle is fundamentally flawed. One of the most vocal critics has undoubtedly been Franklin Miller. In a 2008 paper, Steven Joffe and Miller build on this critical work, offering a new conception of clinical research ethics based on science, taking what they call a “scientific orientation” toward the ethics of clinical research. Though there is much to recommend Joffe and Miller’s scientifically oriented conception of clinical research ethics, I believe that both the critical and constructive projects suffer from the same basic mistake: inattention to context. The internal norms of science cannot be fully specified, let alone satisfied, independently of contextual (external) factors that only come into view when we are attentive to the particular context of that form of inquiry.     

The religious and moral foundations of pastoral counseling

This paper explores the significant issues related to the articulation of distinctions between pastoral counseling and the secular psychotherapies. The argument is made that pastoral counseling can be distinguished from the secular psychotherapies because the former is grounded in the moral vision of the religious traditions as well as the growing body of clinical knowledge the secular psychotherapies have made available to the culture. A dialectical model of moral inquiry is then presented as the most adequate for the pastoral counseling enterprise to carry out its inescapable moral task.He is a Candidate-in-Training at the C.G. Jung Institute in New York City.     

The role of moral commitments in moral judgment

Traditional approaches to moral psychology assumed that moral judgments resulted from the application of explicit commitments, such as those embodied in consequentialist or deontological philosophies. In contrast, recent work suggests that moral judgments often result from unconscious or emotional processes, with explicit commitments generated post hoc. This paper explores the intermediate position that moral commitments mediate moral judgments, but not through their explicit and consistent application in the course of judgment. An experiment with 336 participants finds that individuals vary in the extent to which their moral commitments are consequentialist or deontological, and that this variation is systematically but imperfectly related to the moral judgments elicited by trolley car problems. Consequentialist participants find action in trolley car scenarios more permissible than do deontologists, and only consequentialists moderate their judgments when scenarios that typically elicit different intuitions are presented side by side. The findings emphasize the need for a theory of moral reasoning that can accommodate both the associations and dissociations between moral commitments and moral judgments.     

The role of examples in moral philosophy

Contemporary moral philosophy for the most part relegates examples to a negative role, as counter-examples. In this essay a view is articulated according to which the example has a much more positive and more fundamental role to play in the argumentation of moral philosophy: according to this view, examples may provide grounding for general moral principles. Some of the philosophical implications or presuppositions of such a view of examples are examined.     

The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values

While individual differences in the willingness and ability to engage analytic processing have long informed research in reasoning and decision making, the implications of such differences have not yet had a strong influence in other domains of psychological research. We claim that analytic thinking is not limited to problems that have a normative basis and, as an extension of this, predict that individual differences in analytic thinking will be influential in determining beliefs and values. Along with assessments of cognitive ability and style, religious beliefs, and moral values, participants judged the wrongness of acts considered disgusting and conventionally immoral, but that do not violate care- or fairness-based moral principles. Differences in willingness to engage analytic thinking predicted reduced judgements of wrongness, independent of demographics, political ideology, religiosity, and moral values. Further, we show that those who were higher in cognitive ability were less likely to indicate that purity, patriotism, and respect for traditions and authority are important to their moral thinking. These findings are consistent with a “Reflectionist” view that assumes a role for analytic thought in determining substantive, deeply-held human beliefs and values.     

Relation,consensus, and commitment as foundations of moral growth

In her book, In a Different Voice, Gilligan failed to include a discussion of her earlier borrowing from Perry and of his critical use of relation, conversation and commitment. Gilligan's book is persuasive in its argument that an alternative to exclusively formalistic ethics needs to be recognised. However, the integration of central ideas from Perry offers some significant extensions of the usefulness of her work and establishes dialectical conversation as essential to mature valuing.     

Moral foundations,worldviews, moral absolutism and belief in conspiracy theories

In the present research, we examined whether individual differences in basic moral concerns might be related to a greater endorsement of conspiracy theories. Building on the notion that conspiracy theories often deal with super‐individual relevant events in which a group perspective is central, we proposed that individual differences in moral concerns pertaining to group‐ and community‐concerns (i.e., binding moral foundations) rather than to individual well‐being (i.e., individualising moral foundations) would be positively associated with conspiracy beliefs. We further hypothesised that such relations would be totally mediated by beliefs in a dangerous world and by embracing moral absolutism. We found support for these predictions in two community samples (Ns: 319; 514). Theoretical implications were discussed.     

The lover of the beautiful and the good: Platonic foundations of aesthetic and moral value

Though acknowledged by scholars, Plato’s identification of the Beautiful and the Good has generated little interest, even in aesthetics where the moral concepts are a current topic. The view is suspect because, e.g., it is easy to find examples of ugly saints and beautiful sinners. In this paper the thesis is defended using ideas from Plato’s ancient commentators, the Neoplatonists. Most interesting is Proclus, who applied to value theory a battery of linguistic tools with fixed semantic properties—comparative adjectives, associated gradable adjectives, mass nouns, and predicate negations—all with a semantics that demand a privative scale of value. It is shown how it is perfectly possible to interpret value terms Platonically over privative Boolean algebras so that beautifuland good diverge while at higher levels other value terms are coextensional. Considerations are offered that this structure conforms to actual usage.     

The interplay of modern myths about sexual aggression and moral foundations in the blaming of rape victims

Moral Foundations Theory proposes five intuition-based moral concerns: Care and Fairness (“individualizing foundations”) as well as Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity (“binding foundations”). In studies carried out in Italy, Spain, and Germany, the authors examined how these concerns are associated with the acceptance of modern myths about sexual aggression (AMMSA), and how both jointly predict rape victim blaming. Overall, victim blaming was positively predicted by Authority and Sanctity, and negatively predicted by Care and Fairness. Although victim blaming was best predicted by AMMSA, moral concerns also contributed to its prediction, partly independently, partly mediated through AMMSA, and in the case of Sanctity in interaction with AMMSA. Discussion highlights how integrating moral foundations in the investigation of victim blaming and AMMSA across different cultural contexts may deepen our understanding of why, in each cultural context, victim blaming and related beliefs are resistant to change.