Moral Responsibility, Psychiatric Disorders and Duress

ABSTRACT  The paper is a discussion of moral responsibility and excuses in regard to psychiatric disorders involving abnormal desires (e.g. impulse control disorders such as kleptomania and pyromania, psychosexual disorders such as exhibitionism, obsessive-compulsive disorder and others). It points out problems with previous approaches to the question of whether or not to excuse persons with these disorders, and offers a new approach based on the concept of duress. There is a discussion of duress in regard to non-psychiatric cases based on the core notion of duress involving a choice between undesirables, and the paper concludes with an argument that moral blame for individuals with these sorts of disorders should often be lessened and in some cases removed entirely.     

Duress and Responsibility for Action

ABSTRACT Not all crimes require mens rea, but all serious ones do. Crudely the requirement is that the defendant be able to take responsibility for the actus reus of which he is accused. What must be implied by this is essentially that the agent retain control of his actions. It is unjust to punish actions which are outside of the agent's control since such punishment cannot deter and is, arguably, pointless.
Duress does not remove an agent's control of his actions. This does not mean that actions performed under duress should be viewed as fully intentional. For though the agent foresees and wishes for the result of his action performed under duress, it is wished for as the best option out of a range of alternatives manipulated by the one who makes the threats which constitute the duress. The agent is responsible for his choice, but not for what is available for him to choose. He has an obligation to do what is best in the circumstances and should not be blamed if that would, in other circumstances, be accounted criminal.     

Roman Catholic Clericalism,Religious Duress,and Clergy Sexual Abuse

Since 1984, sexual abuse by Catholic clergy has captured public attention and resulted in a stream of criminal and civil lawsuits. The hierarchy has been defensive in the face of constant accusations and criticism. This study examines selected key aspects of the clergy sex abuse phenomenon including historical precedents and the impact of clericalism on the development of psychological and emotional duress in victims and others closely associated with sexual abuse.     

Reinhold and the Promise of a Higher Metaphysics

While Reinhold was no doubt interested in harnessing Kantian practical reason as a rational ground for our fundamental religious convictions, it remains unclear as to whether he reserves any role for theoretical or speculative reason in moral faith, and if so, what. This paper argues that he continues to assign an important role to speculative reason in the establishment and dissemination of a “religion of reason” in his efforts across three major texts of the Jena period (namely, the 1786–1787 Letters on the Kantian Philosophy , the 1789 Attempt at the New Theory of the Human Power of Representation , and the 1790 first edition of Contributions to the Correction of the Misunderstandings of Previous Philosophers ) to outline a “new metaphysics” that accounts for supersensible objects (God, the soul, freedom, and the physical, the moral and the intelligible world) in terms of forms of reason. It shows how Reinhold develops a unified account of speculative and practical reason by extending the former's role to include that of producing ideas that pertain to the practical postulates and narrowing the latter's role to that of imparting objective reality and further content to the ideas.     

Anchoring,Familiarity, and Confidence in the Detection of Deception

Anchoring in judgments is the tendency for the final judgment to be biased toward the initial estimate through insufficient adjustment. In the context of the detection of deception, it has been used to explain phenomena such as negative absolute leakage and the truthfulness bias. We examined the influence of order of judgment type on attitude ratings, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias. Receivers of communications should tend to anchor their judgments on the sender's attitudinal position if asked to make attitude judgments first and on the sender's behavior if asked to make truthfulness judgments first. The results partly support these predictions. Negative absolute leakage, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias were not significantly different for those who made attitude judgments before truthfulness judgments. However, results show that accuracy decreased as the session continued and there was no difference in the confidence with which truth and deception judgments were made, but there was a positive relation between confidence and truthfulness bias.     

Base Rates,Deception Detection,and Deception Theory: A Reply to Burgoon (2015)

This essay continues a debate about the relative scientific merits of the Park‐Levine Model (PLM) and Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) with regard to accuracy in deception detection. Key points of disagreement include (a) the degree to which message recipients are sensitive to sender veracity and (b) the extent to which interactivity moderates the veracity and base‐rate effects specified by PLM. According to PLM, people are truth‐biased, truth‐bias makes people insensitive to deception, and as a consequence, base rates affect accuracy regardless of interactivity. IDT, in direct contrast, holds that people are sensitive to the veracity of other's communication and that interactivity is a key moderator. Consistent with PLM, data repeatedly show that people are insensitive to other's veracity and that this insensitivity is general across media affordances including interactivity. This rejoinder uses Burgoon's (2015) own interactive data to demonstrate the empirical superiority of PLM over IDT.     

Self–Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe

In the debate over the nature of self–deception, "intentionalists" argue that self–deception requires an intention to deceive oneself, and "motivationists" argue that a desire, and not an intention, typically plays a crucial causal role in self–deception. Intentionalists have criticized motivationist views for ignoring what is distinctive about self–deception, and for failing to account for cases of "twisted" self–deception. I offer a new motivationist account whose distinctive element is the desire to believe. I argue that this account identifies what is common to cases of both "twisted" and "straight" self–deception, and that it captures what is distinctive about self–deception.     

Deception Meets Enlightenment: From a Viable Theory of Deception to a Quirk About Humanity's Potential

This article seeks to further suggestions made by C. West Churchman (1979) Churchman, C. W. 1979. The systems approach and its enemies, New York: Basic Books.  [Google Scholar] that a full inquiry into human systems requires a viable theory of deception. It argues that such a theory of deception requires an understanding of deception, a recognition of errors in perception, and an ability to see simultaneously from competing points of view. The intent here is to provide some insights that are useful in our understanding of deception, and thereby contributing to a viable theory of deception. Insights are used from what Huxley (1944) Huxley, A. 1944. The perennial philosophy, New York: Harper and Row.  [Google Scholar] calls the “perennial tradition,” found particularly within the esoteric traditions of the Buddhist, Sufi, and Taoist esoteric teachings, as well as many other spiritual traditions of the world. The perennial tradition emphasizes the role and continual presence of deception, alongside enlightenment, within human experience. In accord with C. West Churchman's view, this tradition suggests that, by a simultaneous recognition of both our enlightenment and our deception in any given situation, we have the proper perspective to meet the problems we face. A thought experiment, using insights from the perennial tradition, is offered as a challenge to all involved in human systems inquiry.     

Clericalism,Religious Duress and its Psychological Impact on Victims of Clergy Sexual Abuse

Religious duress is a unique kind of threat and constraint involuntarily experienced by some members of the Roman Catholic Church as a result of religious indoctrination and training. Fear, awe and respect for the clergy foster the development and actualization of religious duress. This phenomenon can seriously impede a person’s capacity to accurately perceive and evaluate abusive actions perpetrated on them by clergy. This constraint poses an impediment to emotional and spiritual development. Internalized religious duress confuses and psychologically overwhelms such individuals and renders them incapable of absorbing their sexual trauma. The consequent feelings of numbness and immobility distort the perception of reality. It then becomes impossible for the individual to act in a manner that would protect and promote emotional growth and spiritual well being.     

The Hope,Promise, and Possibility of Psychotherapy

In this paper, five values—diversity, science, education, practice, and spirit—(a) are examined within the professional context of psychotherapy, (b) are presented as forming the foundation of much if not all that is psychotherapy, and (c) are considered as binding values that join us as a community of practicing, theorizing, and researching psychotherapists. Some of the positives of each value are reviewed. Diversity has heightened our sensitivity to and respect for individual and cultural differences. Science has kept us focused on empirically challenging and empirically informing our practice. Education has maintained emphasis on providing solid training/supervision in psychotherapy and transmitting its culture. Practice has provided us with opportunities to increasingly implement and expand on our role as helpers and healers. Spirit has been the guiding light—the heart and soul—that supports, infuses and informs all of our therapeutic endeavors and gives them meaning. What follows is a celebration of sorts—(a) capturing some of what we have done and are doing right in psychotherapy, (b) reflecting some of the weight of those “right” efforts, and (c) conveying some of the inherent hope, promise, and possibility that forever guide us in our work.     

Manipulation and Deception

This paper introduces the category of ‘non-deceptive manipulation that causes false beliefs’, analyzes how it narrows the traditional scope of ‘deception’, and draws moral implications.     

Towards a Cognitive Theory of Cyber Deception

This work is an initial step toward developing a cognitive theory of cyber deception. While widely studied, the psychology of deception has largely focused on physical cues of deception. Given that present-day communication among humans is largely electronic, we focus on the cyber domain where physical cues are unavailable and for which there is less psychological research. To improve cyber defense, researchers have used signaling theory to extended algorithms developed for the optimal allocation of limited defense resources by using deceptive signals to trick the human mind. However, the algorithms are designed to protect against adversaries that make perfectly rational decisions. In behavioral experiments using an abstract cybersecurity game (i.e., Insider Attack Game), we examined human decision-making when paired against the defense algorithm. We developed an instance-based learning (IBL) model of an attacker using the Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-R) cognitive architecture to investigate how humans make decisions under deception in cyber-attack scenarios. Our results show that the defense algorithm is more effective at reducing the probability of attack and protecting assets when using deceptive signaling, compared to no signaling, but is less effective than predicted against a perfectly rational adversary. Also, the IBL model replicates human attack decisions accurately. The IBL model shows how human decisions arise from experience, and how memory retrieval dynamics can give rise to cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias. The implications of these findings are discussed in the perspective of informing theories of deception and designing more effective signaling schemes that consider human bounded rationality.