Mirror neurons are not evidence for the Simulation Theory

Recently, there as been a resurgence of interest in theories of mindreading. New discoveries in neuroscience have revitalized the languishing debate. The discovery of so-called mirror neurons has revived interest particularly in the Simulation Theory (ST) of mindreading. Both ST proponents and theorists studying mirror neurons have argued that mirror neurons are strong evidence in favor of ST over Theory Theory (TT). In this paper I argue against the prevailing view that mirror neurons are evidence for the ST of mindreading. My view is that on an appropriate construal of their function, mirror neurons do not operate like simulation theorists claim. In fact, mirror neurons are more appropriately understood as one element in an information-rich mindreading process. As such, mirror neurons fit in better with some sort of TT account of mindreading. I offer a positive account, the Model TT, which better explains the role of mirror neurons in social cognition.     

Mirror neurons and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity

The neurological discovery of mirror neurons is of eminent importance for the phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity. G. Rizzolatti and V. Gallese found in experiments with primates that a set of neurons in the premotor cortex represents the visually registered movements of another animal. The activity of these mirror neurons presents exactly the same pattern of activity as appears in the movement of one's own body. These findings may be extended to other cognitive and emotive functions in humans. I show how these neurological findings might be “translated” phenomenologically into our own experienced sensations, feelings and volitions.     

Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading

A new class of visuomotor neuron has been recently discovered in the monkey's premotor cortex: mirror neurons. These neurons respond both when a particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action, performed by another individual, is observed. Mirror neurons appear to form a cortical system matching observation and execution of goal-related motor actions. Experimental evidence suggests that a similar matching system also exists in humans. What might be the functional role of this matching system? One possible function is to enable an organism to detect certain mental states of observed conspecifics. This function might be part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind-reading ability. Two different accounts of mind-reading have been suggested. According to ‘theory theory', mental states are represented as inferred posits of a naive theory. According to ‘simulation theory', other people's mental states are represented by adopting their perspective: by tracking or matching their states with resonant states of one's own. The activity of mirror neurons, and the fact that observers undergo motor facilitation in the same muscular groups as those utilized by target agents, are findings that accord well with simulation theory but would not be predicted by theory theory.     

Mirror neurons and their function in cognitively understood empathy

The current renewal of interest in empathy is closely connected to the recent neurobiological discovery of mirror neurons. Although the concept of empathy has been widely deployed, we shall focus upon one main psychological function it serves: enabling us to understand other peoples’ intentions. In this essay we will draw on neuroscientific, psychological, and philosophical literature in order to investigate the relationships between mirror neurons and empathy as to intention understanding. Firstly, it will be explored whether mirror neurons are the neural basis of our empathic capacities: a vast array of empirical results appears to confirm this hypothesis. Secondly, the higher level capacity of reenactive empathy will be examined and the question will be addressed whether philosophical analysis alone is able to provide a foundation for this more abstract level of empathy. The conclusion will be drawn that both empirical evidence and philosophical analysis can jointly contribute to the clarification of the concept of empathy.     

Mirror neurons and embodied simulation in the development of archetypes and self-agency

Abstract :  In this paper I explore the role of mirror neurons and motor intentionality in the development of self-agency. I suggest that this will also give us a firmer basis for an emergent view of archetypes, as key components in the development trajectory of self-agency, from its foundation in bodily action to its mature expression in mentalization and a conscious awareness of intentionality. I offer some ideas about the implications of these issues of self-agency for our clinical work with patients whose developmental trajectory of self-agency has been partially inhibited, so that their communications have a coercive effect. I discuss the possibility that this kind of clinical phenomenon may relate to Gallese and Lakoff's hypothesis that abstract thought and imagination are forms of simulated action, and that the same sensory-motor circuits that control action also control imagination, concept formation and understanding, but with a crucial development, that of an inhibition of the connections between secondary pre-motor cortical areas and the primary motor cortex. I shall speculate that in the earlier developmental stages of self-agency, the separation of secondary from primary motor areas is not complete, so that imagination and thought are not entirely independent of physical action.     

Patients are not fully human: a nurse's coping response to stress

In this article, dehumanization of patients was studied as a strategy used by nurses to cope with stress. Affective organizational commitment (AOC) and affective commitment to patients (ACP) were tested as moderators. We also explored how nurses' humanity attributions to their in‐group relate to stress symptoms. Participants were nurses working in different wards of an Italian urban hospital. Findings showed that perceiving patients as not fully human was related to lower levels of stress symptoms for nurses with high AOC and ACP, but not for nurses with low AOC and ACP. Moreover, for highly committed nurses, the attribution of uniquely human traits to the in‐group was associated with increased stress symptoms. Implications of findings for the relationship between nurses and patients are discussed.     

A model of aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic judgments

Although aesthetic experiences are frequent in modern life, there is as of yet no scientifically comprehensive theory that explains what psychologically constitutes such experiences. These experiences are particularly interesting because of their hedonic properties and the possibility to provide self‐rewarding cognitive operations. We shall explain why modern art's large number of individualized styles, innovativeness and conceptuality offer positive aesthetic experiences. Moreover, the challenge of art is mainly driven by a need for understanding. Cognitive challenges of both abstract art and other conceptual, complex and multidimensional stimuli require an extension of previous approaches to empirical aesthetics. We present an information‐processing stage model of aesthetic processing. According to the model, aesthetic experiences involve five stages: perception, explicit classification, implicit classification, cognitive mastering and evaluation. The model differentiates between aesthetic emotion and aesthetic judgments as two types of output.     

Cance and luck are not the same

In the mind of many people chance and luck act as real but different causes of events. Even in strictly defined situations as casino gambling, people may perceive influences of luck that help to overcome the negative expectancy defined by the rules of chance. Interviews with gamblers in casinos confirmed this idea. In two experiments it was established that the distinction between chance and luck are also made by ordinary subjects in everyday situations. The results revealed that chance is perceived to operate when an event is surprising, an unexpected coincidence. Luck is perceived when an event implies the escape from negative consequences, or the achievement of something that is important and difficult. The distinction between chance and luck can explain why people are trapped by the illusion of control, even when it is clear that they have no influence on the physical causation determining the outcomes of events. They cannot change the outcome of the roulette wheel, but they can employ their luck, which helps them to place their bets on the winning number.     

Why faces are and are not special: an effect of expertise

Recognition memory for faces is hampered much more by inverted presentation than is memory for any other material so far examined. The present study demonstrates that faces are not unique with regard to this vulnerability to inversion. The experiments also attempt to isolate the source of the inversion effect. In one experiment, use of stimuli (landscapes) in which spatial relations among elements are potentially important distinguishing features is shown not to guarantee a large inversion effect. Two additional experiments show that for dog experts sufficiently knowledgeable to individuate dogs of the same breed, memory for photographs of dogs of that breed is as disrupted by inversion as is face recognition. A final experiment indicates that the effect of orientation on memory for faces does not depend on inability to identify single features of these stimuli upside down. These experiments are consistent with the view that experts represent items in memory in terms of distinguishing features of a different kind than do novices. Speculations as to the type of feature used and neuropsychological and developmental implications of this accomplishment are offered.     

Plucks and bows are not categorically perceived

Letter-like targets (a circle and a square) were presented in one of two fixed and cued visual field locations and were shown alone, flanked by a noise stimulus on the peripheral side (side of target farthest from fixation), on the central side, or on both sides simultaneously. The adjacent target and noise stimulus borders had similar featural properties (both curved or both straight lines) or dissimilar properties (one being a curved line and one a straight line). Each of 10 subjects made a go, no-go response only when his or her designated target appeared in a display. The results showed: (1) single targets were discriminated more accurately and more rapidly than were targets shown simultaneously with noise stimuli, (2) targets having dissimilar border relationships with noise items were discriminated more accurately than were targets having similar border relationships, (3) targets in central-noise displays were discriminated more accurately and rapidly than were targets in peripheral-noise displays, and (4) there was no interaction between border relationships and noise position. The principal result relating to target-noise border featural relationship was consistent with predictions derived from models which place the locus of noise effects at the stage of stimulus feature extraction. Aspects of the results were, however, seen to be consistent with both feature extraction and response competition conceptualizations.     

The effects of valence‐based and discrete emotional states on aesthetic response

There is increasing recognition that consumer aesthetics—the responses of consumers to the aesthetic or appearance aspects of products—has become an important area of marketing in recent years. Consumer aesthetic responses to a product are a source of pleasure for the consumer. Previous research into the aesthetic responses to products has often emphasized exterior factors and visual design, but studies have seldom considered the psychological aesthetic experience of consumers, and in particular their emotional state. This study attempts to bridge this gap by examining the link between consumers’ emotions and their aesthetic response to a product. Thus, the major goal of this study was to determine how valence‐based and discrete emotional states influence choice. In Studies 1 and 2, positive and negative emotions were manipulated to implement two different induction techniques and explore the effect of emotions on participants’ choices in two separate experiments. The results of both experiments confirmed the predictions, indicating that aesthetic responses and purchase intention are functions of emotional valence, such that both are stronger for people in a positive emotional state than for those in a negative emotional state. Study 2 also used a neutral affective state to establish the robustness of this observed effect of incidental affect. The results of Study 3 demonstrate that aesthetic response and purchase intention are not only a function of affect valence, but also are affected by the certainty appraisal associated with specific affective states. This research, therefore, contributes to the literature by offering empirical evidence that incidental affect is a determinant of aesthetic response.     

The Mirror and I: When private opinions are in conflict with public norms

In two studies it is demonstrated that two self-saliency manipulations, often used interchangeably, can have profoundly different consequences. Whereas self-activation increased stereotyping in highly prejudiced participants, a mirror decreased stereotyping. Results show that this difference can be ascribed to the activation of specific self-aspects. Whereas a mirror increased both private and public self-awareness (and, hence, awareness of the social norm that stereotyping is bad), self-activation increased private self-awareness exclusively (and, hence, awareness of privately held negative stereotypes). The implications of these findings for the relation between self-awareness and conformity to social norms are discussed.