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Scott F. Aikin 《Human Studies》2006,29(3):317-340
Pragmatism’s naturalism is inconsistent with the phenomenological tradition’s anti-naturalism. This poses a problem for the
methodological consistency of phenomenological work in the pragmatist tradition. Solutions such as phenomenologizing naturalism
or naturalizing phenomenology have been proposed, but they fail. As a consequence, pragmatists and other naturalists must
answer the phenomenological tradition’s criticisms of naturalism. 相似文献
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James E. Tomberlin 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》1998,32(S12):489-498
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Steve Clarke 《Sophia》2009,48(2):127-142
There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural
entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural
entities. Naturalism is characterized, following Leiter and Rea, as a position which involves a primary commitment to scientific
methodology and it is argued that any naturalistic ontological commitments must be compatible with this primary commitment.
It is further argued that properly applied scientific method has warranted the acceptance of the existence of supernatural
entities in the past and that it is plausible to think that it will do so again in the future. So naturalists should allow
for the possibility of supernatural entities.
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Steve ClarkeEmail: |
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Lisa Warenski 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):403-426
This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in
a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical
indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted
in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with
the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further
conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable
in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish
empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.
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Lisa WarenskiEmail: |
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James Maffie 《Erkenntnis》1995,43(1):1-27
Naturalists seek continuity between epistemology and science. Critics argue this illegitimately expands science into epistemology and commits the fallacy of scientism. Must naturalists commit this fallacy? I defend a conception of naturalized epistemology which upholds the non-identity of epistemic ends, norms, and concepts with scientific evidential ends, norms, and concepts. I argue it enables naturalists to avoid three leading scientistic fallacies: dogmatism, one dimensionalism, and granting science an epistemic monopoly. 相似文献