The Transcendental Method and (Post-)Empiricist Philosophy of Science

This paper reconsiders the relation between Kantian transcendental reflection (including transcendental idealism) and 20th century philosophy of science. As has been pointed out by Michael Friedman and others, the notion of a “relativized a priori” played a central role in Rudolf Carnap’s, Hans Reichenbach’s and other logical empiricists’ thought. Thus, even though the logical empiricists dispensed with Kantian synthetic a priori judgments, they did maintain a crucial Kantian doctrine, viz., a distinction between the (transcendental) level of establishing norms for empirical inquiry and the (empirical) level of norm-governed inquiry itself. Even though Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions is often taken to be diametrically opposed to the received view of science inherited from logical empiricism, a version of this basically Kantian distinction is preserved in Kuhn’s thought. In this respect, as Friedman has argued, Kuhn is closer to Carnap’s theory of linguistic frameworks than, say, W.V. Quine’s holistic naturalism. Kuhn, indeed, might be described as a “new Kant” in post-empiricist philosophy of science. This article examines, first, the relativization of the Kantian a priori in Reichenbach’s work, arguing that while Reichenbach (after having given up his original Kantianism) criticized “transcendentalism”, he nevertheless retained, in a reinterpreted form, a Kantian-like transcendental method, claiming that the task of philosophy (of science) is to discover and analyze the presuppositions underlying the applicability of conceptual systems. Then, some reflections on Kuhn’s views on realism are offered, and it is suggested that Kuhn (as well as some other influential contributors to the realism debate, such as Hilary Putnam) can be reinterpreted as a (relativized, naturalized) Kantian transcendental idealist. Given the central importance of Kuhnian themes in contemporary philosophy of science, it is no exaggeration to claim that Kantian transcendental inquiry into the constitutive principles of empirical knowledge, and even transcendental idealism (as the framework for such inquiry), still have a crucial role to play in this field and deserve further scrutiny.     

再论我国心理学的分化现象

我国心理学正处于分化过程之中,其中两个明显的例证就是:基础心理学与应用及人文心理学的分化,以及对心理学研究和服务成果的评价标准摆脱SCI的束缚.这背后深层的原因在于,若以科学哲学认识论的视角,人类的知识大致可分为可靠有用的知识和无用虚幻(伪科学)的知识,可靠知识又可进一步分为科学的知识和非科学的知识.心理学从诞生之日起...     

Bayesian test and Kuhn’s paradigm

Kuhn’s theory of paradigm reveals a pattern of scientific progress, in which normal science alternates with scientific revolution. But Kuhn underrated too much the function of scientific test in his pattern, because he focuses all his attention on the hypothetico-deductive schema instead of Bayesian schema. This paper employs Bayesian schema to re-examine Kuhn’s theory of paradigm, to uncover its logical and rational components, and to illustrate the tensional structure of logic and belief, rationality and irrationality, in the process of scientific revolution. __________ Translated from Ziran Bianzhengfa Tongxun 自然辩证法通讯 (Journal of Dialectics of Nature), 2005 (6) by Zhang Jianfeng, proofread by Wang Dong     

试论康德心理学思想及其对当代的影响

康德著作中蕴含着丰富的心理学思想,其在继承沃尔夫理性心理学与经验心理学二分的基础上,通过批评理性心理学,消解了我思的主体地位,为解决二元论问题做出了重要努力;通过批评经验心理学,指明了心理学在成长为一门科学过程中必须面对的诸多问题。新康德主义在继承并改造康德思想的过程中,发展出一系列影响深远的心理学理论;认知心理学的重要代表人物皮亚杰基于对康德思想独具特色的把握,提出了发生认识论;而当代认知科学的图式理论,则完全是建基于对康德经验图式理论框架的全面继承上。     

Paul Meehl as methodologist-philosopher of science: the formulation of metascience

Paul Meehl's contributions to methodology and the philosophy of science extend well beyond his widely known writings in such areas as construct validity and statistical significance testing. I describe one of Meehl's less well-known, but potentially most important, methodological undertakings: his work on metascience, or the science of science. Metascience could ultimately revolutionize our conceptualizations and understanding of science and provide considerable help to practicing scientists and scientific endeavors, including efforts to advance the development and appraisal of theories in psychology.     

心理学中实验法的方法论地位重估

认知心理学以实验法为其方法论基础,着力对人类的认识过程进行模型建构。然而,早在20世纪70年代初,其创立者奈塞尔就对心理学的实验范式感到不满,转而寻求心理学的生态学效度。心理学中对实验法的推崇源于自然科学特别是物理学的成功。而实际上,物理学在20世纪初遭遇了实验法所带来的困境。受制于实验法的种种局限,当代认知科学逐渐放弃了方法论的沙文主义立场,接纳了来自语言学、哲学、神经科学等多领域、多视角的研究策略。心理学在一定程度上具有人文科学的性质,因此同样需要采用多重研究手段和方法,而不是一味地笃信实验法的权威性。     

Carnap,Kuhn, and revisionism: on the publication of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Structure</Emphasis> in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Encyclopedia</Emphasis>

In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly regarding Carnap’s work. In this paper, I argue against the interpretation that Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the revisionist idea that Carnap “would have found Structure philosophically congenial”. I claim that Kuhn’s book, from Carnap’s point of view, is not in philosophy of science but rather in history of science (in the context of a sharp discovery–justification distinction). It could also explain the fact that, despite his sympathetic letters to Kuhn as editor, Carnap never refers to Kuhn’s book in his work in philosophy of science.     

文化视域下认知心理学范式演进探新

认知科学的发展历程经历了符号范式、联结主范式和具身认知范式的演变。认知心理学范式演变折射出认知心理学研究方式转变和对人的心智探索的深化,同时也反映出关于身心关系实现了从传统的身心二元对立到当下身心一体论的超越;对其文化反思是引领心理学从离身认知到具身认知进程更趋合理化的基础。     

But is it sociology of knowledge? Wilhelm Jerusalem’s “sociology of cognition” in context

This paper considers the charge that??contrary to the current widespread assumption accompanying the near-universal neglect of his work??Wilhelm Jerusalem (1854?C1923) cannot count as one of the founders of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. In order to elucidate the matter, Jerusalem??s ??sociology of cognition?? is here reconstructed in the context of his own work in psychology and philosophy as well as in the context of the work of some predecessors and contemporaries. It is argued that while it shows clear discontinuities with the present-day understanding of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge, Jerusalem??s sociology of cognition was not only distinctive in its own day but also anticipated in nuce a much-discussed theme in current history of science.     

CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY*

This article addresses two related themes: (1) the interface between clinical research and contemporary philosophy of science, and (2) sociopsychological processes as they are reflected in clinical research. It is argued that our research efforts in clinical psychology continue to be dominated by logical empiricism, an epistemology that has failed to survive recent criticisms stemming from the refinement of our conceptions of explicit rationality. The self-contradictory paradox faced by logical empiricism and all other justificational approaches to knowledge is avoided by the nonjustificational perspectives that have developed over the last two decades. Clinical researchers are urged to reappraise the assumptions and implications of conventional epistemologies and to explore the alternatives emerging from these more recent developments in philosophy of science. The second part of the article argues that human psychological processes are an imperative topic of inquiry in an adequate model of science. Knowledge can be viewed as an active process of constructing order; as such, its analysis requires an understanding of the knower and psychological knowing processes. This point is illustrated and elaborated in four commentaries on contemporary inference traditions, the shifting sands of parochialism in clinical psychology, the popularity of molecular research, and the tyranny of technique in our research and practice. Concluding remarks are addressed to the adequacy of contemporary graduate education and the responsibilities attendant on our roles as scientists, teachers, and practitioners of psychology.     

Methodological naturalism and epistemic internalism

Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology, which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer reasons for thinking that naturalism in epistemology is compatible with both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. We also argue that there are some distinctively internalist aims that are currently being studied scientifically and these notions, and others, should be studied by scientific methods. This essay is dedicated to Deborah Mayo, who has long advocated using error statistical techniques to analyze and resolve epistemological puzzles in the philosophy of science. This essay follows the same spirit by advocating that computational concepts and techniques be applied within the heart of traditional, analytic epistemology.     

儿童朴素物理学的错误概念及影响概念转换的因素

建构主义的学习观认为,新知识的学习总是建立在旧知识的基础上,新旧知识经验进行双向交流。儿童在日常生活中形成的自发概念是科学学习的重要基础,而其中与基本科学理论不一致的错误概念阻碍了学习过程。该文概述了儿童朴素物理学的错误概念研究,探讨自发概念的结构及其争论,并总结了影响概念转换的重要因素,包括认知冲突感,元认知和动机因素,认识论信念因素等     

Did Tom Kuhn actually Meet Tom Bayes?

Wesley Salmon and John Earman have presented influential Bayesian reconstructions of Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory-change. In this paper I argue that all attempts to give a Bayesian reading of Kuhn’s philosophy of science are fundamentally misguided due to the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory is in fact inconsistent with Kuhn’s account. The reasons for this inconsistency are traced to the role the concept of incommensurability plays with reference to the ‘observational vocabulary’ within Kuhn’s picture of scientific theories. The upshot of the discussion is that it is impossible to integrate both Kuhn’s claims and Bayesianism within a coherent account of theory-change.

Descartes as critic of Galileo's scientific methodology

Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.     

Idealizations and scientific understanding

In this paper, I propose that the debate in epistemology concerning the nature and value of understanding can shed light on the role of scientific idealizations in producing scientific understanding. In philosophy of science, the received view seems to be that understanding is a species of knowledge. On this view, understanding is factive just as knowledge is, i.e., if S knows that p, then p is true. Epistemologists, however, distinguish between different kinds of understanding. Among epistemologists, there are those who think that a certain kind of understanding??objectual understanding??is not factive, and those who think that objectual understanding is quasi-factive. Those who think that understanding is not factive argue that scientific idealizations constitute cognitive success, which we then consider as instances of understanding, and yet they are not true. This paper is an attempt to draw lessons from this debate as they pertain to the role of idealizations in producing scientific understanding. I argue that scientific understanding is quasi-factive.     

STATE OF SCIENCE IN INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: A REVIEW OF SELF-REPORTED LIMITATIONS

This study investigated self-reported limitations of published papers as an alternative and novel operationalization of the state of science of industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology. A content analysis was conducted of the reported limitations in every I-O psychology articles published in the Academy of Management Journal, the Journal of Applied Psychology, and Personnel Psychology between 1995 and 2008 (N= 2,402). Articles were coded for the number and types of limitations reported, characteristics of the research design, and topic area. Threats to internal validity were the most often reported limitations. In addition, variations were detected in the reporting of limitations over time, indicating a subtle but steady shift in the focus of I-O psychology research. Implications of these results for the science and practice of I-O psychology and for the use of self-reported limitations in scientific communication are discussed.     

心理学解释的层次与衔接问题

心理学解释(psychological explanation)及其相关问题的探讨,是当代心理学哲学的一个重要论域,也是心理学方法论的核心理论问题。对心理现象的本质、特征及其作用机制的探讨,历来是哲学家与科学家孜孜以求的共同事业。在从不同视角、基点、逻辑理路对心灵及其与大脑的关系进行探析的过程当中,形成了不同的研究范式、概念框架和解释原则。我们既可以从较高的、个人的解释层次