Immediate and delayed effects of causal uncertainty inductions on uncertainty accessibility

Previous research has focused on enhanced processing as a response to causal uncertainty (CU), but relatively little empirical attention has been given to how CU is activated and the temporal unfolding of this activation. The current research investigates the counterintuitive idea that people inhibit causal uncertainty immediately after its activation. We find that this inhibition weakens over time. Study 1 demonstrates this inhibition effect with self-report uncertainty. Study 2 demonstrates this effect with an implicit accessibility measure. Temporary inhibition of uncertainty may be a general response when uncertainty is activated.     

The power of causal beliefs and conflicting evidence on causal judgments and decision making

In two experiments, we investigated the relative impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence on both decision making and causal judgments, and whether this relative impact could be altered by previous experience. Participants had to decide which of two alternatives would attain a higher outcome on the basis of four cues. After completing the decision task, they were asked to estimate to what extent each cue was a reliable cause of the outcome. Participants were provided with instructions that causally related two of the cues to the outcome, whereas they received neutral information about the other two cues. Two of the four cues—a causal and a neutral cue—had high validity and were both generative. The remaining two cues had low validity, and were generative in Experiment 1, but almost not related to the outcome in Experiment 2. Selected groups of participants in both experiments received pre-training with either causal or neutral cues, or no pre-training was provided. Results revealed that the impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence depends on both the experienced pre-training and cue validity. When all cues were generative and participants received pre-training with causal cues, they mostly relied on their causal beliefs, whereas they relied on empirical evidence when they received pre-training with neutral cues. In contrast, when some of the cues were almost not related to the outcome, participants’ responses were primarily influenced by validity and—to a lesser extent—by causal beliefs. In either case, however, the influence of causal beliefs was higher in causal judgments than in decision making. While current theoretical approaches in causal learning focus either on the effect of causal beliefs or empirical evidence, the present research shows that both factors are required to explain the flexibility involved in human inferences.     

Intolerance of uncertainty,causal uncertainty,causal importance,self-concept clarity and their relations to generalized anxiety disorder

Although numerous studies have provided support for the notion that intolerance of uncertainty plays a key role in pathological worry (the hallmark feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD)), other uncertainty-related constructs may also have relevance for the understanding of individuals who engage in pathological worry. Three constructs from the social cognition literature, causal uncertainty, causal importance, and self-concept clarity, were examined in the present study to assess the degree to which these explain unique variance in GAD, over and above intolerance of uncertainty. N = 235 participants completed self-report measures of trait worry, GAD symptoms, and uncertainty-relevant constructs. A subgroup was subsequently classified as low in GAD symptoms (n = 69) or high in GAD symptoms (n = 54) based on validated cut scores on measures of trait worry and GAD symptoms. In logistic regressions, only elevated intolerance of uncertainty and lower self-concept clarity emerged as unique correlates of high (vs. low) GAD symptoms. The possible role of self-concept uncertainty in GAD and the utility of integrating social cognition theories and constructs into clinical research on intolerance of uncertainty are discussed.     

The impact of domain-specific beliefs on decisions and causal judgments

Extensive evidence suggests that people often rely on their causal beliefs in their decisions and causal judgments. To date, however, there is a dearth of research comparing the impact of causal beliefs in different domains. We conducted two experiments to map the influence of domain-specific causal beliefs on the evaluation of empirical evidence when making decisions and subsequent causal judgments. Participants made 120 decisions in a two-alternative forced-choice task, framed in either a medical or a financial domain. Before each decision, participants could actively search for information about the outcome (“occurrence of a disease” or “decrease in a company's share price”) on the basis of four cues. To analyze the strength of causal beliefs, we set two cues to have a generative relation to the outcome and two to have a preventive relation to the outcome. To examine the influence of empirical evidence, we manipulated the predictive power (i.e., cue validities) of the cues. Both experiments included a validity switch, where the four selectable cues switched from high to low validity or vice versa. Participants had to make a causal judgment about each cue before and after the validity switch. In the medical domain, participants stuck to the causal information in causal judgments, even when evidence was contradictory, while decisions showed an effect of both empirical and causal information. In contrast, in the financial domain, participants mainly adapted their decisions and judgments to the cue validities. We conclude that the strength of causal beliefs (1) is shaped by the domain, and (2) has a differential influence on the degree to which empirical evidence is taken into account in causal judgments and decision making.     

Counter-stereotypic beliefs in math do not protect school girls from stereotype threat

The threat of being negatively stereotyped in math impairs performance of highly qualified females on difficult math tests, a phenomenon known as “stereotype threat”—ST. Perhaps more alarmingly, recent studies based on unselective samples of elementary-, middle-, and high-school students show that ST also operates in girls from the general population. Here we offer first evidence that ST does operate (with large effect sizes) even in middle-school girls who deny the negative gender stereotype. Children’s beliefs about the two genders math ability, therefore, do not necessarily moderate their susceptibility to ST, an important issue that remained unclear so far. This new finding is also of great practical significance: School girls’ counter-stereotypic beliefs cannot be taken as sufficient evidence for deciding whether the struggle against ST is or is not needed. Appropriate interventions should be the default option when aiming for true gender equality in math and science achievements.     

Just world beliefs, causal beliefs, and acquaintance: Associations with stigma toward eating disorders and obesity

The current study investigated the relationship between just world beliefs and stigmatizing attitudes toward eating disorders and obesity. Further, the associations between stigma and causal beliefs, and between stigma and acquaintance with these conditions, were examined. Participants (n = 447) read four vignettes describing an individual with anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, binge eating disorder, or obesity. After each vignette, participants completed questionnaires assessing stigmatizing attitudes, just world beliefs, causal beliefs, and acquaintance with the condition depicted in the vignette. Stronger just world beliefs were associated with greater stigma toward all three eating disorders, as well as obesity (rs ranging from −.11 to −.18). More stigmatizing attitudes were associated with greater attribution of individual responsibility for the development of the disorder. However, participants with personal experience or who knew someone with the depicted problem did not have lower stigma scores than those who did not. The current study suggests that justification ideologies such as just world beliefs and controllability beliefs may underlie the stigmatization of eating disorders and obesity. These findings provide support for stigma reduction efforts aimed at targeting justification ideologies and altering causal beliefs.     

Disentangling stereotype activation and stereotype application in the stereotype misperception task

When forming impressions about other people, stereotypes about the individual's social group often influence the resulting impression. At least 2 distinguishable processes underlie stereotypic impression formation: stereotype activation and stereotype application. Most previous research has used implicit measures to assess stereotype activation and explicit measures to assess stereotype application, which has several disadvantages. The authors propose a measure of stereotypic impression formation, the stereotype misperception task (SMT), together with a multinomial model that quantitatively disentangles the contributions of stereotype activation and application to responses in the SMT. The validity of the SMT and of the multinomial model was confirmed in 5 studies. The authors hope to advance research on stereotyping by providing a measurement tool that separates multiple processes underlying impression formation.     

Obsessive beliefs and uncertainty in obsessive compulsive and related patients

Background/objectiveThe aim of the present study was to examine obsessive beliefs and intolerance of uncertainty differences among patients Obsessive compulsive disoreder (OCD), trichotillomania, excoriation, generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and a control group healthy.Method130 participants between the ages of 17 and 62 years (Mean = 29.56, SD = 11.81) diagnosed with OCD (n = 36), trichotillomania (n = 18), excoriation (n = 17), GAD (n = 31) and a healthy control group (n = 28) were evaluated by Obsessive Beliefs Spanish Inventory-Revised and Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale.ResultsThe trichotillomania group presented one of the highest obsessive beliefs highlighting over-importance of thoughts, thought action fusion-moral, importance of controlling one's thoughts. The OCD group also had higher scores in inflated responsibility and thought action fusion-likelihood. The GAD group excelled in inhibitory and prospective uncertainty. The level of depression influenced obsessive beliefs while anxiety affected inhibitory and prospective uncertainty.ConclusionsCognitive variables such as obsessive beliefs and Intolerance of Uncertainty should be considered in the prevention and intervention of obsessive and anxiety disorders.     

Interaction between previous beliefs and cue predictive value in covariation-based causal induction

The main aim of this work was to show the impact of preexisting causal beliefs on causal induction from cause-effect co-occurrence information, when several cues compete with each other for predicting the same effect. Two different causal scenarios -- one social (a), the other medical (b) -- were used to check the generality of the effects. In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants were provided information on the co-occurrence of a two-cause compound and an effect, but not about the potential relationship between each cause by its own and the effect. As expected, prior beliefs -- induced by means of instructions -- strongly modulated the causal strength assigned to each element of the compound. In Experiments 2a and 2b, covariation evidence was provided, not only about the predictive value of the two-cause compound, but also about one of the elements of the compound. When this evidence was available, prior beliefs had less impact on judgments, and these were mostly guided by the relative predictive value of the cue. These results demonstrate the involvement of inferential integrative mechanisms in the generation of causal knowledge and show that single covariation detection mechanisms -- either rule-based or associative -- are insufficient to account for human causal judgment. At the same time, the fact that the power of new covariational evidence to change prior beliefs depended on the availability of information on the relative (conditional) predictive value of the target candidate cause suggests that causal knowledge derived from information on causal mechanisms and from covariation probably share a common representational basis.     

Strategy selection in causal reasoning: when beliefs and covariation collide.

The present study investigated how people combine covariation information (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1992) with pre-existing beliefs (White, 1989) when evaluating causal hypotheses. Three experiments, using both within- and between-subjects designs, found that the use of covariation information and beliefs interacted, such that the effects of covariation were larger when people assessed hypotheses about believable than about unbelievable causal candidates. In Experiment 2, this interaction was observed when participants made judgments in stages (e.g., first evaluating covariation information about a causal candidate and then evaluating the believability of a candidate), as well as when the information was presented simultaneously. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this pattern was also reflected in participants' metacognitive judgments: Participants indicated that they weighed covariation information more heavily for believable than unbelievable candidates. Finally, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated the presence of individual differences in the use of covariation- and belief-based cues. That is, individuals who tended to base their causality judgments primarily on belief were less likely to make use of covariation information and vice versa. The findings were most consistent with White's (1989) causal power theory, which suggests that covariation information is more likely to be considered relevant to believable than unbelievable causes.     

Antecedents of causal uncertainty and perceived control: a prospective study

Perceptions of lack of control have been thought to be closely related to causal uncertainty, or uncertainty about the causes of events (Weary and Edwards, 1994). A 6-week prospective study tested the notion that perceived lack of control results in higher levels of later causal uncertainty. This prediction was confirmed. It also was found that time 1 causal uncertainty was associated with higher levels of time 2 perceptions of lack of control. Feelings of lack of control, causal uncertainty, and levels of depressive symptomatology were concurrently related at both time periods. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the influence of causal beliefs on the feeling of agency

The sense of agency is the experience of being the origin of a sensory consequence. This study investigates whether contextual beliefs modulate low-level sensorimotor processes which contribute to the emergence of the sense of agency. We looked at the influence of causal beliefs on ‘intentional binding’, a phenomenon which accompanies self-agency. Participants judged the onset-time of either an action or a sound which followed the action. They were induced to believe that the tone was either triggered by themselves or by somebody else, although, in reality, the sound was always triggered by the participants. We found that intentional binding was stronger when participants believed that they triggered the tone, compared to when they believed that another person triggered the tone. These results suggest that high-level contextual information influences sensorimotor processes responsible for generating intentional binding.     

The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty

Two studies examined a novel prediction of the causal Bayes net approach to judgments under uncertainty, namely that causal knowledge affects the interpretation of statistical evidence obtained over multiple observations. Participants estimated the conditional probability of an uncertain event (breast cancer) given information about the base rate, hit rate (probability of a positive mammogram given cancer) and false positive rate (probability of a positive mammogram in the absence of cancer). Conditional probability estimates were made after observing one or two positive mammograms. Participants exhibited a causal stability effect: there was a smaller increase in estimates of the probability of cancer over multiple positive mammograms when a causal explanation of false positives was provided. This was the case when the judgments were made by different participants (Experiment 1) or by the same participants (Experiment 2). These results show that identical patterns of observed events can lead to different estimates of event probability depending on beliefs about the generative causes of the observations.     

Adjusting for the correspondence bias: Effects of causal uncertainty, cognitive busyness, and causal strength of situational information

This research examined the conditions under which people who have more chronic doubt about their ability to make sense of social behavior (i.e., are causally uncertain; [Weary and Edwards, 1994] and [Weary and Edwards, 1996]) are more likely to adjust their dispositional inferences for a target’s behaviors. Using a cognitive busyness manipulation within the attitude attribution paradigm, we found in Study 1 that higher causal uncertainty predicted increased correction of dispositional inferences, but only when participants had sufficient attentional resources to devote to the task. In Study 2, we found that higher-causal uncertainty predicted greater inferential correction, but only when the additional information provided a more compelling alternative explanation for the observed behavior. Results of this research are discussed in terms of their relevance to the Causal Uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994) and dispositional inference models.     

Arousal and stereotype threat

Seemingly insignificant features of the context can undermine the quantitative performance of skilled females—an effect attributed to stereotype threat. The present studies tested the hypotheses that stereotype threat triggers arousal, and that attributions about that arousal could moderate the effects of stereotype threat on performance. To examine whether arousal is triggered by stereotype threat, we conducted two experiments in which female participants were asked to take a math test under conditions of stereotype threat or not. In Study 1, women under stereotype threat performed better on an easy threat-irrelevant task, but worse on a difficult threat-irrelevant task than women not under threat. In Study 2, threatened women underperformed on a math test, but this underperformance was attenuated for women directed to misattribute their arousal. These results suggest that arousal—and how arousal is attributed—may play an important role in the debilitating effects of stereotype threat.     

Seeing the forest and not the trees: When impact uncertainty heightens causal complexity

This study attempts to isolate the effects of experiencing uncertainty on people's cognitive processes. I argue that people can believe that their actions affect the outcome (i.e. outcome control), but still face uncertainty regarding the extent to which actions will make a difference (i.e. impact uncertainty). To this end, I introduce a novel experimental paradigm which isolates the effects of impact uncertainty from outcome control. The findings revealed that after experiencing impact uncertainty, participants demonstrated greater causal complexity (i.e. more likely to make situational attributions and judge outcomes as having a “ripple effect”), but did not make fewer effort attributions for the outcomes. These findings demonstrate how the experience of impact uncertainty can affect cognitive processing, without compromising outcome control. Implications of these findings for developing more nuanced theories on control and uncertainty are discussed.     

Aging and stereotype suppression

Recent work in social cognitive aging has suggested that older adults are more likely than younger adults to activate and use stereotypic information, even when they intend not to. Furthermore, evidence suggests that older adults have difficulty altering their interpretation of a situation, even when it has become clear that their initial interpretation is incorrect. In the current study, younger and older adults read a series of narratives in which a character had a sex-stereotyped occupation (e.g., a plumber is stereotypically male), and the character's gender was either consistent or inconsistent with that stereotype. Explicit labeling of gender was also varied. Results revealed that with explicit labeling, older adults were able to discount their stereotypes and avoid processing difficulties when subsequent stereotype-inconsistent information was encountered. These data suggest that when counter-stereotypic information is explicitly provided at encoding, older adults are no more likely than younger adults to rely on stereotypes, and are similarly capable of altering their interpretation of a situation when information suggests that interpretation is incorrect. These findings indicate that although older adults are more prone to the influence of unwanted stereotypes, this effect can be averted and judgments can be made more egalitarian by providing older adults with explicit stereotype contradiction at encoding.     

Awareness of a gender stereotype,personal beliefs and self-perceptions regarding math ability: when boys do not surpass girls

The negative reputation of women in mathematics and its consequences on their self-perceptions have been extensively demonstrated. However, in France and other countries, the younger the students, the less pronounced these gender differences are. The focus of this study was to explore whether children of two age groups (fourth graders and seventh graders) are aware of a math-ability gender stereotype favorable to boys, and to determine their personal beliefs on mathematics ability. The link between this gender stereotype and self-perceptions was also examined. As expected, there was not a clear-cut awareness of a math-ability gender stereotype favorable to boys. More surprising, girls in both age groups and seventh-grade boys believed that girls do better than boys. Moreover, when their gender identity was made salient, the boys who believed in girl superiority perceived their own performance in mathematics as lower. The girls, on the other hand, regardless of their age and stereotype awareness or personal beliefs, perceived their performance in math as higher when their gender identity was made salient than when it was not.