No‐self,real self,ignorance and self‐deception: Does self‐deception require a self?

In this paper I dispute Eliot Deutsch's claim [See Deutsch, Eliot (1996) Self‐deception: a comparative study, in: Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds) Self and Deception: a cross‐cultural enquiry (Albany, State University of New York Press), pp. 315–326] that examining self‐deception from the perspective of non‐Western traditions (i.e. how it is understood in those cultures) can help us to better understand the nature of the phenomenon in one's own culture. Although the claim appears to be uncontrover‐sial and perhaps even self‐evident, I shall argue that it is fundamentally mistaken. What is important about both the claim and my critical assessment of it is not what it tells us about self‐deception. I shall show that it tells us little about self‐deception; that Deutsch confuses ignorance with self‐deception; and that he straightforwardly equivocates on the concept. Instead, what is interesting is what Deutsch's treatment of self‐deception in comparative perspective can tell us about comparative philosophy. The significance of what follows in this paper is less about self‐deception than it is about comparative philosophy.     

Hegel and self‐actualization

Abstract

Hegel says that mind develops through three phases, which he calls soul, consciousness, and mind. By referring to these three phases as the Primary level, the Social level and the Realizing level, it makes it clearer that they link up with thoroughly familiar phenomena in the field of psychotherapy and with contemporary life generally. In fact, they give a new angle on the whole process of self‐actualization, which throws light on many topics in humanistic psychology.     

II. Eisenberg and self‐obligations

Terms for the pitch of tones, such as ‘high‐low’ do not describe pitch and can interfere with our apprehending such data for what they are in their sensuous uniqueness. Very different alternatives such as ‘narrow‐broad’ or French aigu‐grave serve equally well. In listening to music the first requisite is the apprehension of ‘uncategorized’ tones, the words for them serving only as a way of marking the fact of their differences. This must lead us to reaffirm what was said by Gorgias about what language can and cannot do in respect of such data.     

Personhood and the “multiple self” view

This paper critically assesses the supposition that the best way to capture the intuition that the concept of personhood has practical importance is to analyse personhood in terms of multiple selves. It explores the works of David Velleman and, more recently, Stanley Klein in illuminating the multiple self model. The paper argues that the reasons driving belief in multiple selves, and the subsequent conceptual distinctions between selves that David Velleman encourages, has not been sufficiently motivated. Among other things, it makes the point that Velleman’s theory of self is plagued with the problem of ambiguity and arbitrariness. It also argues that Stanley Klein’s recent attempt to ground the belief in multiple selves in empirical analysis is fraught with difficulties.     

Freedom,emotion, and self‐subsistence

A set of basic static predicates, ‘in itself, ‘existing through itself, ‘free’, and others are taken to be (at least) extensionally equivalent, and some consequences are drawn in Parts A and ? of the paper. Part C introduces adequate causation and adequate conceiving as extensionally equivalent. The dynamism or activism of Spinoza is reflected in the reconstruction by equating action with causing, passion (passive emotion) with being caused. The relation between conceiving (understanding) and causing is narrowed down by introducing grasping (λαμβ?νω) as a basic epistemological term. Part D, ‘The road to freedom through active emotion’, introduces a system of grading with respect to the distinctions introduced in the foregoing, including ‘being in itself, ‘freedom’, etc. Active emotions are seen to represent transitions to a higher degree of freedom, the stronger and more active ones being the more conducive to rapid increase in degree of freedom. Elementary parts of the calculus of predicates are used in order to facilitate the survey of conceptual relations and to prove some theorems.     

Functioning of cognitive codes in autobiographical memory and the self—Is the self visual?

The main goal was to test the relationship between types of cognitive codes (perceptual–imaginative and verbal–propositional) and autobiographical memory. The purpose of this research was to evaluate whether there are independent processes serving the self, depending on separate cognitive codes. Sixty adult participants completed the NEO-FFI inventory using two kinds of procedure: perceptual–imaginative code or verbal–propositional code. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used for analysis. The study has shown the dynamic of the self, depending on two cognitive perspectives. The results indicate that the reflection of the self in autobiographical memory brings different knowledge about the self and its motives.     

A syndrome of errant sexuality – and the self

Abstract

Sexual activity can be viewed as a service for the self. Addictive, perverse and aversive devices mostly build an aggregate. I will present self-psychological and other views for understanding such an aggregation of errant sexuality. In the course of the development of culture, sexuality has developed a variety of functions. Self-psychology views sexual activity as a device for establishing and/or repairing coherence and vitality of the self. In the present paper, I will posit perverse action as being part of a conglomerate – consisting of addictive, perverse and aversive features as different but interdependent appearances of sexual life. Fundamental to developing and sustaining deviant sexuality, as perverse activity, is sexualisation. A vertical split is often described. The individual psychodynamic may be featured by addictive and aversive attributes. Addictive, perverse and aversive behaviours are viewed as part of narcissistic behaviour disorders. Self-psychologically informed features of treatment concentrate on the anxieties of being empty and destructive, and thus being unable to engage in an intimate relationship. The healing process consists of helping the client to establish a stronger self, able to build up and maintain relationships with sufficiently sustaining self-object qualities.

Triebel A.

Sexualität kann als Aktivität im Dienste des Selbst angesehen werden. Süchtige, perverse und aversive Verrichtungen bilden meistens ein Aggregat. Ich will selbstpschologische und andere Gesichtspunkte darstellen, um eine solche Ansammlung umherirrender Sexualität zu verstehen. Im Verlauf der Entwicklung der Kultur hat Sexualität eine Vielzahl von Funktionen entwickelt. Selbstpschologie sieht sexuelle Aktivität als eine Maßnahme, um die Kohärenz und Vitalität des Selbst zu etablieren und/oder wieder herzustellen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit will ich perverse Handlung als Teil eines Konglomerats darstellen – bestehend aus süchtigen, perversen und aversiven Zügen als verschiedenartige aber interdependente Erscheinungen sexuellen Lebens. Grundlegend für die Entwicklung und Aufrechterhaltung devianter Sexualität, wie perverser Aktivität, ist die Sexualisierung. Oft wird eine vertikale Spaltung beschrieben. Die individuelle Psychodynamik kann durch süchtige und aversive Attribute gekennzeichnet sein. Süchtige, perverse und aversive Verhaltensweisen werden als Teil von narzißtischen Verahltensstörungen angesehen. Selbstpsychologisch informierte Merkmale der Behandlung konzentrieren sich auf Ängste, leer und destruktiv zu sein und somit unfähig, sich in einer intimen Beziehung zu engagieren. Der Heilungsprozeß besteht in der Hilfe, ein stärkeres Selbst zu etablieren und die Fähigkeit, Beziehungen mit genügend tragenden Selbst-Objekt Qualitäten aufzubauen und zu erhalten.

Tribel A. Un síndrome de Sexualidad Errante-y del Self

La actividad sexual puede ser vista como al servicio del self. Adicciones, perversiones y mecanismos aversivos la mayoría de la veces conforman un agregado. Presentaré el punto de vista de la psicología del Self y otros para la comprensión de la incorporación de la sexualidad errante. En el curso de desarrollo de cultura sexual se han desarrollado una variedad de funciones. La psicología del Self contempla la actividad sexual como un mecanismo para el establecimiento de la coherencia y/ o la reparación y vitalidad del Self. En este trabajo propondré la acción perversa como una parte de un conglomerado, consistente en un futuro adictivo, perverso y aversivo, como partes diferentes pero interdependientes apariencias de la vida sexual. Fundamentalmente para el desarrollo y sostenimiento de la desviación sexual. A menudo se describe una escisión vertical. La psicodinamia individual puede ser representada por atributos adictivos y aversivos. Comportamientos adictivos, perversos y aversivos son vistos como parte de trastornos de comportamiento narcisista. La psicología del self informa sobre tratamientos concentrados en las ansiedades de sentirse vacíos y destructivos y por tanto incapaz de unirse en una relación intima. El proceso de cura consiste en ayudar a establecer un self más fuerte, capaz de construir y mantener relaciones con sostenimiento suficiente de las cualidades del Self-objeto.     

Mother—infant interaction structures and presymbolic self‐ and object representations

Using research on the purely social face‐to‐face exchange, we examine patterns of mother—infant interaction and their relevance for the presymbolic origins of self and object representations, focusing on the representation of inter‐relatedness between self and object. Based on a dyadic systems view in which the system is defined by both self‐ and interactive‐regulation processes, we argue that characteristic patterns of self and interactive regulation form early interaction structures, which provide an important basis for emerging self and object representations. What will be represented, presymbolically, is the dynamic interactive process itself, the interplay, as each partner influences the other from moment to moment. This is a dynamic, process view of “interactive”; or “dyadic”; representations. The argument that early interaction structures organize experience is based on a transformational model in which there are continuous transformations and restructurings, where development is in a constant state of active reorganization. To define the capacities on which a presymbolic representational capacity is based, we review the last decade's research on infant perception and memory, which has radically changed our concepts of representation. The interaction structures we describe illustrate the salience of arousal, affect, space, and time in the early organization of experience: (1) state transforming, the expectation that an arousal state can be transformed through the contribution of the partner; (2) facial mirroring, the expectation of matching and being matched in the direction of affective change; (3) disruption and repair, the expectation of degree of ease and rapidity of interactive repair following facial‐visual mismatches; (4) “chase and dodge,”; the expectation of the misregulation and derailment of spatial‐orientation patterns, without repair; and (5) interpersonal timing, the expectation of degree of vocal rhythm matching.     

Infant imitation and the self—A response to Welsh

Talia Welsh (2006 Welsh, T. 2006. Do neonates display innate self-awareness? Why neonatal imitation fails to provide sufficient grounds for innate self and other awareness. Philosophical Psychology, 19: 221–238. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) argues that Shaun Gallagher and Andrew Meltzoff's (1996) application of neonatal imitation research is insufficient grounds for their claim that neonates are born with a primitive body image and thus an innate self-awareness. Drawing upon an understanding of the self that is founded upon a “theory of mind,” Welsh challenges the notion that neonates have the capacity for self-awareness and charges the supposition with an essentialism which threatens to disrupt more social constructionist understandings of the self. In this paper, I initially defend Gallagher and Meltzoff's (1996) application of infant imitation to understandings of neonatal self-awareness by explaining how body image schemas can be understood as non-representational embodied cognitive phenomena that challenge “theory of mind” theory. I then further develop the claim that neonates are born self-aware with reference to my own work in fetal development. I conclude that Welsh's political concerns are unfounded by showing how the conclusion that a neonate is self-aware does not signal a return to an essentialist understanding of self-awareness, but rather introduces into philosophical and psychological discourse possible alternate understandings of an embodied sense of self that are embedded within intersubjective contexts.     

Creativity and the subliminal manipulation of projected self‐images

Abstract:

This is a report of two experiments on the relationship between creativity and the effects of manipulations of self‐image. Creativity was estimated with the Creative Functioning Test (CFT), an assessment of the tendency to bar the use of subjective interpretations when the support for a “correct” interpretation is being gradually eroded. Self‐image was manipulated in the Identification Test (IT). This involves a backwards masking design in which an ambiguous picture of a face is presented briefly on a viewing screen, preceded by either of two subliminal verbal messages. These were I SUPERIOR and I INFERIOR in a pilot study (n = 25) and I GOOD and I BAD in the main study (n = 33). In the latter, there was also an interview which served to further cross‐validate the CFT. In both studies, creative subjects alternated between reporting young faces and adult ones significantly more often than uncreative subjects. Their identity was not, then, fixedly adult. Creative and uncreative subjects also defended their projected self‐image in different ways against the subliminal manipulations. High and stable self‐confidence was typical of both highly creative and uncreative subjects, but not of subjects in the middle range. Still, the self‐confidence in the two extreme groups was only superficially similar.     

The growth hypothesis and self‐actualization: An existential alternative

Abstract

Examining the process of becoming from an existential perspective, we describe the existence of the self in non‐biological terms as a product of its own intentionality. In this context, there is no need to postulate a growth hypothesis in order to (1) to describe a person as a process of becoming, and (2) to explain self‐actualization. While the process of becoming is a static process, self‐actualization is a dynamic process. In the first case, the self deterministically and naively merely becomes. In the second, case, the process results from becoming the object of personal choices, whereby we become authentic. While the self is “a being in the process of mere becoming,” self‐actualization is “a being in the process of authentic becoming.” In this view, humanistic psychotherapy aims at making the self's mere becoming an authentic process. Existential crisis, in particular confrontation with death, is often the transformational medium.     

A motivational hierarchy within: Primacy of the individual self,relational self,or collective self?

The individual self, relational self, and collective self are important and meaningful aspects of identity. However, they plausibly differ in their relative importance such that one self lies closer to the motivational core of the self-concept, better represent the “home base” of selfhood, or, simply stated, is motivationally primary. Four multi-method studies tested the relative motivational-primacy of the selves. Despite their disparate methods, the studies yielded consistent evidence of a three-tiered hierarchy with the individual self at the top, followed by the relational self, and trailed at the bottom by the collective self. The same hierarchy emerged in the Eastern culture of China and the Western cultures of the US and UK. Such pancultural consistency suggests that the motivational hierarchy is a fundamental pattern of the human self.     

British,Asian and Hindu: identity,self‐narration and the ethnographic interview

This article, based on a longitudinal study of young British Hindus’ perceptions of their religious tradition, explores their understandings of themselves as ‘British’, ‘Asian’ and Hindu’ [1] [1] The Longitudinal Study of Young British Hindus’ Perceptions of their Religious Tradition was funded by the Leverhulme Trust and directed by Professor Robert Jackson in the Warwick Religions and Education Research Unit, University of Warwick 1995‐97. Earlier ethnographic study of these young people is reported in Jackson and Nesbitt (1993). View all notes. A theoretical framework is provided by psychologists’ and philosophers’ acknowledgement of the processual, interactive, integrative nature of identity and the conceptualisation of it as both narrative and interpretative. The young people's narratives of identity are contextualised by the ‘between two cultures’ debate, and by Jacobson's (1997) recent analysis of the factors in young British Pakistanis’ increasing preference for an Islamic rather than Asian or Pakistani identity. It is suggested that a binary model is over simple and that ‘Hindu’ emerges as a transgenerational, core identity, but with significant differences from the young South Asian Muslims’ preferred Islamic identity.

     

Creativity,chaos, and self‐renewal in human systems

The research findings from the psychology of creativity are shown to be of considerable relevance to the study of self‐organization and self‐renewal in human systems. The characteristics of the creative person, and the nature of the creative process, particularly as they have been elaborated by Barron, are shown to be remarkably congruent with recent findings and theoretical elaborations by Abraham, Jantsch, Laszlo, Prigogine, and others in the fields of evolutionary and chaos theory. The broader social implications of chaos and evolutionary theories are fleshed out through an understanding of their characteristics in creative human systems.     

The growth hypothesis and self‐actualization: An existential alternative

Abstract

Examining the process of becoming from an existential perspective, we describe the existence of the self in non‐biological terms as a product of its own intentionality. In this context, there is no need to postulate a growth hypothesis in order to (1) to describe a person as a process of becoming, and (2) to explain self‐actualization. While the process of becoming is a static process, self‐actualization is a dynamic process. In the first case, the self deterministically and naively merely becomes. In the second, case, the process results from becoming the object of personal choices, whereby we become authentic. While the self is “a being in the process of mere becoming,” self‐actualization is “a being in the process of authentic becoming.” In this view, humanistic psychotherapy aims at making the self's mere becoming an authentic process. Existential crisis, in particular confrontation with death, is often the transformational medium.     

Enduring self‐health

Teratologies: A Cultural Study of Cancer, by Jacky Stacey, London/ New York: Routledge, 1997, 304 pp., £45.00 cloth, £13.99 pb     

Active and passive-touch during interpersonal multisensory stimulation change self–other boundaries

In the “enfacement” illusion seeing an unfamiliar face being touched at the same time as one’s own face evokes changes in self-face recognition. We investigated the contribution of proprioceptive and motor signals derived from self-generated actions in the sensory-driven malleability of self–other boundaries during the “enfacement” illusion. Changes in self-face recognition during active- and passive-touch interpersonal visuo-tactile stimulation were quantified by means of psychophysical and psychometric tasks. Active- and passive-touch evoked comparable changes in the categorical boundaries of self–other distinction, changing the extent to which the other is assimilated into the mental self-representation. Actively touching or simply feeling touch on one’s own face with concurrent observed touch on someone else’s face seems to elicit comparable changes in self-recognition, suggesting that afferent input might be sufficient for updating one’s body-image, although some components of the experience of self-identification seem to be more affected by passive- than by active-touch.     

Is there a special association between self judgements and conscious recollection?

Dual‐process models of recognition memory posit a rapid retrieval process that produces a general sense of familiarity and a slower retrieval process that produces conscious recollections of prior experience. The Remember–Know paradigm has been used to study the subjective correlates of these two processes with Remember judgements assumed to index conscious recollection and Know judgements assumed to index familiarity. In this paper we examine Conway and Dewhurst's recent finding that judgements of self during encoding produce more Remember responses than alternative semantic judgements. While one might interpret this result to suggest a special association between self judgement and conscious recollection, we consider the possibility that it occurs because of greater discriminability in this condition. The results of four experiments demonstrate that a self judgement condition produces more, fewer, or an equal number of Remember responses relative to a control condition depending on whether overall discriminability in the self judgement condition is greater than, less than, or equal to that in the control condition. The implications of these results for conceptions of self judgement and the use of the Remember–Know paradigm are detailed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.