A challenge for Humean externalism

Humean externalism is the view that moral motivation must be explained in terms of desires that are “external” to an agent’s motivationally-inert moral judgments. A standard argument in favor of Humean externalism appeals to the possibility of amoral or morally cynical agents—agents for whom moral considerations gain no motivational traction. The possibility of such agents seems to provide evidence for both the claim that moral judgments are themselves motivationally inert, and the claim that moral motivation has its source in desires external to those judgments. This essay makes the case that, rather than providing a compelling argument in favor of Humean externalism, the argument from amoralism can be recast to set up an important challenge to this view. On one hand, it appears that the central methodological considerations and types of evidence that undergird the externalist argument from amoralism are in tension with a central Humean commitment: namely, that desires can be sources of motivation. While it is possible for Humeans to escape this horn of the dilemma, the most plausible strategies for doing so can be co-opted by internalists to resist the argument’s externalist conclusion.     

A Humean theory of moral intuition

According to the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuitions, they are intellectual appearances that are psychologically and epistemically analogous to perceptual appearances. Moral intuitions share the key characteristics of other intuitions, but can also have a distinctive phenomenology and motivational role. This paper develops the Humean claim that the shared and distinctive features of substantive moral intuitions are best explained by their being constituted by moral emotions. This is supported by an independently plausible non-Humean, quasi-perceptualist theory of emotion, according to which the phenomenal feel of emotions is crucial for their intentional content.     

Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature Part I: Humean Supervenience

This the first part of a two-part article in which we defend the thesis of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). According to this thesis, two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on the Humean base. the Humean base is easy to characterize intuitively, but there is no consensus on how, precisely, it should be defined. Here in Part I, we present and motivate a characterization of the Humean base that, we argue, enables HS to capture what is really stake in the debate, without taking on extraneous commitments.
"I tend to picture the [facts of the form "it is a law that s" and "is is not a lw that s"] as having been sprinkled been sprinkled like powdered sugar over the doughy surface of the non-nomic facts."—Marc Lange²
"Avoid empty carbohydrates."— Runner's World ³     

Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature Part II: the Epistemological Argument for Humean Supervenience

In Part I, we presented and motivated a new formulation of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). Here in Part II, we present an epistemological argument in defense of HS, thus formulated. Our contention is that one can combine a modest realism about laws of nature with a proper recognition of the importance of empirical testability in the epistemology of science only if one accepts HS.     

Humean explanations in the moral sciences

There is an essential tension in Hume's account of explanation in the moral sciences. He holds the familiar (though problematic) view that explanations of action are causal explanations backed by the laws of human nature. But he also tenders a rational and historical model of explanation which has been neglected in Hume studies. Developed primarily in the Essays and put into practice in the History of England, this model holds that explanations in the moral sciences cite agents’ reasons for acting in definite historical situations. Such explanations are context‐dependent, social (not psychological) in content, essentially post hoc, and provide insufficient grounds for prediction. The tension between Hume's two models is considerable, not to say inconsistent. We would best understand him as trying to reconcile the two. Each provides different and equally important kinds of intelligibility. Until this is appreciated, the one‐sided interpretation of Hume as a psychological reductionist and a covering‐law theorist will continue.     

Conditions of Cognitive Sanity and the Internalist Credo

BonJour has proposed background conditions on internalist justification, which Kornblith argues are inconsistent with a core internalist ‘credo’ – that subjects internally alike are justificationally alike – signaling the ‘death’ of internalism. The funeral arrangements are premature, though more systematic consideration of background conditions is needed. The majority of BonJour's conditions are not background conditions as their failure makes an epistemically relevant internal difference. This neutralizes Kornblith's criticisms and reveals how the proposed conditions are not departures from internalism. BonJour's background conditions are simply conditions, the credo remains intact, and Kornblith's objections do not spell problems for internalism, let alone death.     

Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons

In his important recent book Schroeder proposes a Humean theory of reasons that he calls hypotheticalism. His rigourous account of the weight of reasons is crucial to his theory, both as an element of the theory and constituting his defence to powerful standard objections to Humean theories of reasons. In this paper I examine that rigourous account and show it to face problems of vacuity and consonance. There are technical resources that may be brought to bear on the problem of vacuity but implementation is not simple and philosophical motivation a further difficulty. Even supposing vacuity is fixed, the problems of consonance bring to light a different obstruction lying in Schroeder’s path. There is a difference between the general weighing of reasons and the context specificity of the correct placing of weight on them in deliberation and this difference cannot be fixed by the resources in the account. For these reasons we are still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.     

Quasi-realism and the Humean Defense of Normative Non-factualism

Philosophical Studies -     

Disengagement Training for the Treatment of Pathological Worry: A Preliminary Test

Pathological worry is characterized by an inability to distract or disengage from worry, and this uncontrollability is the defining feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). The present study assessed a novel computerized strategy that targets these attention difficulties. Worry Disengagement Training (WDT), which involves alternating between writing about one’s worry and positive topics, was evaluated in a sample with elevated worry (N = 50), most of whom met for GAD diagnosis (66%). Compared to waitlist, WDT led to increased ability to disengage from in vivo worry on a breath focus task, resulting in fewer negative intrusions (β = -.29, p = .02; sr² = .08). Relative to waitlist, WDT also led to lower self-reported general worry (β = -.36, p = .001, sr² = .14) and depressive symptoms (β = -.25, p = .02, sr² = .07). These effects remained in the subset of participants meeting criteria for GAD. WDT did not impact anxious arousal, suggesting some specificity of effects. These findings provide preliminary support for WDT as an effective strategy to increase disengagement ability and reduce worry and depression. Limitations and future directions are discussed.     

Motivating Emotions: Emotionism and the Internalist Connection

Axiomathes - I outline a theory of moral motivation which is compatible with the metaphysical claims of strong emotionism—a sentimentalist account of morality first outlined by Jesse Prinz...     

Humean Naturalism and the Problem of Induction

Naturalised epistemology has shunned rationality, a hallmark of humanity since ancient Greece. One of Quine's explicit motivations is that Hume's problem of induction cannot be solved. However, Hume himself suggests a solution and the narrow focus of the paper is to present a 'Humean Solution' which is an elaboration and defence of Hume's suggestion. What emerges will be argued to be a naturalised conception of rationality which makes naturalised epistemology more continuous with traditional epistemology's focus on rationality.     

Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress*

I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be used to generate a version of internalist foundationalism based on reliabilist principles.     

Two Portraits of the Humean Moral Agent

Among contemporary ethicists, Hume is perhaps best known for his views about morality's practical import and his spectator–centered account of moral evaluation. Yet according to the so–called "spectator complaint", these two aspects of Hume's moral theory cannot be reconciled with one another. I argue that the answer to the spectator complaint lies in Hume's account of "goodness" and "greatness of mind". Through a discussion of these two virtues, Hume makes clear the connection between his views about moral motivation and his understanding of moral evaluation by providing us with two portraits of the Humean moral agent.     

What the Humean Should Say About Entanglement

Tim Maudlin has influentially argued that Humeanism about laws of nature stands in conflict with quantum mechanics. Specifically Humeanism implies the principle Separability: the complete physical state of a world is determined by the intrinsic physical state of each space‐time point. Maudlin argues Separability is violated by the entangled states posited by QM. We argue that Maudlin only establishes that a stronger principle, which we call Strong Separability, is in tension with QM. Separability is not in tension with QM. Moreover, while the Humean requires Separability to capture the core tenets of her view, there's no Humean‐specific motivation for accepting Strong Separability. We go on to give a Humean account of entangled states which satisfies Separability. The core idea is that certain quantum states depend upon the Humean mosaic in much the same way as the laws do. In fact, we offer a variant of the Best System account on which the systemization procedure that generates the laws also serves to ground these states. We show how this account works by applying it to the example of Bohmian Mechanics. The 3N‐dimensional configuration space, the world particle in it and the wave function on it are part of the best system of the Humean mosaic, which consists of N particles moving in 3‐dimensional space. We argue that this account is superior to the Humean account of Bohmian Mechanics defended by Loewer and Albert, which takes the 3N‐dimensional space, and its inhabitants, as fundamental.