The Illusion of Exclusivity

It is widely held that when you are deliberating about whether to believe some proposition p, only considerations relevant to the truth of p can be taken into account as reasons bearing on whether to believe p and motivate you accordingly. This thesis of exclusivity has significance for debates about the nature of belief, about control of belief, and about certain forms of evidentialism. In this paper I distinguish a strong and a weak version of exclusivity. I provide reason to think that strong exclusivity is an illusion and that weak exclusivity may also be an illusion. I describe a number of cases in which exclusivity seems not to hold, and I show how an illusion of exclusivity may be generated by a rather different feature of doxastic deliberation, which I call demandingness.     

Self-Esteem: The Past of an Illusion

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Illusion of Transparency

It's generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agree that empirical error is impossible in such cases. I argue that this immunity to empirical error is illusory and sketch a new anti-individualist approach to concepts that doesn't require such immunity.     

Color Illusion

As standardly conceived, an illusion is an experience of an object o appearing F where o is not in fact F. Paradigm examples of color illusion, however, do not fit this pattern. A diagnosis of this uncovers different sense of appearance talk that is the basis of a dilemma for the standard conception. The dilemma is only a challenge. But if the challenge cannot be met, then any conception of experience, such as representationalism, that is committed to the standard conception is false. Perhaps surprisingly, naïve realism provides a better account of color illusion.

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Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self

In the contemporary debate on the nature of autonomy, it is generally taken for granted that autonomy is to be understood as rule by the self, with the debate centring on how that self is to be identified. Garnett [2013b Garnett, Michael 2013b. The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91/4. [Google Scholar]] has recently proposed a theory that rejects the dominant understanding of autonomy as rule by the self and views it instead as resistance to rule by others. According to that theory, an autonomous agent is one whose various ‘autonomy traits’ render her sufficiently resistant to subjection to foreign wills. I argue that Garnett has not given us good reason to abandon the understanding of autonomy as rule by the self. His account is plausible only if it is understood to require for autonomy the possession of at least one trait with which the agent can be identified. And the best explanation of the necessity of some such trait(s) is offered, not by Garnett's, but by the dominant understanding of autonomy he rejects.     

闪光滞后效应的机制：时间错觉与空间错觉

闪光滞后效应（flash—lag effect,FLE）是指在与某运动物体相同的位置上呈现的闪光（flash）知觉上滞后于该运动物体的视错觉。本文简要介绍了有关闪光滞后效应机制的理论模型。笔者认为,目前各种理论的争议可归结为时间错觉假说与空间错觉假说之争,并在此基础上就今后进一步研究的方向提出了建议。     

The Visuomotor System Resists the Horizontal-Vertical Illusion

The effect of the horizontal-vertical illusion on the visual and visuomotor systems was investigated. Participants (N = 8) viewed horizontal and vertical lines in an inverted-T stimulus and judged whether the two line segments were the same or different lengths. Participants also reached out and grasped either the vertical or the horizontal line segment of the stimulus. Perceptually, participants succumbed to the illusion; that is, they judged Ts of equal horizontal and vertical line lengths to be different and Ts of unequal line lengths to be the same. When reaching toward the same stimuli, however, the size of their grip aperture was scaled appropriately for the various line lengths. Thus, whereas the perceptual system succumbed to the illusion, the visuomotor system did not. Those results support a model proposed by M. A. Goodale and A. D. Milner (1992), who posited separate cortical pathways for visual perception and visually guided action.     

Destiny or Illusion

ABSTRACT

The potential influence of problematic family-of-origin patterns varies in degree and significance among pre-marital couples. Having witnessed the effects of family conflict or irresponsible parental behavior during their formative years as children, either or both partners become dispirited and feel trapped in a perceived intergenerational process destined to fail. This paper discusses clinical intervention with couples who are considering first time marriage and who report fear regarding the infiltration and eventual emergence of dysfunctional family-of-origin patterns within their own relationship. A three phase treatment program that involves disclosing fears of destiny, the promotion of skepticism, and relationship maintenance is outlined, discussed, and augmented by case vignettes.     

Modesty without Illusion

The common image of the fully virtuous person is of someone with perfect self-command and self-perception, who always makes correct evaluations. However, modesty appears to be a real virtue, and it seems contradictory for someone to believe that she is modest. Accordingly, traditional defenders of phronesis (the view that virtue involves practical wisdom) deny that modesty is a virtue, while defenders of modesty such as Julia Driver deny that phronesis is required for virtue. I offer a new theory of modesty—the two standards account—under which phronesis and modesty are reconciled. Additionally, since the two standards account involves reflection on moral ideals, I provide an account of the proper nature of moral ideals.     

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Varieties of Pictorial Illusion

This article focuses on a potentially perplexing aspect of our interactions with pictorial representations (including film, paintings, pictures, drawings, photographs, even video games): in some cases, it seems that visual representations can play tricks on our cognitive faculties. We may either come to believe that objects represented in pictures are real or perhaps perceive them as such. The possibility of widespread pictorial illusions has been oft discussed, and discarded, in the aesthetics literature. I support this stance. However, the nature of the illusion is more complicated than is usually considered. I argue that there are five different types of potential illusions and present reasons for rejecting each. I also explore in detail the most persistent illusion: the “object recognition perceptual illusion thesis,” which states that we undergo a perceptual illusion while viewing pictorial representations simply in virtue of seeing objects in the representation. I contend that a rejection of this thesis depends on the nature of perceptual content, an issue with far‐reaching consequences in aesthetics.     

The Poggendorff Illusion and estimates of transverse extent.

The underestimation of transverse extent relative to longitudinal extent, in the Poggendorff Illusion, was tested by varying oblique line orientation, interparallel line distance, and presence or absence of obliques. 20 subjects made estimates of the transverse extent on both a longitudinal and transverse extent. The results indicated that, although underestimation was found for some stimulus conditions, overestimation was found for others. It was argued that even though presence of obliques affected judgmental error the longitudinal-transverse illusion could not form a basis for the Poggendorff Illusion.