Reflections on Cure,or “I/Thou/It”

Cure is a topic much on our minds but rarely in focus. This paper probes what systematizes this protean thing called cure, hoping to open it to new meaning. It reveals cure as a moving target; illustrates several ways of putting a working definition together; and, while reflecting on three treatments, considers cure as both state and process. Cure's vernacular definition is not unknown to analysts: recovery from illness, a state of well-being restored. But psychoanalysis also deems the mind's heart a rupture that does not heal: if we are our scars, then there is no return to a state of continuous well-being, because none never existed. In both daily clinical life and the long run, as some clinical examples illustrate, we cannot choose between these two meanings, but must rather operate in the difficult tension, the irony, between them.     

Kolb学习风格与中国大学生英语/i/-/I/发音的关系

以中国大学生为对象, 在对其英语/i/-/&;#618;/发音进行声学分析的基础上, 从Kolb经验学习模式入手, 结合其他相关学习者因素, 探讨学习风格与英语/i/-/&;#618;/发音的关系。结果显示, 中国学生发音表现个体差异较大, 其发音水平与学习风格紧密相关：吸收型和发散型学习者表现较好, 集中型学习者较差, 适应型学习者最差。另外, 中国学生发音表现与其英语使用和练习量也有显著正相关, 但与英语学习起始年龄和英语教育年限等其他因素都无直接联系。     

I am I:A/M—The Therapist as Personification of Hopper's Fourth Basic Assumption

The group therapist often and perhaps necessarily personifies Incohesion and displays its predominant defenses of contact-shunning Aggregation, and merger-hungry Massification. Hence, I am I:A/M. In Hopper's group example, and in each of three of this author's groups, the therapist displayed aggregative and massified defenses, countertansferential duals of basic assumptive transferences. In any therapeutic interaction, it is possible to find elements of incohesion, dependency, pairing, and fight/flight. The incohesion concept has significant clinical utility. A theoretical question remains, whether Hopper's proposed axis of experience and defense merits the special status, basic assumption, or whether incohesion may be collapsed into the existing triad of basic assumptions.     

对变化/分割模型的检验(I)

用两个实验对变化／分割模型进行了检验。实验１控制目标时距和该时距内的填充数字系列,操纵数字系列的分割段数;实验２控制目标时距内的填充数字系列的间距,操纵目标时距及其中填充数字系列的分割段数,要求被试用再现法和多数估计法分别复制目标时距,并进行立即估计和延迟估计。结果显示：与存储容量模型和加工时间模型相比较,变化／分割模型对时间估计的解释具有更高的预测效度     

How do I remember that I know you know that I know?

Communication is aided greatly when speakers and listeners take advantage of mutually shared knowledge (i.e., common ground). How such information is represented in memory is not well known. Using a neuropsychological-psycholinguistic approach to real-time language understanding, we investigated the ability to form and use common ground during conversation in memory-impaired participants with hippocampal amnesia. Analyses of amnesics' eye fixations as they interpreted their partner's utterances about a set of objects demonstrated successful use of common ground when the amnesics had immediate access to common-ground information, but dramatic failures when they did not. These findings indicate a clear role for declarative memory in maintenance of common-ground representations. Even when amnesics were successful, however, the eye movement record revealed subtle deficits in resolving potential ambiguity among competing intended referents; this finding suggests that declarative memory may be critical to more basic aspects of the on-line resolution of linguistic ambiguity.     

What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem

When your word processor or email program is running on your computer, this creates a “virtual machine” that manipulates windows, files, text, etc. What is this virtual machine, and what are the virtual objects it manipulates? Many standard arguments in the philosophy of mind have exact analogues for virtual machines and virtual objects, but we do not want to draw the wild metaphysical conclusions that have sometimes tempted philosophers in the philosophy of mind. A computer file is not made of epiphenomenal ectoplasm. I argue instead that virtual objects are “supervenient objects.” The stereotypical example of supervenient objects is the statue and the lump of clay. To this end I propose a theory of supervenient objects. Then I turn to persons and mental states. I argue that my mental states are virtual states of a cognitive virtual machine implemented on my body, and a person is a supervenient object supervening on this cognitive virtual machine.     

‘I’

It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on any occasion it is used by applying its character to a particular context, arguing that the problem cases show that this is not always the context of utterance. The task facing the semantic theorist is thus to explain what fixes the reference-determining context. I consider and reject both Predelli’s suggestion that the reference-determining context is the one intended by the utterer, and Corazza et al.’s proposal that the relevant context is fixed by conventions delivered by the utterance setting. The discussion of these two accounts reveals that an adequate theory of indexical reference should allow the speaker to use indexicals in novel ways, whilst holding that what a speaker can refer to with an indexical utterance is constrained by what an audience can understand. I develop an account based around these two requirements.     

How can I know I’ve perceived God?

In this paper I argue that a necessary condition of ones perceiving God is that an experience of the right phenomenological sort be caused in one directly enough by God and – bypassing the issue of what is necessary for an experience to be of the right phenomenological sort – discuss some difficulties in finding reasons for thinking that God has or has not directly enough caused any such experience.     

From I: A/M to “Who am I?”—Aggregation/Massification and Trauma-Based Affects and Object Relations in Groups: A Response to Earl Hopper

Hopper's portrayal of the fourth basic assumption of Incohesion: Aggregation/Massification has two components: (1) a revision of Turquet's theory of BA Oneness to incorporate the polarity of aggregation and massification stemming from annihilation anxiety; and (2) a conception of the difficult patient as having an encapsulated psychosis. Hopper's theory of the encapsulated psychosis offers an important but incomplete perspective in explaining borderline and narcissistic pathology, as well as psychological trauma. In this response to Hopper, I suggest that the fourth assumption is in fact a still more primitive state of boundary opening and closing. I also see a need to differentiate trauma as such from borderline pathology, and further hold that the relationship between Hopper's British Independent theory and trauma theories based on dissociation needs to be clarified.     

‘I hope that I get old before I die’: ageing and the concept of disease

Ageing is often deemed bad for people and something that ought to be eliminated. An important aspect of this normative aspect of ageing is whether ageing, i.e., senescence, is a disease. In this essay, I defend a theory of disease that concludes that ageing is not a disease, based on an account of natural function. I also criticize other arguments that lead to the same conclusion. It is important to be clear about valid reasons in this debate, since the failure of bad analyses is exploited by proponents of the view that ageing is indeed a disease. Finally, I argue that there could be other reasons for attempting to eradicate senescence, which have to do with an evaluative assessment of ageing in relation to the good life. I touch on some reasons why ageing might be good for people and conclude that we cannot justify generalized statements in this regard.     

Am I You?

It has been suggested that a rational being stands in what is called a “second-personal relation” to herself. According to philosophers like S. Darwall and Ch. Korsgaard, being a rational agent is to interact with oneself, to make demands on oneself. The thesis of the paper is that this view rests on a logical confusion. Transitive verbs like “asking”, “making a demand” or “obligating” can occur with the reflexive pronoun, but it is a mistake to assume that the reflexive and the non-reflexive use exhibit the same logical grammar. The thesis that they do is in part motivated by the assumption that to show that my relation to you bears the same form as my practical self-relation is to show that, fundamentally, you are not an object for me to think about and act on, but a subject with whom to think and act together. I argue, to the contrary, that if my addressing you exhibited the same form as a relation I could literally be said to stand in to myself, then the nexus between us would be such that I am irretrievably alienated from you. To allow the possibility of addressing oneself is to assume one of the following accounts of the second-person pronoun. Either one has to follow R. Heck and conceive it as a merely linguistic phenomenon whose content can be analyzed in terms of “the person to whom I'm now speaking”; or one has to internalize the second person and follow Ch. Korsgaard in taking its prior use to be entirely within and independent of its linguistic expression. But to account for the idea of mutual recognition requires a third view according to which address is an act of mind sui generis for which linguistic expression is essential.     

Who Is I?

Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom I refers, we show that there are occasionswhen it is not always obvious. In demonstratingthis we challenge Kaplan's assumptionthat the utterer, agent and referent of I arealways the same person.We begin by presenting what weregard to be the received view about indexicalreference popularized by David Kaplan in hisinfluential 1972 Demonstratives before goingon, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle'sanswering machine paradox which may be thoughtto threaten this view, and his deferredutterance method of resolving this puzzle. Insection 3 we introduce a novel version of theanswering machine paradox which suggests that,in certain cases, Kaplan's identification ofutterer, agent and referent of I breaks down.In the fourth section we go on to consider arecent revision of Kaplan's picture by Predelliwhich appeals to the intentions of the utterer,before arguing that this picture is committedto unacceptable consequences and, therefore,should be avoided if possible. Finally, insection 5, we present a new revision ofKaplan's account which retains much of thespirit of his original proposal whilst offeringa intuitively acceptable way to explain all ofthe apparently problematic data. In doing so,we also show how this picture is able toexplain the scenario which motivated Predelli'saccount without appealing to speakerintentions.     

I know I can do this,but where's my motivation?

Breadth of scope and inclusion of teachers as co-investigators made the Weinstein et al. intervention unusually powerful and well adapted to its context although its effects are difficult to interpret. Future efforts might build on this model by expanding its purview even further, particularly by including more self-report data, attending to educational aims and curricular content in addition to instructional method, addressing the value aspects as well as the expectancy aspects of motivation, and seeking to develop enduring dispositions of motivation to learn in students and autonomous goal setting in teachers.     

Was I Entitled or Should I Apologize? Affirmative Action Going Forward

As a U.S. civil rights policy, affirmative action commonly denotes race-conscious and result-oriented efforts by private and public officials to correct the unequal distribution of economic opportunity and education attributed to slavery, segregation, poverty and racism. Opponents argue that affirmative action (1) violates ideals of color-blind public policies, offending moral principles of fairness and constitutional principles of equality and due process; (2) has proven to be socially and politically divisive; (3) has not made things better; (4) mainly benefits middle-class, wealthy and foreign-born blacks; (4) stigmatizes its beneficiaries; and (5) compromises the self-esteem and self-respect of beneficiaries who know that they have been awarded preferential treatment. By way of a thought experiment, imagine that after decades of public policy and experimentation, the United States public finally came to agree: affirmative action is morally and legally wrong. Employing such a thought experiment, this essay by a beneficiary of affirmative action—written in response to James Sterba’s Affirmative Action for the Future (2009)—examines duties of moral repair and the possibility that the past beneficiaries of affirmative action owe apologies, compensation or some other highly personal form of corrective accountability. Beneficiaries of affirmative action have experienced woundedness and moral insecurity. Indeed, the practice of affirmative action comes with a psychology, a set of psychological benefits and burdens whose moral logic those of us who believe in our own fallibility—as much as we believe in the justice of what we have received and conferred on others—should address.     

“Why am I so stuck?”: A Collaborative/Therapeutic Assessment Case Discussion

Assessors from 3 continents worked together on a single multimethod case study. Their goal was to hold the client at the center and forefront of their attitudes and thinking as each assessor focused on a specific measure or group of measures. The adult client requested a neuropsychological assessment and completed a full battery of cognitive measures as well as the MMPI–2, the Rorschach, and the Wartegg. A basic tenet of collaborative/therapeutic assessment holds that the client is a full partner in the assessment process; he or she is also seen as the final arbiter of the usefulness of the ideas derived. With that in mind, the client worked with the lead assessor to create 6 questions she wished answered by the assessment. Feedback and discussion occurred in a number of ways: through discussion sessions with the lead assessor that included extended inquiry; individualized letters from the other assessors, each addressing her 6 questions; a summary letter from the lead assessor; and a metaphorical, therapeutic story that stressed key findings from the assessment. Results converged powerfully, with similar findings from each assessor. The client stated that she felt heard and understood in the process, even by individuals who she had never met personally.