From Experience to Relation: Laszlo and Inayatullah,Two Futurists Compared

Humans have two futures: either liberty or uncertainty. In liberty, humans can forecast a vision of the future. However, in uncertainty, humans must forecast multiple futures. This article compares Ervin Laszlo's theory of the liberty future with Sohail Inayatullah's theory of the uncertainty future. Additionally, this article analyzes these two futurists through the lens of Martin Buber, and I argue that the future represents reality not to the “I” of the combination I–It but to the “I” of Buber's preferred combination of I–Thou.     

Buber from the Cartesian Perspective? A Critical Review of Reading Buber’s Pedagogy

The positive reception of Buber??s philosophy does not fully match Buber??s intention in terms of overcoming the problem of the subject?Cobject binary. In other words, a number of authors have remained within the traditional way of thinking by merely replacing the subject and object with Buber??s I and You, establishing a more dogmatic normative subjectivity, paradoxically going against Buber??s intent and even seemingly not noticing this problem. In this article, we will investigate the reasons for these paradoxical readings of Buber. By focusing on the structure and significance of Buber??s ontology of between-humane, we will study the concept of I?CYou and I?CIt, suggesting that these are not intentionality-oriented concepts, but a radically relationship-centered one. The theoretical problem caused by Buber himself in the process of adaptation of his dialog-philosophy to his dialog-pedagogy, namely the impossibility of complete mutuality in the educational relationship will be critically examined, based on Buber??s own declaration in his ??Afterword?? (1957) in I and Thou (1923). With this, we will reflect on the problematic situation of post-Buberian literature in contemporary pedagogy to pave a way to modernize Buber??s dialog-pedagogy.     

The barbarism of reflection: A Vichian perspective on the nuclear arms race

Abstract

This article explores how the I—Thou relation described by Martin Buber can be important in the therapeutic effect of psychotherapy relationships. It also discusses the characteristics that Buber viewed as essential to interhuman encounter, both as helpful aspects of a psychotherapy relationship in themselves and as guidelines for increasing the likelihood of the occurrence of I—Thou relations.     

Martin Buber’s Myth of Zion: National Education or Counter-Education?

If national education is, as Ilan Gur-Ze’ev thinks, inevitably a matter of agents for and victims of a national system, only a “counter-education” can correct it. Martin Buber shared many of Gur-Ze’ev’s concerns, but advocated a more positive view of national education. This essay examines Buber’s development of his pedagogical theory in its context, notes his influence on several educational models, investigates how his view of national education either continues or is ignored in the modern State of Israel, and shows that his positive view draws not only on his “I-Thou” dialogical insight but also on his advocacy of a myth of Zion, a myth that provides an alternative not just to the dominant myths in Israel today but also to Gur-Ze’ev’s counter-education.     

The morality of faith in Martin Buber and William James

Some philosophers have become atheists because of “intellectual probity.” Martin Buber relates two occasions during which he advocated his view of the term “God” and rejected alternative perspectives. He never justified the basis for either his advocacy or his rejection, yet both play an important role in all his writing, especially his specific type of Zionism. Using what has been called the mere theism of William James’ “The Will to Believe” and the criteria for faith that James advances in that essay illuminates both Buber’s general view of the divine and more particularly his Zionism. Once Buber, no less than James, is understood as a mere theist the basis of what he accepts and what he rejects as true religion becomes clearer. Buber’s theism meets James’ requirement of being a live, forced, momentous option and his Zionism also strives to meet those standards.     

Difficulties in Defining the Concept of God: Kierkegaard in Dialogue with Levinas,Buber, and Rosenzweig

This article investigates difficulties in defining the concept of God by focusing on the question of what it means to understand God as a ‘person.’ This question is explored with respect to the work of Søren Kierkegaard, in dialogue with Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas. Thereby, the following three questions regarding divine ‘personhood’ come into view: First, how can God be a partner of dialogue if he at the same time remains unknown and unthinkable, a limit-concept of understanding? Second, if God is love in person and at the same time a spiritual reality ‘between’ human agents, in what ways are his personal and trans-personal traits related to each other? Third, what exactly is revealed through God’s ‘name’? By way of an inconclusive conclusion, divine personhood is discussed in regard to prayer, where the problems of predication that arise in third-personal speech about God are linked with the second-personal encounter with God.

     

Proclaiming the Passion: Popular Drama and the Passion Tradition in Luther's Germany

Abstract

This article examines Martin Luther's opinions on popular drama, in particular his views on Carnival plays, Corpus Christi plays, and Passion-tide performances. A consideration of key works by the Lutheran playwright, Joachim Greff (1510-1552), provides an insight into the development of Lutheran biblical drama from its beginnings. It accordingly challenges the consensus that Luther objected to, and actively prevented, the performances of Protestant dramatizations in Reformation Germany of Christ's Passion and the Resurrection.     

Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity: The Contemporary Significance of Early Husserl's Conception of Truth

This essay explores Edmund Husserl's significance for contemporary truth theory. Focusing on his Logical Investigations (1900/1901), it argues that early Husserl's conception of truth unsettles a common polarity between epistemic and nonepistemic approaches. Unlike contemporary epistemic conceptions of truth, he gives full weight to “truth makers” that have their own being: objective identity, perceptible objects, and states of affairs. Yet, unlike contemporary nonepistemic conceptions, he also insists on the intentional givenness of such truth makers and on the complexity of the experiences within which propositional truth claims arise. To develop this argument, the essay explains how early Husserl's conception of truth builds on his phenomenology of intentional experience and knowledge. By emphasizing an objective identity between what is signitively meant and intuitively given, Husserl's approach provides a way to resituate propositional truth within a broader and more dynamic conception of truth.     

God as Thou and Prayer as Dialogue: Martin Buber’s Tools for Reconciliation

??Prayer?? can be defined as ??the offering, in public worship or private devotion, of petition, confession, adoration, or thanksgiving to God; also the form of words in which such an offering is made?? (cf. Cohn-Sherbok 2010). In addition to this simple definition it could be said that there are different forms of prayer: some are vocal and articulate and others are only mental in nature; some prayers are communal and liturgical and other prayers are spontaneous or at least composed by the one saying the prayer (cf. Stump 1999). Accordingly, it is evident that there are manifold intricacies involved in any characterisation of ??prayer??. In this article my aims are twofold. First, I explore the implications of Martin Buber??s philosophy, particularly of his conception of God as Thou for our understanding of ??prayer??; second, I will argue that Buber??s understanding of ??prayer?? as dialogue serves as a way for the individual to seek reconciliation with itself, with others, and with God.     

Zhuangzi and Buber in Dialogue: A Lesson in Practicing Integrative Philosophy

I put forward the case that comparative philosophy is best practiced as integrative philosophy. The model for integrative philosophy employed embodies its own methodology, integrating the Hegelian dialectic and the Yin-Yang 陰陽, cyclical model of change illustrated by the Yijing 易經 (Book of Changes) as strategies for integrating philosophical traditions. As an object lesson, I integrate a real, historical one-way encounter with an imagined two-way encounter between Martin Buber and Zhuangzi 莊子, to provide a counter-example to replace Huntington’s clash of civilizations with a meeting of civilizations.     

Martin Buber and psychotherapy

This paper is intended to make the ideas of Martin Buber more directly available to psychotherapists. Buber's influence on therapy is mostly indirect and the author believes that his impact could be considerable if his writings were better known and more often discussed. Several important ideas of Buber are summarized. These include dialogue, I-Thou relationships, existential guilt, and confirmation.     

The German Reformation and the Mathematization of the Created World

This article explores the emergence of mathematics and mathematical method as a means of defining authoritative truth in the thought of some scholars in the German Reformation. Against the background of Martin Luther's critique of Aristotelian philosophy, Philip Melanchthon presented mathematics as an ideal discipline for preparing the mind to understand God. His approach drew on the work of humanist mathematicians such as Regiomontanus. It finds resonances in the work of the Basel humanist Simon Grynaeus, and (in a less mathematically informed way) in the thought of Peter Ramus. These discussions about the divine nature and certainty of mathematical truth formed the context within which Johannes Kepler's Platonist astronomy emerged.     

Boolos and the Metamathematics of Quine's Definitions of Logical Truth and Consequence

The paper is concerned with Quine's substitutional account of logical truth. The critique of Quine's definition tends to focus on miscellaneous odds and ends, such as problems with identity. However, in an appendix to his influential article On Second Order Logic, George Boolos offered an ingenious argument that seems to diminish Quine's account of logical truth on a deeper level. In the article he shows that Quine's substitutional account of logical truth cannot be generalized properly to the general concept of logical consequence. The purpose of this paper is threefold: first, to introduce the reader to the metamathematics of Quine's substitutional definition of logical truth; second, to make Boolos' result accessible to a broader audience by giving a detailed and self-contained presentation of his proof; and, finally, to discuss some of the possible implications and how a defender of the Quinean concepts might react to the challenge posed by Boolos' result.     

Everything is under control: Buber’s critique of Heidegger’s magic

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - As part of a religiously-oriented analysis, Martin Buber associates Martin Heidegger’s later philosophy with magic. The present article is...     

The Disease Concept of Alcoholism by E. M. Jellinek

The authors use the philosophical writings of Martin Buber to discuss intimacy and distance in group psychotherapy. They argue that there are two entirely different types of dynamics. The first is a relationship and real meeting between members of the group that necessarily ends, as do all I–You relationships, with a transition to I–It relations. In the second type of dynamic the relations are on the It dimension, in which others exist only as the content of the individual's experience. Any apparent intimacy that develops is limited by the very attitude to others as objects of the “I,” and ends with disappointment in the realization that there is no real intimacy and meeting.     

Power and Freedom in Heidegger’s First Notebook

ABSTRACT

In the first notebook published in Überlegungen II-VI, which covers the years 1931 and 1932, Martin Heidegger uses a conception of power that is different to that found in his later work. Rather than power being the expression of the will to will and source of ruin for humanity, he says that humanity can only be saved from ruin if it can pave the way for an “empowerment of being” (Ermächtigung des Seins). This article will show that this early understanding of power is related to Heidegger’s conception of freedom as the essence of truth, developing his thinking on this topic from the period of 1927–1930. It will show that the terms “empowerment of being” and “letting be” (Seinlassen) are akin, and that Heidegger uses the former to distance his thinking from potential misinterpretations of the essay “On the Essence of Truth”.     

On Tugendhat's Analysis of Heidegger's Concept of Truth

This paper responds to Tugendhat's well‐known and influential critique of Heidegger's concept of truth with the resources of Heidegger's texts, in particular §44 of Being and Time. To start with, Tugendhat's primary critical argument is reconstructed. It is held to consist firstly in the charge of ambiguity against Heidegger's formulations of his concept of truth and secondly in the claim that Heidegger's concept of truth is incompatible with an adequate concept of falsehood. It is shown that the supposedly ambiguous meanings are, on the one hand, in fact clearly distinguished by Heidegger and, on the other, that they merely amount to different extensions of the same meaning of truth. It is then shown how this concept of truth is indeed compatible with an adequate, albeit post‐metaphysical, concept of falsehood. Finally, the grounds of falsehood in the untruth of the existential of Verfallen are pursued and further objections are dismissed.     

Philosophies of Life and Painful Experiences

The article discusses whether the philosophy of the modern era may be traced back to the thought of Martin Luther. This position has been advocated by French political philosopher Reiner Schürmann in his book Broken Hegemonies, on the history of Western thought from a phenomenological point of view. The author finds Schürmann's position remarkable in three respects: (i) It suggests a philosophical influence from Luther which is in accordance with his own criticism of Aristotelian metaphysics; (ii) it makes plausible that there is a transcendental turn at the heart of Luther's approach; but (iii) it nevertheless points out important differences between Kant's autonomy and Luther's heteronomy which have substantial consequences for their anthropology, epistemology, and theory of interpretation. The author finds that Schürmann argues convincingly for his point of view, in spite of some critical objections, and he concludes with a discussion of how such a genealogy may influence the present discussion on self and other in the philosophical debate.