说明文阅读中因果序列的表征

结合自定步调阅读与句子启动再认范式, 探讨说明文阅读过程中因果序列的表征问题。研究包括3个实验, 实验1的文本提供一个包括4个概念的因果链(如, A－B－C－D), 文本最后设置包含概念A或概念B或概念C的句子, 对概念D进行探测, 结果发现, 对于概念D的再认启动作用, 概念C＞概念B＞概念A; 实验2改变因果链的说明顺序, 使之与因果链本身次序不一致, 结果与实验1一致; 实验3的文本分别介绍两条独立的因果链(如A－B－C; D－E－F), 最后呈现包含概念A或概念D的句子, 对概念C进行探测, 结果发现, 包含概念A的句子理解启动了相关因果链, 使读者对随后呈现的概念C的再认反应加快。基于本研究结果, 结合相关研究, 本文尝试提出说明文文本表征的建构模式。     

Principled and statistical connections in common sense conception

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. We report six experiments that investigate the nature of the relations we represent between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and its other properties. The experiments provide evidence that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and some of its properties (k-properties; e.g. having four legs for dogs), but not other properties (t-properties; e.g. being brown for dogs). Principled connections are different from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections, (i) license the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess the k-property, (ii) license explanation of the presence of k-properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is, and (iii) license normative expectations concerning the presence of the k-property in tokens of the type. The experiments provide evidence for all three of these aspects of principled connections. The experiments also demonstrate that principled connections must be distinguished from merely strong statistical connections. We suggest that principled connections are one of the fundamental types of relations (in addition to logical, statistical, and causal relations) in terms of which our conceptual knowledge is structured. We argue that principled connections reveal a formal mode of understanding and explanation. This mode of understanding complements other modes of understanding that have been studied within the theory-based approach to conceptual representation. Finally, we suggest that kind representations are distinguished from representations of mere types by the representation of principled connections to k-properties.     

The propositional structure of discourse in the two cerebral hemispheres

Readers construct at least two interrelated representations when they comprehend a text: (a) a representation of the explicit ideas in a text and the relations among them (i.e., a propositional representation) and (b) a representation of the context or situation to which a text refers (i.e., a discourse model). In a recent study, found evidence that readers' representations were structured according to propositional relations, but only in the left hemisphere. Both hemispheres, however, appeared to represent contextually relevant semantic information. The goal in the current study was to examine further the organization of explicit text concepts in the two hemispheres. We used an item-priming-in-recognition paradigm in combination with a lateralized visual-field manipulation. We found evidence for a propositionally structured representation in the left hemisphere, that is, priming effects that reflected the linear distance between primes and targets in the propositional structure of passages. We also found that the right hemisphere represented explicit text concepts, but we found no evidence that these concepts were organized structurally. In a second experiment, we found our item priming effects reflected the representation of text information in memory and did not reflect lexical-semantic priming at test.     

On the Causal Completeness of Physics

According to an increasing number of authors, the best, if not the only, argument in favour of physicalism is the so‐called ‘overdetermination argument’. This argument, if sound, establishes that all the entities that enter into causal interactions with the physical world are physical. One key premise in the overdetermination argument is the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, said to be supported by contemporary physics. In this paper, I examine various ways in which physics may support the principle, either as a methodological guide or as depending on some other laws and principles of physics.     

Integration processes during frequency graph comprehension: Performance and eye movements while processing tree maps versus pie charts

Frequency graph types differ in the way how data are translated into visual representations. We compared 2 visualization methods, a traditional circular representation (pie chart) and a rectangular representation (constant column width tree map), which were hypothesized to differ regarding the cognitive ease of visual comparison processes. Performance was evaluated in tasks involving proportion and comparison judgments under both highly controlled and more realistic circumstances. The results showed performance benefits (in terms of reduced response times or error rates) for rectangular representations. Additional eye movement analyses revealed that this benefit was mainly due to a facilitation of scanning the graph for relevant information. The results suggest that facilitating comparison processes by representing the critical variable in less complex visual dimensions (i.e., straight length with constant orientation instead of surface area or curved length) eventually enhances the efficiency of integration processes during graph comprehension.     

Memory-Based Hypothesis Formation: Heuristic Learning of Commonsense Causal Relations from Text

We present a memory-based approach to learning commonsense causal relations from episodic text. The method relies on dynamic memory that consists of events, event schemata, episodes, causal heuristics, and causal hypotheses. The learning algorithms are based on applying causal heuristics to precedents of new information. The heuristics are derived from principles of causation, and, to a limited extent, from domain-related causal reasoning. Learning is defined as finding—and later augmenting—inter-episodal and intea-episodal causal connections. The learning algorithms enable inductive generalization of causal associations into AND/OR graphs. The methodology has been implemented and tested in the program NEXUS.     

Emilie du Châtelet on the Existence and Nature of God: An Examination of Her Arguments in Light of Their Sources

Many commentators have suggested that the metaphysical portions of Emilie du Châtelet's Institutions de physique are a mere retelling of Leibniz's views. I argue that a close reading of the text shows that du Châtelet's cosmological argument and discussion of God's nature contains both Lockean and Leibnizian elements. I discuss where she follows Locke in her arguments, what Leibnizian elements she brings in, and how this enables her to avoid some of the mistakes commonly attributed to Locke's formulation of the cosmological argument. I show that while du Châtelet accepts the causal principle ex nihilo nihil fit, she does not utilize Locke's stronger causal principle. I also discuss her use of the principle of sufficient reason in both improving the Lockean cosmological argument and in proving the attributes of God.     

Mental models as representations of text

A theory of text representation is outlined which suggests that a text is encoded in a mental model that contains representations of only those individuals and events that are relevant to the interpretation of the text in question. Such models are constructed on-line in response to cues in the text and with reference to knowledge about the world. An experiment is reported which demonstrates that mental models represent the events most probably described in a text. The results confirm previous findings that memory for the content of a passage is not based on the construction of one of its linguistically motivated representations. However, unlike most previous findings, they do support a positive proposal about the nature of the representations on which memory for content is based.     

The representations of the arithmetic operations include functional relationships

Current theories of mathematical problem solving propose that people select a mathematical operation as the solution to a problem on the basis of a structure mapping between their problem representation and the representation of the mathematical operations. The structure-mapping hypothesis requires that the problem and the mathematical representations contain analogous relations. Past research has demonstrated that the problem representation consists of functional relationships, or principles. The present study tested whether people represent analogous principles for each arithmetic operation (i.e., addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division). For each operation, college (Experiments 1 and 2) and 8th grade (Experiment 2) participants were asked to rate the degree to which a set of completed problems was a good attempt at the operation. The pattern of presented answers either violated one of four principles or did not violate any principles. The distance of the presented answers from the correct answers was independently manipulated. Consistent with the hypothesis that people represent the principles, (1) violations of the principles were rated as poorer attempts at the operation, (2) operations that are learned first (e.g., addition) had more extensive principle representations than did operations learned later (multiplication), and (3) principles that are more frequently in evidence developed more quickly. In Experiment 3, college participants rated the degree to which statements were indicative of each operation. The statements were either consistent or inconsistent with one of two principles. The participants' ratings showed that operations with longer developmental histories had strong principle representations. The implications for a structure-mapping approach to mathematical problem solving are discussed.     

Retrieving text inferences: Controlled and automatic influences

Bridging inferences contribute to text coherence by identifying the connections among ideas, whereas elaborative inferences simply specify sensible extrapolations from text. Bridging inferences have been indistinguishable from explicit text ideas on numerous measures, suggesting similar longterm memory (LTM) representations for the two, whereas elaborative inferences are inferior. To evaluate the LTM representations of text ideas, we used the extended process-dissociation procedure (Buchner, Erdfelder, & Vaterrodt-Plunnecke, 1995; Jacoby, 1991) to partition the controlled, recollective contributions to text retrieval from the automatic, familiarity-based contributions. The automatic contribution to the recognition of implied concepts was consistently negligible, an outcome consistent with the absence of perceptual processing of those concepts during the original reading. In addition, the controlled basis of recognition was consistently higher for explicit than for implicit concepts, which suggests a more robust conceptual representation for explicit text ideas (Yonelinas, 2002). These results were interpreted to reflect the asymmetric representation of explicit ideas and inferences (elaborative and even bridging inferences) in the surface, propositional textbase, and situational levels of text representation.     

Encoding time and signs exposure time in the representation of diagrammatic deontic meanings

It has been proposed that prohibition and obligation be represented in different ways in reasoning with deontic information (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 2005). Obligations are salient in permissible situations and prohibitions in impermissible situations. In some specific cases, differential initial representations are also consistently predicted from the comprehension of negations, if prohibition is considered as the negation of an obligation. Three experiments evaluate whether traffic signs of prohibition and obligation speed up the response time to the proposed direction represented and whether this advantage remains when people have more time to think. When making judgements about the manoeuvre performed by a vehicle, participants' response times are consistent with the predicted representation when they have a short time (i.e., 300 ms) to understand the premise. In this case they represent what is permissible by obligatory signs and also what is impermissible by prohibitory signs. However, if they have more time (i.e., 1000 ms) to understand the premise, they still represent what is permissible by obligatory signs but they seem to change their initial representations to what is permissible by prohibitory signs.     

The role of causal connections in the retrieval of text

In two experiments, subjects read a series of passages, each containing two target concepts that appeared in widely separated positions within the passage. Following each passage, the time to retrieve each of these concepts was recorded. Several measures from both the Kintsch and van Dijk (1978) model and Trabasso and Sperry’s (1985) causal analysis were derived to predict retrieval time. Regression analyses showed that substantial proportions of variance were accounted for by measures derived from a causal analysis. Neither physical position nor measures based on the Kintsch and van Dijk model accounted for significant proportions of variance. Following Experiment 2, a reanalysis of O’Brien’s (1987) results revealed that the number of causal connections to an antecedent was a significant predictor of antecedent search time. Results are discussed in terms of a spread of activation through an integrated text representation in which causal connections play a major role.     

Representations gone mental

Many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to elucidate the nature of mental representation by appealing to notions like isomorphism or abstract structural resemblance. The ‘structural representations’ that these theorists champion are said to count as representations by virtue of functioning as internal models of distal systems. In his 2007 book, Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey endorses the structural conception of mental representation, but uses it to develop a novel argument against representationalism, the widespread view that cognition essentially involves the manipulation of mental representations. Ramsey argues that although theories within the ‘classical’ tradition of cognitive science once posited structural representations, these theories are being superseded by newer theories, within the tradition of connectionism and cognitive neuroscience, which rarely if ever appeal to structural representations. Instead, these theories seem to be explaining cognition by invoking so-called ‘receptor representations’, which, Ramsey claims, aren’t genuine representations at all—despite being called representations, these mechanisms function more as triggers or causal relays than as genuine stand-ins for distal systems. I argue that when the notions of structural and receptor representation are properly explicated, there turns out to be no distinction between them. There only appears to be a distinction between receptor and structural representations because the latter are tacitly conflated with the ‘mental models’ ostensibly involved in offline cognitive processes such as episodic memory and mental imagery. While structural representations might count as genuine representations, they aren’t distinctively mental representations, for they can be found in all sorts of non-intentional systems such as plants. Thus to explain the kinds of offline cognitive capacities that have motivated talk of mental models, we must develop richer conceptions of mental representation than those provided by the notions of structural and receptor representation.     

Persuasion and the contexts of dissuasion: Causal models and informal arguments

This paper develops the view that in arguing informally individuals construct a dual representation in which there is a coupling of arguments and the structure of the qualitative (mental) causal model to which these refer. Invited to consider a future possibility, individuals generate a causal model and mentally simulate the consequences of certain actions. Their arguments refer to the causal paths in the model. Correspondingly, faced with specific arguments about a policy option they generate a model with particular causal paths and mentally simulate the outcomes. The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with this notion. Decisions on the percentage of funds to be allocated to genetically modified (GM) crop research depended on the structure of the arguments elicited in response to imagining a future state of affairs. Specifically, the presence of a dissuasive argument eliminated the impact of any persuasive argument. The non-monotonic properties of everyday informal argument can then be seen as a corollary of change to causal structure in the model. The dual representation view predicts that the impact of a dissuasive argument will depend on the structure of the causal model. Experiment 2 tested and confirmed this prediction by requiring individuals to judge the relative persuasiveness of two cases referring either to a model with two independent causal paths or to a model in which one causal path depended on the other. In contrast to Experiment 1, prior opinion on GM crop research did not affect allocation decisions. An advisory role in contrast to a participant role may encourage a more decontextualised mode of thinking. According to the dual representation view, ease of mental simulation should exert wide-ranging effects on judgements and the rhetoric of arguments should also be important. The paper concludes with a discussion of some of these expectations.     

From semantics to syntax and back again: argument structure in the third year of life

An essential part of the human capacity for language is the ability to link conceptual or semantic representations with syntactic representations. On the basis of data from spontaneous production, suggested that young children acquire such links on a verb-by-verb basis, with little in the way of a general understanding of linguistic argument structure. Here, we suggest that a receptive understanding of argument structure--including principles linking syntax and conceptual/semantic structure--appears earlier. In a forced-choice pointing task we have shown that toddlers in the third year of life can map a single scene (involving a novel causative action paired with a novel verb) onto two distinct syntactic frames (transitive and intransitive). This suggests that even before toddlers begin generalizing argument structure in their own speech, they have some representation of conceptual/semantic categories, syntactic categories, and a system that links the two.     

The perception of causality in infancy

Michotte proposed a rationalist theory of the origin of the human capacity to represent causal relations among events. He suggested that the input analyzer that underlies the causal perception in launching, entraining, and expulsion events is innate and is the ultimate source of all causal representations. We review the literature on infant causal representations, providing evidence that launching, entraining and expulsion events are interpreted causally by young infants. However, there is as of yet no good evidence that these representations are innate. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that these representations are not the sole source of the human capacity for causal representation.     

重复获益效应对文本阅读加工的影响

通过三个实验分析比较同一篇文本前后两次阅读过程中每个句子的阅读时间,探讨汉语文本阅读中的重复获益效应。结果发现（1）汉语文本阅读中存在重复获益效应,并且被试倾向于对没有标题的文章命名;（2）产生重复获益效应的重要因素是在阅读过程中建立良好的情境模型;（3）当前后两篇文本的情境内容高度相关时,主要是情节重复效应影响文本阅读,当情境内容低相关时,抽象重复效应将影响文本的阅读。     

Comprehension by learning-disabled and nondisabled adolescents of personal/social problems presented in text.

Four groups of 14-year-olds, differing in reading level, learning disability status, and socioeconomic status, read and retold short problem narratives and answered questions. The pattern of reporting components of the problem schema (goal/obstacles/choices) differed for problems presented with or without a statement of the character's priority for action, suggesting that including priorities adds another level of information to the problem text and changes its macrostructure. Even the poorest readers showed this sensitivity to text structure. Three of the four measures of problem representation (idea units recalled, problem-schema components reported, and error rate) reflected overall reading ability. However, the degree to which extraneous information was incorporated into problem representations did not. Learning-disabled students made more importations, and more implausible importations, than did non-disabled students. Moreover, this pattern was associated with poor problem solving. Only proficient readers showed awareness of the source of the information (text or extratext) on which their predictions were based.     

A New Argument for a Necessary Being

I present a new argument for the thesis that there is a necessarily existing, causally powerful entity—a necessary being. The outline of the argument is this: (i) necessarily, every beginning of a certain sort S (which I'll specify) can have a cause; (ii) a beginning to the existence of all non-necessarily existing things would be of sort S; (iii) such a beginning can obtain; (iv) such a beginning cannot be caused unless there is a necessary being; therefore, (v) there is a necessary being. The argument uses a causal principle that is more modest than causal principles previously used in arguments for a necessary being.