Implicit learning: Indirect, not unconscious

Dienes and Berry (1997) argue that there really are two kinds of knowledge, implicit and explicit, that can be characterized through a subjective threshold. We argue that the subjective threshold does not separate two forms of knowledge, but instead two uses of knowledge, for two different purposes. With Neal and Hesketh (1997), we suggest that an understanding of learning will be better served by investigating the processing that occurs under various circumstances than by attempting to isolate learning that occurs with awareness from that which occurs without it.     

Implicit synthesis

In this reply to Neal and Hesketh and to the commentators, we argue that implicit knowledge is partly abstract and can be usefully defined by the criteria of both metaknowledge and intentional control. We suggest that the pattern of dissociations supports a claim of separate implicit and explicit learning modes. According to our characterization, implicit learning leads to knowledge that is not automatically represented as knowledge by the learning process; instead, the presence of knowledge has to be inferred by the subject (partial explicitation) if metaknowledge is gained at all. During explicit learning, knowledge is automatically labeled as knowledge by the learning process, so that metaknowledge comes immediately and to the fullest extent. Finally, we suggest that implicit knowledge may to some degree apply regardless of intention.     

Implicit probabilistic sequence learning is independent of explicit awareness

Studies into interactions between explicit and implicit motor sequence learning have yielded mixed results. Some of these discrepancies have been attributed to difficulties in isolating implicit learning. In the present study, the effect of explicit knowledge on implicit learning was investigated using a modified version of the Alternating Serial Response Time (ASRT) task, a probabilistic sequence learning paradigm that yields continuous and relatively pure measures of implicit learning. Results revealed that implicit learning occurred to the same extent, whether or not subjects had explicit knowledge. Some evidence, however, indicated that explicit knowledge could interfere with the expression of implicit learning early in training. In addition, there were dissociations between learning measures, in that reaction time and accuracy were differentially affected by explicit knowledge. These findings indicate that implicit sequence learning occurs independently of explicit knowledge, and help to explain previous discrepant findings.     

The time course of implicit and explicit concept learning

The present experiment investigated the development of implicit and explicit knowledge during concept learning. According to Cleeremans and Jiménez (2002), the content of a representation can be conscious only when the representation is of a sufficiently good quality; on this theory, increasing explicit and decreasing implicit knowledge might be expected with training. The view that implicit knowledge arises from compilation of explicit knowledge makes the opposite prediction. The present research tested these possibilities using subjective measures based on confidence ratings. One group of participants was presented with blocks of category exemplars that activated prior knowledge, whereas another group was presented with blocks of categories that did not elicit any useful prior knowledge. The results showed that, irrespective of the knowledge group participants were allocated to, explicit knowledge increased over the course of learning, whereas implicit knowledge either stayed the same or decreased, consistent with Cleeremans and Jiménez's prediction.     

Effects of divided attention and speeded responding on implicit and explicit retrieval of artificial grammar knowledge

The artificial grammar (AG) learning literature (see, e.g., Mathews et al., 1989; Reber, 1967) has relied heavily on a single measure of implicitly acquired knowledge. Recent work comparing this measure (string classification) with a more indirect measure in which participants make liking ratings of novel stimuli (e.g., Manza & Bornstein, 1995; Newell & Bright, 2001) has shown that string classification (which we argue can be thought of as an explicit, rather than an implicit, measure of memory) gives rise to more explicit knowledge of the grammatical structure in learning strings and is more resilient to changes in surface features and processing between encoding and retrieval. We report data from two experiments that extend these findings. In Experiment 1, we showed that a divided attention manipulation (at retrieval) interfered with explicit retrieval of AG knowledge but did not interfere with implicit retrieval. In Experiment 2, we showed that forcing participants to respond within a very tight deadline resulted in the same asymmetric interference pattern between the tasks. In both experiments, we also showed that the type of information being retrieved influenced whether interference was observed. The results are discussed in terms of the relatively automatic nature of implicit retrieval and also with respect to the differences between analytic and nonanalytic processing (Whittlesea & Price, 2001).     

Reporting tendencies underlie discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem

The assumption that implicit measures assess associations that are not accessible to consciousness abounds in current social cognition research. In the present report, we question this assumption, focusing on the construct of implicit self-esteem as a case in point. Although researchers often argue that implicitly measured self-esteem is unconscious, we provide evidence that it is not, and that discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem are the result of reporting tendencies. Study 1 demonstrated that individuals for whom explicitly measured self-esteem is relatively high and implicitly measured self-esteem is relatively low admit to overpresenting themselves. In Study 2, implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem were related when subjects were urged to avoid over- or underpresenting themselves when responding to the explicit measures. We discuss the critical distinction between awareness of one's attitudes and awareness of their influence.     

The interaction of the explicit and the implicit in skill learning: a dual-process approach

This article explicates the interaction between implicit and explicit processes in skill learning, in contrast to the tendency of researchers to study each type in isolation. It highlights various effects of the interaction on learning (including synergy effects). The authors argue for an integrated model of skill learning that takes into account both implicit and explicit processes. Moreover, they argue for a bottom-up approach (first learning implicit knowledge and then explicit knowledge) in the integrated model. A variety of qualitative data can be accounted for by the approach. A computational model, CLARION, is then used to simulate a range of quantitative data. The results demonstrate the plausibility of the model, which provides a new perspective on skill learning.     

How does prior knowledge affect implicit and explicit concept learning?

Two experiments investigated the effect of prior knowledge on implicit and explicit learning. Implicit as opposed to explicit learning is sometimes characterized as unselective or purely statistical. During training, one group of participants was presented with category exemplars whose features could be tied together by integrative knowledge, whereas another group saw category exemplars with unrelated feature combinations. Half of the participants in each group learned these categories under a secondary-task condition (meant to discourage explicit learning), and the remaining half performed the categorization task under a single-task condition (meant to favour explicit learning). In a test phase, participants classified only the individual features of the training exemplars. Secondary- as opposed to single-task conditions impaired explicit but not implicit knowledge (as determined by subjective measures). Importantly, prior knowledge resulted in increased amounts of both implicit and explicit knowledge.     

The Relation Between Implicit and Explicit Learning: Evidence for Parallel Development

Much research has focused on the separability of implicit and explicit learning, but less has focused on how they might interact. A recent model suggests that in the motor-skill domain, explicit knowledge can guide movement, and the implicit system learns in parallel, based on these movements. Functional imaging studies do not support that contention, however; they indicate that learning is exclusively implicit or explicit. In the experiment reported here, participants learned a motor sequencing task either implicitly or explicitly. At transfer, most of the stimuli were random, but the sequence occasionally appeared; thus, it was not obvious that explicit knowledge could be applied to the task. Nevertheless, participants with explicit training showed sequence knowledge equivalent to those with implicit training, implying that implicit knowledge had been acquired in parallel with explicit knowledge. This result has implications for the development of automaticity and of motor-skill learning.     

Role of prior knowledge in implicit and explicit learning of artificial grammars

Artificial grammar learning (AGL) performance reflects both implicit and explicit processes and has typically been modeled without incorporating any influence from general world knowledge. Our research provides a systematic investigation of the implicit vs. explicit nature of general knowledge and its interaction with knowledge types investigated by past AGL research (i.e., rule- and similarity-based knowledge). In an AGL experiment, a general knowledge manipulation involved expectations being either congruent or incongruent with training stimulus structure. Inconsistent observations paradoxically led to an advantage in structural knowledge and in the use of general world knowledge in both explicit (conscious) and implicit (unconscious) cases (as assessed by subjective measures). The above findings were obtained under conditions of reduced processing time and impaired executive resources. Key findings from our work are that implicit AGL can clearly be affected by general knowledge, and implicit learning can be enhanced by the violation of expectations.     

On the reliability of implicit and explicit memory measures

Functional dissociations between implicit and explicit memory tests often take the form of large differences between groups or experimental conditions (e.g., amnesics and controls, elderly and younger persons, or persons learning with and without a distracting secondary task) when performance is assessed using explicit memory tests, whereas no difference is observed with implicit memory tests. We argue that the interpretation of such dissociations in terms of the memory processes or systems involved in performance is problematic because the same data pattern would emerge as a result of a mere methodological artifact, that is, the situation that implicit memory tests have low reliability whereas explicit memory tests are fairly reliable measurement instruments. We present reasons for such a reliability difference, and we demonstrate it empirically in Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2. However, our analysis also shows, and Experiment 3 confirms empirically, that implicit memory tests need not necessarily be less reliable measurement instruments than explicit memory tests.     

Social intuition as a form of implicit learning: Sequences of body movements are learned less explicitly than letter sequences

In the current paper, we first evaluate the suitability of traditional serial reaction time (SRT) and artificial grammar learning (AGL) experiments for measuring implicit learning of social signals. We then report the results of a novel sequence learning task which combines aspects of the SRT and AGL paradigms to meet our suggested criteria for how implicit learning experiments can be adapted to increase their relevance to situations of social intuition. The sequences followed standard finite-state grammars. Sequence learning and consciousness of acquired knowledge were compared between 2 groups of 24 participants viewing either sequences of individually presented letters or sequences of body-posture pictures, which were described as series of yoga movements. Participants in both conditions showed above-chance classification accuracy, indicating that sequence learning had occurred in both stimulus conditions. This shows that sequence learning can still be found when learning procedures reflect the characteristics of social intuition. Rule awareness was measured using trial-by-trial evaluation of decision strategy (Dienes & Scott, 2005; Scott & Dienes, 2008). For letters, sequence classification was best on trials where participants reported responding on the basis of explicit rules or memory, indicating some explicit learning in this condition. For body-posture, classification was not above chance on these types of trial, but instead showed a trend to be best on those trials where participants reported that their responses were based on intuition, familiarity, or random choice, suggesting that learning was more implicit. Results therefore indicate that the use of traditional stimuli in research on sequence learning might underestimate the extent to which learning is implicit in domains such as social learning, contributing to ongoing debate about levels of conscious awareness in implicit learning.     

Intact implicit learning in autism spectrum conditions

Individuals with autism spectrum condition (ASC) have diagnostic impairments in skills that are associated with an implicit acquisition; however, it is not clear whether ASC individuals show specific implicit learning deficits. We compared ASC and typically developing (TD) individuals matched for IQ on five learning tasks: four implicit learning tasks—contextual cueing, serial reaction time, artificial grammar learning, and probabilistic classification learning tasks—that used procedures expressly designed to minimize the use of explicit strategies, and one comparison explicit learning task, paired associates learning. We found implicit learning to be intact in ASC. Beyond no evidence of differences, there was evidence of statistical equivalence between the groups on all the implicit learning tasks. This was not a consequence of compensation by explicit learning ability or IQ. Furthermore, there was no evidence to relate implicit learning to ASC symptomatology. We conclude that implicit mechanisms are preserved in ASC and propose that it is disruption by other atypical processes that impact negatively on the development of skills associated with an implicit acquisition.     

The effect of implicit and explicit practice in the development of decision making in volleyball serving

This experiment investigated the effect of explicit, implicit, and sequential learning (implicit-explicit) on the acquisition and retention of decision-making skill in volleyball. The participants were 60 female novices, ages 10 to 12 years. The experimental groups followed three different methods of training: (a) explicit practice for the development of declarative knowledge, (b) implicit practice for the development of the procedural knowledge, (c) sequential practice (implicit first and then explicit), and (d) control group that participated only in the measurements. A pre-test, a post-test, and a retention test measured the response time and accuracy of the decision-making skill. Analysis indicated that all experimental groups improved over time while the control group did not. The sequential group was faster and more accurate than the implicit group, and the latter was faster and more accurate than the explicit one. The sequential group outperformed implicit and explicit groups on both speed and accuracy of decision. It seems that both explicit and implicit processes, when they take place in sequence, interact positively, and this method improves speed and accuracy of decision making rather than when each mode of learning (implicit or explicit) occurs separately. If the role of working memory is reduced at the early stages of learning, the accumulation of declarative knowledge (explicit learning) may benefit from accumulation of procedural knowledge and enhance decision-making skill.     

Learning without consciously knowing: Evidence from event-related potentials in sequence learning

This paper investigated how implicit and explicit knowledge is reflected in event-related potentials (ERPs) in sequence learning. ERPs were recorded during a serial reaction time task. The results showed that there were greater RT benefits for standard compared with deviant stimuli later than early on, indicating sequence learning. After training, more standard triplets were generated under inclusion than exclusion tests and more standard triplets under exclusion than chance level, indicating that participants acquired both explicit and implicit knowledge. However, deviant targets elicited enhanced N2 and P3 components for targets with explicit knowledge but a larger N2 effect for targets with implicit knowledge, revealing that implicit knowledge expresses itself in relatively early components (N2) and explicit knowledge in additional P3 components. The results help resolve current debate about the neural substrates supporting implicit and explicit learning.     

内隐学习的主观测量标准

近40年来,验证知识的内隐性一直是内隐学习研究的焦点。传统三大范式常以自由言语报告或是迫选测验作为验证知识内隐性的外显指标,然而各种迹象表明,言语报告和迫选测验存在一定的局限性。由此,Dienes等人提出了内隐学习的主观测量。文章将从言语报告和追选测验的局限性着手,阐述主观测量诞生的必要性及其在衡量知识意识性上的效度。     

The neural correlates of implicit and explicit sequence learning: Interacting networks revealed by the process dissociation procedure

In two H2(15)O PET scan experiments, we investigated the cerebral correlates of explicit and implicit knowledge in a serial reaction time (SRT) task. To do so, we used a novel application of the Process Dissociation Procedure, a behavioral paradigm that makes it possible to separately assess conscious and unconscious contributions to performance during a subsequent sequence generation task. To manipulate the extent to which the repeating sequential pattern was learned explicitly, we varied the pace of the choice reaction time task-a variable that is known to have differential effects on the extent to which sensitivity to sequence structure involves implicit or explicit knowledge. Results showed that activity in the striatum subtends the implicit component of performance during recollection of a learned sequence, whereas the anterior cingulate/mesial prefrontal cortex (ACC/MPFC) supports the explicit component. Most importantly, we found that the ACC/MPFC exerts control on the activity of the striatum during retrieval of the sequence after explicit learning, whereas the activity of these regions is uncoupled when learning had been essentially implicit. These data suggest that implicit learning processes can be successfully controlled by conscious knowledge when learning is essentially explicit. They also supply further evidence for a partial dissociation between the neural substrates supporting conscious and nonconscious components of performance during recollection of a learned sequence.     

The conscious, the unconscious, and familiarity

This article examines the role of subjective familiarity in the implicit and explicit learning of artificial grammars. Experiment 1 found that objective measures of similarity (including fragment frequency and repetition structure) predicted ratings of familiarity, that familiarity ratings predicted grammaticality judgments, and that the extremity of familiarity ratings predicted confidence. Familiarity was further shown to predict judgments in the absence of confidence, hence contributing to above-chance guessing. Experiment 2 found that confidence developed as participants refined their knowledge of the distribution of familiarity and that differences in familiarity could be exploited prior to confidence developing. Experiment 3 found that familiarity was consciously exploited to make grammaticality judgments including those made without confidence and that familiarity could in some instances influence participants' grammaticality judgments apparently without their awareness. All 3 experiments found that knowledge distinct from familiarity was derived only under deliberate learning conditions. The results provide decisive evidence that familiarity is the essential source of knowledge in artificial grammar learning while also supporting a dual-process model of implicit and explicit learning.     

Implicit Learning and Concept Learning

In Experiments 1 and 2, subjects were exposed to letter strings that followed a pattern—the second letter was always the same. This exposure was disguised as a test of immediate memory. Following this training, subjects could discriminate new letter strings following the pattern from letter strings not following the pattern more often than would be expected by chance, which is the traditional evidence for concept learning. Discrimination was also better than would be predicted from subjects' explicit report of the pattern, demonstrating the co-occurrence of concept learning and implicit learning. In Experiment 3, rules were learned explicitly. Discrimination was worse than would be predicted from subjects' explicit report, validating the implicit learning paradigm. In Experiment 4, deviations from a prototypical pattern were presented during training. In the test of discrimination, prototypes were as familiar as old deviations and more familiar than new deviations, even when considering only implicit knowledge. Experiment 5 found implicit knowledge of a familiar concept. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the distinguishing features of a concept can be learned implicitly, and that one type of implicit learning is concept learning.     

Prediction during statistical learning, and implications for the implicit/explicit divide

Accounts of statistical learning, both implicit and explicit, often invoke predictive processes as central to learning, yet practically all experiments employ non-predictive measures during training. We argue that the common theoretical assumption of anticipation and prediction needs clearer, more direct evidence for it during learning. We offer a novel experimental context to explore prediction, and report results from a simple sequential learning task designed to promote predictive behaviors in participants as they responded to a short sequence of simple stimulus events. Predictive tendencies in participants were measured using their computer mouse, the trajectories of which served as a means of tapping into predictive behavior while participants were exposed to very short and simple sequences of events. A total of 143 participants were randomly assigned to stimulus sequences along a continuum of regularity. Analysis of computer-mouse trajectories revealed that (a) participants almost always anticipate events in some manner, (b) participants exhibit two stable patterns of behavior, either reacting to vs. predicting future events, (c) the extent to which participants predict relates to performance on a recall test, and (d) explicit reports of perceiving patterns in the brief sequence correlates with extent of prediction. We end with a discussion of implicit and explicit statistical learning and of the role prediction may play in both kinds of learning.