<Emphasis Type="Italic">The Self</Emphasis> restated

This is a short summary of the book The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness and the First-Person Stance (Oxford University Press 2012). It introduced an “author meets critics” panel at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meeting in San Francisco 2016. I try to relate the discussion in the book to recent work that has appeared since its publication.     

Revisiting <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Depleted Self</Emphasis>

This article revisits Donald Capps’s book The Depleted Self (The depleted self: sin in a narcissistic age. Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 1993), which grew out of his 1990 Schaff Lectures at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary. In these lectures Capps proposed that the theology of guilt had dominated much of post-Reformation discourse. But with the growing prevalence of the narcissistic personality in the late twentieth century, the theology of guilt no longer adequately expressed humanity’s sense of “wrongness” before God. Late twentieth-century persons sense this disjunction between God and self through shame dynamics. Narcissists are not “full” of themselves, as popular perspectives might indicate. Instead, they are empty, depleted selves. Psychologists suggest this stems from lack of emotional stimulation and the absence of mirroring in the early stages of life. The narcissist’s search for attention and affirmation takes craving, paranoid, manipulative, or phallic forms and is essentially a desperate attempt to fill the internal emptiness. Capps suggests that two narratives from the Gospels are helpful here: the story of the woman with the alabaster jar and the story of Jesus’s dialogue with Mary and John at Calvary. These stories provide us with clues as to how depleted selves experienced mirroring and the potential for internal peace in community with Jesus.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">The Riddle of the Self</Emphasis> revisited

This paper pays tribute to Felix Trofimovich Mikhajlov (1930–2006), on the occasion of the publication of the third edition of his well-known book, Zagadka čelovečeskogo ja (The Riddle of the Self). Zagadka is a fine expression of the critical humanism that characterized some of the best Russian writing in the Marxist tradition. Moreover, the book provides an ingenious introduction to the philosophical framework of what in the West is called “cultural-historical activity theory.” The first part of the paper is a personal reminiscence about Felix, his remarkable gifts, and the friendship we enjoyed for more than 25 years. The second part returns to the themes of Zagadka and considers what resonance they have for us today, nearly half a century after its first publication.     

Combinations of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Stit</Emphasis> with <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ought</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Know</Emphasis>

This paper presents a short survey of recent developments in stit theories, with an emphasis on combinations of stit and deontic logic, and those of stit and epistemic logic.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ziran</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Wuwei</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Daodejing</Emphasis>: An Ethical Assessment

In Daoist philosophy, the self is understood as an individual interdependent with others, and situated within a broader environment. Within this framework, the concept ziran is frequently understood in terms of naturalness or nature while wuwei is explained in terms of non-oppressive government. In many existing accounts, little is done to connect these two key Daoist concepts. Here, I suggest that wuwei and ziran are correlated, ethical, concepts. Together, they provide a unifying ethical framework for understanding the philosophy of the Daodejing. I explore the meaning of ziran as self-so-ness or, in human terms, as pertaining to an individual’s spontaneity. The appropriate response to the spontaneity of individuals is to avoid, insofar as possible, imposing or using restrictive norms and methods, that is, wuwei. According to this view, ziran and wuwei offer an account of ethics that attends to core notions of interdependent selfhood, including mutuality, relationality, interdependence, symbiosis, and responsiveness.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ceteris</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Paribus</Emphasis> Qualifiers

Antecedent-strengthening, a trivially valid inference of classical logic of the form: P → Q ? (P & R) → Q, has a counterpart in everyday reasoning that often fails. A plausible solution to the problem involves assuming an implicit ceteris paribus (CP) qualifier that can be explicated as an additional conjunct in the antecedent of the premise. The qualifier can be explicated as ‘everything else relevant remains unchanged’ or alternatively as ‘nothing interferes’. The qualifier appears most prominently in the context of the discussion of laws in the sciences, where these laws are often expressed with a CP qualifier. From an analysis of the qualifier’s role in the problem of antecedent-strengthening, we can learn more about CP qualifiers in general and in their application to the laws used in the sciences.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Jeong-han</Emphasis> as a Korean Culture-Bound Narcissism: Dealing with <Emphasis Type="Italic">Jeong-han</Emphasis> Through <Emphasis Type="Italic">Jeong</Emphasis>-Dynamics

This article explores a Korean culture-bound emotion called jeong-han, which shares similarities with narcissism and depression in terms of causes, formation processes, emotions, cognitions, and neurotic sufferings. This article has three main goals: 1) to report and describe the presence and experience of jeong-han among contemporary Koreans; 2) to compare jeong-han with narcissism and depression; and 3) to suggest an effective way of dealing with jeong-han through jeong-dynamics. In order to effectively help people with jeong-han both in counseling and ministry settings, providing jeong and facilitating jeong-dynamics in a small group or community setting can be helpful.     

Deontological evidentialism and <Emphasis Type="Italic">ought</Emphasis> implies <Emphasis Type="Italic">can</Emphasis>

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism.     

Revalidation of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sat</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Chit</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ananda</Emphasis> Scale

Sat-Chit-Ananda is an indigenous construct that refers to absolute bliss and consciousness. The present study aimed to strengthen the psychometric properties of the newly developed Sat-Chit-Ananda scale (Singh et al. in Int J Vedic Found Manag 1(2):54–74, 2014). A total of 398 students aged 17–36 years (mean age = 21.33 years, SD = 2.2, 70% males) participated in this study. An exploratory as well as confirmatory factor analysis was computed for the 17-item scale. Its’ concurrent validity was established by assessing its correlation with other well-being measures, namely Flourishing (Diener et al. in Soc Indic Res 97:143–156 2010) and Scale of Positive and Negative Experience (Diener et al. 2010). Satisfactory results were obtained from both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Sat-Chit-Ananda and its factors were found to be significantly positively correlated with Flourishing and Positive Experiences and were negatively correlated with Negative Experiences. Thus, the validity of the Sat-Chit-Ananda (Singh et al. 2014) scale stands further substantiated—offering this scale as a promising new assessment tool.     

From <Emphasis Type="Italic">ego</Emphasis> to <Emphasis Type="Italic">alter ego</Emphasis>: Husserl,Merleau-Ponty and a layered approach to intersubjectivity

This article presents two different phenomenological paths leading from ego to alter ego: a Husserlian and a Merleau-Pontian way of thinking. These two phenomenological paths serve to disentangle the conceptual–philosophical underpinning of the mirror neurons system hypothesis, in which both ways of thinking are entwined. A Merleau-Pontian re-reading of the mirror neurons system theory is proposed, in which the characteristics of mirror neurons are effectively used in the explanation of action understanding and imitation. This proposal uncovers the remaining necessary presupposition of a minimalized version of the Husserlian concept of pairing and its recent and improved version in terms of the intermodal system. This leads to a layered approach to the constitution of intersubjectivity.     

From Grace <Emphasis Type="Italic">Alone</Emphasis> to <Emphasis Type="Italic">Grace</Emphasis> Alone: Male Body Image and Intimacy at Princeton Seminary

This essay explores recent literature on male body image and reports the findings of empirical research of male body image on the campus of Princeton Seminary. While the author did not find that Princeton Seminary men suffer from what is being called the “Adonis Complex” in any pathological sense, the author did find that the “talking taboo” among seminary men regarding intimate matters is still operative and that these men seem to be longing for male intimacy, as evidenced by their eager and voluntary support of my study. Surprisingly, the author found that, during the course of his interviews, theological language about grace seemed to be subverting the experience of intimacy and, ironically, the experience of grace itself.     

The codification of intersubjectivity in the diachronic change <Emphasis Type="Italic">AD locative</Emphasis> &gt; <Emphasis Type="Italic">A</Emphasis>(<Emphasis Type="Italic">D</Emphasis>) <Emphasis Type="Italic">indirect object</Emphasis> in Spanish

The principal aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between intersubjectivity and grammar. We argue that intersubjectivity represents, on the one hand, a prerequisite for the development of language as a symbolic system, and therefore also for the development of grammar. Furthermore, we attempt to show that language, and especially grammar, codify intersubjectivity. That is to say, grammatical constructions represent the intersubjective interactions that situated agents maintain in different pragmatic contects. We call this phenomenon the meta-representational capacity of language. Our main object of analysis is the development of the ditransitive construction (give something to someone - dar algo a alguien) in the Spanish language. The evolution of this construction makes it clear that there is an important correlation between the degree of complexity of the codified intersubjective interaction and grammatically obligatory nature and the prominence of the grammatical construction that codifies it: the greater the complexity, the greater its obligatoriness, and vice versa.     

A Definition Framework for the Terms <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nanomaterial</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nanoparticle</Emphasis>

Scientific writings and policy documents define the terms nanomaterial and nanoparticle in various ways. This variation is considered problematic because the absence of a shared definition is understood as potentially hindering nanomaterial knowledge production and regulation. Another view is that the existence of a shared definition may itself cause problems, as rigid definitions arguably exclude important aspects of the studied phenomena. The aim of this paper is to inform this state of disagreement by providing analytical concepts for a systematic understanding of how, and even whether, nanomaterial and nanoparticle could and should be defined. To do this, we review definitions of nanomaterial and nanoparticle presented in research articles and policy documents. Definitions were identified by first conducting a Scopus search and then tracing cited definitions back to their sources. In total, 36 definitions were identified. Theories of definition from philosophy and linguistics provide analytical guidance for structuring and categorizing the identified definitions, and the main analytical dimensions of the definitions are then identified and discussed. Finally, we propose a framework for understanding the process of defining nanomaterial and nanoparticle. This framework considers both the generality needed for a shared understanding (by suggesting proto-definitions of nanomaterial and nanoparticle) and the level of precision required for different purposes (by allowing for various explications of the proto-definitions).     

That <Emphasis Type="Italic">F</Emphasis>

Jeffrey King’s principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.

Plural <Emphasis Type="Italic">Grundgesetze</Emphasis>

PG (Plural Grundgesetze) is a predicative monadic second-order system which exploits the notion of plural quantification and a few Fregean devices, among which a formulation of the infamous Basic Law V. It is shown that second-order Peano arithmetic can be derived in PG. I also investigate the philosophical issue of predicativism connected to PG. In particular, as predicativism about concepts seems rather un-Fregean, I analyse whether there is a way to make predicativism compatible with Frege’s logicism.     

Precis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Philosophy and Neuroscience</Emphasis>: <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Ruthlessly Reductive Account</Emphasis>

This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear “ruthlessly reductive” results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience by focusing exclusively on higher-level cognitive neuroscience, and ignoring the discipline's cell-physiological and molecular-biological core.